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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for interdisciplinary research, education, and engagement on contemporary Asia, invites nominations for the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award. The award recognizes outstanding journalists who have spent their careers helping audiences worldwide understand the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2024 award will honor a recipient whose work has primarily appeared in American news media. APARC invites award nomination submissions from news editors, publishers, scholars, journalism associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region. Submissions are due by Thursday, February 15, 2024.

Sponsored by APARC, the award carries a cash prize of US $10,000. It rotates between recipients whose primary body of work has been featured in Asian news media and those whose primary body of work has been featured in American news media. The 2024 award will recognize a recipient from the latter category.

For the purpose of the award, the Asia-Pacific region is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia and Australasia. Both individual journalists with a considerable body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in traditional forms of print or broadcast journalism and/or in new forms of multimedia journalism. The Award Selection Committee, whose members are experts in journalism and Asia research and policy, presides over the judging of nominees and is responsible for the selection of honorees.

An annual tradition since 2002, the award honors the legacy of APARC benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. Throughout its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of coverage of the Asia-Pacific region and help advance mutual understanding between audiences in the United States and their Asian counterparts.

Recent honorees include India’s magazine of long-form journalism The Caravan; NPR's Beijing Correspondent Emily Feng; Burmese journalist and human rights defender Swe Win; former Wall Street Journal investigative reporter Tom Wright; and the internationally esteemed champion of press freedom Maria Ressa, CEO of the Philippine news platform Rappler and winner of the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize.

Award nominations are accepted electronically through Thursday, February 15, 2024, at 11:59 PM PST. For information about the nomination procedures and to submit an entry please visit the award nomination entry page. APARC will announce the winner by April 2024 and present the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in the autumn quarter of 2024.

Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

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The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, which concluded the 2023 APEC host year for the United States, included a highly-anticipated meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Shorenstein APARC scholars weigh in on the significance of the meeting in the context of China’s geopolitical ambitions, the outcomes of the APEC summit, and other topics.
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Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in covering the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2024 award through February 15.

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Gi-Wook Shin
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This essay originally appeared in Korean on June 16 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the third in a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.


“I voted for Yoon Suk-Yeol because I just couldn’t vote for Lee Jae-Myung. Do you think Yoon will be a good president?”

“Well, it’s only been a month since he entered office. We should wait at least a year to see how he does.”

When I visited Korea this June, I had this exchange while speaking with friends. Like these friends, there are many Koreans who cast their ballots for Yoon to oust the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) from power, even though they did not necessarily approve of Yoon. They achieved their goal, and the conservatives regained the presidency. However, these voters looked upon the Yoon administration with a mixture of hope and trepidation.

Their fears were realized only a month later, in late July. The ruling People Power Party (PPP) became paralyzed by an internal power struggle. A mere two months after entering office, Yoon’s approval ratings plummeted below 30%. Some polls even indicate that over half of voters would choose Lee Jae-Myung if the election were to be held again.

There is an uncanny resemblance to the early days of the Biden administration. The conversations I had with my Korean friends in June are reminiscent of those I had with friends in the United States soon after Biden entered the White House. They confessed that they voted for Biden because they could not support Trump, and they were both worried and hopeful about the new administration. Their concerns began to materialize during Biden’s first year in office. Despite a slight rebound in the past two months, Biden’s approval rating remains in the 40s. Those in Democratic circles openly voice their fears about losing both the House and the Senate in November’s midterms.

 
Biden and Yoon could not be more different in terms of ideological orientation or political experience. Nonetheless, they find themselves in a similar political predicament.
Gi-Wook Shin

Just as in Korea, there have been polls in the United States that show that more Americans would vote for Trump than Biden if the election were to be held today. The former president is poised to make another run for the White House in 2024, as the FBI continues its investigation into his potential mishandling of classified documents.

Biden and Yoon could not be more different in terms of ideological orientation or political experience. Nonetheless, they find themselves in a similar political predicament. How can we explain this state of affairs? Some would emphasize the effect of catastrophic events beyond any leader’s control, like the COVID-19 pandemic. Others stress the role of structural factors, including political polarization. Critics in Korea and the United States point to policy failures and shortcomings of political leadership, while both Biden and Yoon insist that their respective predecessors left behind daunting challenges. This essay examines each of these factors as it explores the path ahead for President Yoon Suk-Yeol, who recently marked his 100th day in office.

Is Yoon Korea’s Trump?

Before comparing Yoon with Biden, however, it is necessary to first address another frequently mentioned comparison—that of Yoon with Trump. In the months leading up to Korea’s presidential election this March, foreign journalists and observers often asked if Yoon could be understood as a Trump-like figure in Korean politics. To be sure, there is an overlap: a lack of political experience, strong anti-China rhetoric, and anti-feminist attitudes. Yoon’s unwillingness to foster diversity calls to mind Trump’s white supremacist rhetoric.[1] Both are perceived as “strongmen” who forcefully achieve their goals by any means, not skilled politicians who foster compromise through negotiation. Moreover, both are known for their blunt manner of speaking and their anti-pluralist rhetoric.[2]

However, the differences between the two are arguably more salient. Trump’s doctrine of “America First” rejected an international order built on multilateral cooperation. He showed no hesitation in openly pressuring longstanding allies like Japan and Korea. In contrast, Yoon has voiced support for the liberal international order and has emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Furthermore, Trump has shown little regard for the rule of law. Instead of condemning those who attacked the Capitol on January 6, 2021, Trump still claims that the election was fraudulent. Yoon, who was trained as a lawyer, has consistently emphasized the rule of law.

Trump was rejected by the Republican establishment as a political maverick. Yoon, on the other hand, is the embodiment of Korea’s elite. He graduated from the Department of Law at Seoul National University, which is regarded as Korea’s most prestigious university. He then became a prosecutor and rose to the position of prosecutor general, overseeing one of Korea’s most powerful institutions. If anything, Yoon brings to mind a different Republican president: George W. Bush.

Yoon and George W. Bush: Striking Similarities

Bush and Yoon both grew up in upper-middle-class households and graduated from prestigious universities. Bush’s father served as president from 1988 to 1992, while Yoon’s father taught at Yonsei University as a professor of applied statistics.[3] Despite their affluent backgrounds, both faced troubles during their youth. Bush struggled with alcohol and was once arrested for a dui violation. He also suffered defeat in his first attempt to run for Congress in 1978. Yoon failed the state bar exam eight times and succeeded on his ninth attempt, only to be relegated to less important positions multiple times in his prosecutorial career for his uncompromising stance in politically sensitive investigations.[4] Bush and Yoon have both overcome difficulties, and they also cultivated down-to-earth, approachable personas as politicians.

The similarities do not end there. As president, Bush and Yoon both relied heavily on well-established figures in the conservative mainstream when making appointments to key positions. Bush chose Dick Cheney, who served as secretary of defense during his father’s administration, to be his running mate. Donald Rumsfeld, who led the Pentagon under President Ford, was once again appointed to the same position. Key figures from the Republican national security establishment, including Condoleezza Rice, played a significant role in shaping the Bush administration’s foreign policy.

The Bush administration followed the traditional Republican stance of emphasizing alliances in foreign policy. It pursued market-friendly policies at home and abroad, lowering taxes and entering into free trade agreements with Korea and other countries. Moreover, it pushed ahead with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and Iran. In doing so, the Bush administration raised political tensions by pursuing a so-called ABC policy (“anything but Clinton”), seeking to overturn its predecessor’s legacy.

There are striking similarities in the composition and policy orientation of the Yoon administration. Consider its foreign policy team, for instance. Park Jin, a legislator with extensive foreign policy credentials, was appointed as foreign minister. Kwon Young-Se, a former National Assembly member who was the Park Geun-Hye administration’s first ambassador to Beijing, now leads the Ministry of Unification. Kim Sung-Han, a professor at Korea University who was a vice foreign minister during the conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration, is Yoon’s national security advisor. Kim Tae-Hyo, who played a key role in shaping Lee Myung-Bak’s national security policy and subsequently taught political science at Sungkyunkwan University, has returned to government as Yoon’s deputy national security advisor.

 
The Yoon administration is expected to stress the U.S.-Korea alliance and adopt a hardline stance against Pyongyang. Some expect Yoon to pursue a policy of “anything but Moon,” just as Bush proceeded with “anything but Clinton.”
Gi-Wook Shin

Some observers have noted that this team bears a resemblance to the neoconservatives of the Bush administration. The Yoon administration is expected to stress the U.S.-Korea alliance and adopt a hardline stance against Pyongyang. Some expect Yoon to pursue a policy of “anything but Moon,” just as Bush proceeded with “anything but Clinton.”

In assembling his economic team, Yoon has drawn from well-established career civil servants. His prime minister, Han Duck-Soo, entered the civil service in 1970 and later served as minister of finance and prime minister under President Roh Moo-Hyun. Choo Kyung-Ho, who serves as deputy prime minister and the minister of economy and finance, has nearly three decades of experience in economic and financial policy. The Yoon administration has rolled out a package of market-friendly economic policies focused on eliminating red tape, stimulating innovation, and lowering corporate taxes.

There is more than a passing similarity between the composition and policy objectives of the Yoon and George W. Bush administrations. That said, the political trajectory of Yoon’s presidency seems likely to follow that of Biden, not Bush. Unlike Biden, whose approval ratings have steadily declined after entering office, Bush’s ratings soared to 90% following 9/11 and stayed relatively high during the early days of the War on Terror. Bush was re-elected in 2004, but it remains to be seen whether Biden can do the same.

Yoon faces many of the same challenges as Biden: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, high inflation, and a society riven by ever-worsening political and economic polarization. Both leaders also have to contend with a ruling party that is far from cohesive. Examining the path that the Biden administration has taken over the past 18 months can thus yield important lessons for the political future of the Yoon administration.

An Early Loss of Support

During Trump’s presidency in the United States and Moon Jae-In’s presidency in Korea, commentators often spoke about a crisis of democracy. The conversation has now shifted to focusing on a crisis of political leadership. Those in the United States and in Korea have sought to understand why Biden and Yoon, who each entered office after a hard-won electoral victory, faced difficulties early on in their terms.

As I noted in a previous essay, both presidents won narrow victories in bruising election campaigns marked by unprecedented levels of mudslinging.[5] In both countries, the ruling parties won important victories shortly after the presidential election. Raphael Warnock won a Senate seat in Georgia for the Democratic Party in January 2021, while the PPP swept Korea’s local elections in June 2022. However, those in the United States and Korea who hoped that the new president would overcome the crisis of democracy and return the country to normalcy have so far been disappointed.

Let us first look at the United States. According to a RealClearPolitics average of multiple polls conducted in July and August, nearly 70% of respondents believe that the country is going in the wrong direction. Only 23.2% stated that the country is headed in the right direction.[6] In its own analysis, FiveThirtyEight notes that Biden had the lowest approval rating (38.6%) of any president 18 months after entering office. (By comparison, Trump recorded 42.1% at the same point in his term.) Biden’s ratings have fallen even among African Americans and Latino Americans, who traditionally make up the Democratic Party’s base. Among youth, who overwhelmingly voted for Biden in 2020 (over 60%), the level of support has fallen by half.[7]

A similar trend is now evident in Korea. In terms of the speed and magnitude of the decline, Yoon has fared much worse than Biden. According to a poll of 1,000 respondents conducted by Gallup Korea from July 26 to 28, only 28% expressed support for Yoon’s job performance. In terms of age groups, those in their 30s and 40s showed the lowest level of support at 17%. Even among respondents in the city of Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, which are conservative strongholds, negative responses exceeded positive responses by 7 percentage points.[8] If there was a difference between Biden and Yoon in this regard, it was in the main reason for the loss in support. Economic troubles created difficulties for Biden, whereas Yoon went against prevailing public opinion by appointing controversial individuals to key posts.

How might we understand the causes of Biden’s political troubles? In the July 20 New Statesman, Adam Tooze writes that “a combination of bad luck, ineptitude, internal divisions, the structures of U.S. politics and the ruthlessness of their enemies has put not only the future of the Biden administration but the republic itself in danger.”[9] One could reasonably classify the pandemic and high inflation as “bad luck.” Beyond this, Tooze largely points to two causes. Political polarization and “the ruthlessness of. . . enemies” are structural factors. On the other hand, “ineptitude” and “internal divisions” pertain to questions of political leadership. It is debatable whether Biden has already “failed,” as Tooze concludes. However, his frame of analysis provides a useful lens for diagnosing the current political situation in Korea.

Extreme Political Polarization

Structural factors have played an important role in the United States. Trump was skilled in using “divide and conquer” to his political advantage. Political polarization in the United States reached unprecedented levels during Trump’s term in office. The 2020 election came down to the wire, with Arizona, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania playing a decisive role in the electoral college vote. Trump, along with certain segments of the Republican Party, still refuses to concede defeat.

In such a polarized environment, it is difficult for even the most skilled politician to obtain an approval rating exceeding 50%. Major initiatives that require a broad national consensus, such as FDR’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, have become virtually impossible. Biden initially pitched “Build Back Better” as a New Deal for the 21st century, but it encountered significant opposition in Congress. Conflicts over the so-called culture war issues, including abortion rights, have further intensified. Edward Luce, the U.S. national editor of the Financial Times, recently warned that “America is two nations barely on speaking terms.”[10]

Second, critics have raised doubts about the effectiveness of Biden’s political leadership at home. While Biden successfully led the Democratic Party to victory in its battle against Trump in 2020, voters did not necessarily see him as the most attractive candidate at the outset. Even though they did not secure the nomination, candidates such as Sanders and Warren, who openly advocated for progressive policies, drew a great deal of support during the primaries. Once Trump had been defeated, the intra-party alliance loosened. It became a daunting challenge to bring together different factions of the Democratic Party into a cohesive whole. I also raised this point in an interview with the Korean press, noting that Biden could face a lame duck period much sooner than expected. In perhaps the most well-known example, the Build Back Better initiative failed to pass Congress not only because of opposition from Republicans, but also because of pushback from Democratic senators Manchin and Sinema.

Although the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act takes meaningful steps related to climate change, many progressive Democrats were deeply unhappy with Biden for failing to keep his promise to act on the issue. Biden’s loss of support among young voters is partly due to economic difficulties, but it is also related to his reluctance to wholeheartedly adopt key elements of the progressive agenda. On the other side, centrist and conservative-leaning figures in the Democratic establishment, including Larry Summers, are criticizing Biden’s economic policies as being too far to the left. Moreover, Biden met with Mohammed bin Salman in July, despite his strong condemnation of the Saudi prince’s human rights record. This meeting was ostensibly for the purpose of persuading Saudi Arabia to increase its oil production. Biden received criticism from both sides of the aisle after failing to achieve this goal.

The United States is experiencing its worst inflation since the 1980s, with persistent concerns about an impending recession. Furthermore, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ongoing war in Ukraine have raised doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. leadership on the world stage. Biden’s response to Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan also raised doubts in some quarters. All of these events have led to growing dismay and disappointment among the American public. It is certainly too early to pronounce Biden as a failed president, as Tooze claims in the New Statesman. If anything, the Dobbs decision and the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act appear to have created momentum among core supporters of the Democratic Party ahead of this year’s midterms.

However, the Democratic Party still faces an uphill battle in its bid to retain the White House. The outcome of several ongoing criminal investigations involving the former president remains an open question, but Trump is all but certain to run again in 2024. If Biden fails, then Trump may well return—with profound consequences for America and the international community.

Tooze’s analysis of Biden’s first 18 months has significant implications for Korea. Both the United States and Korea are exposed to external shocks, including the pandemic and high inflation. The two countries also share structural problems, including political polarization and the lack of toleration and compromise among political actors.[11] Far from steering Korea’s democracy out of troubled waters, Yoon is in danger of losing political momentum altogether due to intra-party strife and incompetence.

Is There a Way Out for Yoon?

Just as Biden has to contend with Trump’s legacy, Yoon also has to deal with everything that Moon Jae-In has left behind. Missteps and complications in economic and foreign policy have surely created a challenge for Yoon, but one cannot keep blaming the Moon administration for ongoing difficulties. The people rendered their judgment when they voted the DPK out of power. Yoon will be judged on his own merits.

 
Biden can rely on a team of trusted aides and advisors. His party also controls both houses of Congress. Yoon, however, is still a newcomer to politics, and the opposition party commands a powerful majority in the National Assembly.
Gi-Wook Shin

In several respects, Yoon finds himself in a much more difficult situation than Biden. With decades of political experience, Biden can rely on a team of trusted aides and advisors with whom he has worked since at least the Obama administration. His party also controls both houses of Congress. Yoon, however, is still a newcomer to politics, and the opposition party commands a powerful majority in the National Assembly. The PPP and the DPK only recently agreed on the division of standing committee chairs, which is required to proceed with a session of the National Assembly.[12] This delay has cost the Yoon administration, which urgently needs support for its legislative priorities.

An approval rating in the 20s only two months into office is a serious warning sign. Every country in the world is being battered by external shocks, but smaller countries like Korea sway more violently when struck by the same wave. President Yoon has rightly said that policies should not waver with every fluctuation in public opinion, but a democratically elected leader must heed the people’s warning. Popular support is a sine qua non for any president.

To find a way out of the current crisis, Yoon must demonstrate leadership as a politician, not as a lawyer or a prosecutor. He must make it a priority to defuse internal strife within the PPP. Like Biden, Yoon was elected as the best candidate to achieve a transfer of power. He was seen, first and foremost, as a leader of disparate political forces who opposed Lee Jae-Myung. There are multiple factions within the PPP that seek to protect their own interests. Yoon’s supporters were united in their opposition to Lee, but it was unclear what they stood in favor of, with no clear goal to coalesce around once the election was over.

The ongoing struggle between Lee Jun-Seok, the suspended chairman of the PPP, and pro-Yoon politicians has taken no one by surprise. President Yoon could have fostered dialogue and compromise, but instead left this conflict to fester. His actions have sometimes exacerbated the situation. One journalist wrote that “Yoon is his own worst enemy.” Yoon must honestly reflect on his role in the ruling party’s crisis and show himself to be a responsible leader with integrity.

Yoon became a politician with a vow to restore fairness and common sense to politics. He also repeatedly emphasized the importance of freedom in his inaugural address. However, it still remains unclear to the Korean people what this means in practice. How does he intend to apply fairness and common sense to his administration’s policies? What concrete steps is he taking to restore and defend liberal democracy in Korea? Even if Yoon and his aides already have something in mind, the Korean people are still waiting for the answers to these questions.

In particular, polls repeatedly indicate that controversial personnel appointments are the main reason behind unfavorable views of Yoon. Put differently, the public believes that Yoon is violating his pledge to apply fairness and common sense when choosing individuals to appoint to key government positions. In the same vein, only criticizing the failures of the Moon administration is not enough to restore and renew Korea’s damaged democracy. The Korean people still await the Yoon administration’s vision for the country, one which would be based on fairness, common sense, and freedom.

How Yoon Can Rebuild Popular Support

Another way out of the current crisis would be to pursue policies that align with the political center. Due to political polarization, no president can hope for approval ratings in the 70s or 80s anymore. For simplicity, let us assume that roughly one-third of Korea’s electorate leans left, a third consists of moderates, and the remaining third is conservative. The most feasible strategy to regain popular support would be to attract around two-thirds of the moderates (22%) in addition to his conservative base (33%), which would yield an approval rating in the mid-50s.

Political polarization is a structural problem that cannot be resolved overnight. Nonetheless, certain steps can be taken to bolster support among moderates. The Yoon administration would do well to keep this in mind as it seeks to implement reforms in education, pensions, and labor policy. The experiences of past governments are instructive in this respect. Kim Dae-Jung entered office in 1998 with a legislative minority, but he joined forces with Kim Jong-Pil’s United Liberal Democrats to build political momentum.[13] Lee Myung-Bak faced a domestic political crisis early on in office, but he was able to regain support by enacting centrist policies that addressed the needs of ordinary citizens.

 
Faulty policies must, of course, be corrected. However, it is excessive and unnecessary to punish those who made a good faith effort to formulate reasonable policies based on the information that was available at the time.
Gi-Wook Shin

Yoon must resist the temptation to pursue “anything but Moon.” The Moon administration openly vowed to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” rejecting and punishing the policies of its predecessor. Faulty policies must, of course, be corrected. Those who were involved in corrupt or illegal activities should be held to account. However, it is excessive and unnecessary to punish those who made a good faith effort to formulate reasonable policies based on the information that was available at the time. Doing so would make civil servants even more reluctant to do their jobs.

The Moon administration created a task force within every key government agency to pursue its “eradication” agenda. While using the judicial apparatus, it was a politically motivated act to punish those who were involved in the previous conservative administrations’ policy decisions. Yoon must avoid repeating this mistake. He would know better than anyone the pitfalls of going down such a path. Although Yoon was initially part of this effort as a prosecutor, he later became the target of such a political campaign during his time as prosecutor general.

Having a strong base of popular support is critical in conducting foreign policy, an area in which Korea will face formidable challenges. Yoon’s attendance at the NATO summit in Madrid in June demonstrated his resolve to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance and uphold the liberal international order. The overarching orientation of Yoon’s foreign policy is commendable. However, managing relations with China will be a demanding task. Yoon’s foreign policy team will soon be put to the test. Pyongyang could engage in a major provocation. Beijing will continue to pressure Seoul to uphold the “three noes” with respect to the THAAD missile defense system.[14] A military clash between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait is by no means an unlikely possibility. Popular support is critical in responding to any foreign policy crisis. A leader who is weak at home is also constrained abroad.

Finally, Yoon must refrain from turning to the rule of law as the solution to every problem. Respect for laws and principles is a necessary condition for democracy, but it is not a sufficient condition. We have seen all too clearly how the Moon administration weakened Korea’s democracy under the guise of rule of law. Without respect for democratic norms and values and the resolve to defend them, liberal democracy cannot be sustained. To defend freedom, which President Yoon emphasized during his inaugural address, it is vital to show toleration for the other side and forbearance in the exercise of power. He must engage in a sustained dialogue to persuade the people, including the opposition.

In late July, Park Soon-Ae, the education minister, faced intense public opposition after abruptly announcing that the age of entry into elementary school would be lowered from six years to five. She resigned only ten days later. Before pursuing major policy reforms, sufficient time must first be taken to gather a wide range of views through public debate and dialogue. The Yoon administration not only faces a large opposition party, but also must contend with progressive elements of Korea’s civil society. The administration must skillfully conduct negotiations, reconcile opposing views, and foster compromise. The ability to exercise political leadership will be crucial.

In doing so, the administration must acknowledge differences while pursuing shared goals and interests. It is only natural for there to be opposing views in a pluralistic, democratic society. The government must listen to a variety of voices and appoint a diverse group of individuals to key positions. As I noted in a previous essay, ensuring diversity is critical to innovation and organizational effectiveness.[15] Relying heavily on former prosecutors and career civil servants, as the Yoon administration has done, makes it much more difficult for diverse voices and experiences from the full breadth of Korean society to inform policymaking on important issues.

A Global Crisis of Leadership: The Path Ahead for Yoon

We are now experiencing a global crisis of leadership, perhaps as serious as the global crisis of democracy. Trump and Moon are no longer in office, but their respective successors are struggling to unite and lead their countries. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party experienced a prolonged leadership vacuum before choosing Liz Truss as the new prime minister. Merkel’s absence is keenly felt in Germany. Macron was re-elected after a difficult election campaign in France, but the ruling party’s approval rating is stalled in the mid-30s. Firm leadership and cohesion among democratic powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan—are critical in defending the liberal international order from challenges by authoritarian powers like China or Russia. The current state of affairs is far from encouraging.

Korea is no exception. Its own crisis of leadership is unfolding much more rapidly than those in other major democracies, with serious repercussions. There are structural problems, both domestic and external, that President Yoon cannot immediately resolve. However, it is critical for him to deeply reflect on his effectiveness as a leader so far. If he honestly confronts and learns from his shortcomings and mistakes, the present political crisis could become a turning point. Amidst a global crisis of leadership, Yoon could elevate Korea as a staunch defender of democracy. The choice is his to make.


[1] See, for example, the discussion about the composition of Yoon’s Cabinet in Gi-Wook Shin, “Beyond Representation: How Diversity Can Unleash Korea’s Innovation,” Shorenstein APARC, June 30, 2022. https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/beyond-representation-how-diversity-can-unleash-korea%E2%80%99s-innovation.
 

[2] This section and the following section expand on a previous discussion of this comparison in Gi-Wook Shin and Kelsi Caywood, “Which Yoon Should Biden Expect at the Upcoming South Korea-US Summit?,” The Diplomat, May 17, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/which-yoon-should-biden-expect-at-the-upcoming-south-korea-us-summit/.
 

[3] Together with Seoul National University and Korea University, Yonsei University is widely regarded as one of the most prestigious universities in Korea.
 

[4] The state bar exam was abolished in 2017, as Korea transitioned to a U.S.-style system of law schools. Before 2017, individuals underwent training at the Judicial Research & Training Institute (JRTI) upon passing the bar exam. Only those with the highest grades during this training process could become judges or prosecutors. Although Korean culture stresses seniority by age, the Prosecutors’ Office has an organizational culture that emphasizes the year in which a prosecutor entered the JRTI. Having failed the bar exam eight times, Yoon essentially fell eight years behind his peers and entered the JRTI with individuals who were much younger than him. He also worked under prosecutors who were younger than him. His subsequent demotions set him back even further, until the Moon Jae-In administration appointed him as the head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office in 2017 and then as prosecutor general in 2019. The latter appointment was highly unusual, as it skipped five classes at once. Yoon belonged to the JRTI’s 23rd class, while his predecessor as prosecutor general belonged to the 18th class.
 

[5] Gi-Wook Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein APARC, May 3, 2022. https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/troubled-waters-south-korea%E2%80%99s-democracy-crisis.
 

[6] “Direction of Country,” RealClearPolitics, accessed September 2, 2022. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/direction_of_country-902.html.
 

[7] Geoffrey Skelley, “What’s Behind Biden’s Record-Low Approval Rating?,” FiveThirtyEight, July 14, 2022. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whats-behind-bidens-record-low-approval-rating/.
 

[8] “Daily Opinion no. 505 (4th Week of July 2022)” [in Korean], Gallup Korea, July 28, 2022. https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1314.
 

[9] Adam Tooze, “Why Joe Biden failed,” New Statesman, July 20, 2022, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/americas/north-america/2022/07/adam-tooze-why-joe-biden-failed.
 

[10] Edward Luce, “America is Two Nations Barely on Speaking Terms,” Financial Times, June 8, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/aa1fe12c-d5a2-4a1a-b6df-70b38894c4fd.
 

[11] See Shin, “In Troubled Waters.”
 

[12] In Korea’s National Assembly, the ruling party and the main opposition party typically divide the appointment of standing committee chairs. For instance, under the agreement between the PPP and the DPK in late July, the ppp appointed the chair of seven standing committees, while the DPK appointed 11.
 

[13] Born in 1926, Kim Jong-Pil graduated from the Korea Military Academy and played a key role in Park Chung-Hee’s coup in May 1961. Kim established the Democratic Republican Party, which was Park’s political base of power during his time as president, and also served as the founding leader of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency. After Korea transitioned to democracy, Kim joined forces with Kim Dae-Jung in 1998 and served as prime minister. This coalition is sometimes referred to as the “DJP alliance,” based on the initials of the two leaders (DJ/Dae-Jung and JP/Jong-Pil). Kim Jong-Pil died in 2018.
 

[14] This refers to China’s three demands: to refrain from deploying additional THAAD batteries, to not participate in the U.S. missile defense system, and to not participate in a trilateral military alliance with Japan and the United States.
 

[15] Gi-Wook Shin, “Beyond Representation: How Diversity Can Unleash Korea’s Innovation,” Shorenstein APARC, June 30, 2022. https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/beyond-representation-how-diversity-can-unleash-korea%E2%80%99s-innovation.

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South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaks on the government supplementary budget at the National Assembly on May 16, 2022 in Seoul.
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Stanford campus archway and text about call for applications for APARC 2023-24 fellowships
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APARC Invites Fall 2023 Asia Studies Fellowship Applications

The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin fall quarter 2023. These include postdoctoral fellowships on contemporary Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.
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How Korea’s New President Can Recover from His First 100 Days of Struggles.

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3D mockup cover of APARC's volume 'South Korea's Democracy in Crisis'

South Korea's Democracy in Crisis: The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization 
위기의 한국 민주주의: 비자유주의, 포퓰리즘, 양극화의 위협

In this book launch event held in Korea, the participants will examine and discuss the threats to democracy in Korea. For more information about the book, please visit the publication webpage.

<The book launch event will be in Korean>

14:00-14:05 Introduction by Ho-Ki Kim, Professor of Sociology, Yonsei University

Moderated by Dukjin Chang, Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University

14:05-15:20 Presentations

Democracy in Crisis: Populism in Post-Truth Era
Gi-Wook Shin, Director of Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Ho-Ki Kim, Professor of Sociology, Yonsei University

Two divergences in South Korea’s Economy and Disparities in Democracy
Jun-Ho Jeong, Professor of Economics, Kangwon University
Il-Young Lee, Professor of Economics, Hanshin University

Judicialization of Politics and Politicization of  the Judiciary in Korea : Challenges in Maintaining the Balance of Power
Seongwook Heo, Professor of Law, Seoul National University

15:20-15:40 Break

15:40-16:55 Panel Discussion

Won-Taek Kang, Professor of Political Science, Seoul National University
Seeun Jeong, Professor of Economics, Chungnam National University
Chulwoo Lee, Professor of Law, Yonsei University

16:55-17:00 Closing Remarks by Gi-Wook Shin, Director of Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

This event is made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation and other friends of the Korea Program.

In-Person event in Korea
June 14, 2PM-5PM, Korea Time
Press Center, Seoul

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Cover of North Korean Conundrum, showing a knotted ball of string.

Read our news story about the book >> 

North Korea is consistently identified as one of the world’s worst human rights abusers. However, the issue of human rights in North Korea is a complex one, intertwined with issues like life in the North Korean police state, inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, access to information in the North, and international cooperation, to name a few. There are likewise multiple actors involved, including the two Korean governments, the United States, the United Nations, South Korea NGOs, and global human rights organizations. While North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the security threat it poses have occupied the center stage and eclipsed other issues in recent years, human rights remain important to U.S. policy. 

The contributors to The North Korean Conundrum explore how dealing with the issue of human rights is shaped and affected by the political issues with which it is so entwined. Sections discuss the role of the United Nations; how North Koreans’ limited access to information is part of the problem, and how this is changing; the relationship between human rights and denuclearization; and North Korean human rights in comparative perspective.

Contents

  1. North Korea: Human Rights and Nuclear Security Robert R. King and Gi-Wook Shin
  2. The COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea: Origins, Necessities, Obstacles, and Prospects Michael Kirby
  3. Encouraging Progress on Human Rights in North Korea: The Role of the United Nations and South Korea Joon Oh 
  4. DPRK Human Rights on the UN Stage: U.S. Leadership Is Essential Peter Yeo and Ryan Kaminski
  5. Efforts to Reach North Koreans by South Korean NGOs: Then, Now, and Challenges Minjung Kim
  6. The Changing Information Environment in North Korea Nat Kretchun
  7. North Korea’s Response to Foreign Information Martyn Williams
  8. Human Rights Advocacy in the Time of Nuclear Stalemate: The Interrelationship Between Pressuring North Korea on Human Rights and Denuclearization  Tae-Ung Baik
  9. The Error of Zero-Sum Thinking about Human Rights and U.S. Denuclearization Policy Victor Cha
  10. Germany’s Lessons for Korea Sean King
  11. Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Puzzles, Priorities, and Political Power Thomas Fingar

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

June 2022 Update

The Korean version of The North Korean Conundrum is now available, published by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). Purchase the Korean version via NKDB's website >>

To mark the release of the Korean version of the book, APARC hosted a book talk in Seoul jointly with the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, on June 9, 2022.
Watch NTD Korea's report of the event:

View news coverage of the event by Korean Media:

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Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security

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Gi-Wook Shin
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Political attention is turning once again to the Korean Peninsula and the United States’ policy towards both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On April 15, 2021, the Human Rights Commission of the United States Congress convened a hearing on “Civil and Political Rights in the Republic of Korea: Implications for Human Rights on the Peninsula.” This follows on the announcement of the first face-to-face White House visit between President Biden and President Moon Jae-In where “North Korea is likely to be high on the agenda.”

In the first of three public events on North Korea Human Rights, APARC’s Korea Program hosted Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in DPRK; Roberta Cohen, co-chair emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; and former South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Joon Oh for a discussion of what role the United Nations plays in creating accountability for the ongoing human rights violations and crimes against humanity being enacted by the North Korean government against its people.

The full discussion is available to watch below.

[Subscribe to APARC’s newsletters for updates on our scholars’ research.]

Exploring Means of Enforcing Accountability

Speaking as an independently acting investigator, Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana echoed the findings of his predecessors in warning that the activity within North Korea has escalated from human rights violations to international crimes against humanity, including extermination, enslavement, torture, sexual violence, and knowingly inflicting prolonged starvation.

What governing body has the ability to hold national leadership at the highest level accountable for such crimes? Quintana outlines several options. One is the International Criminal Court, the international tribunal seated in The Hauge. However, superpower nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are historically recalcitrant to the jurisdiction of this legal body and could feasibly veto a case against the DPRK sent to the ICC.

Another option is for the UN Security Council to create a hybrid tribunal through which international prosecution could litigate. This option is more ad hoc, but would circumvent some of the potential veto pitfalls to using the ICC.

The Secretary General of the United Nations could also use the pejoratives given under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter to force action and accountability forward. This would be a difficult and even unprecedented means of jurisdiction, but it is supported by an already existing, if rarely enacted, legal framework.

Moving Forward

Each of the avenues proposed by Special Rapporteur Quintana has varying levels of efficacy and shortcomings, particularly in the immediate context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the further hindrance it has created to gathering evidence and intelligence directly from North Korea. As Roberta Cohen notes,

“No possibility exists right now for International Criminal Court referral, or establishing an ad hoc tribunal, but progress is nonetheless being made in laying the groundwork for eventual criminal prosecution and other aspects of transitional justice.”

Former Ambassador Joon Oh echoes the importance of keeping the issue of human rights and international crimes in North Korea in the spotlight even if immediate legal options stall.

“The issue of accountability is extremely important. These alternative ways [of creating accountability] should be explored. Exploring these avenues adds pressure on North Korea. Even remote possibilities add pressure, which might help change their behavior.”

On April 26, 2021, Ambassador Robert King, former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean human rights issues will continue the dialogue on accountability in North Korea with a discussion of his forthcoming book, Patterns of Impunity: Human Rights in North Korea and the Role of the U.S. Special Envoy, and the role the South Korean and U.S. governments play in promoting human rights in North Korea. Registration for the book launch is open through the day of the event.  

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(From left to right) Siegfried Hecker, Victor Cha, Oriana Mastro, Gi-Wook Shin, Robert Carlin
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Experts on human rights agree that the UN needs to work through multiple channels to support ongoing investigations and build evidence for future litigations in order to create accountability and pressure the DPRK to desist in committing human rights crimes.

Shorenstein APARCStanford UniversityEncina Hall E301Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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Koret Fellow, 2019-20
Visiting Scholar at APARC
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Ph.D.

Robert R. King was a Visiting Scholar, Koret Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2019 fall term.  He is the former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues at the U.S. Department of State (2009-2017).  He is Special Advisor to the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a non-resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute, and a member of the board of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. 

Ambassador King’s research interests include North Korea human rights, Northeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy, and the Congressional role in U.S. foreign affairs.  During his time at Shorenstein APARC, he researched the United States efforts to promote human rights in North Korea.

Before assuming his position at the Department of State, King was Staff Director and Minority Staff Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives (2001-2009).  He served as Chief of Staff to Congressman Tom Lantos of California (1983-2008).  He was a White House Fellow on the staff of the National Security Council (1977-1978), and Senior Analyst and Assistant Director of Research at Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany (1970-1977).

King holds a PhD and an MALD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a BA in political Science from Brigham Young University.

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keunlee 2012
Keun Lee, winner of the 2014 Schumpeter Prize and a professor of economics at Seoul National University, will explore the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the effectiveness of the national innovation system (NIS) of a country determines its long term economic performance, using the case of South Korea as an example. Professor Lee will present an overview of South Korea’s NIS during the “catch-up” and “post-catch-up” stages; and will compare the Korean case with the NIS of European economies to derive comparative lessons. He will also address specific innovation issues in Korea, such as commercializing knowledge in the public sector.

Professor Lee authored Economic Catch-up and Technological Leapfrogging: Path to Development & Macroeconomic Stability in Korea (2016, E Elgar); and Schumpeterian analysis of Economic catch-up (Cambridge University Press, 2013: awarded Schumpeter Prize). He is currently president of the International Schumpeter Society, a member of the Committee for Development Policy of the UN, an editor of Research Policy, an associate editor of Industrial and Corporate Change, and a council member of the World Economic Forum. He obtained a PhD in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and worked at the World Bank, University of Aberdeen, and the East West Center, Hawaii. One of his most cited articles is a paper on Korea’s Technological Catch-up published in Research Policy, with 1,000 citations (Google Scholar). His H-index is now 35, with 85 papers with more than 10 citations.

Keun Lee <i>Professor of Economics, Seoul National University</i>
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In the days leading up to the Washington summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump, the tension in Seoul was hard to escape. Fears of an open clash between the two leaders, of a handshake that went on too long, or of a hostile early morning tweet directed at Moon were widespread. But when a senior national security advisor to Moon met a group of American visitors after the first day of talks, he was visibly relieved. The dinner between Moon and U.S. President Donald Trump went so well, he recounted with a slight smile, that it was extended 35 minutes.

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Toyo Keizai Online (Tokyo Business Today)
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Gi-Wook Shin
Rennie Moon
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As expected, Moon Jae-in has been elected as South Korea’s 19th president. In a five-way contest, Moon garnered 41.1 percent of the vote, with strong support from those in their 20s to 50s, winning most of the regions in the country. 

South Koreans’ longing for change had been expressed through the now-famous candlelight demonstrations that lasted for almost twenty consecutive weekends culminating in the impeachment of now former president Park Geun-hye. It was also reflected in the highest voter turnout in two decades, at 77.2 percent.

Just hours after his decisive victory, Moon began his five-year term without the usual practice of a transition team. Moreover, he took office during turbulent times — domestically and internationally — perhaps even more so than when former president Kim Dae-jung took office in 1998 when the nation was struggling with the Asian financial crisis.

First and foremost, Moon must deal with the mounting social and economic challenges that the country is facing. Having entered a period of low-growth coupled with an aging population, the economy confronts a host of difficult issues, including high levels of youth unemployment, income inequality, household debt, elderly poverty and rising social welfare expenditures.

The Moon administration immediately established a ‘job creation committee’ and pledged to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. But it will not be easy to amass the financial resources needed by a government already struggling with serious budget deficits. Most agree that ‘economic democratisation’ is needed, but the details of how to achieve that — including reforming the chaebol — remain unclear.

Economic uncertainties have been a key factor contributing to social unrest. Words in vogue among South Koreans in their 20s and 30s reflect the social discontent with youth unemployment and inequality that ultimately erupted in the demonstrations.

‘Hell Joseon’ captures a sentiment of what it means to live in South Korea’s hellish reality. ‘Golden Spoons Dirt Spoons’ levels the charge that one’s life course is decided for good by one’s family background. ‘Gapjil’ refers to acts of impunity by the powerful against the weak, while the ‘Sampo generation’ is a generation forced to give up three things: courtship, marriage and children. If Moon fails to live up to the expectations of the country’s youth, a bloc that widely supported him, social discontent and symptoms of unrest will likely return.

Moon also faces daunting tasks in national security matters. North Korea has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction and relations have been all but completely severed. As controversy over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) has shown, South Korea remains caught in the middle of a hegemonic struggle between the United States and China.

If that wasn’t enough, South Korea made a deal with Japan on the comfort women issue in late 2015 but the public now demands its renegotiation. South Korean–Russian relations are also at their grimmest. To top it all off, Moon must deal with a formidable set of nationalist and populist leaders — Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Shinzo Abe, Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin — all known for their very strong characters, in stark contrast to Moon’s nice-guy, everyman personality.

The most urgent but also most challenging task is managing inter-Korean relations. As Pyongyang steps up its nuclear and missile programs, Seoul must reaffirm to the international community that it will continue its efforts to denuclearise the North. At the same time, relations between the two Koreas must be improved to strengthen South Korea’s strategic position in the region as well as reduce tensions on the peninsula.

Trump has been sending out confusing messages probably because he has no suitable plan to deal with Pyongyang. As such, if Seoul were to bring to the table a persuasive policy of engagement, Washington would be receptive unless it weakens US efforts towards denuclearisation. Both Beijing (pressured by Washington to solve the North Korean nuclear issue) and Pyongyang (concerned about becoming overly dependent on China) would welcome Seoul taking the initiative to improve inter-Korean relations.

Some pundits at home and abroad worry that the Moon administration might follow in the footsteps of the Roh administration (2003–2008), whose outcomes lagged too far behind its good will to bring about reform. Moon served as Roh’s chief of staff and the two administrations overlap in manpower. But Moon and his team have also learned many lessons from the trial and error of the Roh administration, preparing themselves over the past ten years of conservative rule.

With the new administration in place, political turmoil over the last six months has finally ended. Moon’s first moves as president, including key appointments in the Blue House and opening up communication channels with the public, have been well received. A public poll conducted by Gallup Korea one week after the inauguration showed that 87 percent of the respondents expected him to do well. Despite mounting challenges, South Koreans remain hopeful that their new leader can take the nation to the next level.

This piece was originally carried by East Asia Forum on May 23, 2017, and reposted with permission.

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