At a seminar on reactionary politics in South Korea, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang argued that the large far-right mobilizations defending former President Yoon Suk Yeol after his martial law declaration were not an isolated development. Instead, they were the product of decades of ideological conflict, authoritarian legacies, and organizational infrastructure on the Korean right.

Cold War Legacies and Conservative Hegemony

Yang argued that much of the existing scholarship on the far right focuses on globalization, economic insecurity, and anti-immigrant politics. In South Korea, however, the far-right is shaped less by immigration than by the country’s Cold War history and deeply entrenched anti-communism during the authoritarian era.

For decades, anti-communism functioned as a dominant state ideology, defining the boundaries of acceptable political thought. Under authoritarian governments, even moderate reform movements could be dismissed as sympathetic to communism or North Korea. Yang argued that these ideological structures were never fully dismantled after democratization.

As a result, the boundary between mainstream conservatism and the far right remains blurred. Yang suggested that what is often labeled conservatism in Korea would be considered far-right politics in many other democracies.

Far-right politics in Korea is organized around anti-communism, hostility toward North Korea and China, and strong pro-Americanism. It is also tied to nostalgia for authoritarian leaders such as Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and, increasingly, Chun Doo Hwan, who are remembered by supporters as figures who protected the nation and delivered economic growth.

Building a Right-Wing Infrastructure

Rather than viewing the far right as a fringe movement, Yang described it as a broad right-wing infrastructure made up of parties, religious groups, intellectuals, media organizations, and grassroots activists.

She emphasized that these actors are closely connected. Conservative politicians often participate in far-right rallies, while influential pastors, online personalities, and activists help shape the broader political agenda and organize these events. In this sense, Yang argued, the Korean far right cannot be understood simply through party politics or street protests alone. It is the interaction between formal institutions and social movements that gives the far right its durability.

Yang traced the growth of this infrastructure to the “lost decade” between 1998 and 2008, when reform-oriented governments and former democracy activists became newly influential. Many conservatives viewed this period as a moment of political and cultural displacement. In response, the “New Right” invested heavily in think tanks, publishing houses, online media, and cultural organizations to spread conservative worldviews and challenge the legacy of the democratization movement.

Drawing on ideas of cultural hegemony, these groups focused not only on elections but also on shaping how Koreans think about history, democracy, and national identity.

New Strategies and New Constituencies

Yang also highlighted how the Korean far right has adopted new forms of mobilization. Far-right activists increasingly portray themselves as defenders of freedom and democracy, borrowing the language of civil disobedience and resistance. In their view, they are protecting South Korea from totalitarian threats associated with North Korea, China, and the domestic left. Some even compare their actions to the struggles of figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela, framing themselves as guardians of democracy rather than opponents of it.

At the same time, anti-feminism has become a powerful source of support, particularly among younger men. Yang noted that many men in their twenties and thirties have been drawn to right-wing politics because anti-feminist rhetoric resonates strongly with their frustrations and sense of exclusion. These appeals have allowed the far right to expand beyond its traditional base of older anti-communist conservatives and build support among a younger generation.

Yang also pointed to the far-right’s growing transnational connections. Korean conservative activists increasingly borrow strategies, messaging, and organizational models from global right-wing movements, while cultivating relationships with foreign donors and international conservative networks.

Yang concluded that South Korea’s far right is best understood as “old wine in a new bottle.” Its core narratives – anti-communism, fear of the left, and nostalgia for authoritarian order – are not new. What has changed are the strategies, technologies, and social coalitions through which those ideas are expressed.

Key Takeaways
 

• Cold War legacies remain central: anti-communism and authoritarian political culture continue to shape South Korea’s right-wing politics.
• The boundary between conservatism and the far-right is often blurred in Korea, making far-right ideas more socially accepted than in many other democracies.
• South Korea’s far-right operates through a broad infrastructure of parties, churches, media outlets, and protest movements rather than through fringe groups alone.
• Old narratives have found new forms: anti-feminism, social media, conspiracy theories, and transnational conservative networks are helping the far right expand its influence.

Kerstin Norris is a research associate at APARC’s Korea Program and managerial editor of The Journal of Korean Studies.