International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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Some people said North Korea would not survive the end of the USSR and dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Some people said Kim Jong Il's likely tenure could be measured in months. Some people said that North Korea was on the verge of collapse in 1997; some people, in fact, proclaimed that the economy had already collapsed.

What sorts of myths and misperceptions do we entertain and perpetuate that make it difficult for us to deal with North Korea coherently?

Robert Carlin is a 2007 Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University since 2005. After receiving an A.M degree from Harvard University's East Asian Regional Studies program, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971. From 1974 to 1988, he was a senior North Korea media analyst in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), where he received the director of the CIA's Exceptional Analyst Award. From 1989 to 2002, he was the chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Concurrently, from 1993 to 2002, Mr. Carlin served as senior policy advisor to the U.S. special envoy for talks with North Korea, taking part in every significant set of U.S.-DPRK negotiations of which there were many--during those years. He was on the delegation accompanying Secretary of State Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Carlin was senior political advisor to the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), leading numerous KEDO negotiating teams to the DPRK. Altogether, he has made 25 trips to North Korea.

Much of Mr. Carlin's analysis on North Korea from his years at FBIS has been declassified and is available either in the "Trends in Communist Propaganda" or "Trends in Communist Media". Over the years, he has written chapters for several books on the Korean issue including, most recently, "Talk to Me, Later," appearing in North Korea: 2005 and Beyond. In 2006, he co-authored an IISS Adelphi paper "North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics and Security." His essay on negotiating with North Korea will appear in Korea 2007 - Politics, Economy, Society. Over his career, Mr. Carlin has lectured at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, foreign ministries and intelligence organizations abroad, and numerous universities.

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On October 11, the Stanford Board of Trustees approved the appointment of Shorenstein APARC's Director, Gi-Wook Shin, as the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies.

An endowment was established in 1999 through the donations of alumnus Jae-Hyun Hyun, the Korea Foundation, and KSA, to enable the university to recruit a social science scholar whose work focuses on Korea from the perspective of contemporary policy issues. In addition to broadening Stanford's teaching and research programs in Asian studies, the holder of this chair is expected to conduct research on the political economy of Korea, trade and finance, security relations, politics, or other topics of importance to understanding Korea in the context of today's world.

When Professor Shin left UCLA to come to Stanford, he left the largest Korean studies program in the nation. With true entrepreneurial spirit, he has built an impressive and dynamic Korean studies program. It hosts luncheon seminars, workshops, and conferences, and has sponsored many Korean scholars, government officials, and business leaders who spend time at Stanford as visiting scholars. It also supports an active research program. Stanford is steadily becoming a world-class center for contemporary Korean studies.
-- Coit D. Blacker, Director FSI

In 2005, Dr. Shin was appointed Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. Since becoming director of the center, Shin has been laying a strong and dynamic foundation for interdisciplinary research, training, and outreach, both through his leadership of the Korean Studies Program and his efforts to bring focus to the center's wide-ranging affiliation of Asia-related projects, programs, and initiatives.

About the Donors:

Jae-Hyun Hyun received his MBA from Stanford in 1981. He is the chairman of Tong Yang Group, a diversified business conglomerate of Korea. The Tong Yang Group, which originally built its foundation as a manufacturer of cement and confectionery goods, is a fully integrated financial services group that offers virtually every financial service available in Korea, such as securities, merchant banking, life insurance, mutual funds, credit cards, venture capital, and asset management. Prior to joining Tong Yang, Mr. Hyun served as a public prosecutor at the city of Pusan's Public Prosecutor's Office. He has four children; three have attended Stanford (Jenny '99, Richard '03 and Tina '05).

The Korea Foundation was established in 1991 to promote an understanding of Korea throughout the world and to enhance international goodwill and friendship through a multitude of international exchange programs. The foundation promotes interest in Korea by supporting Korean studies at universities, research institutions, and libraries. The foundation also provides Korean studies materials to individuals and organizations, and provides scholarships for foreign scholars, students, and experts.

The Korea Stanford Alumni (KSA) Association, a group of dedicated Stanford alumni who have returned to Korea, hosts various events for its more than 500 registered members.

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This talk will examine the patterns and characteristics of the "politics of protest" by civil society actors in South Korea after its democratic transition in 1987. Kim will utilize a recently compiled dataset called Protest Event Database Archive Korea (PEDAK) to analyze main features of protest politics in the post-transitional period and highlight continuities and changes in social protest. The persistence of popular protest has important implications for the future of South Korean democracy.

Sunhyuk Kim is Chair of the Department of Public Administration at Korea University, Seoul, Korea. He was Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, Visiting Professor at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and Research Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He is the author of The Politics of Democratization in Korea (2000), Economic Crisis and Dual Transition in Korea (2004), and numerous articles on South Korean politics and foreign policy. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.

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The opportunity to engage Kim Jong-il, the leader of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), in serious dialogue is inherently attractive. A face-to-face meeting with Kim has the potential to break through a fog of misperception and mistrust.

Given the nature of the DPRK system, the key decisions can only be made at the very top of the pyramid of power. One summit encounter is therefore potentially more valuable then scores of ministerial meetings or talks among senior officials.

These opportunities have unfortunately been extremely rare. Despite some 35 years of intermittent dialogue going back to the South-North talks held in 1972, this would mark only the second time the top leaders of divided Korea have met each other.

The hope for momentum created by the historic meeting of President Kim Dae-jung with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June 2000 swiftly dissipated, disappointing many Koreans.

This may appear to be the right moment to restore the impetus to the North-South summitry. Since the 2000 summit, the process of engagement between the Koreas has deepened dramatically, ranging from extended contacts among officials to the flow of tourists, at least from the South to the North, across the border.

Economic exchanges are widespread, from the Gaeseong industrial park to a growing trade in goods. And the six-party talks to reach an agreement to dismantle the DPRK's nuclear program are at least moving forward, in large part due to the resumption of direct diplomatic negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington.

There are serious reasons, however, to question whether this is the right time for a second inter-Korean summit.

First and foremost, President Roh Moo-hyun is, in every sense of the word, a lame duck. When the summit was scheduled to take place, it was less than three months until the presidential election.

The election campaign is unusually uncertain, with the ruling party and its allies still in the process of selecting their nominee. Polls indicate that a change in leadership --bringing the opposition Grand National Party to power -- is very possible.

While he remains in office, President Roh has every right to exercise his authority and leadership. But given the political uncertainties, and the vital nature of inter-Korean relations, it would seem imperative to secure bipartisan support not only for the summit but also for the policy outcome.

For any gains to be meaningful, there should be some assurance that these policies will continue in place whomever succeeds as president.

Without that broad support, charges that the summit meeting is motivated more by domestic political considerations gain credence.

Even worse, Pyongyang's decision to agree to hold the summit may also be a crude attempt on its part to try to influence the ROK election in favor of the progressive camp. Even if these charges are not true, they undermine the value that this summit may have to shape a long-term future for the peninsula.

The timing of the summit is also problematic because the nuclear negotiations with the DPRK have reached a very delicate moment.

The temporary halt to the operation of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and the reintroduction of international inspectors was an important gesture.

But the DPRK has not yet clearly decided to irreversibly disable its nuclear facilities and fully disclose its nuclear programs and arsenals.

The Roh administration claims this summit will reinforce this negotiation. But it also has declared that the nuclear issue will not be on the summit agenda. In the absence of a dismantlement deal, this summit may only serve to recognize the DPRK's claim to the status of a nuclear power.

But all of these problems of timing take a back seat, in my view, to the location of the inter-Korean summit. Kim Jong-il committed himself, in the 2000 joint declaration, to a return visit to Seoul. This was not a trivial matter -- it was perhaps the most difficult issue in the talks, as Kim Dae-jung said upon return to Seoul.

Everyone understands the historic significance of a visit by Kim to Seoul. It would finally signal the DPRK's acceptance of the legitimacy of the ROK and its leadership and the abandonment of its historic aim to force unification under its banner.

The DPRK leadership would be compelled to show its own people images of their leader in the glittering streets of Seoul. That visit alone could go much farther than any peace declaration, any agreement on boundaries, any military confidence-building measures, or any economic investment deals, toward bringing a permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula.

If this summit had occurred in the right place, then the issues of timing would be incidental. No one could object to a breakthrough of that magnitude. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-il was not pressed to live up to his commitment. If this meeting achieves anything, it should make it clear that the next summit will only be held in Seoul.

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Between 1979 and 1992, the Journal of Korean Studies became a leading academic forum for the publication of innovative in-depth research on Korea. Now under the editorial guidance of Gi-Wook Shin and John Duncan, this journal continues to be dedicated to quality articles, in all disciplines, on a broad range of topics concerning Korea, both historical and contemporary.

This edition's contents are as follows:

Special section: North Korea:

Guest Editor: Jae-Jung Suh

  1. Making Sense of North Korea: Institutionalizing Juche at the Nexus of Self and Other - Jae-Jung Suh
  2. The Making of the North Korean State - Gwang-Oon Kim
  3. The Suryong System as the Institution of Collectivist Development - Young Chul Chung
  4. The Rise and Demise of Industrial Agriculture in North Korea - Chong-Ae Yu

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Famine Relief, Social Order, and State Performance in Late Chosn Korea - Anders Karlsson

Book Reviews

  1. A History of the Early Korean Kingdom of Paekche, Together with an Annotated Translation of The Paekche Annals of the Samguk Sagi, by Jonathan Best. Reviewed by Gari Ledyard
  2. Perspectives on the Imjin War.  Reviews by Kenneth M. Swope:
    1. The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis During the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598, translated by Byonghyon Choi
    2. The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China, by Samuel Hawley
    3. Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War, 1592–1598, by Stephen Turnbull.
  3. Painters as Envoys: Korean Inspiration in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Nanga, by Burglind Jungmann. Reviewed by Insoo Cho.
  4. Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900–1950, by Donald N. Clark. Reviewed by Kyung Moon Hwang
  5. Christianity in Korea, edited by Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Timothy S. Lee. Reviewed by Chai-sik Chung
  6. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea, by Seungsook Moon. Reviewed by William A. Hayes
  7. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, by Gi-Wook Shin. Reviewed by William A. Hayes
  8. North Korea: Between Survival and Glory.  Reviews by Sung-han Kim:
    1. North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim
    2. North Korea: 2005 and Beyond, edited by Philip W. Yun and Gi-Wook Shin
    3. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, edited by Victor D. Cha and David Kang
    4. A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, by Chae-Jin Lee
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Gi-Wook Shin
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9780731161126

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Joon Young Chung is a reporter at Yonhap News, a Korean news wire service, and has worked in various departments including the national desk, business desk and the North Korea desk for the past 14 years. Recently he has covered Inter-Korean dialogue and the Six-Party talks.

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(650) 723-2408 (650) 723-6530
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Choongeun_Lee_1.jpg PhD

Choongeun Lee is a Research Fellow at the Science & Technology Policy Institute(STEPI, Korea). Before joining STEPI, he worked at the Yanbian University of Science & Technology, Chinese Academy of Science, and Peking University in China. He received his B.A. and Ph. D in engineering from Seoul National University in Korea, and Ph.D. in education from Beijing Normal University in China.

His research has concentrated on science and technology systems (S&T) and policy of North Korea, China, and other transition countries. His recent publications include Linking strategy of military and civil innovation system based on recent change in security posture on Korean peninsula (2007, STEPI), Education and S&T System in North Korea (2006, Kyongin Publishing Co.), Nuclear Bomb and Technology in North Korea (2005, Itreebook), The S&T System and Policy of North Korea (2005, Hanulbooks), The S&T Cooperation of North Korea-China and its Implication (2005, North Korean Studies Review).

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On March 18, 1871, Taewongun (Grand Prince) who held real power when King Kojong (r. 1863-1907) assumed power at the age of 12, issued a historical order that was enforced nationwide: All Confucian private academies ever built, except for the forty-seven royal-chartered ones, were to be destroyed. To justify this unprecedented repression, Taewongun argued that the academies were "the fundamental causes for the decaying nation." During the period from 1865 to 1871, over 800 academies were abolished and these intermediate organizations largely disappeared from the central scene of the Korean history and politics. Taewongun's startling regulation of private academies was rather surprising. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Choson monarchs enthusiastically encouraged and sponsored the establishment of the academies on the ground that the academy growth would contribute to country's moral reform and state-building. Why did the dramatic change of governmental policy on the academies occur? How can we resolve this historical enigma? To answer these questions, Koo situates this historical drama in a broader -structural- sociological context involving political competition between the state and nascent civil society, in association with his aim of overcoming the current historical explanations emphasizing more imminent causes of the abolition, such as military and fiscal abuses of the academies.

Jeong-Woo Koo is a visiting scholar at the department of sociology, Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Stanford University in 2007. His interests include comparative-historical sociology, organizations, sociology of education, political sociology, quantitative method, and East-Asian studies. His dissertation explores a long term political competition between state and civil society in Choson Korea. He is currently working on two projects, one on the worldwide expansion of international human rights and its impact on nation-states (with John Meyer and Francisco Ramirez), and the other on the formation of regionalism in East Asia (with Gi-Wook Shin). His publications include "The Origins of the Public Sphere and Civil Society: Private Academies and Petitions in Korea, 1506-1800," Social Science History 31: 3 (Fall 2007), and "World Society and Human Rights: Worldwide Foundings of National Human Rights Institutions, 1978-2004," Korean Journal of Sociology 41: 3 (Spring 2007).

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Jeong-Woo Koo Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology, Stanford University Speaker
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The year 2007 marks the 20th anniversary of South Korea's June 10 civil uprising of 1987, and the 10th year since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. To commemorate these occasions, the Korea Herald published a series of contributions from prominent foreign scholars to analyze the significant changes that Korea has undergone during the past two decades. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin wrote the op-ed below, on the problems of Korean nationalism.

When the Virginia Tech massacre shook American society, Koreans and Korean-Americans alike nervously responded with a deep sense of collective guilt. Many first-generation immigrants took it upon themselves to apologize for the actions of gunman Cho Seung-hui on the grounds that they all share the same Korean ethnicity (meaning blood).

South Korea's ambassador to Washington, Lee Tae-shik, went so far as to say that the Korean- American community needed to "repent," suggesting a 32-day fast, one day for each victim, to prove that Koreans were a "worthwhile ethnic minority in America." The South Korean government offered to send an official delegation to the funerals of the victims.

This episode may seem bizarre or perplexing to non-Koreans since most ethnicities (including Americans) don't have that strong sense of collective responsibility. Yet this incident well illustrates Korea's psyche, i.e., deeply rooted ethnic national identity, which remains strong today.

Korea has been democratizing and globalizing for the last two decades but neither force has weakened the power of nationalism. On the contrary, it has only become stronger.

How can we explain this phenomenon of persistent ethnic nationalism in a country at the forefront of globalization? Where does such a tradition of collectivistic, ethnic identity come from? What are the positive and negative aspects of ethnic nationalism in Korea? How can Korea, as it is becoming a multiethnic society, deal with it in a globalizing world?

Origins and History

Historically Koreans have developed a sense of nation based on shared blood and ancestry. The Korean nation was "ethnicized" or "racialized" through a belief in a common prehistoric origin, producing an intense sense of collective oneness.

Ethnicity is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon based on a common language and history, and race understood as a collectivity defined by innate and immutable phenotypic and genotypic characteristics. However, Koreans have not differentiated between the two. Instead, race served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the notion of nation. Koreans are said to believe that they all belong to a "unitary nation" ("tanil minjok"), one that is ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive from its neighbors.

This sense of ethnic homogeneity, contrary to the popular "prehistoric origin" belief, took root in the early 20th century. Faced with imperialist encroachments, from both the East (Japan) and West, Koreans developed the notion of a unitary nation to show its autonomy and uniqueness. For Korea, which had a long history of political, linguistic, and geographic continuity, the internal issues of political integration or geographic demarcation were less important than the threat of imperialism. Enhancement of collective consciousness and internal solidarity among Koreans against the external threat was more urgent. As a result, the ethnic base or racial genealogy of the Korean nation was emphasized.

Sin Chae-ho, a leading nationalist of the time, for instance, presented Korean history as one of the "ethnic nation" ("minjoksa") and traced it to the mythical figure Tangun. According to him, the Korean people were descendants of Tangun Chosun, who merged with the Puy of Manchuria to form the Kogury people. This original blend, Sin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core ("chujok") of the Korean nation, a nation preserved through defense and warfare against outside forces. The nation was defined as "an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people descended through a single pure bloodline" that would last even after losing political sovereignty.

The need to assert the distinctiveness and purity of the Korean nation grew more important under colonial rule, especially as Japan attempted to assimilate Koreans into its empire as "imperial subjects." The assimilation policy was based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate.

The theory was used to justify colonialist policies to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly get rid of all distinctions and achieve equality between the two nations. Yet colonial assimilation policy meant changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese ethical system, and Shinto worship. Koreans resented and resisted the policy by asserting their unique and great national heritage. Yi Kwang-su, a leading figure at the time, claimed that bloodline, personality, and culture are three fundamental elements defining a nation and that "Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation ("tanil han minjok") in blood and culture." Such a view was widely accepted among Koreans: to impugn the natural and unique character of the Korean ethnic nation during colonial rule would have been tantamount to betraying Koreanness in the face of the imperial challenge of an alien ethnic nation. Ironically, Japanese rule reinforced Koreans' claim to a truly distinct and homogeneous ethnic identity.

After independence in 1945, and despite peninsular division into North and South, the unity of the Korean ethnic nation or race was largely taken for granted. Neither side disputed the ethnic base of the Korean nation, spanning thousands of years, based on a single bloodline of the great Han race. Instead, both sides contested for the sole representation of the ethnically homogeneous Korean nation.

Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to shape Korean politics and foreign relations. Many ethnic Koreans overseas share this sense of ethnic homogeneity, which can explain the response by the Korean American community to the Virginia Tech massacre.

Prize and Price

Ethnic nationalism has been a crucial source of pride and inspiration for the Korean people during the turbulent years of their nation's transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war, and dictatorship. It has enhanced collective consciousness and solidarity against external threats and has served Korea's modernization well. Nationalism is also the underlying principle of guiding the current globalization process in the South.

In the North, ethnic national consciousness offered the grounds for the formation of a belief that Koreans are a chosen people, a position that became the epistemological basis for the juche ideology and the recent "theory of the Korean nation as number one." Ethnic nationalism could also play an integrative role in a unification process, as this self-ascribed identity of homogeneity can serve as the basis for the initial impetus toward unification, if not as the stable foundation of a unified Korea.

At the same time, such a blood-based ethnic national identity became a totalitarian force in politics, culture, and society. Individuals were considered only part of an abstract whole, and citizens were asked to sacrifice individual freedom and civil rights for the collectivity.

Nation was also used as a trump card to override other competing identities as well as to justify violations of human and civic rights in both Koreas in the name of the "nation." The power of nationalism has thus hindered cultural and social diversity and tolerance in Korean society.

The dominance of collectivistic, ethnic nationalism constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere. In its formative years of nation building, nationalism developed in opposition to liberalism and these two ideologies were mistakenly positioned against each other. This historical legacy led to the poverty of modern thought in Korea, including liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism. A lack of a liberal base, for instance, made Korean conservatism highly vulnerable to manipulation by authoritarian leaders.

Ironically, the very belief in ethnic unity has also produced tension and conflict between the two Koreas over the last half-century. The prevailing sense of unity in the face of territorial partition has provoked contention over who truly represents the Korean ethnic nation versus who is at fault for undermining that Korean unity. This battle for true national representation helps to explain highly charged inter-Korea conflict, including the Korean War that killed millions of fellows in the name of "national liberation."

Challenges and Future Tasks

Ethnic nationalism will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society. Neither democratization nor globalization has been able to uproot the power of nationalism. It would thus be wrong and dangerous to ignore or underestimate its power, treating it as a mere myth or something to pass away in due course. At the same time, we can't remain simply content with its current role, either.

Instead, it should be recognized that ethnic nationalism has become a dominant force in Korean society and politics and that it can be oppressive and dangerous when fused with racism and other essentialist ideologies. Koreans must strive to find ways to mitigate its potential harmful effects and use it in constructive manner. In particular, Koreans must promote cultural diversity and tolerance, and establish democratic institutions that can contain the repressive, essentialist elements of ethnic nationalism.

This important task is urgent because Korea, on the contrary to popular perception, is becoming a multiethnic society. Today about a half-million migrant labor workers, with the majority coming from China and Southeast Asia, live in the South. Only a decade ago, the number was less than one hundred thousand. Similarly more than one out of 10 marriages is "international," meaning that the spouse is nonethnic Korean (reaching 13.6 percent in 2005). Considering that the figure was only 1.7 percent in 1994, Korea is fast becoming a multiethnic society.

Despite new realities, however, perception and institutions are slow to change. Most Koreans still have stronger attachment to "ethnic Koreans living in foreign countries" than to "ethnic non-Koreans living in Korea." It is also much easier for a Korean-American who to "recover" Korean citizenship than for an Indonesian migrant worker living in Korea to obtain Korean citizenship. This is true even if the Indonesian worker might be more culturally and linguistically Korean than a Korean-American.

The principle of "bloodline" or jus sanguinis still defines the notions of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the minds of Koreans. In its formative years, Koreans stressed the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding attention to its civic dimension, i.e. citizenship. After colonial rule, neither state (North or South) paid adequate attention or made serious effort to cultivate a more inclusive notion of citizenship.

Social institutions that can address issues of discrimination against ethnic non-Koreans (e.g., ethnic Chinese known as "hwagyo") have been overlooked and underdeveloped. The Korean nationality law based on jus sanguinis legitimizes consciously or unconsciously discrimination against foreign migrant workers by explicitly favoring ethnic Koreans.

Korea needs to institutionalize a legal system that mitigates unfair practices and discrimination against those who do not supposedly share the Korean blood. Koreans need an institutional framework to promote a national identity that would allow recognition of ethnic diversity and cultural tolerance among the populace, rather than appeal to an ethnic consciousness that tends to encourage a false uniformity and then enforcing conformity to it.

They should envision a society in which they can live together, not simply as fellow ethnic Koreans but as equal citizens of a democratic polity. In fact, it is only a matter of time before Koreans will face serious challenges living in a multiethnic society (e.g., children of ethnically mixed couples, civic rights of migrant labor workers) that it is unprepared to resolve. Preparing for such challenges through public education and legal institutions won't be an easy task and should be an integral part of democratic consolidation processes that are currently under way.

Discussion of unification is premature and problematic if unification occurs without such adjustments. As the German unification experience shows, a shared ethnic identity alone will not be able to prevent North Koreans from becoming "second-class citizens" in a unified Korea. Even worse, because of higher expectations resulting from a shared sense of ethnic unity, a gap between identity (ethnic homogeneity) and practice (second-class citizens) will add more confusion and tension to the unification process.

All said, Koreans should strive to promote ethnic diversity and cultural tolerance, and develop proper legal institution so that all can live together in a multiethnic or unified Korea as equal citizens of a democratic polity. This task will be all the more important and urgent as Korea consolidates democracy, globalizes its economy, and prepares for national unification.

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Korea is the showcase of the theory of the developmental state in which the state plays an important role in cultivating entrepreneurship. The success of Chaebols serves to vindicate such a claim. Yet the Korean path of Chaebol-centered development has resulted in a relatively weak parts sector, especially among the small and medium enterprises (SMEs). There have been several attempts from the state since the 1980s to develop the SMEs, but with mixed outcomes. If the Korean state is said to have been successful in creating world-class Chaebols to compete internationally, why has the state failed in developing the SMEs? The talk will explore the causes of the underdeveloped SMEs in Korea and address alternative solutions drawing upon comparisons with the case of Taiwan.

Michelle Hsieh is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. She received her PhD in Sociology from McGill University, Canada. Her research interests fall within the areas of economic sociology, international development, and comparative political economy in Taiwan and Korea. She is working on a book manuscript comparing two competing models of late development using Taiwan and Korea as case studies.

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Fei-yu (Michelle) Hsieh Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University
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