Despite successful economic reforms over the past two decades, China's health care system for the nearly one billion people that live and work in rural areas is broken. Having admitted that there is a crisis, the government is now committed to looking for solutions. In this proposal, we have two overall goals to help provide insights on part of the solution. Our first objective is to collect an updated wave of highly informative data in Year 1 to build on an existing set of data already collected by our study team (from 2004) to analyze the effects of key health policies and institutions that have emerged over the past several years, including the government's rural health insurance system, the privatization of rural clinics, and new investments into township hospitals. Our second, more forward-looking goal for Years 2 and 3 is to set up and introduce an initial experiment on incentives to study one of the most serious flaws in China's health system: the practice in which doctors both prescribe and derive significant profit from drugs. The main hypothesis to be tested is whether realigning doctors' financial incentives embedded in the current organization of China's rural health system influence: a) the way doctors treat and manage their patients; b) the time and effort doctors put into patient care; and c) patient satisfaction.

One of the most persistent and important questions in international comparisons of health systems pertains to the wide divergence in costs between countries. Japan has significantly lower per capita health care costs than does the United States, despite having a fee-for-service reimbursement system and universal coverage, and aggressively purchasing and utilizing equipment-embodied medical technologies. 1 One important factor in the increase in American health care costs over time has been the substitution of surgical intervention for medical treatment. 2 This leads us to consider differential rates of surgery as a potential explanation for divergent cost performances. Indeed, although Japan has one-half the inpatient admission rate of the United States, it has only one-quarter the surgery rate per capita

We use newly released data on Japanese hospitals to explore patients’ perceptions of hospital quality, the implications of these assessments for the structure of demand for hospital care, and the role of the availability and quality of hospital care in influencing access. We find that the primary influences on hospital choice for Japanese patients are interpersonal aspects of care, that Japanese hospital markets are not segmented, and that availability has no influence on access. These results are interpreted in light of institutional differences between the Japanese and American health care systems.