International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, invites nominations for the 2025 Shorenstein Journalism Award. The award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for their significant contributions to reporting on the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2025 award will honor an Asian news media outlet or a journalist whose work has primarily appeared in Asian news media. Award nomination entries are due by Saturday, February 15, 2025.

Sponsored by APARC, the award carries a cash prize of US $10,000. It alternates between recipients who have primarily contributed to Asian news media and those whose work has mainly appeared in Western news media. In the 2025 cycle, the award will recognize a recipient from the former category. The Award Selection Committee invites nominations from news editors, publishers, scholars, teachers, journalists, news media outlets, journalism associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region. Self-nominations are not accepted.

The award defines the Asia-Pacific region as encompassing Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, as well as Australasia. Both individual journalists with a substantial body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in print or broadcast journalism or in emerging forms of multimedia journalism. The Award Selection Committee, comprised of journalism and Asia experts, judges nomination entries and selects the honorees.

An annual tradition since 2002, the award honors the legacy of APARC benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. Throughout its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of reporting on Asia. Recent honorees include The New York Times' Chief China Correspondent Chris Buckley; India's long-form narrative journalism magazine The Caravan; Burmese journalist and human rights defender Swe Win; and Maria Ressa, CEO of the Philippine news platform Rappler and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.

Award nominations are accepted electronically via our online entry form through Saturday, February 15, 2025, at 11:59 PM PST. For information about the nomination rules and to submit an entry please visit the award nomination entry page. APARC will announce the winner by April 2025 and present the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in autumn quarter 2025.

Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

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Trump’s Second Act and the Stakes for Asia

APARC recently hosted two panels to consider what a second Trump presidency might mean for economic, security, and political dynamics across Asia and U.S. relations with Asian nations.
Trump’s Second Act and the Stakes for Asia
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Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual Shoresntein Award promotes excellence in journalism on the Asia-Pacific region and carries a cash prize of US $10,000. The 2025 award will honor an Asian news media outlet or a journalist whose work has primarily appeared in Asian news media. Nomination entries are due by February 15, 2025.

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Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has reignited debates about the United States' role in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and democratic recession. The return of Trump to the White House will have profound implications for Asia. To assess the stakes for the region, APARC convened a panel of experts who weighed in on the potential risks and opportunities the second Trump administration’s policies may pose for Asian nations and how regional stakeholders look at their future with the United States. Another panel, organized by APARC’s China Program, focused on what’s ahead for U.S.-China relations.

High Stakes for the Asia-Pacific

APARC’s panel, The 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections: High Stakes for Asia, examined how the return of Trump’s political ideology and the macroeconomic effects of his foreign policy will affect Asia.

“We are witnessing the solidification of Trumpism as an influential political ideology,” stated APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin at the opening of the discussion, “one that has begun to transcend traditional  American conservatism. Trumpism — marked by a blend of economic nationalism, nativism, and a strongman approach to leadership —could have a huge impact not only in American society but also on the liberal global order.”

According to Shin, Trump’s policies, particularly his focus on unilateralism and economic self-interest, could significantly alter the political and economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region.

Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, argued that Trump’s victory was no longer an anomaly but part of a larger trend of working-class voters shifting allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Fukuyama expressed concerns about Trump’s aggressive economic policies, including imposing broad tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, and warned that such policies could result in inflation, trade tensions, and long-term economic instability. In addition, he asserted that Trump’s reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts could undermine the United States’ commitments to security alliances, particularly in Asia.

APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui emphasized the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s policies, noting that Trump’s "America First" approach could further erode the international liberal order. He suggested that Japan would face significant challenges navigating the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policies. According to Tsutsui, “There might be greater pressure to line up with the United States in dealing with China economically, which would  put a great deal of strain on the Japanese economy.” Such an alignment might also muddle Japan’s own diplomatic and security interests.

Gita Wirjawan, a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy and former visiting scholar at APARC, focused on the stakes for Southeast Asia. Wirjawan argued that Trump’s economic policies, such as protectionism and prioritizing economic growth over democratic principles, could embolden right-wing populist movements in Southeast Asia. He suggested that parts of Southeast Asia could be a natural beneficiary of a reallocation of financial capital from the U.S. as companies diversify supply chains by establishing operations outside China in response to Trump’s planned tariffs. Yet, growing economic inequality in Southeast Asia, particularly in urban areas, could fuel the rise of similar nationalist policies, undermining efforts to promote inclusive, democratic development.

Shin highlighted the challenges South Korea might face under a second Trump presidency. Trump will likely demand higher defense payments from South Korea, potentially straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. This could put President Yoon in a tough spot, especially as trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation has been progressing well but faces uncertainty. Economically, South Korean firms may struggle if U.S. policies like the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act are rolled back, as subsidies were crucial for their investments in the U.S. On North Korea, Shin noted that Trump may resume summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, leaving South Korea sidelined and potentially sparking an arms race in Northeast Asia. 

The panelists all emphasized that Asia, with its diverse political landscapes, would need to navigate a new era of economic nationalism and geopolitical unpredictability, with potential challenges to economic stability and democratic norms.

A Focus on U.S.-China Relations 

The second panel, "Crossroads of Power: U.S.-China Relations in a New Administration," focused specifically on the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China relations in the wake of the election. Moderated by APARC China Program Director Jean Oi, the discussion featured Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, and Peking University's Yu Tiejun, the APARC's China Policy Fellow during all 2024. The panelists analyzed the potential trade, security, and diplomacy shifts between the two global superpowers, particularly in light of D.C.’s bipartisan consensus on China. 

Central to the discussion was the continuity of U.S. policy toward China under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. Examples of this continuity included recent tariff increases on Chinese imports, a new U.S. Department of the Treasury program to screen U.S. outbound foreign investments in key sectors, and tighter export controls on critical technologies like quantum computing and advanced semiconductors. The panelists explored the economic and strategic ramifications, noting that these policies could disrupt existing trade patterns. 

Another area of concern was China’s uneven implementation of the 2020 Phase One  trade deal it negotiated with the U.S., in which China had committed to domestic reforms and $200 billion of additional U.S. imports. This failure could buttress the new administration’s plan to increase tariffs, complicating diplomatic efforts between Washington and Beijing. Fingar noted that while China has made efforts to diversify its supply chains, these changes might not be enough to shield it from the effects of U.S. economic policies, which could include escalating tariffs or additional restrictions on Chinese exports. 

The conversation also touched on broader geopolitical considerations, particularly concerning China’s role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The panelists discussed the potential for cooperation or de-escalation in U.S.-China relations, with China’s positioning on the war serving as both a point of contention and a possible avenue for diplomatic engagement. 

Underscoring the deepening complexities in U.S.-China relations post-election, the panelists highlighted the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump administration, particularly regarding the role of people-to-people exchanges in fostering mutual understanding.

Both events emphasized the multifaceted consequences of Trump’s return to power for Asia and the global international order. While the discussions highlighted the challenges posed by the rise of economic nationalism, trade tensions, and shifting security priorities, they also pointed to potential areas of cooperation and the evolving dynamics of global diplomacy.


In the Media


From Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro:

What a Second Trump Term Means for the World
OnPoint – WBUR, Nov 12 (interview)

Race to the White House: How the US Election Will Impact Foreign Policy
UBS Circle One, October 23 (interview)

From Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman:

On Korea-U.S. Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Yonhap News, Nov 20 (featured)

Trump Looking for Trade 'Reset' with Most Countries: Ex-USTR Official
Nikkei, Nov 16 (interview)

How Southeast Asia Can Weather the Trump Trade Typhoon
The Economist, Nov 14 (quoted)

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group of people standing on steps of Encina Hall at the 2024 Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue
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Driving Climate-Resilient Infrastructure and Inclusive Industrialization: Highlights from the Third Annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue

Held at Stanford and hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the third annual Dialogue convened global leaders, academics, industry experts, and emerging experts to share best practices for advancing Sustainable Development Goal 9 in support of economic growth and human well-being.
Driving Climate-Resilient Infrastructure and Inclusive Industrialization: Highlights from the Third Annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue
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APARC recently hosted two panels to consider what a second Trump presidency might mean for economic, security, and political dynamics across Asia and U.S. relations with Asian nations.

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Shorenstein APARC's annual report for the academic year 2023-24 is now available.

Learn about the research, publications, and events produced by the Center and its programs over the last academic year. Read the feature sections, which look at the historic meeting at Stanford between the leaders of Korea and Japan and the launch of the Center's new Taiwan Program; learn about the research our faculty and postdoctoral fellows engaged in, including a study on China's integration of urban-rural health insurance and the policy work done by the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL); and catch up on the Center's policy work, education initiatives, publications, and policy outreach. Download your copy or read it online below.

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Flyer for the panel "The 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections: High Stakes for Asia" with speaker headshots.

The November 2024 U.S. presidential election is projected to have profound implications for the world. In the Asia-Pacific region, the outcomes and subsequent policy priorities could significantly change global alliances and the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Kamala Harris and Donald Trump offer substantially different approaches to bilateral and multilateral cooperation that would have divergent impacts on trade relations, security partnerships, and diplomatic ties with Washington at a time in which U.S.-Asia engagement remains crucial for regional security, economic development, humanitarian assistance, technological innovation, and climate action.

Join a panel of experts on democracy, international relations, human rights, trade, and development to explore the potential opportunities and risks the next U.S. administration’s policies may pose for the Asia-Pacific and how stakeholders in the region look at their future with the United States. 

This event is part of APARC's Contemporary Asia Seminar Series, which hosts professionals in public and foreign policy, journalism, and academia who share their perspectives on pressing issues facing Asia today.

Panelists:

Headshot for Frank Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, was published in 2018. His latest book, Liberalism and Its Discontents, was published in May 2022. 

Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation and of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Square portrait photo of Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, the Director of the Japan Program and Deputy Director at APARC, a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor of Sociology, all at Stanford University. Tsutsui received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Kyoto University and earned an additional master’s degree and Ph.D. from Stanford’s sociology department in 2002. Tsutsui’s research interests lie in political/comparative sociology, social movements, globalization, human rights, and Japanese society. His most recent publication, Human Rights and the State: The Power of Ideas and the Realities of International Politics (Iwanami Shinsho, 2022), was awarded the 2022 Ishibashi Tanzan Award and the 44th Suntory Prize for Arts and Sciences.

Gita Wirjawan

Gita Wirjawan is a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Precourt Institute for Energy and formerly a visiting scholar at APARC. His public service has included positions as Indonesia’s minister of trade, chairman of its Investment Coordinating Board, and chair of a 159-nation WTO ministerial conference in 2012 that focused on easing global trade barriers.

As an investment banker, he has held key appointments at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan, where he led many mergers, corporate restructuring, corporate financing, and strategic sales involving leading companies in Southeast Asia. Having established a successful investment business in Indonesia, the Ancora Group, he created the Ancora Foundation, which has endowed scholarships for Indonesians to attend high-ranked universities worldwide and has funded the training of teachers at hundreds of Indonesian kindergartens serving underprivileged children.

Gita hosts the educational podcast “Endgame” to promote Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity. His degrees are from the Harvard Kennedy School (MPA), Baylor University (MBA), and the University of Texas at Austin (BSc). 

 

Moderator:

Headshot for Gi-Wook Shin

Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a professor of sociology, and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. At Stanford, he has also served as director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center since 2005 and as founding director of the Korea Program since 2001. His research concentrates on nationalism, development, and international relations, focusing on Korea/Asia.

Shin is the author/editor of more than 25 books, including South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis: The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization; The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security; Global Talent: Foreign Labor as Social Capital in Korea; and One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India, will be published by Stanford University Press in 2025.

In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, environmental, and political challenges in Asia through interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. He also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC in May 2024.

Shin previously taught at the University of Iowa and the University of California, Los Angeles. He holds a BA from Yonsei University and an MA and PhD from the University of Washington.

Gi-Wook Shin
Francis Fukuyama

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616 Jane Stanford way
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, the Director of the Japan Program and Deputy Director at APARC, a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor of Sociology, all at Stanford University.

Prior to his appointment at Stanford in July 2020, Tsutsui was Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies, and Director of the Donia Human Rights Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Tsutsui’s research interests lie in political/comparative sociology, social movements, globalization, human rights, and Japanese society. More specifically, he has conducted (1) cross-national quantitative analyses on how human rights ideas and instruments have expanded globally and impacted local politics and (2) qualitative case studies of the impact of global human rights on Japanese politics. His current projects examine (a) changing conceptions of nationhood and minority rights in national constitutions and in practice, (b) populism and the future of democracy, (c) experimental surveys on public understanding about human rights, (d) campus policies and practices around human rights, (e) global expansion of corporate social responsibility and its impact on corporate behavior, and (f) Japan’s public diplomacy and perceptions about Japan in the world.

His research on the globalization of human rights and its impact on local politics has appeared in American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Problems, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and other social science journals. His book publications include Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press 2018), and two co-edited volumes Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World (with Alwyn Lim, Cambridge University Press 2015) and The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (with John Ciorciari, University of Michigan Press forthcoming). He has been a recipient of National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, National Science Foundation grants, the SSRC/CGP Abe Fellowship, Stanford Japan Studies Postdoctoral Fellowship, and other grants as well as awards from American Sociological Association sections on Global and Transnational Sociology (2010, 2013, 2019), Human Rights (2017, 2019), Asia and Asian America (2018, 2019), Collective Behavior and Social Movements (2018), and Political Sociology (2019). 

Tsutsui received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Kyoto University and earned an additional master’s degree and Ph.D. from Stanford’s sociology department in 2002.

Deputy Director, Shorenstein APARC
Director, Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC
Co-Director, Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui
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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2022-24
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Gita Wirjawan joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as a visiting scholar for the 2022-23 and 2023-2024 academic years. In the 2024-25 year, he is a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy. Wirjawan is the chairman and founder of Ancora Group and Ancora Foundation, as well as the host of the podcast "Endgame." While at APARC, he researched the directionality of nation-building in Southeast Asia and sustainability and sustainable development in the U.S. and Southeast Asia.

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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a host of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin in Autumn quarter 2025.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and contemporary Asia broadly defined, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.

Japan Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.  

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024. 
 

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Gerhard Hoffstaedter, Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellow
Q&As

Refugee Placemaking in Malaysia: A Conversation with Dr. Gerhard Hoffstaedter

Anthropologist Gerhard Hoffstaedter, APARC's Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellow on Southeast Asia, discusses his research into the experiences of refugees in Malaysia and their interactions with international institutions.
Refugee Placemaking in Malaysia: A Conversation with Dr. Gerhard Hoffstaedter
2024 Incoming Fellows at Shorenstein APARC
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APARC Names 2024 Incoming Fellows

The Center’s new cohort of nine scholars pursues research spanning diverse topics across contemporary Asia studies.
APARC Names 2024 Incoming Fellows
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The Center offers multiple fellowships for Asia researchers to begin in Autumn quarter 2025. These include postdoctoral fellowships on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, a visiting scholar position on contemporary Taiwan, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.

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Scot Marciel
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This commentary was originally published by The Diplomat.


New United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop faces what seems to be an impossible mission. Even setting aside the long history of failed U.N. envoys to the country, the current situation is not at all welcoming to a would-be foreign peacemaker. The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis.

For its part, the broad resistance – and arguably the population at large – is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that. In addition, despite improved inter-group communication and broad unity on the goal of ousting the military, its various elements represent a host of different interests, and there is no one person who can speak for all or even most of those interests.

There is no foolproof path to success for Bishop, but past experience and an analysis of the current Myanmar situation suggest an approach that includes the following elements.

First, recognize that – at least for now – there is virtually zero chance that any envoy will be able to (a) persuade the military to reduce violence or (b) bring the parties to the table for serious dialogue on a potential compromise deal. Myanmar now is a zero-sum situation; there is no compromise to be had and pushing one will do little more than alienate everyone involved. The best hope for an environment that would allow for genuine dialogue/negotiations would be for the military to be weakened to the point that it seriously begins to seek an exit strategy. That has not yet happened.


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Second, Bishop should use the interim period to put herself in the best possible situation to be helpful should that inflection point be reached. That would involve first talking at length with credible experts on Myanmar, most of whom should be Myanmar people. The next step would be to very carefully begin to develop relationships with key players – in the military, the resistance, and among other political and civil society players.  The emphasis here is on “very carefully” because the junta will use any visits/meetings as photo ops to confer legitimacy, which will undermine the envoy’s standing with the resistance and the broad Myanmar population.

Bishop should insist that any meetings not be photographed. If that proves impossible, any meetings/photos with the generals need to be matched in a timely way with similar events with the National Unity Government and other resistance officials. Bishop’s public appearances and media engagements should be limited and restrained, though she likely will need to “clarify” any meeting readouts from the junta.

Third, as Morten Pedersen noted in a recent article for the Lowy Institute, Bishop can use her discussions with the broad resistance to encourage further coordination and development of a shared vision, along with work toward a more detailed blueprint for any future transition. There is less to do with the generals, frankly, though encouraging them to think of a realistic exit strategy might have some limited value (mostly among officers other than the top one or two generals).

Fourth, Bishop can use her position to push the United Nations as well as Myanmar’s neighbors and other interested parties to review and rethink their approach on humanitarian assistance. To date, the U.N. and the neighbors have largely played by the junta’s rules, and in doing so have both conferred legitimacy on it and ensured that most of the assistance does not reach those who truly need it. Bishop will have the standing and the clout to insist on a more creative approach. Key will be her discussions with the Thais, who have generally backed the generals but under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin seem to be more open to new ideas than in the past.

Finally, Bishop would do well to coordinate and exchange ideas with key regional players, including current Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Special Envoy Alounkeo Kittikhoun, including before any visits to Myanmar. These players have had limited influence to date but could play important roles if and when the situation changes and there is a genuine need for regional and international support for negotiations and a potential “deal” to end the crisis. Again, such a deal is very unlikely – or if it somehow happened would not be durable – until and unless the military is desperate enough to make massive concessions, which means patience will be a necessity.

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U.S. President Joe Biden talks with Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin as they and other World leaders arrive for a "family photo" during the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Week.
Commentary

Navigating New Realities: The Future of U.S.–Thai Relations

While a return to the U.S.-Thailand alliance's heyday may seem improbable, patience, persistence, and an acknowledgment of new geopolitical realities can pave the way for a more productive relationship between Washington and Bangkok.
Navigating New Realities: The Future of U.S.–Thai Relations
Norrman Joshua
Q&As

The Legacies of Militarization: Norman Joshua Writes a Social and Cultural History of Indonesian Authoritarianism

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow Norman Joshua examines how state-society interactions in Indonesia produced an authoritarian political culture, tracing the implications of the country’s enduring legacy of militarization.
The Legacies of Militarization: Norman Joshua Writes a Social and Cultural History of Indonesian Authoritarianism
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Former Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop faces an unenviable task in attempting to bring peace to the country.

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Reconsidering Southeast Asia, May 16

Join us in celebrating a quarter-century of scholarship, learning, and intellectual exchange on Southeast Asia at Stanford! This special all-day event will bring together experts to discuss a variety of current issues in Southeast Asia including geopolitical competition, environmental sustainability, and gender inequality. The economic and sociopolitical futures of the region will also be debated, and alumni of the Southeast Asia Program will share their scholarly experiences and findings.

8:00-8:30 a.m.
Registration


8:30-8:40 a.m.

Welcome remarks
Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University

Celebratory remarks
Richard Saller
President of Stanford University

8:40-9:00 a.m.

Opening remarks
Don Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University

Celebratory remarks
Kathryn Stoner
Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law

Video messages
The Honourable Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim
Prime Minister of Malaysia
Pita Limjaroenrat
Member of Parliament, Prime Ministerial Candidate of Move Forward Party, Thailand 


9:00-10:30 a.m.
Panel 1 — The Anthropocene in Southeast Asia: Two Rivers

Panelists
James Scott
Sterling Professor Emeritus, Political Science; Acting Director, Agrarian Studies; Professor Emeritus, School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and Anthropology and Institute for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University (via Zoom)

Brian Eyler
Senior Fellow and Director, Southeast Asia Program and the Energy, Water, and Sustainability Program, Stimson Center

Moderator 
Rebakah Daro Minarchek
Assistant Teaching Professor, Integrated Social Sciences, University of Washington


10:30-10:45 a.m.
Coffee and Tea Break


10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
Panel 2 — Geopolitics and U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Panelists            
Yuen Foong Khong
Co-Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalization and Li Ka Shing Professor in Political Science, National University of Singapore (via Zoom).

Scot Marciel
Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC and Former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, Indonesia, and ASEAN

Elina Noor
Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Gregory B. Poling
Senior Fellow/Director, Southeast Asia Program & Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Moderator 
Don Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University


12:15-1:00 p.m.
Lunch Break


1:00-2:30 p.m.
Panel 3 — Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellowship on Southeast Asia: Looking Back and Forward 

Panelists
Jacques Bertrand
Professor of Political Science and Director of the Collaborative Master’s Specialization in Contemporary East and Southeast Asian Studies at the Asian Institute of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Affairs, University of Toronto

Paul Schuler
Associate Professor, University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy

Gerald Sim
Professor of Film and Media Studies, Florida Atlantic University

Mark R. Thompson
Chair Professor of Public and international Affairs and Director, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong

David Timberman
Independent Analyst and Consultant; Former Director of Asia Programs, Freedom House

Angie Ngọc Trần
Professor of Political Economy in the Social Sciences and Global Studies Department, California State University, Monterey Bay

Moderator 
Robert Hefner
Professor, Department of Anthropology and the Pardee School of Global Affairs, Boston University


2:30-2:45 p.m.
Coffee and Tea Break


2:45-4:15 p.m.        
Panel 4 — Gender Inequality in Southeast Asia: Causes, Consequences, Solutions

Panelists
Mina Roces
Professor of History in the School of Humanities and Languages in the Faculty of Arts, Design and Architecture, The University of New South Wales

Mala Htun
Professor of Political Science, the University of New Mexico

Moderator 
Barbara Watson Andaya
Professor in the Asian Studies Program and former Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa


4:15 - 4:30 p.m.
Coffee and Tea Break


4:30-5:45 p.m.
Panel 5 — The Future of Southeast Asia

Gita Wirjawan
Visiting Scholar at Shorenstein APARC and Former Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia

Richard Heydarian
Columnist and Senior Lecturer at the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines, Diliman

Moderator 
Don Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University


5:45-6:00 p.m.

Closing Remarks
Don Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University

Conferences
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Flyer for the discussion "Rethinking US-Southeast Asia Relations" with headshots of speakers Cheng-Chwee Kuik and David Shambaugh.

This event is part of the Southeast Asia Program's 25th Anniversary celebration on the theme "Reconsidering Southeast Asia: Issues and Prospects"

Two critiques still burden America’s relations with Southeast Asia: Southeast Asians tend to resent the American tendency to emphasize China while warning them against the "China threat” lest they succumb to the influence of Beijing. Americans, in turn, tend to object when Southeast Asians hedge their cooperation by tilting toward China while taking advantage of what the US can offer. Responding to American pressure, Southeast Asians warn Washington, “Don’t make us choose.” These and other concerns will be taken up by two analysts uniquely well-qualified to discuss them. 

Kuik Cheng Chwee - 040824

Cheng-Chwee Kuik is Professor of International Relations and Head of the Centre for Asian Studies at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies in the National University of Malaysia and a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. 

David Shambaugh - 030824

David Shambaugh is the Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, whose China Policy Program he founded and directs. 

Each scholar has written widely on the seminar’s topic. Recent examples include essays by Prof. Kuik—e.g., “Explaining Hedging: The Case of Malaysian Equidistance” (in process, 2024) and “Getting Hedging Right: A Small-State Perspective” (2021)—and the detailed report and recommendations of a Working Group on Southeast Asia led by Prof. Shambaugh, Prioritizing Southeast Asia in American China Policy (Asia Society, 2023), which followed his Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia (2020). 

Lunch will be served.

Donald K. Emmerson
Don Emmerson, Director, Southeast Asia Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Affairs, Stanford University
Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Professor of International Relations, National University of Malaysia
David Shambaugh, 2023-24 Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
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As tensions continue to grow between China and the United States, Southeast Asian nations remain locked in the epicenter of an emergent geopolitical competition. Many questions remain as to how these countries will respond to the external pressures generated by this rivalry.

To address these questions, Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson recently joined ONE News Philippines host Richard Heydarian for an interview in an episode of the series The View From Manila. The full interview is available below:

Heydarian opened the conversation by asking whether great power competition between China and the United States constituted a new Cold War. According to Emmerson, this was not the case, and another Cold War in the region is unlikely to happen due in part to the economic interconnectedness between China and the United States.

Over the course of the conversation, Emmerson discussed the various challenges ASEAN member nations face as they balance their own domestic needs and desire for autonomy with the increasingly tenuous international political scene in the South China Sea.

Emmerson emphasized the potential vulnerability of ASEAN member states amidst clashes between superpower countries. “It's natural that the diversity of Southeast Asia would be an opportunity for large, powerful outsiders to come in and try to establish support that would further divide Southeast Asia,” he said of the potential for great power rivalry to continue and perhaps worsen the multiple divisions and distinctions that already exist within Southeast Asia.

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U.S. President Joe Biden talks with Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin as they and other World leaders arrive for a "family photo" during the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Week.
Commentary

Navigating New Realities: The Future of U.S.–Thai Relations

While a return to the U.S.-Thailand alliance's heyday may seem improbable, patience, persistence, and an acknowledgment of new geopolitical realities can pave the way for a more productive relationship between Washington and Bangkok.
Navigating New Realities: The Future of U.S.–Thai Relations
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In a new interview, Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson discusses the history and politics that have shaped great power competition in Southeast Asia and how the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States might affect ASEAN member states.

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Scot Marciel
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This article first appeared in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. You can also download its PDF version.


With the conclusion of the Cold War, Southeast Asia entered a transformative era that spanned approximately 25 years. During this period, the geopolitics of the region underwent profound changes, reshaping the foundations of regional security. Washington’s two pivotal alliances in Southeast Asia, which had been cornerstones of stability, struggled to find purpose. In the post-Cold War era, U.S.–Philippine relations weathered a turbulent course, while the alliance between Washington and Bangkok drifted. Policymakers in Washington relegated both alliances to secondary roles in U.S. Asian foreign policy.

However, since the inauguration of the Bongbong Marcos administration, the past year has witnessed a revitalization of the U.S.–Philippine alliance. A series of proactive measures have been taken to strengthen defense ties, highlighted by Marcos’ successful visit to Washington and a continuous stream of high-level US officials visiting Manila. In stark contrast, US–Thai relations have continued to amble along, characterized by senior-level visits but a conspicuous lack of momentum, leading some to question whether the relationship qualifies any longer as an “alliance.”[1]


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How Did We Reach This Point?

Numerous factors have contributed to the erosion of the alliance, which reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, driven by mutual concerns regarding communist expansionism. Rewinding to 1975, the fall of Saigon and the broader U.S. withdrawal from the region left Thai officials bewildered, shaking their confidence in Washington. Consequently, they embarked on diversifying their international relationships, notably by establishing ties with China.

The conclusion of the Cold War severed the alliance from a shared threat or adversary, and it marked the loss of the strategic lens through which Washington had previously viewed Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. The United States began exerting pressure on Thailand on a wide array of issues, spanning from trade matters to democracy and human rights. Thai officials voiced discontent, asserting that they were no longer receiving the special treatment befitting an ally. Furthermore, during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Washington offered minimal support and encouraged Thailand to follow the International Monetary Fund’s stringent prescriptions. In contrast, China provided more substantial support to its new partner. This period of U.S. policy remains a source of disappointment, if not anger, for many Thais.

[The Trump administration's] actions stabilized bilateral relations, albeit at a less enthusiastic level than what the two countries had enjoyed for decades.

Relations experienced a modest warming in the early 2000s. Washington embraced Thailand’s democratic progress, its cooperation in the Global War on Terror, and its role as a regional hub for security cooperation, humanitarian relief, and US diplomatic endeavors. The US military and American officials working closely with Bangkok highly valued Thailand’s collaboration on an array of issues. The George W. Bush administration even bestowed major non-NATO ally status upon Thailand and initiated negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. However, this period of the alliance paled in comparison to its former “glory days.” This was evident in the absence of a shared threat perception, the dearth of substantial personal connections between senior Thai and US officials, and the relatively limited attention Washington—outside of the Pentagon—paid to Thailand.

The downward trajectory of the relationship gained momentum in 2006 when the Thai military ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in a coup. Washington denounced the coup and suspended military assistance in compliance with the law, though this reaction did not precipitate a complete breakdown in the relationship. Over the subsequent years, Thailand’s deep-seated political polarization, persistent street protests by the “yellow shirts” and “red shirts,” and occasional judicial interventions in electoral politics led to bewilderment and frustration among US officials.[2] They struggled to comprehend why the Thai establishment found it challenging to accept the outcomes of competitive elections.

The turning point came in 2014 with another military coup, which prompted a sharply critical response from the United States. This included another suspension of military aid and a deliberate distancing of the United States from the new Thai government. In response, the coup government and its conservative supporters bitterly criticized Washington, alleging double standards and a lack of understanding of the Thai situation. The government also began leaning increasingly toward China, which offered diplomatic backing, arms, and additional defense cooperation. Bangkok maintained a distinct chilliness toward the United States for several years, even initiating a brief ‘investigation’ of US Ambassador Glyn Davies for public comments related to the lèse-majesté law.[3]

The Trump administration, with a focus on the geopolitical rivalry with China rather than democracy and human rights, reengaged with Thailand in 2017-2018. It invited then–Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha to the White House and restored military-to-military relations following Thailand’s pseudo-democratic 2019 elections. These actions stabilized bilateral relations, albeit at a less enthusiastic level than what the two countries had enjoyed for decades.

[T]he Biden administration continues to be disappointed with the Thai conservative establishment’s employment of legal and parliamentary tactics to impede the restoration of full democracy in the kingdom.

Where Relations Stand Today

After a sluggish start, the Biden administration ramped up its efforts in 2022 to enhance the United States’ relationship with Thailand. This included hosting Prime Minister Prayut as part of the US–ASEAN Summit, convening the inaugural bilateral Strategic and Defense Dialogue, dispatching Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Bangkok for discussions on military modernization, and publicly lauding the signing of a communiqué by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. The communiqué was framed as an expansion of the renowned 1962 Rusk-Thanat communiqué, which had solidified the alliance half a century earlier.[4]

Despite these advancements, the relationship has yet to approach its previous heights for several notable reasons. Foremost, the two nations lack a shared perception of common threats. Notably, the United States perceives China as a threat, while Thailand regards China as a significant partner. Consequently, Washington has no doubt felt dissatisfaction with the deepening security ties between Thailand and China, including arms sales and joint military exercises.

Secondly, the United States has voiced its discontent with Thailand’s robust support for the Myanmar junta and its neutral stance regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Biden administration continues to be disappointed with the Thai conservative establishment’s employment of legal and parliamentary tactics to impede the restoration of full democracy in the kingdom. As an indication of this disappointment, the Biden administration opted not to invite Thailand to participate in its December 2021 and March 2023 Summits for Democracy. These decisions irked Thai authorities, as did President Joe Biden’s choice to skip the Thailand-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting in late 2022.[5] Furthermore, Washington’s recent refusal of Thailand’s request to purchase F-35 fighter jets, possibly influenced by concerns regarding Thailand’s deepening security ties with China, undoubtedly contributed to Bangkok’s frustration.[6]

The key to strengthening [U.S.-Thailand] ties lies in both countries adjusting their expectations regarding each other and the relationship itself [...] Moving forward, both nations can capitalize on the numerous strengths within their broad and deep relationship.

The Way Ahead

As previously highlighted, the current reality has prompted some to question the relevance of the U.S.–Thailand alliance in its current form. Some wonder if it might be more accurate to reclassify the relationship as something other than a traditional alliance, considering the glaring lack of strategic alignment and Thailand’s burgeoning closeness to China. Considering these factors, it appears that the objectives of the two nations are increasingly divergent. In fact, discreet voices in Thailand have been quietly suggesting for years that their “alliance” with the United States appears less meaningful and valuable when compared to Washington’s “partnerships” with non-allies, such as Singapore and even Vietnam.

While it is true that the current state of the relationship is more aptly described as a partnership rather than a conventional alliance, this does not necessarily imply that the governments should terminate the alliance altogether. In the realm of diplomacy, such a move would inevitably be perceived as a downgrade of the relationship, regardless of any new title applied to it. It would be more prudent for both governments to focus on enhancing the substance and tone of the relationship while accepting the inherent ambiguity of being somewhat misaligned allies.

The key to strengthening these ties lies in both countries adjusting their expectations regarding each other and the relationship itself. The United States should accept that Thailand is not currently strategically aligned with Washington nor a full-fledged democracy. Nevertheless, Thailand can still play a crucial role as an important partner. This recognition, among other factors, necessitates patience concerning Thailand’s domestic politics and faith that the kingdom will not fall excessively under China’s influence. Instead, like Indonesia and Malaysia, it can seek to maintain positive relations with both major powers as well as numerous middle powers.

On the other hand, Thailand should realize that its relationship with Washington holds significance for its own strategic autonomy, security, and economic interests. It should strive to be a more constructive partner.

Moving forward, both nations can capitalize on the numerous strengths within their broad and deep relationship. The United States remains Thailand’s leading export market and its third-largest source of foreign investment. Thailand has also aligned itself with Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Health cooperation, notably the long-standing partnership in health research, continues to thrive. The security relationship, which has long been at the core of the alliance, remains robust, albeit less exclusive than in the past. The United States and Thailand jointly host the influential annual Cobra Gold exercise and engage in cooperation and training across various domains. Washington continues to be a key supplier of weaponry and equipment to the Thai military. The two countries also collaborate closely on law enforcement, including counternarcotics efforts. People-to-people connections, including the Peace Corps program, educational exchanges, scholarships, and various initiatives, help maintain a deep reservoir of goodwill between the two nations.

The recent Thai elections represented a missed opportunity. The establishment of a new government led by the victorious political party could have triggered a surge in US enthusiasm for the relationship, not because Washington endorsed a particular party, but because it would have marked a triumph for democracy. Regrettably, Thailand’s conservative establishment obstructed that party from forming a government, resulting in a less democratic outcome.

Despite the disappointing outcome, the emergence of a new Thai government and a fresh Thai foreign minister provides an opening to strengthen cooperation between the US and Thailand on regional and subregional issues. Thailand has traditionally been influential in these areas, but its diplomacy lacked vigor during the Prayut era. This potential cooperation encompasses expanded efforts to safeguard the crucial Mekong River ecosystem, increased collaboration on mitigating and addressing climate change, and the enhancement of economic ties among mainland Southeast Asian nations.

A new government could also facilitate more constructive dialogue regarding Myanmar, offering a prime opportunity to increase cross-border humanitarian assistance. On the defense and security front, both countries should reinitiate discussions on the earlier proposal to transform U-Tapao Air Base into a regional disaster relief hub. Additionally, regular dialogues on potential security concerns, such as the possibility of Chinese access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, are essential.

While a return to the alliance’s heyday seems unlikely, a path to a more productive and robust relationship between these long-standing allies exists through patience, persistence, and a willingness to embrace new geopolitical realities.


NOTES

[1] Several authors recently have discussed this alliance versus partnership question. See, for example, Benjamin Zawacki, “U.S.-Thai Relations Have an Alliance Problem,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Murray Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand,” CSIS, 2 September 2022, https://www.csis.org/.

[2] See: Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Two Thailands: Clashing Political Orders and Entrenched Polarization,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers, ed. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 67–80, https://carnegieendowment.org/. The red shirts initially emerged as backers of the deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who faced removal in a military coup in September 2006. Over time, this support shifted to Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Conversely, the yellow shirts signify those who stood in opposition to Mr. Thaksin and played a pivotal role in the street protests that precipitated the 2006 coup.

[3] Thomas Fuller, “Thai Police Investigate U.S. Ambassador on Suspicion of Insulting the King,” New York Times, 9 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/. This law makes it illegal to defame, insult, or threaten the monarch of Thailand.

[4] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai Remarks to the Press” (press release, US Department of State, 10 July 2022), https://www.state.gov/.

[5] Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Belittled Again as U.S. Ostracizes It From Democracy Summit,” Nikkei Asia, 9 December 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/; and “Thailand Shut Out of U.S. Democracy Summit Again,” Bangkok Post, 29 March 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.

[6] Matthew Fulco and Chen Chuanren, “U.S.-Thai Military Alliance Is At A Crossroads,” Aviation Week, 19 July 2023, https://aviationweek.com/.

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While a return to the U.S.-Thailand alliance's heyday may seem improbable, patience, persistence, and an acknowledgment of new geopolitical realities can pave the way for a more productive relationship between Washington and Bangkok.

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