Sectoral Rent Extraction Possibilities and Bribery by Multinational Corporations: Evidence from Vietnam

Edmund J. Malesky will argue that openness to foreign investment can have differential effects on corruption, even within the same country and under the same domestic institutions over time. Rather than interpreting bribes solely as a coercive “tax” imposed on business activities, he allows for the possibility that firms may themselves be complicit in using bribes to enter protected sectors or gain access to lucrative procurement contracts.  The propensity to bribe across sectors should vary with expected profitability related to investment restrictions. Thus, the linkage of foreign investment to corruption should increase dramatically as firms seek to enter restricted and uncompetitive sectors that offer higher rents. Malesky demonstrates this effect using a nationally representative survey of 10,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam. He also shows how the impact of domestic reforms and economic openness is affected by policies that restrict competition by limiting entry into a given sector.

Edmund Malesky is an associate professor of political science at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He has published in leading political science and economic journals, including the American Political Science Review and the Journal of Politics, and has been awarded the Harvard Academy Fellowship and Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in comparative politics. Malesky serves as the lead researcher for the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index and Cambodian Business Environment Scorecard.

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