On Monday, an undersea earthquake shook Indonesia's remote Mentawai Islands and triggered a 10-foot tsunami: It has killed at least 272 people, and left 412 missing. The first cargo plane with humanitarian supplies arrived today. Hundreds of miles away in eastern Java, the volcanic Mount Merapi erupted Tuesday and killed at least 30 people.
That's two disasters in less than 24 hours.
Indonesia is no stranger to catastrophe. It is located along the Pacific Ring of Fire, which is one of the most seismically and volcanically volatile areas in the world. Its last sizeable earthquake and tsunami duo struck in December of 2004, killing more than 225,000 people in 14 countries.
But despite the death and destruction of the last 48 hours, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said today that he doesn't yet see a need for foreign aid or rescue assistance.
So far, only the Philippines and the United States have offered to help Indonesia. But Natalegawa's behavior seems counter-intuitive. In the face of disaster, why would any country preemptively say no to aid?
A look into Indonesia's history reveals latent political sensitivities that may have influenced Natalegawa's decision. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization of countries who are not aligned with or against any major world power.
Indonesia prides itself on its "independent and active" foreign policy, which was first developed by then Vice President Mohammad Hatta on September 2, 1948 in Central Java. "Do we, Indonesians, in the struggle for the freedom of our people and our country, only have to choose between Russia and America?" he asked. "Is not there any other stand that we can take in the pursuit of our ideals?"
The "other stand" became known as "mendayung antara dua karang" or "rowing between two reefs."
Indonesia doesn't want to appear incompetent, or weak, to outside governments, and may also be wary to accept aid for fear of undermining its national legitimacy.
In 2004, Indonesia's acceptance of aid had an arguably negative effect on its citizens. "Though the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in Aceh were generally successful, the amount of aid did engender some resentment in Jakarta over whether the national government had lost control of the reconstruction, and also potentially altered the economy in Aceh," explains Josh Kurlantzick a fellow for southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So people remember that."
Donald Emmerson, the director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, cites several reasons for Natalegawa's response. First, he says, if the Indonesian government solicited foreign aid, it would be inundated with offers. Coordinating offers of assistance right now would be a severe burden on the government.
Then there's the question of scale: so far, the destruction seems manageable in comparison to the 2004 disaster. Still, it's unclear whether Indonesia will be able to adequately respond on its own. "Indonesia is a large country, and its infrastructure is overstretched," Emmerson says. "Its capacity to respond effectively to domestic disasters is not as good as it might be."
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.
What was learned last week about
the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?
The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation
that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his
successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of
Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father
is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is
not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the
possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in
2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had
lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.
Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?
There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the
eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was
caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese
officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted
contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao,
ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the
successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently
ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the
personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.
The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.
What is known about Kim Jong-un?
He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was
born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are
significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was
born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is
almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet
student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also
liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say
he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been
appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense
Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.
Who now heads North Korea? What is the
power structure like?
The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute
dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact
that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country
alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in
recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a
dominant place today.
A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.
Does a period of transition put the
regime in danger? What took place before?
It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of
transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what
form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a
period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current
process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the
successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and
consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of
state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his
father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established
as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in
2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough
time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the
military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.
What legacy does he leave his son Kim
Jong-un?
Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely
sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite
states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and
China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has
become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s.
Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several
hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of
a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen
its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to
basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.
The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.
What is the situation at the diplomatic level?
North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.
Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.
The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.
The speaker says that restoration of Cheonggye stream in downtown Seoul is arguably the most prestigious and controversial construction project in Korea today. Since its reopening in 2005 after having been buried for half a century, the stream site has become an important leisure place for the urban populace. It has also become an icon of greener Seoul in it’s quest for a global city status. In the meantime, the stream project also actively mobilized the discourses of national identity restoration, heritage and "people." This talk is about the ideology and the representation of Cheonggye stream. It will focus on how the stream project seeks to revive a sense of the shared past as a galvanizing force in what is after all divisive transformations in the new urban economy of contemporary Korea. The speaker aims to show how the stream restoration represents an important shift in the mode of governing the urban population.
Dr. Hong Kal is Associate Professor of Art History at the department of Visual Arts, York University. Her research explores the politics of a visual spectacle in twentieth-century Korea. She is the author of Aesthetic Constructions of Korean Nationalism (Routledge, forthcoming). She was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center in 2003-2005.
Philippines Conference Room
Between 1958 and 1962, China descended into hell." So opens Mao's Great Famine: A History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, Frank Dikötter's riveting and magnificently detailed chronicle of the Great Leap Forward. Using previously restricted archives, historian Dikötter reveals that under this initiative the country became the site not only of one of the most deadly mass killings of human history (at least 45 million people were worked, starved or beaten to death) but also the greatest demolition of real estate - and catastrophe for the natural environment - in human history, as up to a third of all housing was turned to rubble and the land savaged in the maniacal pursuit of steel and other industrial accomplishments. Piecing together both the vicious machinations in the corridors of power and the everyday experiences of ordinary people, Dikötter at last gives voice to the dead and disenfranchised.
Frank Dikötter is Chair Professor of Humanities at the University of Hong Kong and Professor of the Modern History of China on leave from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He has published nine books on modern China, from the classic The Discourse of Race in Modern China(1992) to China before Mao: The Age of Openness (2007).
**Books will be available for purchase during this event.**
Philippines Conference Room
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E331
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Peter Zeitz is a Stanford Shorenstein Fellow for the 2010-2011 academic year. He received his PhD in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles in 2010. Specializing in economic history and industrial organization, Zeitz's research interests include productivity change in Chinese industry during the twentieth century, the mechanics of international transfers of knowledge, and personnel economics. His doctoral research has focused on the effects of performance incentives on the productivity of Chinese state-owned enterprises, the transfer of textile technology to China prior to World War II, and the effects of trade in capital goods on productivity trends in Chinese industry. His research has been supported by the Fulbright program as well as grants from the National Science Foundation and the University of California Pacific Rim Program.
Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard Professor and U.S. Ambassador to Japan, was a seminal figure in both American education about and policy toward East Asia. In his detailed new biography, Dr. George Packard brings together his scholarship and his personal experience working for Reischauer in the early 1960s.
Re-centering the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the turmoil of the 1960 Security Treaty Riots, Ambassador Reischauer relied on his deep understanding of and sympathy for Japan, stabilizing the bilateral relationship for decades. Packard's insights on this history have bearing today as the United States and Japan seek to build a new partnership to cope with emerging challenges.
George R. Packard, president of the United States-Japan Foundation, is the former dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he founded Johns Hopkins's Foreign Policy Institute, The SAIS Review, the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in China. He has been a military intelligence officer, Foreign Service Officer, journalist, scholar, educator, and author.
Philippines Conference Room
". . . History, values, memory, and identity are significant elements that can influence the 'soft power' of an alliance built on 'hard power,' and policy makers of both nations should not overlook their importance," says Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Stanford Korean Studies Program, in the chapter that he contributed to the recently published book U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia.
In his chapter "Values and History in U.S.-South Korean Relations," Shin discusses developments in the types of issues that the United States and South Korea have collaborated on in recent years--including free trade agreements, Iraq and Afghanistan military operations, and policy coordination toward North Korea--and the significance of issues of history, values, memory, and identity--such as inter-Korean reconciliation and memories of U.S. military maneuvers in Korea--that have given the U.S.-South Korea relationship a "more complex and multidimensional" nature.
Published by Cambridge University Press in October 2010, the book was edited by Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University's Department of Sociology.
Puangthong Pawakapan is the Shorenstein APARC / Asia Foundation research fellow for 2010-2011. She has a PhD in History from the University of Wollongong in Australia and a BA in Political Science from Thammasat University, Thailand. She is an Assistant Professor in International Relations Department, Chulalongkorn University. Prior to joining Shrorenstein APARC, Pawakapan was a deputy director of the Master Program in International Development Studies at the same university for four years. Between 1999-1999, she was a research affiliate at the Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University, where she researched on “Thailand’s response to the Cambodian Genocide” in Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives (2004 and 2006).
Pawakapan’s academic expertise is in the field of Southeast Asian Studies with special interest on the political relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. Political violence is also part of her interest. Most of her previous research focus on the modern and contemporary history of Thai-Cambodian relations. During her fellowship at the Shrorenstein APARC, her research will focus on the current conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, stemming from the Preah Vihear Temple issue.
