The Performance and Driving Force of Government Health Expenditure in China: Evidence from Provincial Panel Data, 1991-2007
The new health reform started in 2009 has shown the determination of the Chinese government, especially the central government, to increase its responsibility in the health sector. The most obvious manifestation of this commitment would be to increase government health expenditure (GHE). But there is still a hot debate about whether the government should allocate more public finds to health or just deepen the marketization of the health sector. Moreover, commitments at the central and local levels are not the same: local government responsibility for GHE is high, and commitments by the central government to increase GHE have not translated into increases in local government GHE as much as proposed in the national health reform.
Our research seeks to answer two questions: What was the actual pattern of GHE? And why did China’s local governments respond as they did? We first discuss the necessity of public financing for health care, and then analyze how intergovernmental economic competition affects local governments’ behavior under “Chinese-style decentralization” (known as fiscal decentralization with political centralization). Empirically, we apply a dynamic panel data model to provincial panel data from 1991 to 2007 to identify the effect of GHE on health performance in each province over time, using infant mortality and some morbidity metrics as health performance variables. We also examine differences across regions, as well as before and after the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003.
Our analysis provides evidence that Chinese-style decentralization negatively impacted GHE. The main findings are as follows:
- Increasing GHE did improve health performance, and this improvement was mainly
driven by the GHE through the health department directly, not
through spending by other governmental departments that also impact health.
However, pursuit of economic performance lowered local governments’ GHE, mainly
by decreasing GHE through local health departments.
- Compared with in the
eastern and western regions, this health improvement was not significant in China’s
middle regions, where the intergovernmental economic competition leads to much
less GHE through health departments.
- The outburst of SARS in 2003 further
increased the positive effect from GHE through local health departments, while
the effect from GHE through other departments was not equally significant.
All these results suggest that adjusting the structure of public health financing, reforming the fiscal system, and improving the performance evaluation system for local governments are critical for the success of China’s on-going health reform.
Philippines Conference Room
Qiulin Chen
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room C335
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Qiulin Chen is a postdoctoral fellow of Shorenstein APARC and a member of the center's Asia Health Policy Program. His main interest of research is health economics and public finance, focusing on policy and outcome comparison of health care systems and Chinese health reform. His dissertation focused on performance comparison between public (or governmental) and private health care financing, between local and central government responsibility on health care, between contracted and integrated health care system. In particular, his dissertation examined under Chinese-style decentralization, known as fiscal decentralization with political centralization, how economic competition affect local government's behaviour on health investment, and why public contracted system obstructs health performance and provides one channel of such effects in terms of preventive care and public health. He is currently involved in a comparative research project on demographic change in East Asia based on the National Transfer Accounts data and analysis.
Chen's recent publication is "The changing pattern of China's public services" (with Ling Li and Yu Jiang) in Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global Perspective (Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, editors), forthcoming 2011. Before studying in Stanford, he has published more than 10 papers in academic journals in Chinese, such as Jing Ji Yan Jiu (Economic Research) and Zhong Guo Wei Sheng Jing Ji (Chinese Health Economics), and 5 book chapters. He has participated in about 20 research projects, such as A Design of Framework for Healthcare Reform in China which is commissioned by the State Council Working Party on Health Reform, Strategy Planning Study of "Healthy China 2020" which is commissioned by the Minister of Health, and Health Challenge in the Aging Society and It's Policy Implication funded by Chinese National Natural Science Foundation.
Chen earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Peking University in 2010, and earned a B.A. in Business Administration from Nanjing University in 2001. From 2004 through 2008, he was Executive Assistant of the Director of the China Centre for Economic Research at Peking University (CCER). He is also a postdoctoral fellow of National School of Development at Peking University (Its predecessor is CCER).