India’s 160 million Muslims differ geographically by language, socio-economic status, and culture. The Muslim-Indian community shares a common trajectory of challenges in their political power and socio-economic status. Their identity, in the eyes of the average Indian, is evermore monolithic and faith-based. To some politicians, Muslim Indians are now considered a security risk. In a talk held August 10 at the Commonwealth Club of California, Rafiq Dossani discussed the causes of their challenges and possible future.
Rafiq Dossani was a senior research scholar at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and erstwhile director of the Stanford Center for South Asia. His research interests include South Asian security, government, higher education, technology, and business.
Dossani’s most recent book is Knowledge Perspectives of New Product Development, co-edited with D. Assimakopoulos and E. Carayannis, published in 2011 by Springer. His earlier books include Does South Asia Exist?, published in 2010 by Shorenstein APARC; India Arriving, published in 2007 by AMACOM Books/American Management Association (reprinted in India in 2008 by McGraw-Hill, and in China in 2009 by Oriental Publishing House); Prospects for Peace in South Asia, co-edited with Henry Rowen, published in 2005 by Stanford University Press; and Telecommunications Reform in India, published in 2002 by Greenwood Press. One book is under preparation: Higher Education in the BRIC Countries, co-authored with Martin Carnoy and others, to be published in 2012.
Dossani currently chairs FOCUS USA, a non-profit organization that supports emergency relief in the developing world. Between 2004 and 2010, he was a trustee of Hidden Villa, a non-profit educational organization in the Bay Area. He also serves on the board of the Industry Studies Association, and is chair of the Industry Studies Association Annual Conference for 2010–12.
Earlier, Dossani worked for the Robert Fleming Investment Banking group, first as CEO of its India operations and later as head of its San Francisco operations. He also previously served as the chairman and CEO of a stockbroking firm on the OTCEI stock exchange in India, as the deputy editor of Business India Weekly, and as a professor of finance at Pennsylvania State University.
Dossani holds a BA in economics from St. Stephen's College, New Delhi, India; an MBA from the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, India; and a PhD in finance from Northwestern University.
World War Two, the most violent period in the modern history of Europe and Asia (1937–1945), left deep scars still evident on both continents. Numerous and often conflicting narratives exist about the wartime era, ranging from personal memoirs to official accounts of wartime actions. Many issues, from collaboration to responsibility for war crimes, remain unresolved. In Europe some issues that have been buried for decades, such as the record of collaboration with Nazi occupiers, are now resurfacing. In Northeast Asia, World War Two’s complex, painful legacy continues to impact popular culture, education, diplomacy, and even economic relations.
While differences exist in the wartime circumstances and reconciliation processes of Europe and Asia, many valuable lessons can be gained through a study of the experiences on both continents. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) facilitated a comparative dialogue on World War Two, bringing together 15 noted experts for the Colonialism, Collaboration, and Criminality conference, held June 16 to 17 at Stanford. Each of the event’s five panels paired an Asia and a Europe scholar addressing a common theme.
The debate over remembrance of World War Two
Asia’s relative lack of progress in achieving reconciliation of the painful legacies of the war in Asia and the Pacific continues to bedevil current relations in the region. This is a consequence of the way the Cold War interrupted the resolution of wartime issues and blocked dialogue over the past, particularly between Japan, China, and South Korea, suggested Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC. The widely held image of an unrepentant Japan ignores the fierce debate within Japan over wartime memory, often obscured by the prominence of rightwing nationalist views. Meanwhile, within China and Korea, wartime memory is also increasingly contested ground, from the issue of collaboration to the emergence of a more nationalist narrative in China, further complicating relations among those Asian neighbors.
Daniel Chirot, a professor of international studies at the University of Washington, emphasized that immediate postwar economic and security needs, including the growth of Communism, accelerated West Germany’s willingness to reconcile with its Western neighbors. He concurred with Sneider, saying that no such imperative existed in Northeast Asia until the need for economic cooperation three decades after the war. He suggested that the growth of regional integration might, as in Europe, drive Northeast Asia toward greater reconciliation.
Divided memories
Justice for sensitive historical human rights issues, such as World War Two atrocities, bears increasing importance in today’s ever-globalized economic and political climate, stated Thomas Berger, a professor of international relations at Boston University. Berger noted the challenge that Japan’s factional politics poses to a revision of the country’s official wartime narrative, and suggested that a strong regional structure, such as the European Union, could effectively facilitate reconciliation in Northeast Asia.
Frances Gouda, a professor of political science at the University of Amsterdam, examined the use of Anne Frank and former Indonesian president Sukarno as “icons of memory” in Dutch interpretations of World War Two. She asserted that Frank’s victimization allows people to come to terms with Nazi war crimes, but that Sukarno’s vilification as a Japanese collaborator oversimplifies history and allows the Netherlands to avoid confronting its own colonial past.
Collaboration and resistance
France’s Vichy regime, responsible both for collaborating with the Nazis and acting independently to persecute Jewish citizens, remains a painful and unresolved subject in the country’s contemporary quest for national identity, said Julian Jackson, a professor of history at Queen Mary, University of London. He pointed to French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s act of making a national martyr out of Guy Môquet, a young communist who died resisting the German Occupation, as a key example of the complexities involved in trying to come to terms with France’s past.
Ongoing territorial disputes over islands located between Japan and its neighbors in China and Korea are a product of the unresolved legacy of the wartime era in Asia. Sovereignty over those islands was left deliberately unresolved by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty which formally ended the war, suggested Alexis Dudden, a professor of history from the University of Connecticut. As a result, the territorial disputes have become a battleground on which larger questions of historical memory about the war are contested, not only by Japanese conservatives but also by Koreans and Chinese, she said.
Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s press statement at the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
(U.S. National Archives)
Paths to reconciliation
Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC and a professor of sociology, suggested that while Europe’s experience with war and reconciliation offers lessons for Asia, significant differences exist between the wartime and post-war situations of the two continents, and that reconciliation in Asia requires time. Increased economic interaction between the countries in Northeast Asia serves less to foster reconciliation, he said, than to spur competition for regional dominance. Shin emphasized that the United States, which has greatly impacted the region’s post-war history, can play a critical role as a facilitator in establishing lasting regional accord.
The Nazi regime’s systematic attempt to completely wipe out all traces of Jewish history and culture in Europe, even as closely bound as it was with Germany’s own traditions, is a unique case, stated Fania Oz-Salzberger, a professor of history at Haifa and Monash Universities. She explored universal elements in the German-Jewish reconciliation experience, noting, like Shin and Chirot, the important element of time that is needed to reflect upon painful events of the past. Oz-Salzberger especially spoke of the healing that takes place at the level of society and culture, sometimes even before governments are ready to reconcile with one another.
Continuing political impacts
Gilbert Rozman, a professor of sociology at Princeton University, suggested that Northeast Asia’s wartime history debates will continue to complicate regional relations unless China, Japan, and Korea reach a point of mutual reconciliation. He noted the role that Japan’s government, in the 1980s during its financial heyday, and more recently, China’s leaders during a similarly strong economic era, have played in prolonging the debate.
Memories of war are transmitted across the years through a complex process involving multiple actors and they can later influence political behavior, explained MIT political science professor Roger Petersen. He described the process within the context of the Lithuania’s successful declaration of independence from the former Soviet Union in January 1991. Petersen stated that Lithuanian émigrés, in part, helped keep the narrative of Soviet aggression and Lithuanian martyrdom alive until the conditions were right for action many decades later.
The Colonialism, Collaboration, and Criminality conference grew out of Shorenstein APARC’s Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, which for the past three years has examined the legacy of war-era memories in Northeast Asia and the United States and explored possible means of reconciliation. Shorenstein APARC has already published the first in a series of four books based on the project, and an edited volume of papers from the June 2011 conference is forthcoming next year.
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Japanese wartime era postcard depicting the seizure of Rehe in northern China in late 1937.
Kazuma Fukai is a corporate affiliate visiting fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for 2011–12. He has worked for Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.'s Legal Department since 2003. His responsibilities included overseas transactions such as acquisitions of foreign companies, emission trading, and procurement of natural resources. Since 2010, Fukai has been engaged in the review of nuclear power plants and related systems in terms of the technical aspects and nuclear culture in the Nuclear Integrity Reform Department. Fukai graduated from Doshisha University in 2003 with a bachelor of law degree.
Japan leads, chased closely by South Korea, with China, on a vastly larger scale, not far behind. Not as mercantilist development states nor as threats to America's high-tech industry, but rather as the world’s most rapidly aging societies.
A wave of unprecedented demographic change is sweeping across East Asia, the forefront of a phenomenon of longer life expectancy and declining birthrates that together yield a striking rate of aging. Japan already confronts a shrinking population. Korea is graying even more quickly. And although China is projected to grow for another couple of decades, demographic change races against economic development. Could China become the first country to grow old before growing rich? In Southeast Asia, Singapore also is confronting a declining birthrate and an aging society. Increasingly, Asia’s aging countries look to its younger societies, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India, as sources of migrant labor and even wives. Those countries in turn face different demographic challenges, such as how to educate their youth for global competition.
The third Stanford Kyoto Trans-Asian Dialogue will focus on demographic change in the region and its implications across a wide range of areas, including economies, societies, and security. Asia’s experience offers both lessons and warnings for North America and Europe, which are facing similar problems. Questions to be addressed include:
What are the inter-relationships between population aging and key macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, savings rates, and public and private intergenerational transfers?
How and why do policy responses to population aging differ in Japan, South Korea, and across different regions of China?
What are the effects of demographic change on national institutions such as employment practices, pension and welfare systems, and financial systems?
What policies can or should be pursued to influence future outcomes?
How will demographic change affect security in the Asia-Pacific region?
How have patterns of migration impacted society and culture in East Asia, in comparative perspective?
How will demographic change influence the movement of people across the region and the prevalence of multicultural families?
What lessons can Asia, the United States, and Europe learn from each other to improve the policy response to population aging?
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) established the Stanford Kyoto Trans-Asian Dialogue in 2009 to facilitate conversation about current Asia-Pacific issues with far-reaching global implications. Scholars from Stanford University and various Asian countries start each session of the two-day event with stimulating, brief presentations, which are followed by engaging, off-the-record discussion. Each Dialogue closes with a public symposium and reception, and a final report is published on the Shorenstein APARC website.
Previous Dialogues have brought together a diverse range of experts and opinion leaders from Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, India, Australia, and the United States. The first Dialogue examined the global environmental and economic impacts of energy usage in Asia and the United States. It also explored the challenges posed by competition for resources and the possibilities for cooperating to develop sustainable forms of energy and better consumption practices. Last year’s Dialogue considered the question of building an East Asian Community similar in concept to the European Union. Participants discussed existing organizations, such as ASEAN and APEC, and the economic, policy, and security implications of creating an integrated East Asia regional structure.
The annual Stanford Kyoto Trans-Asian Dialogue is made possible through the generosity of the City of Kyoto, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and Yumi and Yasunori Kaneko.
Kyoto International Community House Event Hall
2-1 Torii-cho, Awataguchi,
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8536
JAPAN
More than six decades after the end of World War II, the Japanese government has yet to return an estimated ¥278 million worth of unpaid financial assets owed to Asian victims of forced mobilization for the war effort. During the Allied Occupation of Japan, American authorities directed Japanese officials to deposit these assets in the Bank of Japan for eventual restitution, setting up a custody account in 1946 and a foreign creditor’s account in 1949. However, the outbreak of the Korean War destroyed any chance of restitution, as the U.S. preoccupation over the cold war conflict effectively froze the unpaid assets that still remain in the Bank of Japan. Clarifying the historical record of American involvement in managing these accounts can contribute towards a U.S.-mediated effort to reach regional reconciliation between Japan and its neighbors in Northeast Asia.
This article examines the foreign policy views of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), from the party’s founding through its first year in power.
Main Argument
In 2009 the DPJ came to power in Japan, ending a half-century of conservative rule, with the hope of reshaping the post–Cold War order by rebalancing Japanese policy with a greater emphasis on Asia, inspired by a “new Asianism.” Instead, the party’s first year in office was marked by foreign policy tensions— first with the U.S. over bases in Okinawa, followed by clashes with China in the Senkaku Islands. The DPJ has moved painfully along the learning curve from opposition politics to the realities of governance. On both sides of the Pacific, policymakers now believe the rocky transition has led to a restoration of the postwar consensus, particularly regarding the U.S.-Japan security relationship. But it would be wrong to conclude that DPJ policies, shaped during the party’s formative years by key leaders who remain largely in place, have been simply thrown aside. The new Asianism, which should not be understood as a “pro- China” shift but rather as an effort to manage the rise of China, remains a core identity of the DPJ.
Policy Implications
There is a real danger that relations between Japan and the U.S. could slide again into a morass. Avoiding that outcome requires a more serious effort to understand the underlying foreign policy identity of the DPJ and dispel illusions about the nature of change in Japan.
Rather than seeing the new Asianism as only a threat, policymakers should view it as an opportunity to jointly, and in concert with South Korea, reshape the security order in Northeast Asia.
The DPJ’s interest in an East Asian community potentially challenges China for leadership of future regional structures. The party’s focus on Asia, including ties with countries such as India, Vietnam, South Korea, and Australia, could create a security structure in Asia that can cope with the rise of China’s power.
The mechanism and basis for dialogue is weaker than ever in the U.S.- Japan alliance. The relationships built up over decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party need to be revitalized to adapt to a new era in Japanese politics.
This paper begins with contested issues among various approaches to institutions and seeks an analytical/conceptual framework for integrating them. Based on fundamental studies of knowledge theory and epistemic game theory, it discusses the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal artifacts that cognitively mediate agents’ strategic interactions and their individual beliefs in societal games. This approach is termed as the institutions-as-cognitive-media-view and its implications to the role of culture, institutional complementarities, and policy in the institutional process are discussed. It concludes with a proposal for a three-level approach to institutions: generic-ontological, comparative-substantive, and policy-design levels.
A year has passed since the South Korean warship Cheonan sank into the depths of the Yellow Sea, an event attributed to an attack from North Korea and one that rekindled afresh the ongoing tensions between South and North. In that time, Pyongyang has transmitted confusing signals to the world about the strength of its leadership and its intentions toward South Korea, including publishing photos of a steely but frail-looking Kim Jong Il alongside his young heir apparent Kim Jong Un and unexpectedly attacking Yeonpyong Island in late November. It is clear that the Kim Jong Il regime still maintains strong control over its citizens and that the country's nuclear program continues to grow. Nevertheless, there are hints of instability and signs of information from the outside world trickling into North Korea that point to coming change.
During an April 21 television interview, visiting fellow Sang-Hun Choe, an International Herald Tribune journalist with many years of experience reporting on North Korea, addressed the complexity of the country's current political situation, noting the lack of firsthand information and the mixture of fear and genuine belief motivating adherence to the longstanding official party line. Choe emphasized the importance for the countries most closely tied to North Korean political developments—especially South Korea, the United States, and China—to consider the key questions regarding the future of North Korea, including what shape a transfer of power or a regime collapse could take.
Media coverage of North Korea
Reporting on North Korea is no simple matter, due in large part to the government's tight control on the flow of information in and out of the country. "North Korea is so closed that it is almost impossible for journalists to gather firsthand information," stresses Choe. Television and radio broadcasts and the internet are closely monitored in North Korea, and there is a recent move to confiscate mobile phones as they are smuggled into the country.
Choe suggests that a journalist's own interests and the political agenda of his or her country often shape the angle of their coverage of North Korea. For example, the U.S. media tends to focus on North Korean nuclear developments and the resumption of the Six Party Talks, a reflection of the official U.S. defense agenda. Reporting in South Korea is not quite as straightforward. "South Korea's relationship with North Korea is very complex," Choe states. While there is deep resentment toward North Korean attacks on the South, there is also a sense of shared Korean identity that influences South Korean news coverage of North Korea, he says.
Juche and the Kim family dynasty
Tapping into the deeply rooted sense of nationalism that emerged in Korea as a result of great power competition over the peninsula, North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung masterfully applied the principle of juche to found his family's political dynasty. "It [‘juche'] is very difficult to translate," says Choe. "One of the most common English translations is ‘self reliance,' but that does not really explain everything. It is more like ‘in our own way of living' or ‘in charge of our own fate.'"
North Korean citizens do not mindlessly follow the official party ideology, stresses Choe. Some people are motivated by fear of punishment, while others firmly believe in juche. "We have to take these two elements into account when we try to understand North Korea," he says. "There is fear, but there is also pride in their system. Whether you call it ‘brainwashing' or not, it is the reality."
Kim Jong Il's apparently failing health and heir Kim Jong Un's youth and lack of experience weigh heavily on the minds of political analysts. Photos suggest that Kim Jong Il is recovering from a stroke, a fact confirmed several months ago by the South Korean government. According to Choe, the key question now is how long Kim Jong Il will live. "[He] did not expect that he would have a stroke," he says, "so the transition [of power] is being prepared in a hurry." Kim Jong Il's own rise to power was gradual and he held numerous political positions over the years. Despite being made a military general in September, Kim Jong Un's political experience is comparatively limited.
Future concerns and possible scenarios
Despite uncertainties about the transfer of power in North Korea, recent reports suggest that the country continues to develop its nuclear program. In addition to the regional security concerns this poses, the nuclear accident in Japan this March raises environmental safety questions. For example, how would North Korea prepare for or respond to damage to a nuclear facility caused by a natural disaster? "Despite being a very technologically advanced country, Japan has still had a lot of difficulties dealing with its nuclear disaster," Choe emphasizes.
While North Korea's juche ideology continues to legitimize the Kim family dynasty, Choe suggests that the current system cannot last forever, especially with the country's ongoing food shortages and the significant regional economic and political developments of the past few decades. "If you look at Northeast Asia, all of the other former communist countries are more or less thriving by adopting market reforms/economies, and North Korea is left alone," he says. "It is a very poor, isolated country in a very well-to-do neighborhood of the world—it cannot last forever."
Choe downplays the possibility of an Egypt-style revolution in North Korea, but suggests that China, South Korea, and the United States should consider the potential scenarios for the future of North Korean politics. "The big question is when and how change will come," he states. "If the regime collapses, will there be some kind of power struggle between factions? Is China going to intervene?"
China does not necessarily support North Korea's political decisions, including its nuclear program and economic policies, Choe suggests, but the collapse of North Korea could lead to a mass exodus of refugees into its northeastern provinces. Furthermore, he says, "Another concern for China is what will happen on the Korean Peninsula if North Korea collapses. Is South Korea going to take over the northern half of the peninsula and create one unified Korea, or is America? China might not be happy to have a small, but well-to-do pro-America unified Korea right on its border . . . That explains its attitude seemingly ambiguous [toward North Korea.]"
It is certain that the current North Korean political situation is a very puzzling and complex one, with apparently more questions than answers at this time. As Choe suggests, it is most important now for the world—especially China, South Korea, and the United States—to examine the possible future issues and scenarios facing North Korea, and to identify the related key questions in an effort to prepare for the inevitable change that will one day come.
A full recording of Choe's interview is available online at the KEMS TV website (Korean language).
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North Korean banknotes bearing the image of founder Kim Il Sung
People began emigrating in significant numbers from China beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, and many settled down in Southeast Asia. Jianli Huang, the 2010–2011 Lee Kong Chian Fellow and a specialist on Chinese diaspora studies, presented two well-received talks on this subject in April 2011. Huang's April 12 seminar examined National University of Singapore scholar Wang Gungwu's research on migration nomenclature, including the term "Chinese diaspora," in relation to policymaking. On April 26, Huang insightfully reviewed the life and times of China emigrant and Singapore entrepreneur-philanthropist Lee Kong Chian (1893–1967). Full audio recordings and slides from these two presentations, as well as a link to the Chinese-language coverage of Huang's April 12 seminar in the online edition of the World Journal, are available on the Southeast Asia Forum website.
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Colonial-era architecture in Singapore's Chinatown
The concept of "soft power" is central for the multi-dimensional rise of China as well as the evolving global strategy of the United States. Beijing is increasingly concerned with projecting soft power to neutralize perceptions of China as a threat while Chinese global influence grows. Washington, meanwhile, looks to employ soft power in remaking its post-Iraq international image, countering terrorist ideological extremism, and attracting the cooperation of international partners to deal with global challenges.
This seminar will address several key questions about soft power:
- What are the different implications when governments use "hard power" in "soft" ways versus when they try to use "soft power" in "hard" ways?
- How is soft power understood and operationalized differently in China than in the United States?
- What are the different visions for projecting soft power among various political actors in China?
- Can soft power be threatening? How can we disentangle capabilities and policies that may be threatening from those that are attractive to other states and encourage cooperation?
About the speakers
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Qinghong Wang is currently coordinating the Education Exchange Program for the East-West Center in Honolulu. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa in 2010. His dissertation is entitled, Reinventing Democracy through Confucianism: Representation, Application and Reorientation of Western Transnational Nonprofit Organizations (WTNPOs) in Post-Mao China. Dr. Wang earned his MA in Asian studies from the University of Hawaii in 2003 and his BA in Chinese language and literature from Peking (Beijing) University in 1999. Dr. Wang is originally from Beijing. He was the Lloyd (Joe) R. and Lilian Vasey Fellow with the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) from 2006 to 2007, and has since remained an adjunct fellow with the Forum. His research focuses on the development of civil society in China, U.S.-China relations, traditional and nontraditional security issues in the Asia Pacific, and comparative politics and philosophies of East and West.
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Leif-Eric Easley is the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at Shorenstein APARC. Dr. Easley completed his Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government in 2010, specializing in East Asian international relations. His dissertation presents a theory of national identity perceptions, bilateral trust between governments, and patterns of security cooperation, based on extensive fieldwork in Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing. At Stanford, he is teaching a course on nationalism, contested history, and the international relations of Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States. Dr. Easley is actively involved in high-level U.S.-Asia exchanges (Track II diplomacy) as a Sasakawa and Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS. His research appears in a variety of academic journals, supplemented by commentaries in major newspapers.
With regional perspective commentary by:
Donald Emmerson, Director, Southeast Asia Forum, Shorenstein APARC
Daniel Sneider, Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC
David Straub, Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC