This study seeks to understand the conflict and tension arising from a territorially divided nation with a strong legacy of ethnic homogeneity, using the Korean case for consideration. In doing so, the authors rely on a recent development in social identity theory to explore the dynamics and conflict inherent in intra-group social identification.

At the height of the Cold War, the dominant Western theories of alliance building in interstate relations argued that alliances tend to be motivated more by an external need to confront a clearly defined common adversary than by the domestic attributes of alliance partners. The newly reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance, however, together with the newly expanded NATO, seems to depart from the conventional pattern by emphasizing shared democratic values and by maintaining a high degree of ambiguity regarding the goals and targets of the alliance. Although these new features of American-led military alliances provide an anchor in an other- wise highly fluid situation in the post–Cold War world, many Chinese foreign- and defense- policy analysts believe that U.S. alliances with Asian countries, particularly with Japan, pose a serious, long-term challenge, if not a threat, to China’s national security, national unification, and modernization. The ambiguity of the revised U.S.-Japan security alliance means that it is at best searching for targets and at worst aiming at China.

China’s concerns about the intention, scope, and capability of the alliances are set against a backdrop of several major changes in the region: the end of the Cold War, the simultaneous rise of China and Japan, the post-revolution reforms of Asian communist regimes, and the United States as the sole superpower. China’s uneasiness about the U.S.-led alliances goes far beyond the systemic change in the post–Cold War world, however. Its roots lie in China’s inherent weakness in the games of major powers in East Asia and in relations with other major powers in the first half of the twentieth century.

This paper begins with an overview of the interactions between China and the U.S.-led alliances in East Asia during the Cold War. This is followed by an examination of the post– Cold War period and China’s policies toward the alliances. Finally, policy options are discussed.

The study will review select policy-relevant scholarly publications of the 1990s, when the U.S.-led alliances were perceived to have made significant adaptations to the post–Cold War environment and when China’s perceptions of and policies toward these alliances also changed significantly. The survey also includes some interviews with Chinese analysts.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Why Poor Countries Are Becoming Richer, Democratic, Increasingly Peaceable, and Sometimes More Dangerous

It is easy to be confused about the world’s prospect. On the one hand, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, many millions of people have been freed from economic and political shackles that had long kept them under authoritarian rule and in poverty—or at least far poorer than they should be. On the other hand, several parts of the world are beset by political turmoil and conflicts, rapid population increases, and falling incomes.

North Korea has recently exhibited some noteworthy changes. In September 1998 it amended its constitution to change the power structure and introduced a number of progressive clauses. It also began to use the slogan “A Strong and Prosperous Nation,” which emphasizes eco- nomic prosperity as well as political, ideological, and military strength.

There are two conflicting views among North Korea watchers regarding these changes, together with some other recent changes in relations between the party, military, and govern- ment. One view is that the new constitution can be characterized by the distribution of au- thority and power. According to this view, North Korea is now trying to institutionalize the ruling system, ending Kim Jong Il’s personal rule. Technocrats will take more responsibility for running the economy. Constitutional clauses regarding the economy also aim to provide legal and institutional bases for reform and opening to the international community. This view regards the slogan “A Strong and Prosperous Nation” as North Korea’s declaration of its intent to focus foremost on economic development rather than the military and ideology. According to the other view, on the other hand, the new constitution only institutionalizes and strengthens the military rule that has persisted in North Korea for the last several years. This view suspects that the distribution of power reflected in the new constitution is nominal and that constitutional change regarding the economy is nothing but acceptance of change that has already taken place in North Korea. Therefore, the closed system will be maintained. During the last several years, particularly since the death of Kim Il Sung, there has been debate regarding the relationship between the party, military, and government in North Ko- rea. Does the enhanced status of the military increase its role in North Korea’s general deci- sion-making? Is the role of the party decreasing in the face of the rising role of the military? Is the role of the government also changing? Finally, do the changing relations between the party, the military, and the government affect North Korea’s policy direction?

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changing relations between the party, military, and government, and their impact on policy direction in North Korea.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Zouping offers important general lessons for the study of China's rural transformation. The authors in this volume, all participants in a unique field research project undertaken from 1988 to 1992, address questions that are far from simple and about which there is some controversy.

The questions are grouped around two issues. The first is the role of local governments as economic actors. What is this role, how have they played it, and how can we explain their behavior? Have they dominated rural economies through public ownership of industry and local planning, or has the role of local governments diminished with the rise of market transactions and private ownership? The second issue is market reform and inequality. Have rural cadres enjoyed income advantages in the new market environment? Has the provision of such collective services as education and health care declined, leading to new forms of inequality?

The chapters on the role of local government all point to a single conclusion: one cannot explain the rapid development of Zouping without reference to the role of local governments and of local government officials as economic actors. Scholarly writings about the "transitional economies" have often ignored or distorted this aspect of China's reform experience. On the second issue, changes in inequality owing to market reform, the authors present mixed findings but contribute rich new data to the research on this issue.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

China’s attitude toward the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, particularly the former, has drawn a lot of attention in the post–Cold War era. How China views the utility and function of these two security alliances and reacts to them could well shape the dynamics of the alliances. From a historical perspective, however, this is not a new issue. China has lived with these alliances for almost half a century. To better understand China’s current concerns about the alliances and to predict its future posture, we might look for clues in what China has done in the past. This paper attempts to provide a broad survey of Chinese perceptions of the two security alliances in the Cold War period to elucidate Beijing’s post–Cold War policy orientation. By tracing the evolution of the Chinese calculus of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.- Korea alliances, it hopes to find answers to the following questions. What are some of the important variables or conditions that defined China’s attitudes and approaches to dealing with these two alliances? How do these variables or conditions interact with each other? Have they been constant or changing over time? Are they still relevant in the post–Cold War era, and to what extent?

The paper draws its findings mainly from the Chinese official media. While this may not be an ideal source, it nevertheless provides a systematic data basis for a historical analysis of continuity and change. There is no question that the official Chinese media, particularly before the 1980s, was full of rhetoric and propaganda. There has always been a gap between rhetoric and behavior in Chinese foreign policy, as in other countries. Nevertheless it is equally true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions, self-serving or not, that provide “diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities” of the Chinese leaders and elites, and thus have policy implications.

The findings of the paper suggest that China’s perceptions of the targets, internal structures, and functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have changed remark- ably over time, from extreme hostility to high tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions of such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance of power, the well- being of its relationship with both indigenous and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. The evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China need not view the two security alliances as inherently hostile to its interests. Under some circum- stances they can be considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes are often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat to its security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China’s foreign policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these alliances. Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the region. Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of the American military presence in the region and tends to see it as a short-term arrange- ment rather than a long-term phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the two security alliances as either against China or with China. In the post–Cold War period, they have yet to be convinced that the function of the two alliances could be neither.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

By almost any criterion of success—be it cost-effectiveness, risk-reward ratio, multiplier
effects, or sheer longevity, the Japan America Security Alliance (JASA) stands out as one of
the most successful alliances in twentieth century history. For the United States, chief
architect of a global network of military relationships, JASA is arguably the most important
of its many bilateral alliances. In terms of historic impact, JASA is comparable to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multilateral alliance that restructured the European
security landscape in 1949. For nearly a half-century, JASA and NATO have functioned
as the bedrock on which the Cold War security systems of Asia and Europe have been
constructed.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.