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There was nothing inherently unified about the diverse cultures, religions and languages that comprised the Indian subcontinent under colonialism. The European model of nationalism, which took for granted the existence of one religion, one language or one ethnicity was doomed to failure. It was for this impossibility that the British argued that India was not fit to rule itself. It was on behalf of this sense of identity that, beginning in the nineteenth century, Indian writers of literature began to imagine cultural unity through their fictional and poetic works.

By the 1920s and 1930s, literature had come to occupy a central role in the Indian nationalist movement. Yet literary texts not only reflected the politics of Indias leaders (increasingly represented by the Indian National Congress,) but questioned some of their assumptions about the path India's future should take. For instance, the Hindi novelist Premchand set his stories primarily in rural India and satirized the machinations of the urban elite, emphasizing the rural-urban divide that was increasingly visible in mainstream nationalist politics. Likewise, the English-language author Mulk Raj Anand located his stories among the urban poor, disempowered not only by colonialism, but also by the kind of heavy industrialization supported by congress.

Authors affected by partition, such as Saadat Hasan Manto, painted a poignant picture of the injustices perpetrated on displaced families on both sides of the India-Pakistan border. Attention to the details and artistry of these and other fictional writings can add to our understanding of these hugely significant decades in sub-continental history.

Ulka Anjaria is a Ph.D. candidate in the Program of Modern Thought and Literature at Stanford University. Her dissertation, entitled "Novel Forms: Literary Realism and the Politics of Modernity in India, 1920-1947," discusses the works of Premchand, Mulk Raj Anand, Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay, Raja Rao, Manik Bandopadhyay and Ahmed Ali, relating innovations these authors make on the novel form to larger political developments of the pre-Independence period. She has published articles in Sarai Reader and Economic and Political Weekly.

Ms. Anjaria's talk is the third seminar of the winter quarter South Asia Colloquium Series.

Ulka Anjaria Ph.D. candidate, program of Modern Thought and Literature Speaker Stanford University
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Professor Dittmer received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1971. His scholarly expertise is the study of contemporary China. He teaches courses on contemporary China, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim.

His current research interests include a study of the impact of reform on Chinese communist authority, a survey of patterns of informal politics in East Asia, and a project on the China-Taiwan-US triangle in the context of East Asian regional politics. Professor Dittmer's recently published books and monographs include Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (University of Washington Press, 1992), China's Quest for National Identity (with Samuel Kim, Cornell University Press, 1993), China Under Modernization (Westview Press, 1994), and South Asia's Nuclear Crisis (M. E. Sharpe, 2005.)

Dr. Dittmer's talk is the second seminar of the winter quarter South Asia Colloquium Series.

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Lowell Dittmer Professor, Political Science Speaker University of California, Berkeley
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The islamization process in Pakistan is at the core of the contradictions and identity conflict of Pakistan. It is the permanent attempt to rewrite the history whose founding fathers intended to make the homeland for the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent, much the against the will of the clergy. However it is also an instrument of perpetuation in power of a largely secular military, which constantly manipulates Islamic symbols.

Although widely discussed, the process of islamization in Pakistan has remained relatively limited. No elected legislature went beyond the expression of the idea of the supremacy of the Islamic law. No elected legislature ever passed a somewhat substantial provision. Despite an increasingly strong, or at least vocal religious pressure, the constitution and the legislation of the Pakistani state are still based on a compromise between modernist institutions and ever more pressing religious demands, yet still limited. The supremacy of the Sharia is regularly reaffirmed, yet its implementation does not progress.

The presentation will analyze the impact of the islamization policies, less however on the legal and constitutional system than on the economic, political and social life of Pakistan. Starting from the observation that the islamization process is more limited that it may seem, the presentation will draw on to say that this process reinforces more than it challenges the existing political and social order, and its most salient political expression, the current military regime, by preventing, on the one side the emergence of any real alternative political project and, although in a more pragmatic manner, by bringing back in mainstream politics the fraction of the social body which could possibly be tempted by more radical means of actions.

In this perspective, four dimensions will be more specifically studied: 1) The evolution of the role of religious movements and parties within the Pakistani state; 2) The relationship between these same religious movements and parties and the Pakistani establishment; 3) The specific role of the madrasas in this relation; 4) The relation the religious parties entertains with democracy.

Frederic Grare is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He will lead a project assessing U.S. and European policies toward Pakistan and, where appropriate, recommending alternatives with Ashley J. Tellis and George Perkovich. Grare will focus on the tension between stability and democratization in Pakistan, including challenges of sectarian conflict, Islamist political mobilization, and educational reform. Grare also will facilitate interactions between U.S. experts and officials and European counterparts on the main policy challenges in South Asia.

Grare is a leading expert and writer on South Asia, having served most recently in the French embassy in Pakistan and from 1999 to 2003 in New Delhi as director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities. Grare has written extensively on security issues, Islamist movements, and sectarian conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also has edited the volume, India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle.

His most recent publications include: "India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle, with Gilles Boquerat"(eds), (New Delhi, India Research Press, 2003); "Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict, 1979-1985: At the Turn of the Cold War" (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003); "Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami" (New Delhi, Manohar, 2001)

Grare has an advanced degree from Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques and received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

Dr. Grare's talk is the first seminar of the winter quarter South Asia Colloquium Series.

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Frederic Grare Visiting Scholar Speaker Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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In this important book many of Michael Leifer's students, colleagues and friends come together to explore the key themes of his work. The particular themes explored include the notion of 'order' - a key theme in Michael Leifer's work, the institutions concerned with regional order, especially ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum, maritime security and its management, a little studied but highly important aspect of Southeast Asian Security, and the making of foreign policy within particular states, where Michael Leifer emphasised the important role of the different worldviews of different states. The book concludes with an overall assessment of Michael Leifer's contribution to the study of Southeast Asian international politics.

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Taylor & Francis Group in "Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer"
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Donald K. Emmerson
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Donald K. Emmerson
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It is tempting to dismiss President Bush's travel through Southeast Asia as aimless floating by a doubly lame duck. Getting things done will be harder without either the right to run for a third term in 2008 or the support of a legislative majority between now and then. But if that means having to work with others, at home and abroad, these new limits could be a virtuous necessity -- an opportunity to shed his administration's my-way-or-the-highway image and reverse the squandering of American legitimacy and leverage around the world.

Asia is a good place to begin rebalancing U.S. foreign policy because it is huge, it is dynamic -- and it is not Iraq. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that the president is attending in Vietnam this weekend includes leaders from 21 economies that jointly account for 56, 48, and 40 percent, respectively, of global GDP, trade and population. Since 1989, the forum's economies have grown 26 percent compared with 8 percent for the rest of the world. The Middle East looks trivial by comparison.

The Middle East also lacks a tradition of successful multilateral cooperation. But if the Arab League has accomplished little, Southeast Asia is an exemplar of regional harmony. Cynical observers may deride as mere "talk shops" the many overlapping frameworks that span or involve Southeast Asia. On its calendar of events in 2005 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations listed 612 meetings. But talking is better than fighting, and no two ASEAN members have made war on each other since the group was formed nearly 40 years ago.

Northeast Asia is another matter. There is no ANEAN -- no Association of Northeast Asian Nations. Mistrust among China, Japan and South Korea is still too deep. But North Korea's decision to rejoin the Six-Party Talks (among China, Japan, Russia, the two Koreas, and the United States) has revived the prospect that these conversations could evolve into a framework for broader security in Northeast Asia. Of the six, all but North Korea will attend the economic summit this weekend in Hanoi. On the sidelines of that event, President Bush and his delegation should discuss with these five counterparts a possible shared strategy on North Korea when the talks reconvene, probably in China later this year.

Another key goal for the president on this trip should be helping to revitalize APEC. The "Doha round" of global trade liberalization has run aground. Without a last-minute push, APEC's goals of "free trade" among advanced economies by 2010 and among developing ones by 2020 will not be met. Meanwhile, bilateral trade agreements among APEC members have proliferated. The result is a "noodle bowl" of inconsistent arrangements that may, on balance, divert as much trade as they create. There is, for example, no consistent definition of the "rules of origin" that determine which items benefit from lowered barriers and which do not. Without lowering the quality of all these many bilaterals to their lowest common denominator -- i.e., the least liberal arrangement any signatory will accept -- an effort should be made to link and standardize them so that trade flows are enlarged and not merely redirected.

This may seem like a non-starter. On Monday, the House of Representatives failed to approve permanent normal trade relations with Vietnam. And that was even before the newly elected and arguably more protectionist Democratic majority is seated in January. But progress can still be made in Vietnam.

An advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit for the United States is that it includes both China and Taiwan, and excludes the repressive regime in Burma. But APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is a more important political reason for strengthening the grouping. While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence.

The risk of gridlocked government should not keep the United States from seeking to deepen Asia-Pacific economic and political cooperation. The Bush administration may be a lame duck. But even a healthy duck needs a tranquil pond.

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum in the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He wrote this article for the Mercury News which was printed on Sunday, November 19, 2006. Reprinted with permission from the San Jose Mercury News.

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The "blue wave" of Democratic Party victories on November 7th has altered the dynamics inside Congress and between the legislative and executive branches. U.S. policy toward Asia will be significantly affected. We can expect new and different pressures on relations with regional actors including China and the Koreas, on Asian regionalism, and on trade and economic issues. Indonesia is likely to come in for particular scrutiny. Join us for a timely discussion of the changed domestic politics of U.S. Asia policy now and in the final two years of the Bush administration.

The U.S.-Indonesia Society (USINDO) is an independent NGO specializing in policy issues relating to Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Alphonse La Porta assumed the presidency of USINDO in 2004 after a 38-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service. In the latter capacity he served as ambassador to Mongolia and held diplomatic positions in Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and New Zealand. A former president of the American Foreign Service Association, Ambassador La Porta is a graduate of the National War College, Georgetown University, and New York University.

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Alphonse F. La Porta President Speaker United States-Indonesia Society, Washington, D.C.
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Kristin C. Burke
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"Pan-Asian regionalism remains a long-term aspiration rather than a short-term prospect, but that having been said, that was true of Europe fifty years ago." - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow

On November 2 Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in association with University of California at Berkeley's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, convened regional and economic experts to discuss the role of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and its relationship to the future of regionalism and regional integration in East Asia.

The meeting was timely, as APEC's annual week of high-level meetings begins on November 12th in Hanoi, Vietnam. It will culminate in a summit of heads of state (and a representative from Taiwan) on November 18-19 -- a key opportunity for President Bush to talk with regional leaders about a range of issues, including North Korea. In examining APEC's agenda and its potential institutional challengers, scholars focused on how the US might get more out of the forum and how the US could alter its approach to Asian regionalism to ensure continued relevance and influence in the region.

According to Dr. Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum and senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), "Asian regionalism is at a crossroads, and it may be at a crossroads for sometime." Recent events have demonstrated that countries in the region face a crucial choice: Will they move in the direction of an East Asian identity that actively excludes the US, or more toward trans-Pacific networks such as APEC that include the US? Or both?

As Asian countries consider the merits of APEC and American inclusion, US policy on Asian regionalism has been "curiously passive," especially when juxtaposed with the positive role the US played in supporting development of the European Union, according to Ambassador Michael Armacost, who was US ambassador to Japan and the Philippines and held senior policy positions on the staff of the National Security Council and in the Departments of State and Defense.

Dr. Vinod Aggarwal, a professor of political science and director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, pointed to the example of the European Union (of which the US is not a member), urging that the US seek compatibility among regional and trans-Pacific institutions. Armacost agreed and maintained that the US should not fear exclusion from regional forums, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), an outgrowth of the annual dialogue between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other powers, which held its first meeting in Malaysia last year.

North Korea has said it will rejoin the six-party talks, but a meeting will not take place until after the APEC meeting. Here is an illustration of the utility of APEC that has nothing to do with economics. There could be an informal meeting of the five parties (without North Korea) in Hanoi. And that could be quite helpful in terms of coordinating strategy, especially with China. - Donald Emmerson, director, Southeast Asia Forum, Shorenstein APARC

Armacost underlined that American participation needs to correspond with American interests. In this sense, the US should put more effort into the Asian organizations of which it is already a member, including APEC. Armacost also suggested looking to Northeast Asia --"where the interests of the great powers intersect most directly" and there is no ASEAN counterpart -- according special attention to the six-party talks convened to denuclearize North Korea. He told the group that "fortuitously in the six-power talks, one has a negotiation which could be in embryonic form a regional security institution, in which American participation is not an issue -- it's self-evident. The US should put effort into the six-power talks succeeding, not only because of the substance of those talks, but because if they do succeed, then that format can provide a basis for a sub-regional institution of great importance to us, one that will give us a continuing role in the larger institutions that may emerge in Asia."

Emmerson said that there are essentially two views in Washington on US participation in Asian regional institutions: "one is to say that if these meetings are merely 'talk shops,' then our absence doesn't matter, and the other is to say that we are being, as the phrase goes, 'absent at the creation' of regional architecture, which we will regret not having been able to influence from the beginning, the longer we stay out." He urged greater US involvement in regional organizations and more creative approaches to tackling obstacles to involvement, such as finding a way to compromise on accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a key criterion for membership in the EAS. Attending that summit, in Emmerson's view, "would send a clear signal to East Asians that the US does want to be involved on the ground floor in the creation of an emerging regional architecture in Asia for the 21st century."

As the panelists encouraged the US to devote greater effort to the project of Asian regionalism, they also acknowledged that President Bush and other US delegates to this year's APEC meetings would not be in a position to embark on any bold initiatives, including the talked-of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, or FTAAP. According to Aggarwal, "in the current climate, the FTAAP is a political non-starter." Preoccupied by US midterm elections and the Iraq issue, "the administration is unlikely to put a lot of political capital into pushing for something like an FTAAP," not least because of the upcoming expiration of President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority. Aggarwal said, "I just can not imagine that any congressmen or senators will advocate free trade with countries with which we have our largest trade deficits. These massive trade deficits make the issue a political hot potato and no one will touch it." Instead, he recommended a less direct approach for trade liberalization. (A spokesman for the US Trade Representative's office has said that while they are still in the process of preparing their APEC agenda, they would consider discussing the FTAAP with their regional trading partners.)

But if you're ever going to pump new life into [APEC] you've got to find some practical projects around which people can rally. I would have thought the one economic issue that seems to be very timely, although some of the timeliness is being lost as prices sink, is energy. Virtually everybody in Asia is an importer of energy, and there are a lot of consumer interests that would benefit from the kind of collaboration that you could organize at a meeting like this. I would try to get subjects like that on the agenda, maybe more than trade liberalization. - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow

Founded in 1989, APEC has 21 member economies on both sides of the Pacific. As a trans-Pacific, network, APEC connects the US, Chile, Mexico, and Canada on one side of the Pacific with a diverse group of Asian economies including China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. Aggarwal described the body as more of a "discussion forum" than an organization, as it explicitly rejects the deeply institutionalized approach taken by the European Union in Brussels - something he said should be reconsidered if it is to become more effective.

Panelists raised the paradox that APEC's agenda seems overly ambitious, yet at the same time the forum is under-utilized, in terms of addressing some pressing issues in the region, including as energy, avian flu, and maritime security.

Aggarwal acknowledged that APEC has been host to a wide range of activities, including security, environment, women's rights, finance, and technology policy. "What's striking is that these activities have been discussed in the European Union, for example, but really only in any significant way after 25 years of economic integration." In the mid-1990s, APEC set deadlines for trade liberalization -- 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for other countries. These goals will be hard to meet.

Security in the Asia-Pacific means lots of things. If we always focus on the latest American security issue, then that becomes the driving factor in Asians saying because the Americans have their own agenda, we want to have our own organization. So, yes, I think we should revitalize some of [APEC's] trade goals, we should try to work toward that, but we should be willing to address broader issues, other than only counterterrorism or only North Korea. - Vinod Aggarwal, director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at UC - Berkeley

Armacost compared APEC to the European Union, asserting that the EU succeeded in large part because it "started small, built gradually and focused on depth rather than breadth at outset." In addition, the European body, considered the gold standard of regional integration, concentrated on very practical projects that yielded tangible benefits and generated political support for further endeavors.

In this vein, Armacost recommended two practical purposes for the group. "Virtually everybody in Asia is an importer of energy, and there are a lot of consumer interests that would benefit from the kind of collaboration that you could organize at a meeting like this." Also, returning to one of the organization's fundamental purposes, Armacost contended that in large part, "APEC is only useful insofar as the US uses it as a place to rally support for making one last ditch effort in trying to stimulate the Doha Round."

"I don't think that these bilateral trade agreements are particularly good for American business, or in general for trade negotiations at the Doha Round." - Vinod Aggarwal, director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at UC - Berkeley

"If APEC members really wanted to get the Doha Round back on track, they should agree to a moratorium on preferential trade agreements for a period of one year and challenge the Europeans and other non-APEC members to match them in this moratorium on preferential trade agreements," urged Aggarwal.

Overall, the group agreed that despite inherent problems in APEC, overall participation in this trans-Pacific institution should be considered important to the United States. Armacost made the practical point that "APEC happily provides the major occasion in which the President goes out to the region. Basically, it's an opportunity to cultivate your allies, find out what your adversaries in the region may be up to, and to have a point in your schedule where you've got that agenda of Asian concerns that you are forced to wrestle with. For that reason alone it's worth keeping APEC alive."

All the panelists acknowledged Asian countries' criticisms that the US had too much control over APEC's agenda, and that Washington utilizes the forum to discuss its "issue of the day." Emmerson called on the US to remember that "from the standpoint of a number of developing Asian economies, the American emphasis on trade liberalization has been somewhat distorting. These are low-income countries; they're interested in economic cooperation that can somehow help them raise their populations above poverty levels. There's a whole agenda there that we really haven't discussed, and in a way it has been slighted in APEC by this overriding emphasis on trade liberalization. If trade liberalization turns out to be unrealistic at least in the short run, development goals are an alternative agenda that has some utility, and is worth exploring."

Similarly, Armacost stated that APEC would be a "more valuable institution to us, if we stopped talking for a while and listened a bit." Reflecting on US policy more broadly, he said he "personally regrets that in recent years the institution building instinct, or reflex, in the US has been directed at remaking other people's institutions internally. The international institution focus has been on relieving ourselves of the burdens of institutions which cramp our style or impose limits on diplomatic maneuverability."

I do believe we're not paying enough attention to a region whose importance to us will be greater than any other region ten to fifteen years from now. We should devote more attentiveness to Asia. - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, Shorenstein APARC

Shorenstein APARC's associate director for research Daniel Sneider moderated the panel. This seminar was an outgrowth of the center's work on the role of regionalism in East Asia. The research center will publish a book on this subject next spring, in conjunction with the Brookings Institution.

About the Panelists:

Vinod Aggarwal is professor in the Department of Political Science, affiliated professor of Business and Public Policy in the Haas School of Business, and director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at the University of California at Berkeley.

Michael H. Armacost has been the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow since 2002. From 1995 to 2002, Armacost served as president of the Brookings Institution. Previously, during his twenty-four year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Donald K. Emmerson is director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Shorenstein APARC and a senior fellow at FSI. He also teaches courses on Southeast Asia in International Relations and International Policy Studies.

Daniel C. Sneider is the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC. He was a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the center, and the former foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News.

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There are two obstacles to understanding how historical memory about the wartime period has been formed in Northeast Asia. The first is the existence of persistent national myths about war memory—myths created within those nations and perceptions formed from the outside, and entrenched through the media and popular culture. The second obstacle is the lack of comparative context. The study of historical memory has, until recently, been focused almost entirely on Japan, without comparison to other principle actors in Asia such as China and Korea, or to the United States.

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The dynamics of a global economy is being reshaped by the economic emergence of two Asian giants, China and India. How the world's two most populous countries manage globalization as they pursue economic reform and liberalization will impact significantly their societies, the rest of Asia, and the world.

This book brings together articles by first rate scholars of China and India to share and discuss their research findings in four areas: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses to Globalization; Social Security and Governance; National Security in the age of Globalization; and Ethnicity and Identity in the New World.

The book includes an opening address by Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, from his speech on Managing Globalization: Lessons from China and India, delivered at the official opening of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy on 4 April 2005.

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World Scientific Publishing Co in "India-China: Managing Globalization"
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Jean C. Oi
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This conference examines the cross currents of growing regional integration and rising nationalism in Northeast Asia. This strategic region is standing at a turning point in its history, marked by the end of the Cold War and by the emergence of China as a major power. With the major economies of China, Japan and South Korea growing increasingly interdependent, the movement toward regionalism is gaining momentum. Yet interdependency, often set in a global context, also encourages growing nationalism in all three countries and beyond. The historic rivalry between Japan and China for leadership in Northeast Asia has re-emerged.

This conference posed a set of vital questions to understand how regionalism and nationalism interact in Northeast Asia and potential future trends. What are the competing visions of regional integration now being considered and what are their prospects for realization? How do national tensions, including the Sino-Japanese rivalry, stunt the movement toward regionalism? What is the American relationship to Northeast Asian regionalism? Does the system of Cold War alliances built by the United States still have a role in Northeast Asia?

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