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Gi-Wook Shin
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Growing economic ties and a new interest in cultural exchanges are bringing the countries of Northeast Asia closer together. Yet wounds from past wrongs -- committed in times of colonialism, war, and dictatorship -- are not fully healed. All nations have some sense of victimization -- Japan vis-à-vis the United States and Russia, and China and Korea vis-à-vis Japan -- and often blame others, rather than taking responsibility.

As with many other cases around the world, reconciliation between countries in the region first occurred between governments. Japan established diplomatic rapprochement with countries it had once invaded or colonized: with the Republic of China in 1952, with the Republic of Korea in 1965, and with the People's Republic of China in 1972.

Yet Northeast Asian nations have failed to come to terms with the past. Japan paid no reparations to its former colonies -- though it gave "grants and aid" to South Korea for normalizing their relations -- and China and Korea were excluded from the

San Francisco Treaty that settled Japanese war crimes and atrocities. Historical issues such as disputed territories and Japan's colonial rule were largely swept under the rug in the Cold War system.

The failure to address historical injustice and to reconcile differing views of the past has strained Sino-Japanese relations and friction between Japan and South Korea over Japan's colonial past remains intense. Even South Korea and China are sparring over the history of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo. In addition, Taiwan is immersed in a reexamination of the past. The history question touches upon the most sensitive issues of national identity and now fuels the fires of nationalism in Northeast Asia.

In Korea, nationalism has offered a framework for dealing with victims of historical injustice such as the comfort women and forced laborers. It forces issues to be framed in binary opposition -- victims vs. aggressors -- and leaves little room for any alternative. Koreans are reluctant to acknowledge their atrocities during the Vietnam War, but readily criticize similar acts committed by the U.S. during the Korean War. Disputes over the kingdom of Goguryeo reflect lingering irredentist Korean nationalism as well as China's rising nationalism.

In Japan, uncertainties and anxieties created by the post-Cold War security environment and a decade of economic stagnation provided a fertile ground for nationalist politics. Nationalist scholars are making headway in producing textbooks to "make Japanese proud of themselves." Increased official use of such symbols as the flag and the national anthem used by imperial Japan are part of Japan's quest to become a "normal nation." The goodwill generated by Prime Minister Abe's visit to China and South Korea soon after taking office, suggesting a conciliatory policy toward Asia, has been undermined by his recent remarks on the comfort woman issue. If there is any difference between Korea and Japan, it is that the left in Korea -- as opposed to the right in Japan -- is at the forefront of nationalist politics.

China is promoting nationalism to bolster social and political cohesion. Beijing needs a new unifying force to mobilize the nation in pursuit of common goals, such as economic modernization, and the "glue" is nationalism. In the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese leadership appealed to nationalism (patriotism) to shore up their tainted legitimacy. Nationalism also underpins Chinese foreign policy, both in the region and elsewhere. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, nonproliferation issues -- all of these touch the nationalist nerves of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They do not want to jeopardize relations with their Asian neighbors, but neither do they want to lose face.

Thus, despite increased intra-Asian trade, cultural exchanges, and talk about an East Asian community, Korea, Japan, and China all still find politics of national identity appealing. After all, nationalism is not only about ideology, but also thrives on narrowly defined "national interests." Disputed territories always serve as symbols of national sovereignty that cannot be compromised. The mutual suspicion of Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial waters, as well as the recent escalation of Japan-Korean tension over Dokdo/Takeshima are but two potent reminders.

There is widespread recognition of the need for reconciliation and the final resolution of historical injustices. But there is a fundamental obstacle to reconciliation -- the existence of divided, even conflicting, historical memories. All of the nations involved are bound by very distinct perceptions of history, often contradictory and separated by different accounts of the past and of the context of events. These perceptions are deeply imbedded in public consciousness, transmitted by education, popular culture and through the mass media.

The most daunting task is coming to a common understanding of the past. Whereas a shared view of the past (World War II at least) served to unify (Western) Europe after two devastating wars, history still divides these three close Asian neighbors. Reconciliation has been "thin," and the history issue continues to mar regional cooperation. To achieve a "thicker" reconciliation, they need to move beyond nation-state-oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches, and understand reconciliation as a mutual, interactive process. Citizens' groups, NGOs, victim-activist groups -- be they domestic, transnational, or international, and regardless of political orientation -- should be more actively involved.

Second, Northeast Asian nations must recognize that elements in their shared past may contribute to promoting regional reconciliation. China, Japan, and Korea often argue over history, but it is nonetheless true that elements in their past may also contribute to a regional identity. Coping with Western influence since the 19th century is but one area of common ground. Their experience of building modern nation-states and economies is another example. There exist ample cases and instances of common experiences that can be readily used to formulate a shared view of Northeast Asia's modern history.

Third, we need to encourage and teach critical and independent thinking to young Asians about their respective pasts. In particular, we need to cultivate a mutually acceptable, new national history of each country, resituated in a shared regional identity. Nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism will always coexist, but they need not contradict one another. In this critical time of change and desire to cultivate a shared view, we need to redefine these mutually reinforcing ideologies beyond a narrow, exclusive sense of nation.

Ultimately, building a vision for Northeast Asia's future beyond narrow national and political interests requires enlightened political leadership. Unfortunately, until now, the region has not seen such a visionary leader who is committed to cultivating regional reconciliation. On the contrary, many leaders have politicized the history problem for domestic, nationalist consumption. Interpretations of the past are unavoidably political, producing divided memories, and there is strong temptation to politicize the process for current ideological purposes. However tempting, politically convenient, and even psychologically satisfying it may be to blame others, such an approach will neither heal past wounds nor provide a foundation for the future. We need political leadership that can build public support for sometimes unpopular policies aimed at regional reconciliation.

Reprinted with permission from the Korea Herald.

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From 1976 to 2005 an intermittent but bloody guerilla insurgency raged in the Indonesian province of Aceh. Just a few years ago the conflict seemed intractable, with no end in sight. The two sides had irreconcilable nationalist visions and both appeared committed to violent solutions. However, in August 2005, following the devastating December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, they signed a "Helsinki Agreement," committing themselves to a peaceful resolution. This breakthrough was possible, above all, because the chief secessionist organization, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) agreed to a compromise settlement by which it accepted Aceh's "self-government" within Indonesia.

How could an organization so intransigently committed to an ethno-nationalist vision of Acehnese independence, and for so long, have suddenly re-imagined Aceh as being compatible with Indonesia? Also surprisingly, the peace process has continued since 2005 with very few serious violations. (A former GAM leader, Irwandi Yusuf, was elected as the new governor of the province in December 2006.) In explaining these unexpected events, Aspinall will focus on the dynamics inside GAM. For evidence and illustration, he will draw on first-hand research in Aceh including interviews with former GAM leaders and combatants.

Edward Aspinall is writing a book on the Aceh conflict. Relevant publications include Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia (2005); The Peace Process in Aceh: Why it Failed (2003), coauthored with Harold Crouch; and "Sovereignty, the Successor State and Universal Human Rights: History and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism," Indonesia (April 2002). Before joining ANU, he taught Southeast Asian and Indonesia studies at the University of Sydney (2003-2005) and the University of New South Wales (1997-2001). Aspinall has a Ph.D from ANU and BA degrees from the Universities of Adelaide and Sydney.

This is the Southeast Asia Forum's fourth seminar of the 2006-2007 academic year.

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Edward Aspinall Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change Speaker Austrailian National University
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Rajmohan Gandhi, the author of Mohandas, a major new biography on his grandfather the Mahatma, is currently a visiting professor in the Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and faculty director of Global Crossroads, a learning and living community at the University of Illinois.

He is a jury member for the Nuremberg International Human Rights Award, and co-chair, Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, Gurgaon, India. A former member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of the Indian Parliament), he led the Indian delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1990. He is a commentator in the Indian media, and the author of several books. In 2002 he received the Sahitya Akademi (India's National Academy of Letters) Award for his Rajaji: A Life, a biography of Chakravarti Rajagoplachari (1878-1972), leading figure in India's freedom movement and Governor General of free India, 1948-50.

In 2004 he received the International Humanitarian Award (Human Rights) from the City of Champaign and in 1997 he was awarded an honorary doctorate of law from the University of Calgary and an honorary doctorate of philosophy from Obirin University, Tokyo.

His new book, Mohandas: a True Story of a Man, his People and an Empire, has just been published by Viking/Penguin India. Other books by Gandhi include Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns (Penguin 2004); Revenge & Reconciliation: Understanding South Asian History (Penguin, 1999); The Good Boatman: A Portrait of Gandhi (Penguin, 1995); Patel: A Life, a Biography of Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950), Deputy Prime Minister of India, 1947-50 (Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1990); and Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter (SUNY, 1987).

Dr. Gandhi's talk is the fourth seminar of the winter quarter South Asia Colloquium Series.

This seminar is co-sponsored by Stanford's new Center for South Asia, which is part

of the School of Humanities Division of International, Comparative and Area Studies.

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Rajmohan Gandhi author, visiting professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and grandson of Mahatma Gandhi Speaker
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In the mid-1990s, North Korea experienced a famine that killed up to a million people. In this talk, Professor Haggard will examine the origins of the famine, the subsequent humanitarian aid effort, including the problems of diversion of aid, and the market reforms that followed in the famine's wake. These political economy questions have played an important backdrop to the current negotiations over a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue.

Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He is the author of Pathways from the Periphery: the Political Economy of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (1990), The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (1995, with Robert Kaufman) and The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis (2000). In addition to Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform (forthcoming 2006) he has completed a report on North Korean refugees for the US Committee on Human Rights in North Korea and is initiating a project with TaiMing Cheung and Barry Naughton on Chinese-North Korean economic relations.

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Stephan Haggard Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies Speaker University of California, San Diego
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Is the democratization of Indonesia affecting its relations with the US? Yes, but not always in anticipated ways. Indonesia-American relations in Soeharto's time were not always smooth. But the volatility came mainly (not wholly) in the form of NGO and Congressional criticism in the US in response to human rights violations in Indonesia. In Washington DC, the executive branch was not always supportive of the Indonesian government, but many of the occasions when, for example, the State Department criticized events or conditions in Indonesia were prompted by American legislative pressure. Without such pressure, including pressure by NGOs, would the Dili massacre have prompted the US to suspend inter-military (mil-mil) relations with Indonesia? Probably not.

An idealized image of necessarily friendly democracies would extend the negatively phrased "democratic peace" thesis, that democracies don't fight each other, to the positively wishful thought that by virtue of having (relatively) accountable governments, democracies are bound to get along. But such a "democratic amity" thesis is untenable. It was easier for DC to deal with Jakarta when power was concentrated in the hands of a man who, notwithstanding his Javanist style or, at any rate, proverbs, upheld a version of the anticommunist assumptions that drove much of US foreign policy during the Cold War while lifting his country's macroeconomic indicators and welcoming FDI.

Now that both countries are democratic -- a rough likeness that hides many differences -- one could argue that Indonesian-US interactions, far from being smoother, as "democratic amity" would have it, should be more turbulent. For now that power no longer clearly resides in one place in the archipelago, Indonesian as well as American pluralism can contribute to instability in the relationship.

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The Indonesia Quarterly
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Donald K. Emmerson

There are two obstacles to understanding how historical memory about the wartime period has been formed in Northeast Asia. The first is the existence of persistent national myths about war memory—myths created within those nations and perceptions formed from the outside, and entrenched through the media and popular culture. The second obstacle is the lack of comparative context. The study of historical memory has, until recently, been focused almost entirely on Japan, without comparison to other principle actors in Asia such as China and Korea, or to the United States.

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The increasing sectarian conflict in Iraq and the rise of Islamist parties like Hamas and Hezbollah have put American efforts to democratize the Middle East on hold and raised doubts among experts and policy makers about whether democracy is compatible with the Muslim faith. But in a campus appearance yesterday afternoon, former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim offered an ardent defense of democracy in the Muslim world, telling a standing-room-only crowd in Bechtel Conference Center that "men and women are born free, even in the Islamic construct."

Alternating between serious and sporting through his two-hour speech, Ibrahim broached many of the issues aggravating relations between Islam and the West, including gender relations, American foreign policy, cultural assimilation in Europe and Pope Benedict XVI's recent comments about Islam. However, he was most outspoken regarding his home country - he was a political prisoner in Malaysia for over four years - and rejected the race - and religious-based affirmative action policies that benefit the Malay majority there.

Returning repeatedly to the topic of Muslim democracy, Ibrahim drew from historical references and personal experiences, citing the democratic regimes of Indonesia and Iran of 1950s.

"There was no debate then whether democracy was compatible with Islam," he said. "Fifty years later, we have our leaders in the Muslim world telling us we're not ready."

The fundamental nature of democracy and human rights is universal, Ibrahim emphasized, adding that problems begin with cultural miscommunication.

"We have to debunk and reject the notion, held by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, that to support democracy and freedom is to support America, "he said. "And it is important for Americans to realize democracy is a value cherished as much by Muslims as it is by Americans."

"Misperceptions are unfortunate," he added, elaborating on his impressions of American culture. "This is a country full of contradictions. The level of sophistication and intellectual flavor is unparalleled. So why must people be so prejudiced? Why is misunderstanding so pervasive? To say that Muslims are entirely anti-America is wrong."

Ibrahim offered scathing criticism of his fellow Muslims for violent reactions to both the publication of caricatures of Mohammad in a Danish newspaper in 2005 and to the more recent comment by Pope Benedict XVI referring to elements of Islam as "evil and inhuman." The cartoon spawned riots killing 139 in Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan, while the Pope's remarks fueled a maelstrom of controversy, including the firebombing of Catholic churches throughout the Middle East and the shooting death of a nun in Somalia.

"There is a right to disagree but no one has the right to cause destruction or destroy life," he said. "No one has the right to call for the banning of newspapers."

Acknowledging that his comments were not necessarily indicative of Islamic public opinion, he said, "This view may not be shared by all Muslims, but I am prepared to confront them."

Ibrahim's penchant for speaking his mind and sticking to his principles has dogged the leader through a career of controversy. As a young Malaysian activist in the 1970s, he was arrested during a student protest and spent 20 months in a detention camp. Following a meteoric political ascent, he was named Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, and many expected that he was Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammad's chosen successor.

But their relationship turned sour, and in Sept. 1998 Ibrahim was stripped of party membership and incarcerated under charges of corruption and sodomy. The charges were eventually overturned and he was released in Sept. 2004.

Regarding Malaysian politics today, Ibrahim expressed distaste toward his nation's system of bumiputera - a system of economic and social policies designed to favor ethnic Malays.

"I reject affirmative action based on race," he said. "Our policies should benefit the poor and the marginalized."

Finally, he described the need for engagement between the Islamic world and the West, criticizing the "extreme" foreign policy of the United States and its refusal to negotiate with regimes like Hamas.

"That policy is flawed," he said, adding that "to refuse to engage is a recipe for disaster."

Patrick K. Fitzgerald, Editor-in-Chief

Fitzgerald, a Stanford undergraduate, visited Malaysia in September 2006 as a member of the SEAF-supported Stanford Overseas Seminar in Singapore.

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Shorenstein APARC's Daniel Sneider takes the occasion of South Korean President Roh's visit to the United States to remind policy makers in both Washington and Seoul that they should keep in mind that the current challenges to the alliance are no more difficult than those faced and survived in the past.

The U.S. visit this week by South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun offers yet another opportunity to bemoan the crisis of confidence in our alliance. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, remain widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are strains over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and a stark divergence in approaches toward North Korea.

This portrait of a troubled alliance is often contrasted with a supposed golden age in U.S.-Korean relations during the Cold War. But that view obscures a history of sharp disagreement between the two allies. It is a mythical past that stands in the way of repairing our alliance today. In reality, Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals have often clashed. Differences over North Korea have arisen repeatedly. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

This was true from the earliest postwar days, in a relationship born out of a fateful and poorly considered decision to divide Korea, after decades of Japanese colonial rule, into American and Soviet zones of occupation. Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first leader, was often at odds with his American backers. Washington feared Rhee would provoke a war with the communist North, even after the end of the Korean War.

Relations with Park Chung Hee, who came to power in a military coup in 1961, were even thornier. Park was a fierce Korean nationalist and, according to a close former aide, uncomfortable with Americans. The two countries collided over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy.

In the 1970s, South Koreans developed deep doubts about the durability of the alliance, an uneasiness fed by the Vietnam debacle and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Park defied U.S. pressure in declaring martial law in 1972, junking the constitution and jailing leading opposition figures. He launched a secret campaign of influence-peddling and bribery of American congressmen to counter U.S. criticism of his policies.

While Park feared abandonment by the United States, North Korea's Kim Il Sung worried that China, after developing ties to Washington, might sell him out. Thus Park, even though he had been the victim of two assassination attempts by North Korea, reached out to Pyongyang. During high-level talks in 1972, there was a remarkable shared belief that the major powers were the obstacle to Korean reunification.

The most alarming sign of an alliance in crisis was Park's dangerous decision to develop nuclear weapons, made in secret in 1971 after Richard Nixon's withdrawal of one of the two American infantry divisions. According to my research, American officials became alarmed over the seriousness of this effort when a young CIA agent provided evidence of a crude design for a nuclear warhead.

In the spring of 1975, my father, the late ambassador Richard Sneider, sent a top-secret cable to Washington calling for an urgent review of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Korea was "no longer a client state," he wrote, but was "well on its way to middle power status with ambitions for full self-reliance including its own nuclear potential."

Sneider recommended creation of a new partnership, one more akin to our alliances with NATO or Japan. He also pushed for quiet but tough diplomacy to dissuade Park from heading down the nuclear road. That campaign succeeded finally, but not before my father warned Park that the entire security alliance was jeopardized.

Park was assassinated in 1979 by his own intelligence chief, who claimed to have acted at American instigation. The charge was false, but it remains widely believed in Korea. The perilous state of our alliance reached a peak with the Kwangju uprising against military rule the following year, when hundreds of Koreans were killed by troops deployed with the alleged acquiescence of the United States.

Dispelling the myth of the previous golden era in U.S.-Korean relations does not mean that our relations lacked a foundation of shared interest or that the difficulties we face today are not serious. The gap over how to handle the threat from the North is certainly wider and more evident than in the past. And the democratization of South Korea makes our differences visible and harder to manage.

As policymakers from both countries meet this week, they need to take a deep breath and remember that our alliance survived tremendous stresses in the past. The task before us is not to focus on our divergence but to pick up the challenge left unmet 30 years ago -- to define the basis for a long-term relationship that is durable and reciprocal and that finally sheds the shackles of dependency.

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Mi-Sun Kim is secretary-general of Migrant Workers Health Association in Korea, a non-governmental and non-profit organization working on migrants' health rights and wellbeing. She has also been involved in international advocacy work in promoting and protecting the rights of migrant workers and their families through the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea.

Mi-Sun co-authored Cultural Guidebook for Foreign Migrant Workers (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005), The Report on the Foreign Migrant Workers' Human Rights (Dasan Geulbang, 2001), The Report on the Migrant Workers' Health (Young Doctor, 2001), and was part of a research project titled Survey on Foreign Migrant Workers in Korea (National Human Rights Commission, 2002).

As an NGO activist, she is interested in the formation and maintenance of transnational advocacy networks and their impact on policy development. She holds a B.A in history and studied international organizations at Korea University Graduate School of International Studies.

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