Washington -- For the two regions hit hardest by the Asian tsunami waves, international relief efforts are being complicated by more than the rising death tolls and physical devastation -- they are also war zones.

In the Indian Ocean nation of Sri Lanka and Indonesia's western Aceh province, bitter conflicts threaten to slow even further the painstaking work of locating victims, repairing infrastructure and caring for hundreds of thousands of refugees, according to relief workers and regional experts.

The Sri Lankan government and the rebel Tamil Tigers, which have fought a two-decade civil war, Tuesday traded barbs over the relief efforts and refused to work together -- and instead launched competing efforts.

Across the Indian Ocean, at the northern tip of Sumatra Island in Indonesia, the province of Aceh has been a no-go zone for most international aid organizations and journalists since May 2003, when a new government crackdown was launched in the 28-year struggle against the Free Aceh Movement.

Aid organizations scrambled to get into Aceh while former residents seeking to go back to find relatives complained Tuesday that the Indonesian government, which has been accused of widespread human rights violations in the area, continued to limit access, providing only two-week visas.

Academic analysts expressed hope that the tsunami tragedy might spur some badly needed progress in the two conflicts by creating opportunities for humanitarian cooperation. But at least in the short term, the warring factions were jockeying for advantage -- and in the process slowing rescue and relief efforts and putting more lives at risk.

"The contending sides, both in Sri Lanka and Aceh, are racing to provide relief," said Donald Emmerson, a senior fellow at Stanford University's Institute for International Studies and director of the Southeast Asian Forum.

"At stake is the legitimacy of the government on the one hand -- Colombo and Jakarta -- and the Tamil Tigers and the Free Aceh Movement on the other. If the response of the Sri Lankan and Indonesian governments is insufficient, there could be a crisis of legitimacy in those two areas, which have been engaged in civil war for some decades," he said.

In Sri Lanka, the minority Tamils, who are Hindu, have waged civil war against the country's majority Buddhists since 1983, and a 2002 cease-fire remains brittle. "Tens of thousands have died in an ethnic conflict that continues to fester" since the cease-fire, according to an unclassified report by the CIA.

The Tamil rebels control much of the country's north and east, including coastal areas severely damaged by the tsunami. The Tamil Tigers are conducting their own relief efforts and have made separate appeals to donor countries and the United Nations for assistance.

Even the immense scale of the tsunami damage did not appear to tamp down the deep-seated atmosphere of confrontation.

The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization said in a statement that "assistance channeled through the government of Sri Lanka has failed to reach the displaced in the northeast." It said that one-fourth of the people killed in the northeast were in Tamil-controlled areas.

A military spokesman, Brig. Daya Ratnayake, responded that the government was doing everything it can to help those affected in government-controlled areas and criticized the rebels for trying to score points amid the suffering.

In Aceh, where rebels are waging a fight for independence, there were some hopeful signs in the face of the horrific destruction. The Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement reportedly agreed to a cease-fire Tuesday to let aid efforts reach those in need.

However, aid officials worried that it would take days to get assistance to Aceh, where the majority of Indonesia's deaths occurred. And they said the conflict already has constrained aid efforts by limiting access to the region.

"International nongovernmental organizations have not been allowed into the conflict area since May 2003," said Michael Beer of the Washington-based Nonviolence International, whose field office in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh was lost, along with three of its four staff members. "This has hampered efforts already. The conflict has set back the international community, because they are starting from zero and have been excluded for political reasons."

"Even without the rebellion it is a tough area for the government to go in," said Blair King of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, a nonprofit in Washington. "That is exacerbated by the political situation."

Question: Politicians, experts and the public differ on how they view Indonesia's achievements in the reform process. Your comment? Answer: Most prominent have been the political reforms: Four constitutional amendments, decentralization, laws on elections, and so on. But how will these work out in practice? That is still unclear. Economic reforms, by comparison, have lagged. And what about corruption? Perhaps the least progress has been made on that front. What are key areas that governments after Soeharto have yet to deal with in the transition process? One could make a list. But another response would be to note the gap between the laws already on the books and their implementation. It will not be easy. But doing so will be crucial for success in the transition process. How would the results of next year's elections affect the process of reform? Optimistically, one can picture a healthy concentration of legitimacy at the top of the system, enabling decisive remedial policies. Pessimistically, one can picture a struggle between a popularly mandated presidency and a popularly mandated legislature to the detriment of effective policies. I slant toward optimism. I doubt that the next president and the next DPR (legislature) will be eager to repeat the circumstances in which president Abdurrahman Wahid was removed from office. Whatever happens, 2004 will be a "Year of Voting Frequently" -- at least two elections (April, July) and possibly three (if a second-round presidential vote in September becomes necessary). Let's hope for the best. What are the basic conditions for Indonesia to succeed with reform and to bring the country of 220 million people out of the current crises? When I was in Jakarta in August, the answer I heard most often from Indonesians was: Leadership. Could there be a whiff of nostalgia for Soeharto's leadership in that response? Among the multiple conditions for success in overcoming the current difficulties, one of the most important will be the actual performance of democratically chosen governments, including the one scheduled to emerge from next year's elections. It is, unfortunately, possible that democracy as a method can succeed but wind up discredited by the failure of resulting governments to provide security, ensure justice, reduce poverty, and so on. And there is a sense in which the competitive electoral process itself tends to raise public expectations as to what can and should be done by government. But I am hopeful. Experience of governmental transition often suggests two options, either success and an emergence of democracy, or failure and a return to a militaristic regime. How do you see this? There are not "always two options" in such transitions. Within the category "democracy" alone there are many types and gradations. As for militarism, it is striking how much the image and therefore potential leverage of the military has changed from the immediate post-Soeharto period. Could it be that by not intervening blatantly, army leaders have built up enough credit to allow for subtler forms of influence? Not to mention the more security-conscious atmosphere since Sept. 11, 2001 and Oct. 12, 2002 (terrorist attacks in the U.S. and in Bali respectively). Interesting, too, is the increasing mention of men with army backgrounds as possible presidential candidates next year. But just as democracy is internally diverse, so should we avoid putting everyone who has had an army career in a single box labeled "militarist." I live in California. The voters of my state just fired one governor and hired another. I may be naive, but I hope that as governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger will not treat complex and intractable socioeconomic problems in the same way that the Terminator treated enemy robots! In any case, it is far too early to predict the outcome of any of next year's national elections in either Indonesia or the U.S. Whatever the result, let's hope it's for the better in both countries.