Shorenstein APARC has received a grant from the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul which enables the center to publish a series of books on Korea's democratization and social change, under the series title: Korean Democracy: From Birth to Maturity.

Under this three-year grant, the center will publish a series of studies which focus on: 1) the role of social movements in Korean democratization, 2) comparative relevance of the Korean experiences, and 3) impact of democratization on social and political changes.

For the first study the center will build upon its on-going research projects, particularly the Stanford Korean Democracy Project. This project seeks to understand the emergence and evolution of social movements and their role in Korean democratization. During the authoritarian years, when former military generals ruled Korea, various social groups participated in the movement to restore democracy and ensure human rights. Their activism was instrumental to democratic reforms that took place in the summer of 1987 and they continued to play an important role even after democratic transition.

The Stanford University Korea Democracy Project traces the dynamic of this social movement from 1970 to 1993. Based on sourcebooks obtained from the Korea Democracy Foundation, project researchers led by Dr. Gi-Wook Shin have created novel quantitative data sets. Specifically, they have coded the main features of nearly five thousand protest and repression events from 1970 to 1993, using a comprehensive coding scheme developed expressly for this purpose. In addition, researchers have coded an organizational directory that includes characteristics associated with 387 social movement organizations active during this same period. While there are many informative studies of particular movements - such as the Kwangju uprising - in Korea's democracy movement, the Stanford Korea Democracy Project aims to provide a systematic overview of the movement as it developed through the most authoritarian period (1972-84), democratic transition (1987), and the democratic period (post-1987). Two books are expected from this project.

The second study will address the comparative relevance of Korean experiences. The comparison between Korea and other non-Western societies raises many questions about the conditions necessary for democratic transformation, including the role of culture, national identity, social organization, labor politics, and economic modernization. There is also a need to understand how Korea's particular example provides lessons regarding effective democracy promotion. The center plans to host a conference on labor politics in Korean democracy that is designed to develop a theoretical challenge to the Euro-centric theoretical paradigm in labor studies and draw implications for other non-Western societies. In advancing comparative perspectives, the researchers will work closely with Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). The coordinator of their Democracy Program, Larry Diamond, has already published two books that looked at Korea's experience in this comparative framework.

Finally, the third study will assess the impact of democratization on broader social and political changes in South Korea. This will include not only domestic issues but also Korea's relations with other nations. The latter is particularly relevant since Korean democratization took place in the post-cold war era. As such, democratization has provoked Koreans to rethink their views of the North, US-ROK relations and Korea's role in the world. Clearly democratic change has significantly altered the environment in which Korean government policy is made, broadening the public policy dialogue to include non-governmental actors, new media, and politicians who are sensitive to the shifts of public opinion. Researchers at the center will explore this dynamic in supporting the research and publication of a new book on South Korea's democratization and the anti-American wave of 1999-2002, authored by a former senior American official, David Straub, currently a 2007-2008 Pantech Research Fellow at the Center. 

In December 2007, for the first time ever, South Koreans, anxious about the economy, elected a businessman as their president. Pro-growth conservative Lee Myung-bak won a resounding victory, with 49 percent of the vote, over left-center candidate Chung Dong-young, who won only 26 percent. Lee's margin would have been even greater had it not been for the late entry into the race by another conservative, Lee Hoi-chang, who finished third with 15 percent.

Korean voters had become tired of ten years of rule by the left-center, and they saw incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun as confrontational and ineffective. By contrast, Lee, a former Hyundai Engineering and Construction CEO, has a reputation for being a pragmatic, can-do leader. As mayor of Seoul (2002-2006), he beautified the city and reformed its mass transit system.

Lee is scheduled to be inaugurated on February 25 for a single five-year term, but he faces two early challenges. First, just before the election, the left-center camp passed a bill establishing a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Lee had been involved in business fraud and other corruption. The special prosecutor is supposed to announce his findings before the inauguration. A regular prosecutor earlier found the charges to be unfounded, and most observers think that the special prosecutor will not turn up significant new information.

Second, President-elect Lee must counter centrifugal forces in the conservative party ahead of parliamentary elections on April 5. Lee Hoi-chang's defection has already split the conservative camp, and now President-elect Lee and former conservative party leader Park Geun-hye (daughter of the late President Park Chung Hee) are feuding over how much say each should have in choosing candidates for the parliamentary election.

If President-elect Lee is cleared by the special prosecutor and if he successfully manages relations with Park, Lee's party will likely win a very large majority in the parliamentary election, offering him the opportunity to be a strong and effective executive.

As president, Lee will face two long-term challenges. First, as Lee has promised Korean voters, he must strengthen the economy. While the Korean economy has been growing at a rate of about 5 percent in recent years, the average Korean has felt hard-pressed by large increases in housing and education costs. Lee plans to focus on deregulation and attracting foreign investment. He has, however, already been forced to scale back his promise of 7 percent annual growth to 6 percent at least for his first year in office.

Second, although North Korea was not a major issue in the election campaign, due to the apparent progress in Six-Party talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, many experts are skeptical that North Korea will fully abandon its nuclear ambitions. Lee supports engagement of North Korea and continued humanitarian aid, but he has said he will not provide major economic aid to North Korea until it ends its nuclear weapons program. This marks a significant departure from the policy of his predecessors Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung. A renewal of tensions with North Korea could threaten South Korean economic growth and Lee's popularity.

Lee strongly supports South Korea's alliance with the United States. He may seek talks with the United States to adjust or delay implementation of agreements reached in recent years to reduce the United States' role in South Korea's defense. Lee also supports early ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the largest U.S. free trade agreement since NAFTA. (The U.S. Congress has not yet approved the U.S.-Korea FTA.)

Many experts believe that the near coincidence of Lee's election and the inauguration of a new U.S. administration in January 2009 offers a major opportunity to strengthen U.S.-South Korean relations. Shorenstein APARC and the New York-based Korea Society recently announced the formation of a study group of senior former U.S. officials and experts to issue a report and recommendations on how the next U.S. administration can work with President Lee. The study group will travel to Seoul in early February for meetings with President-elect Lee and his economic, foreign policy, and security advisors.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the election of Lee was that Koreans did not think it remarkable. They simply took it for granted that the election would be free, fair, and peaceful. Yet it has only been twenty years since South Koreans literally forced a military-backed government to allow them to vote democratically for their chief executive. In those two decades, there have been five presidential elections, with Lee's victory making the second full-fledged transfer of power between political camps. Moreover, this election was conducted at very low cost, using public funds; companies were not "squeezed" for campaign contributions as in the past. South Korea has demonstrated itself to be, along with Australia and New Zealand, the most democratic country in East Asia and a model of political development for the entire international community.

We are pleased to announce the first article of the new academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. John D. Ciorciari, one of this year's Shorenstein Fellows. Dr. Ciorciari's current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. In this piece, Dr. Ciorciari shares some comments on "Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution."

In late September, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks took to the streets of Myanmar, leading the largest uprising against the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since 1988. A sharp and sudden hike in fuel prices sparked the protests, but to the regime's many critics, the revolt displayed the depth of popular discontent with economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression in Myanmar. Images of unarmed monks confronting the feared tatmadaw (armed forces) won the protesters considerable moral support from abroad, as did a public appearance by Aung San Suu Kyi. Some observers anticipated that the "saffron revolution" would lead to the overthrow of the regime, as occurred during the "rose," "orange," and "tulip" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

The tatmadaw responded swiftly and brutally, however. Troops imposed tight curfews, raided pagodas, and used clubs and tear gas to disperse protesters. In a matter of days, the armed forces killed numerous demonstrators, arrested or detained thousands more, and re-imposed control. The saffron revolution thus appears to have subsided, and the outlook is not promising for advocates of regime change or dramatic policy shifts in Myanmar.

The episode did reveal some minor cracks in the SPDC edifice. Colonel Hla Win, a longtime senior member of the junta, reportedly defected into an ethnic Karen rebel-controlled area and is seeking political asylum after defying an order to massacre a group of monks. At least one senior army official has leaked incriminating evidence to the press, and a foreign ministry official resigned at the government's "appalling" response to the protests. Prime Minister Soe Win has been hospitalized with leukemia for months. Rumors even swirled of a coup. Nevertheless, SPDC chairman Than Shwe, his deputy Maung Aye, and other cabinet members appear to have closed ranks, and the SPDC looks quite firmly entrenched.

International responses to the uprising and military response have been mixed. Western governments and activist groups quickly condemned the SPDC and pushed the regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy. U.S. President George W. Bush announced tighter sanctions shortly after the crackdown began. Japan--which has favored engagement in the past--is now considering sanctions and has demanded an explanation and an apology for the shooting of a Japanese journalist.

To dampen international pressure, the SPDC allowed Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari to enter the country as a UN special envoy. Gambari has met with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi to convey the UN's concerns about the crackdown. The SPDC has also appointed retired general U Aung Kyi as an official interlocutor with Aung San Suu Kyi and has made gestures of conciliation to the clergy. However, the Myanmar leadership has rebuffed demands for more serious political dialogue or far-reaching policy reforms.

A degree of Chinese and Russian protection has helped shield the SPDC from international pressure. China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution demanding that the SPDC free all political prisoners. Officials in Beijing and Moscow argued that the unrest was an "internal matter" unsuited for Security Council action. Their defense of a strong norm of sovereignty--rooted largely in their fear of similar Western attacks--provides political cover for the SPDC. Their objection to isolating Myanmar economically also makes it unlikely that a program of enhanced U.S. and European sanctions will bring the junta to its knees. As long as Myanmar's neighbors do business with the SPDC, it will probably survive.

To date, divergent foreign policy priorities have conspired against a genuinely multilateral policy to drive reform in Myanmar. For China, Myanmar is a strategic gateway to the East Indian Ocean and a source of prized raw materials, as well as a political ally on issues of state sovereignty. India and Thailand have also been loath to cut off or alienate their troublesome neighbor. India has little ideological affection for the SPDC but rejects sanctions and has responded quietly to recent events in Myanmar. Indian officials view Myanmar as an important regional pivot with China and a source of natural resources. Thai policymakers, worried about refugees and instability in ethnic minority enclaves along the border, have tended to prioritize stability over reform in relations with the SPDC. Both India and Thailand derive considerable economic benefits--both legal and illicit--from an open border. In addition, they fear that using their limited leverage to attack the junta will drive it further into China's embrace.

The governments of other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have split on the issue. Indochinese states defend Myanmar's sovereignty, while the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been more openly critical. With a bit of diplomatic legerdemain, Singapore expressed ASEAN's grave concern to Myanmar, speaking as the Association's chair. Discourse in regional think tanks suggests that a growing number of Southeast Asian officials advocate Myanmar's suspension from ASEAN. Although suspension would push Myanmar even further into the margins of international society, it would be unlikely to unseat the SPDC. Isolation also bears obvious risks; cloning North Korea is not in any ASEAN government's interest.

Most analysts agree that China holds the key to improving the prospects for reform, development, and democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, a change in Chinese policy would increase the likelihood of tougher Indian and ASEAN stances, since a fear of encouraging close Sino-Myanmar ties helps justify their existing approaches. The possibility of embarrassment at the upcoming Olympic games provides a short-term incentive for China to press the SPDC for better governance. A longer-term incentive will be to secure the countries' shared border, which is plagued by narco-trafficking, illegal migration, and ethnic conflict. Finally, China has an incentive to build its credibility as a constructive force in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chinese officials have led a well-documented "charm offensive" in the region, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to build influence. To the extent that ASEAN governments make reform in Myanmar a priority, China can show itself to be a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asia's future.

In the near term, a coalescence of the policies of regional powers is unlikely. Moreover, strong regional pressure does not guarantee seismic policy shifts in Myanmar. The SPDC's harsh response to the protests--like its 2006 decision to move the national capital to a remote area--testifies to considerable paranoia. Still, the outside world has economic, security, and moral reasons to hold Myanmar to higher standards of governance. The pace and direction of change will depend only marginally on the severity of Western sanctions, which bite but do not cripple the regime. Western governments' ability to identify common objectives and forge cooperation with Asian partners will be more determinative. Ultimately, the development of concerted action by relevant Asian states is likely to be the rate-limiting step in the equation. The saffron revolution suggests that many domestic actors are prepared to assume risks to promote reform if Myanmar's neighbors take a tougher stand and help provide the enabling conditions for change.

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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.

Two countries with a common and ancient civilization, India and Pakistan, celebrated 60 years of independence from colonial rule this week. At the time of independence, both countries were in danger of collapsing from internal and external threats. This greatly influenced both countries' subsequent turn toward centralism - in India's case, statism, and in Pakistan's case, army rule.

For four decades, both statism and army rule seemed irreversible. This was despite failures across the board: In both countries, territory was lost and the economy stagnated. Resources were spent on developing nuclear weaponry and on dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which was fostered by Pakistan and repressed by India. What was left was often wasted through corruption. By 1990, it was common for Pakistan to be labeled a failed state and India, perhaps more damningly, a failed democracy.

Pakistan's army and feudal landlords, who shared political power via an informal coalition throughout the first 40 years, deserve most of the blame for Pakistan's failures. They carved up the economy among themselves, and let the poor survive by growing food and providing simple services to the rich. India's greater failures hid these strategies from national or global attention. Pakistan even overtook India for a while until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's nationalizations of the 1970s brought them on par again.

Pakistan, a day older than India, but with an even younger population, seems to have aged more poorly over the past two decades. As the Indian economy picks up speed on the back of the 1991 reforms, India is on its way to becoming a global player in services and acquiring as formidable a reputation as China for job creation. The IT sector alone creates three new jobs every minute of each working day. In the four statistics that really matter - literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality rates and the female-to-male ratio - only in the last does Pakistan perform better than India and that, too, marginally. In the others, it is substantially worse.

There is no single reason for Pakistan's poorer performance. It turned as reformist as India in the 1990s. This has benefited some parts of its economy. For instance, the country adds over 2.5 million new cell phone users each month, or 1 for every second of the day. Though below India's rate of 2.7 new cell phone users per second, it is a much better ratio to the population.

Religious fervor is often accused, but has not - in either the subcontinent's history or in Pakistan's shorter one - been a barrier to development. Despite incidents such as led to the recent siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, theocratic parties have never received more than 15 percent of the popular vote - and that was three decades ago. Evidence within all the countries of South Asia provides proof of the proposition that the poor, regardless of faith or ethnicity, seek the means of development, particularly the acquisition of education. Muslims are no exception to this proposition. For instance, the first administrative district to reach 100 percent literacy in the subcontinent was the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram in the Indian state of Kerala.

Finally, one cannot simply blame performance on Pakistan not being a full democracy. The world abounds with more failed than successful democracies, while China provides the most stunning counterexample of a successful dictatorship. Pakistan's current state of governance - in which the military, the courts and parliament share power and the press is relatively free - has been achieved through decades of negotiation and may well be the best framework given its current stage of political maturity.

Yet, there is one difference that may be the real reason for Pakistan's backwardness, and it is now becoming evident - again, by comparison with India. It is linked to bad governance but does not always follow from the democratic tradition. The difference is, in a word, freedom. India provides a good example: The government used to decide how resources were spent, leaving citizens with few choices on careers, education and lifestyles - on participation in their nation's growth. Since the 1990s, the Indian state has worked hard to give its citizens more freedom. The result is an invigorated India.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has moved slowly on freedom. The state has withdrawn from the economy, but now grants favors selectively to the private sector, with the inevitable corollary of massive corruption and loss of freedom of action.

This suggests that Pakistan is only a crucial freedom step away from success. In reality, the immediate future does not look promising because the country's citizens do not have the political will to achieve real change. It is a sad commentary that Pakistan's choices for the next cycle of political rule look like bad ones: the continuation of the present system of quasi-military rule or its replacement with the destructive feudal forces that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif represent. Surely, Pakistan's citizens deserve much better - something worth pondering as their nation celebrates turning 60.

Reprinted with permission by The San Jose Mercury News.