Alluding to the famous dictum by China’s late leader, Deng Xiaoping, Min Weifang, the executive president of Chinese Society for Education Development Strategies and professor at Peking University (PKU), China, noted that the “water has become very deep, it is difficult to touch the stones [to cross the river].” Min’s comments came at the end of a conference titled “Building World-Class Universities: An Institutional Perspective,” and they specifically referred to the challenges facing Chinese institutions of higher learning. Yet, the phrase nicely captured the challenges facing institutions of higher education worldwide in remolding institutions, social norms and structures to better adapt to the 21^st century. Institutions of higher learning – whether “world-class” or not – need to grasp the demands of a rapidly changing future that is hard to discern. Speakers highlighted the complexities of globalization, market pressures, and a contracting public purse which encumber university governance and produce conflicting goals.

The conference, which was hosted at the Stanford Center at Peking University from Nov. 4-5, was part of the Beijing Forum 2016 and brought together over 30 scholars, university presidents and other thought leaders from 11 countries in Europe, Russia, North America and the Asia-Pacific region. The Forum aimed to focus on the institutional contexts that promote the construction and longevity of world-class universities. The second half of the Forum featured debates about the criteria for and, even, the very definition of “world-class.”

The Forum generated cross-cutting themes among a wide range of experts in attendance. The most prominent themes that emerged included the role of the government; government-university relations; and the tensions between education and knowledge production in universities. The Forum first highlighted the various “world-class university-projects” and elite national university-projects around the globe including in China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and Pakistan. Forum discussions then shifted to focus on questions such as “what is a university?” and “what is world-class”? Various university ranking systems drew skepticism, yet were also recognized as a resource used by donors, governments, alumni and prospective students.

As a policy prescription, a heavy role of the government in university education drew the most fire especially from Chinese colleagues who emphasized China’s need for greater university autonomy from government interference. All could agree, however, upon the important role of the government in tertiary education and, in particular, for building world-class universities, even if striking the proper balance between the role of the government and university administration necessarily differed depending on the national context.

Panelists agreed that contemporary challenges facing top-tier universities are many. They include social and economic pressures that favor “multiversities” over smaller, more cohesive universities; tensions among conflicting stakeholders in “multiversities”; intensification of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) research; commercialization of knowledge; diminishing focus on undergraduate education; overproduction of doctoral degrees; inequality in access to and quality of higher education; and increasing administrative scale and complexity of university management. Many panelists throughout the conference appeared to concur that accelerated knowledge production, a more direct connection to national development goals, increased specialization and commercialization have produced significant benefits in recent years. But they also acknowledged that these benefits have come with a price – perhaps in the form of excellence in undergraduate teaching.

The gains that Peking University and Tsinghua University, in particular, and Chinese universities, in general, have made were widely acknowledged. Increasing numbers of Asian universities, too, have entered the top-tier in global rankings. Yet, solving 21st century demands – as opposed to just managing them – still appeared difficult as experts and thought leaders grappled with what, if any, institutional models can best meet those demands. Some experts suggested providing students access to different kinds of tertiary education (for example, in the form of community colleges, vocational colleges, liberal arts and research universities, as in the U.S. context). Most experts, if not all, agreed that universities need to shore up their educational missions and ensure balanced support for both the humanities and social sciences as well as the sciences and technical fields. In addition, many experts emphasized the need to address societal imbalances and provide better access to quality higher education to all socioeconomic classes.

Related links:

Forum agenda and list of panelists

Photo gallery

Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin and Rennie J. Moon compare the political protests in South Korea of today to that of 1987 in an editorial for the Diplomat. The recent demonstrations are an illustration of “a distinctive Korean political culture that prioritizes elements of virtue, shame and saving face,” they wrote.

Shin, who is the Korea Program director at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, and Moon were both in Seoul on Nov. 12 and were observers of the crowd of one million people who gathered to protest South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s administration. He also spoke to the Economist earlier about the likelihood of the president’s resignation or impeachment.

Read the Diplomat editorial here and the Economist article here.

Shin and Moon have since co-authored a paper on the topic in volume 57 of Asian Survey, titled "South Korea in 2016: Political Leadership in Crisis," which can be viewed here.

Japanese and American scholars and practitioners gathered at Stanford recently for “Womenomics, the Workplace, and Women,” a full-day conference seeking to find pathways to advance opportunity for women in society and the workplace.

Nearly 75 people attended the public conference, which included 20 speakers and was co-sponsored by Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Clayman Institute for Gender Research, as well as the United States-Japan Foundation and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

Takeo Hoshi, director of the Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC, noted that women in Japan and the United States have long encountered obstacles related to gender. Currently, the United States and Japan rank 45^th and 111^th, respectively, on the Global Gender Gap Index.

“The conference is a unique opportunity for experts from Japan and Silicon Valley to learn from each other and their countries’ recent attempts to tackle gender diversity, particularly in the areas of business and technology,” Hoshi said.

The Japanese government’s inclusion of women’s advancement in its economic growth strategy 'Abenomics,' named after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, is “one of the few good policies,” Hoshi said, yet complex cultural constraints and workplace policies need to change in order for it to work. Similarly, in Silicon Valley, while strides have been made, gender diversity still lags in corporate leadership and boards of directors especially in the areas of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics).

Panelists shared perspectives on women’s status, leadership and work-life balance in both countries throughout four panel discussions led by Hoshi, and Shelley Correll, director of the Clayman Institute and professor of sociology; Kenji Kushida, Japan Program research scholar; and Mariko Yoshihara Yang, a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC.

One broad theme that emerged in the discussions: gender equity progress takes time. Closing the gender gap will come incrementally and a multidisciplinary approach could help the process. 

Areas highlighted by the panelists included a need to address unconscious bias and to improve programs that support women in the workplace as well as those seeking to re-enter the labor force after taking time off, such as increased access to childcare and elimination of “evening work” for those who hold full-time jobs.

Panelists suggested expanding educational opportunities, mentorship and peer-to-peer networks among women, as well as training centered on gender equity for all employees. Quotas and government incentives for organizations that adopt equity practices were also proposed to achieve greater female representation.

Additional discussions took place between the panelists in a closed-door workshop the following day. A report that details outcomes and a set of policy recommendations is expected in 2017; the full list of panelists, topics addressed and conference agenda can be viewed here.

As a new U.S. administration assumes office next year, it will face numerous policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific, a region that accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population and two-thirds of global output.

Despite tremendous gains over the past two decades, the Asia-Pacific region is now grappling with varied effects of globalization, chief among them, inequities of growth, migration and development and their implications for societies as some Asian economies slow alongside the United States and security challenges remain at the fore.

Seven scholars from Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) offered views on policy challenges in Asia and some possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations during the next administration.

View the scholars' commentary by scrolling down the page or click on the individual links below to jump to a certain topic.

U.S.-China relations

U.S.-Japan relations

North Korea

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Global governance

Population aging .

Trade

U.S.-China relations

By Thomas Fingar

Image

Alarmist predictions about China’s rise and America’s decline mischaracterize and overstate tensions in the relationship. There is little likelihood that the next U.S. administration will depart from the “hedged engagement” policies pursued by the last eight U.S. administrations. America’s domestic problems cannot be solved by blaming China or any other country. Indeed, they can best be addressed through policies that have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity.

Strains in U.S.-China relations require attention, not radical shifts in policy. China is not an enemy and the United States does not wish to make it one. Nor will or should the next administration resist changes to the status quo if change can better the rules-based international order that has served both countries well. Washington’s objective will be to improve the liberal international system, not to contain or constrain China’s role in that system.

The United States and China have too much at stake to allow relations to become dangerously adversarial, although that is unlikely to happen. But this is not a reason to be sanguine. In the years ahead, managing the relationship will be difficult because key pillars of the relationship are changing. For decades, the strongest source of support for stability in U.S.-China relations has been the U.S. business community, but Chinese actions have alienated this key group and it is now more likely to press for changes than for stability. A second change is occurring in China. As growth slows, Chinese citizens are pressing their government to make additional reforms and respond to perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty.

The next U.S. administration is more likely to continue and adapt current policies toward China and Asia more broadly than to pursue a significantly different approach. Those hoping for or fearing radical changes in U.S. policy will be disappointed..

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He leads a research project on China and the World that explores China’s relations with other countries.

U.S.-Japan relations

By Daniel Sneider

Image

Three consecutive terms held by the same party would certainly preserve the momentum behind the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy of the last few years, especially on the security front. Still there are some dangers ahead. If Japan moves ahead to make a peace treaty with Russia, resolving the territorial issue and opening a flow of Japanese investment into Russia, that could be a source of tension. The new administration may also want to mend fences early with China, seeking cooperation on North Korea and avoiding tensions in Southeast Asia.

The big challenge, however, will be guiding the TPP through Congress. While there is a strong sentiment within policy circles in favor of rescuing the deal, perhaps through some kind of adjustment of the agreement, insiders believe that is highly unlikely. The Sanders-Warren wing of the Democratic party has been greatly strengthened by this election and they will be looking for any sign of retreat on TPP. Mrs. Clinton has an ambitious agenda of domestic policy initiatives – from college tuition and the minimum wage to immigration reform – on which she will need their support. One idea now circulating quietly in policy circles is to ‘save’ the TPP, especially its strategic importance, by separating off a bilateral Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Tokyo is said to be opposed to this but Washington may put pressure on for this option, leaving the door open to a full TPP down the road. .

Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research and a former foreign correspondent. He is the co-author of Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific Wars (Stanford University Press, 2016) and is currently writing about U.S.-Japan security issues.

North Korea

By Kathleen Stephens

Image

From an American foreign policy perspective, North Korea policy challenges will be inherited by the next president as “unfinished business,” unresolved despite a range of approaches spanning previous Republican and Democratic administrations. The first months in a new U.S. president’s term may create a small window to explore potential new openings. The new president should demonstrate at the outset that North Korea is high on the new administration’s priority list, with early, substantive exchanges with allies and key partners like China to affirm U.S. commitment to defense of its allies, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and the vision agreed to at the Six-Party Talks in the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles. Early messaging to Pyongyang is also key – clearly communicating the consequences of further testing or provocations, but at the same time signaling the readiness of the new administration to explore new diplomatic approaches. The appointment of a senior envoy, close to the president, could underscore the administration’s seriousness as well as help manage the difficult policy and political process in Washington itself.

2017 is a presidential election year in South Korea, and looks poised to be a particularly difficult one. This will influence Pyongyang’s calculus, as will the still-unknown impact of continued international sanctions. The challenges posed by North Korea have grown greater with time, but there are few new, untried options acceptable to any new administration in Washington. Nonetheless, the new administration must explore what is possible diplomatically and take further steps to defend and deter as necessary. .

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. She is currently writing and researching on U.S. diplomacy in Korea.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

By Donald K. Emmerson

Image

A new U.S. administration will be inaugurated in January 2017. Unless it wishes to adapt to such outcomes, it should:

(1) renew its predecessor’s refusal to endorse any claim to sovereignty over all, most, or some of the South China Sea and/or its land features made by any of the six contending parties—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam—pending the validation of such a claim under international law.

(2) strongly encourage all countries, including the contenders, to endorse and implement the authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued on July 12, 2016, by an UNCLOS-authorized court. Washington should also emphasize that it, too, will abide by the judgment, and will strive to ensure American ratification of UNCLOS.

(3) maintain its commitment to engage in publicly acknowledged freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea on a regular basis. Previous such FONOPs were conducted in October 2015 by the USS Lassen, in January 2016 by the USS Wilbur, in May 2016 by the USS Lawrence, and in October 2016 by the USS Decatur. The increasingly lengthy intervals between these trips, despite a defense official’s promise to conduct them twice every quarter, has encouraged doubts about precisely the commitment to freedom of navigation that they were meant to convey.

(4) announce what has hitherto been largely implicit: The FONOPs are not being done merely to brandish American naval prowess. Their purpose is to affirm a core geopolitical position, namely, that no single country, not the United States, nor China, nor anyone else, should exercise exclusive or exclusionary control over the South China Sea.

(5) brainstorm with Asian-Pacific and European counterparts a range of innovative ways of multilateralizing the South China Sea as a shared heritage of, and a resource for, its claimants and users alike. .

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program. He is currently editing a Stanford University Press book that examines China’s relations with Southeast Asia.

Global governance

By Phillip Y. Lipscy

Image

Global economic activity is increasingly shifting toward Asia – most forecasts suggest the region will account for about half of the global economy by the midpoint of the 21^st century. This shift is creating important incongruities within the global architecture of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are a central element of the U.S.-based international order and remain heavily tilted toward the West in their formal structures, headquarter locations and personnel compositions. This status quo is a constant source of frustration for policymakers in the region, who seek greater voice consummate with their newfound international status. 

The next U.S. administration should prioritize reinvigoration of the global architecture.  One practical step is to move major international organizations toward multiple headquarter arrangements, which are now common in the private sector – this will mitigate the challenges of recruiting talented individuals willing to spend their careers in distant headquarters in the West. The United States should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created by China, to tie the institution more closely into the existing architecture, contribute to its success and send a signal that Asian contributions to international governance are welcome. The Asian rebalance should be continued and deepened, with an emphasis on institution-building that reassures our Asian counterparts that the United States will remain a Pacific power. .

Philip Y. Lipscy is an assistant professor of political science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow. He is the author of the forthcoming book Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Population aging

By Karen Eggleston

Image

China’s recent announcement of a universal two-child policy restored an important dimension of choice, but it will not fundamentally change the trajectory of a shrinking working-age population and burgeoning share of elderly. China’s population aged 60 and older is projected to grow from nearly 15 percent today to 33 percent in 2050, at which time China’s population aged 80 and older will be larger than the current population of France. This triumph of longevity in China and other Asian countries, left unaddressed, will strain the fiscal integrity of public and private pension systems, while urbanization, technological change and income inequality interact with population aging by threatening the sustainability and perceived fairness of conventional financing for many social programs.

Investment in human capital and innovation in social and economic institutions will be central to addressing the demographic realities ahead. The next administration needs to support those investments as well as help to strengthen public health systems and primary care to control chronic disease and prepare for the next infectious disease pandemic, many of which historically have risen in Asia. .

Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program. She is the editor of the recently published book Policy Challenges from Demographic Change in China and India (Brookings Institution Press/Shorenstein APARC, 2016).

Trade

By Yong Suk Lee

Image

Anti-globalization sentiment has ballooned in the past two years, particularly in regions affected by the import competition from and outsourcing to Asia. However, some firms and workers have benefited from increasing trade openness. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2012, for example, led to substantial growth in exports in the agricultural, automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. Yet, there are winners and losers from trade agreements. Using an economist’s hypothetical perspective, one would assume firms and workers in the losing industry move to the exporting sector and take advantage of the gains from trade. In reality, adjustment across industries and regions from such movements are slow. Put simply, a furniture worker in North Carolina who lost a job due to import competition cannot easily assume a new job in the booming high-tech industry in California. They would require high-income mobility and a different skill set.

Trade policy needs to focus on facilitating the transition of workers to different industries and better train students to prepare for potential mobility in the future. Trade policy will also be vital in determining how international commerce is shaped. As cross-border e-commerce increases, it will be in the interest of the United States to participate in and lead negotiations that determine future trade rules. The Trans-Pacific Partnership should not simply be abandoned. The next administration should educate both policymakers and the public about the effects of trade openness and the economic and strategic importance of trade agreements for the U.S. economy.

Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow and deputy director of Korea Program. He leads a research project focused on Korean education, entrepreneurship and economic development.

Researchers in the Korea Program regularly contribute to Korean media on the Korean affairs ranging from education and economics to politics and North Korea nuclear issues. The articles are in Korean language.

Nationalist Populism in South Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, August 18, 2019)

The Ambiguous Boundary Between Korean Wave and the Anti-Korean Sentiment (Joyce Lee, May 2, 2019)

Restoring the Dignity of South Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, April 18, 2019)

Happiness and Productivity (Yong Suk Lee, March 21, 2019)

Softness Overcomes Hardness  (Joyce Lee, March 6, 2019)

What should the Hanoi Declaration lay out? (Gi-Wook Shin, February 20, 2019)

What Would an Aged Society Look Like? (Yong Suk Lee, January 23, 2019)

Confront the lure of populism or risk economic failures and the coming of a far-right extremist regime (Gi-Wook Shin, January 17, 2019)

Only a drastic measure towards denuclearization can resolve the current stalemate with North Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, interview with Korea Times, January 10, 2019)

Looking After Myself (Joyce Lee, January 9, 2019)

2018, The Moon Jae-In Government's Progress Report (Gi-Wook Shin, December 27, 2018)

Rethinking North Korean Economy? (Yong Suk Lee, November 29, 2018)

The Dark Side of the Korean Culture of Hierarchy (Joyce Lee, November 14, 2018)

Trump's Second Half (Gi-Wook Shin, November 7, 2018)

How Parents Can Help their Children with Career Planning (Yong Suk Lee, October 17, 2018)

Anticipation and Concerns Mount Ahead of the 3rd Inter-Korean Summit (Joyce Lee, September 19, 2018)

Spring on the Korean Peninsula Needs to be hard fought (Gi-Wook Shin, September 5, 2018)

Should we encourage kids to learn coding? (Yong Suk Lee, August 6, 2018)

Some Thoughts on the Korean Value of Saving Face (Joyce Lee, July 16, 2018)

Koreans abroad can play important roles in achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula (Gi-Wook Shin, July 2, 2018)

Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea now becomes an option (Gi-Wook Shin, June 20, 2018)

Trump in Face-Saving Action for Kim (Joyce Lee, June 18, 2018)

South Korea and the U.S. Differ on Priorities for North Korea Policy (Gi-Wook Shin, May 14, 2018)

Is CVID Possible? (Gi-Wook Shin, May 7, 2018)

CVID Faces Challenges (Gi-Wook Shin, May 3, 2018)

The April 27 Korea Summit and the Lingering Question of CVID+α (Gi-Wook Shin, April 30, 2018)

Choices for Your Happiness (Joyce Lee, April 23, 2018)

The Ambiguity of the Moon Government's Goal for the Inter-Korean Summit (Gi-Wook Shin, April 2, 2018)

Korea as a Pacemaker (Gi-Wook Shin, March 13, 2018)

MeToo Movement Should Create Lasting Social Change (Gi-Wook Shin, March 12, 2018)

What's Wrong with Being a Nobody? (Joyce Lee, February 26, 2018)

It's Time to Move Beyond the Political Deadlock of Comfort Women Issue (Gi-Wook Shin, January 15, 2018)

Can the Government Rouse Young Koreans from Their Dreams of Childless Comfort? (Joyce Lee, January 3, 2018)

A Grand Bargain between the US and China Seems More Likely than Ever (Yong Suk Lee, December 25, 2017)

Korea No Longer a Country of Koreans (Rennie Moon, December 11, 2017)

Moon Administration's Diplomatic and Securtiy Strategies (Gi-Wook Shin, November 27, 2017)

Making Little Mr. and Ms. Perfects, But for Whose Sake and at What Cost? (Joyce Lee, November 6, 2017)

Identifying Korea as a Developed Country (Joon Nak Choi, October 30, 2017)

Superficial Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, September 26, 2017)

What Comes After the War of Words Between Trump and Kim Jong-un (Gi-Wook Shin, September 25, 2017)

In the Midst of Rising Fears of War (Joyce Lee, September 12, 2017)

Broken English as the global language (Rennie Moon, August 28, 2017)

'Polifessors' of Moon administration (Gi-Wook Shin, July 24, 2017)

In Anticipation of the Era of Korean Studies (Joyce Lee, July 17, 2017)

Technological Change: Why Korea needs a longer-term perspective on job creation (Yong Suk Lee, June 27, 2017)

Global network of Koreans abroad (Gi-Wook Shin, June 6, 2017)

First summit meeting, not to hurry (Gi-Wook Shin, May 22, 2017)

Korean Americans' love for Korea (Rennie Moon, April 24, 2017)

Trump's anti-immigration stance to be an opportunity for Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, February 27, 2017)

A Labor market by the young, and for the young (Yong Suk Lee, January 30, 2017)

If Korean universities are to succeed with internationalization (Rennie Moon, November 21, 2016)

US presidential election and Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, October 24, 2016)

Political expediency should not block technology innovation (Joon Nak Choi, September 12, 2016)

Strategic policy on inter-Korean relations is essential (Gi-Wook Shin, August 1, 2016)

Is Korea ready to embrace risk and failure? (Yong Suk Lee, June 20, 2016)

Can Pankyo become Silicon Valley in Korea? (Gi-Wook Shin, May 9, 2016)

Image

Stanford professor Andrew Walder has been awarded the Founder’s Prize from the journal Social Science History for his paper, “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1971.” The journal’s editorial board selects one recipient annually for exemplary scholarly work.

Using data from 2,213 historical county and city annals, the paper charts the breadth of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, its evolution through time and the repression through which state structures were rebuilt in the post-Mao era.

Walder, who is a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director emeritus of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, has long studied the sources of conflict, stability and change in communist regimes. He recently published China under Mao, a book that explores the rise and fall of Mao Zedong’s radical socialism.