Last spring two North Korean defectors visited Stanford University from Seoul to share their experiences in the North. Hosted by Stanford's Korean Student Association, the event was held to increase awareness of North Korean human rights issues in the Stanford intellectual community. In fact, the Association hosts "North Korean Human Rights Night" every year. Stanford is not alone in this; many other leading American universities across the country, often also led by Korean American students, convene similar gatherings.

In the summer of 2012, Silicon Valley IT giant Google, a Stanford progeny and neighbor, hosted a conference on how technology can be used to disrupt illicit global networks, such as trafficking in human beings, human organs, and weapons. Ten North Korean defectors, ranging from former elite party members to forgotten orphans, flew in from Seoul to participate. They shared their extraordinary stories of survival amid excruciatingly painful quests for freedom.

Growing pressure on Pyongyang

These two stories are not isolated episodes. They reflect a recent trend of the international community paying dramatically more attention to North Korean human rights issues. Most notably, last month the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to put North Korean human rights violations on the U.N. Security Council's agenda, despite objections from China and Russia. International pressure has been intensifying on Pyongyang since the release last year of a U.N. report documenting a network of political prisons in the North and atrocities that include murder, enslavement, torture, rape and forced abortions.

While concerns about North Korean human rights are longstanding at the U.N., this was the first time the U.N. Security Council ever debated the isolated country's human rights situation. In the past the international community focused primarily on curbing North Korea's nuclear programs. Now human rights in North Korea have become a matter rivaling the nuclear issue in seriousness and global attention. Its importance appears likely to continue to grow in the coming years.

That the human rights situation in North Korea is appalling was never a secret. Defectors have produced some searing accounts of life in the North Korean gulag. Why then did the international community largely ignore it until recently?

Partly this was a product of the priority given to security issues. But it also has to do with the closed nature of the regime and Cold War dynamics that made many people in the international community doubt that the situation could be as bad as some asserted. Pyongyang made it virtually impossible for foreign journalists to report out of the country, much less obtain video that could dramatize the situation of the ordinary people of North Korea for an international audience.

Moreover, some Western observers suspected that those focusing on North Korea's human rights situation were trying to demonize the regime for political and strategic purposes. Others, such as China and Russia, stayed away from supporting international criticism of North Korea's human rights situation, apparently for fear of opening up their own human rights situation to heightened international scrutiny. In any event, with few practical means to address the North Korean human rights situation, the international community paid little heed to the problem until the end of the cold war.

Unspeakable atrocities

Then, the great famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s led to many more North Koreans leaving their country and seeking temporary relief in China. More than ever they traveled on to the South and brought their life stories with them. One consequence has been an enormous increase in the amount of information available about circumstances inside North Korea, not least due to the flow of information into the country and the use of cell phones and other technology to get reports out. Along with changing international norms about human rights, this contributed to a dramatic growth during the past decade in the number of people, organizations and states throughout the world actively focusing on human rights in North Korea. In South Korea alone, there are many NGOs, often led by North Korean refugees, that work on North Korean human rights issues.

In a logical conclusion to these developments, a special United Nations Commission of Inquiry in February 2014 published a report detailing what it called "unspeakable atrocities" in North Korea. The head of the inquiry sent a letter to Kim Jong Un, warning, in effect, that Kim himself might be brought before the International Criminal Court. While the U.N. Security Council has not yet taken concrete action, the fact that it placed North Korea's human rights record on its agenda means that, theoretically at least, it can now at any point take the next step of referring these crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court.

How, then, should we deal with the human rights situation in North Korea? While it is not difficult to condemn the current condition on moral and ethical grounds, it is much more challenging to adequately address it in practical terms, especially when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reacts extremely negatively on such condemnation and uses it as a reason for not engaging on this issue.

For instance, the North Korean human rights situation remains one of the most divisive issues between conservatives and progressives in South Korea. South Korean conservatives advocate a very active program of publicizing and condemning North Korea's human rights situation. Many support steps such as taking the matter before the International Court of Justice with the aim of charging North Korea's leaders with crimes against humanity. Conservatives argue not only that this is the morally correct approach but also that it would put increased pressure on the regime to reform, if not contribute to its collapse.

South Korean progressives, on the other hand, while acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, are adamant that focusing on it will not serve to improve the situation. Instead, they say, by making the regime feel even less secure, it would actually worsen the human rights situation in North Korea as well as hurt efforts to improve inter-Korean relations. Progressives therefore argue South Korea should instead focus for the time being on state-to-state dialogue while providing aid to the North. This would reassure Pyongyang, they say, and eventually contribute to its taking its own reform measures, including improving the human rights situation.

As a result of these very different views, the Republic of Korea has adopted significantly different policies depending on whether a progressive or a conservative leader occupies the Blue House. When progressives Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun were president, the ROK often abstained on votes in UN bodies addressing North Korea's human rights situation. In contrast, conservative governments voted in favor of international criticism of North Korea's human rights situation and sometimes took the lead in raising the issue.

A coordinated effort

Meanwhile, South Korea's National Assembly has for years been unable to pass a North Korean human rights bill at all. Progressives favor "human rights" legislation that deals primarily with providing humanitarian aid to the North, consistent with their perspective on the problem's roots, while conservatives have drafted a bill that focuses on human rights along the lines of the United States' North Korea Human Rights Act, first passed in 2004.

For its part, the U.S. itself became focused on human rights only about a generation ago. It was not until the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-81) that the U.S. embraced an activist policy placing international human rights near the top of its foreign agenda. Before then, the U.S. fiercely criticized communist states, but mostly because of the nature of their regimes rather than their human rights practices per se.

Today democratic governments throughout the world routinely criticize aspects of the human rights situations even in friendly and allied countries, not just in those of adversaries. Actions on behalf of human rights that in earlier decades would have been deemed unacceptable "interference in domestic affairs" now enjoy international legitimacy and broad support. Concepts such as the "responsibility to protect (R2P)," which many Japanese have promoted, assert that national sovereignty is not absolute and that the international community must intervene to stop situations where the regime is unable to protect its people.

While concern is well-taken that a focus on the North Korean human rights situation would burden any engagement effort with Pyongyang and, moreover, would not improve the lives of the people of North Korea in the short- to mid-term, we cannot ignore the human rights situation. Any policy toward the North must take into account that the North Korean human rights issue has developed dramatically in recent years.

For South Korea, this requires a principled but nuanced approach. It has long been the primary center for research on North Korean human rights, with the Korea Institute for National Unification producing its annual White Paper since 1996, but it needs to establish a bipartisan body to develop programs to effectively address those areas most in need. It should also support all important and accurate criticism of North Korea's human rights situation at the United Nations and other international organizations.

However, South Korea may not take the lead in addressing North Korea's human rights abuses, while increasing the humanitarian provision of nutritional assistance and public health services in North Korea without linkage to the nuclear issue. Such an approach would deprive North Korea of the argument that South Korea is not actually concerned about human rights but is using the issue as a weapon against Pyongyang.

Like other aspects of North Korea policy, the human rights problem is extremely troubling yet enormously difficult to address effectively. The international community must share its wisdom and its resources to develop and implement principled, pragmatic, long-term approaches to the challenges that Pyongyang presents, especially the human rights situation. Leaders of the international community as a whole but above all South Korea's neighbors should support and participate in such a coordinated effort. This is in fact an area in which Japan and South Korea can easily cooperate more.

Shin recently coauthored the policy report, "Tailored Engagement: Toward an Effective and Sustainable Inter-Korean Relations Policy," released at a hearing of the Korean National Assembly's special committee on inter-Korean relations. This Nikkei Asian Review article was originally carried on Jan. 20 and reposted with permission.

Sony Pictures Entertainment was set to release a satirical comedy, “The Interview,” in late 2014, but a cyberattack hit the organization that leaked corporate information, leading the company to initially pull the film and opening up a string of theories over who was behind the attack and how to respond.

Speculation began to mount as a clearer picture of the unprecedented hacking, both comprehensive and large in size, began to emerge. The breach is thought to be retribution for Sony’s production of the film, which carries a plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Then, a threat was directed at movie theaters and moviegoers planning to screen and see “The Interview.” The message warned those against involvement ahead of the film’s Dec. 25 opening, indicating a “bitter fate” and alluding to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

An unknown group, The Guardians of Peace “GOP,” claimed responsibility for the cyberattack. Media and those familiar with North Korea began to point blame on the country, which had already publicly condemned the film last June and has a history of cybercrime. Responding to accusations, top North Korean leadership rejected any involvement in the attack.

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The White House responded as Sony canceled the film’s New York premiere and said it would discontinue distribution. Following his year-end press conference, President Barack Obama condemned the hacking, citing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s conclusion that North Korea was behind the attack. The President said the United States would respond “proportionally,” and on Jan. 2, signed an Executive Order that put into action a series of sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury.

David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University, answered questions about the Sony hacking and its policy implications for the United States and North-South Korean relations. Straub is the associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director.

What do we know about the Sony hacking? Who’s responsible?

Based on many types of evidence, including confidential information, U.S. government officials appear to be quite confident that North Korea did in fact conduct this operation. There’s still some disagreement in the media and among tech experts over who is responsible. They’ve cited a number of reasons but the main one is that the FBI’s official statement attributing the attack to North Korea provided evidence that they believe is far from conclusive. I myself am not a technical expert, but based upon my following North Korea for many years – the attack strikes me as being very likely to have been a North Korean operation. The FBI statement noted that the Sony attack is similar to an attack that the North Koreans conducted against South Korean banks and media outlets in March 2013. In that attack, many South Korean banks had their hard drives completely wiped clean. It was a hugely destructive attack and very similar to what happened to Sony.

Does North Korea’s response to the Sony hack coincide with past behavior?

In addition to the 2013 South Korean bank cyberattack, the North Koreans apparently sank a South Korean naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 sailors. In both instances, the North Koreans denied that they did it, expressed outrage over being accused, demanded that the South Koreans produce proof, said that they could prove that they didn’t do it, and then requested that the South Koreans conduct a joint investigation. These same demands are being made in response to the U.S. blaming Pyongyang for the Sony cyberattack. It couldn’t be more similar. More generally, the North Korean regime is very calculating. They know they can’t win an outright military confrontation with South Korea, much less the United States, so what they do is try to find a weak link and go after it in a way in which they have plausible deniability – a situation where it’s very difficult for the attacked party to prove who did it.

Describe North Korea’s hacking capabilities.

North Korea is a very secretive country, so it’s hard to be completely certain of their cyber capabilities. However, according to many accounts, the North Korean government has established professional hacking schools and units over the years, resulting in hundreds if not thousands of trained hackers. North Korea has engaged in a number of attacks in the past, the most prominent one was the attack on South Korean banks in March 2013. But also, a few years ago, North Korea conducted less sophisticated attacks on major U.S. government websites.

Why would they conduct an attack?

The North Koreans appear to have both the capability and the motivation to attack Sony. The nation’s entire political system rests on a cult of personality – now a cult of family, actually – that began with the founder of the regime, Kim Il-sung, and extends to his grandson today, leader Kim Jong-un, who has been in power since Dec. 2011. It’s the only thing holding the political system together at this point. The cult of personality is so strong that any direct criticism of the top leader is something that North Koreans will compete among each other to reject. From this standpoint, it seems very likely that they would feel they had to prevent the showing of a movie that features an assassination of Kim Jong-un. And, the hackers had plenty of time to prepare for and implement the attack because everyone knew well ahead of when the movie would be released.

The United States placed new financial sanctions on North Korea. What impact will the sanctions have?

President Obama made it clear that the U.S. government would respond at a time, in a place, and in a manner of its own choosing. Not all measures taken would be made public. So far, the first publically announced measure was the President’s Executive Order on Jan. 2 imposing additional sanctions on a number of North Korean agencies and officials. This in itself is unlikely to have major consequences because most of those entities were already sanctioned. But, the Executive Order states that the sanctions are being implemented not only because of the cyberattack against Sony, but more generally because of North Korea’s actions and policies, including its serious human rights abuses. So in a sense, the North Koreans got the United States to expand its reasons for sanctioning them.

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking, saying the United States will "respond proportionally," at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19.

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19. Photo credit: WhiteHouse.gov

What other steps will the United States likely take?

President Obama left open the possibility that North Korea might be returned to the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, from which the nation was removed in 2008. I think it was a mistake to remove North Korea from that list in the first place. It was done to promote progress on the nuclear talks, which eventually failed, and ignored a number of terroristic actions that North Korea has committed in recent years. Another possibility, which is being pushed by Republicans in Congress, is to increase financial sanctions that mirror the type that were successfully implemented in Iran.

How will the U.S. response influence cybersecurity policy going forward?

The attack on Sony is a huge wakeup call to American businesses, and even to the U.S. government. It’s the first attack of this size on a company located in the United States. It got tremendous profile in the media and the President has been personally engaged in responding. Nearly everyone has heard about it, so U.S. companies are now going to be focused much more on cybersecurity because it has exposed some potential vulnerabilities – a “if North Korea can do it, presumably others can too” mentality. Moreover, if an attack can be executed on a film company, it could also be done to other businesses and even to elements of U.S. critical infrastructure.

How do you view North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s possible offer to meet with South Korean leadership this year?

Kim Jong-un said that he was open to the possibility of a summit with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address, although he made no specific proposal. He made clear that the summit would be conditional on actions to be taken in advance by South Korea. Among these, Kim demanded ending U.S.-South Korean military exercises and halting the flow of propaganda-filled balloons sent over the border into the North by non-governmental activist groups in the South. Moreover, North Korea has a history of expanding its conditions later, without any warning. So, I think one has to be skeptical. The signal is unfortunately less likely to be a sincere effort toward real, sustained dialogue, and more likely to be a North Korean propaganda effort devised to confuse, divert and divide international public opinion. That said, South Korea has acted entirely appropriately in welcoming the signal and reiterating its own offer of high-level talks. Let’s hope for the best.

David Straub also participated in an interview with Public Radio International on Jan. 1 about the prospect for North-South talks, the audio can be accessed on the PRI website.

The Michigan War Studies Review (MiWSR), an online scholarly journal affiliated with the Michigan War Studies Group, reviewed Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, a seminal book co-edited by Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) scholars Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, and University of Washington’s Daniel Chirot.

“Confronting Memories of World War II is a forceful and timely warning about the dangers of leaving problematic memory legacies unresolved,” says Albert J. Schmidt from The George Washington University, writing for MiWSR.

Organized in four major parts, the book examines the consequences of historical memory of World War II and contemporary nationalistic rhetoric, looking at cases across Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and Western and Eastern Europe, including Germany, Austria and France, among others.

Confronting Memories of World War II is part of an ongoing research project at Shorentein APARC that comparatively analyzes how wartime historical memory lives on through present-day national myths, and is furthered through educational material, media and popular culture.

The full review is attached below and may be also viewed on the MiWSR website.

Two weeks ago, North Korea surprised the world by sending three of its top leaders to the South to attend the closing ceremony of the 17th Asian Games in Incheon. The visit occurred in the midst of growing speculation that North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong Un, was seriously ill, or even that he had been removed from power. That dramatic and unprecedented visit gave renewed hope for improved inter-Korean relations, which have been frozen since the sinking of a South Korean vessel in 2010.

The strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula has continued to worsen over the past several years. To produce material for more nuclear devices, Pyongyang has proceeded with a large-scale uranium enrichment program. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently expressed concern that North Korea may also have reactivated its plutonium production facilities, another means of making fissile material for nuclear bombs. Meanwhile, having rocketed its first satellite into orbit in December 2012, the North is busily developing longer-range missiles to target not only the South but also Japan and the United States.

Unfortunately, there is no initiative on the horizon likely to change this dangerous trajectory. The United States was willing to negotiate with Pyongyang when there was a chance of preventing it from developing nuclear weapons. With that goal now deemed unachievable, Washington is instead intent on containing the threat through increased sanctions and counterproliferation efforts, missile defense, and heightened defense cooperation, with South Korea and Japan. U.S. engagement with North Korea, much less negotiation, is off the table and likely to stay that way.

China's buffer     

Earlier hopes that China would prove to be a deus ex machina have also foundered. While Beijing does not want Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons, it has always been more concerned about preventing instability in the North that might spill across their shared border. More recently, deepening suspicions among Beijing's leaders about U.S. strategic intentions have made North Korea even more important to China as a strategic buffer. China remains by far Pyongyang's most important foreign supporter, as reflected in the burgeoning trade across their border.

That leaves South Korea as the only country that could play a larger and more positive role in tackling the North Korea problem. South Korea is no longer a "shrimp among whales," as it used to think of itself, but a major "middle power." Strategically, Seoul is increasingly important not only to Washington but also to Beijing.

South Korea, however, has been a house divided when it comes to how to deal with the North. Conservative administrations, fearing that a North Korean nuclear arsenal would change the long-term balance of power on the peninsula, have made the North's denuclearization a condition for virtually all engagement with it. Progressive governments, on the other hand, have glossed over the nuclear issue, believing that increased contact will eventually promote change for the better in Pyongyang. The result has been South Korean policies that, whether from the left or the right, have proved unsustainable and ineffective.

"Tailored engagement"     

Based on a yearlong study, my colleagues and I have called for more active South Korean leadership to ameliorate the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We call the concept "tailored engagement." It is based on the conviction that engagement is only one means of dealing with North Korea, but an essential one, and it must be carefully "tailored" or fitted to changing political and security realities on and around the peninsula. It eschews an "appeasement" approach to Pyongyang as well as the notion that inter-Korean engagement under the current circumstances would be tantamount to accepting the North's misbehavior, especially its nuclear weapons program.

Such engagement would not immediately change the nuclear situation, but, if carefully considered and implemented, it need not encourage Pyongyang in that regard, either. Meanwhile, it could help to reduce bilateral tensions, improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans and bring the two societies closer together. It could reduce the risk of conflict now while fostering inter-Korean reconciliation and effecting positive change in the North.

South Koreans must first, however, develop a broader domestic consensus in areas and in ways that do not undermine the international effort to press Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. That is possible because many forms of engagement are in fact largely irrelevant to the nuclear program. For example, South Korea could provide much more humanitarian assistance to ordinary North Koreans; it could also engage in more educational and cultural programs, including sports exchanges. Concrete offers of expanded economic exchanges and support for the development of the North's infrastructure could become part of an incentive package in renewed six-party talks on ending the North's nuclear program.

Speculation about the state of Kim Jong Un's health and the North Korean leaders' visit to the South underline the fact that North Korean politics and society are experiencing great flux. For the outside world, this creates uncertainty, but also offers the possibility of positive change. Tailored engagement can at least test, and perhaps also influence, a changing North Korea.

Even a carefully "tailored" engagement strategy is no panacea. It is only one tool for dealing with the North -- military deterrence, counterproliferation and human rights efforts are among the others that are essential -- but why not try all available means when the situation is so worrisome? Japan should support such an approach because its interests, too, are threatened by the increasingly precarious situation on the peninsula.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on Oct. 16 and reposted with permission.

Stanford researchers have introduced a major new study on North Korea policy at a hearing at the South Korean National Assembly. Entitled “Tailored Engagement,” the report concludes that South Korea is the only country today that may be both willing and able to try a new approach toward the worsening North Korea problem.

“There is considerable urgency for Seoul to act,” according to the report released by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, which comes in response to increasing tensions and heightened nationalism in Northeast Asia.

“Only the Republic of Korea has both the need and the potential influence to change this dangerous trajectory on the Korean Peninsula.”

Published by Gi-Wook Shin, the director of Shorenstein APARC; David Straub, the associate director of the Korea Program; and Joyce Lee, the research associate for the Korea Program, the report is the culmination of more than a year of intensive research activities at Stanford University, including three international conferences focused on Northeast Asia’s security and political situation.

During the past year, North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons and North-South Korean relations worsened, while increasing U.S.-China strategic mistrust has made it less likely that those two countries can cooperate to change North Korea's behavior.

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“I was very impressed by the concern that the Korean Congressmen showed about the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and by their interest in our reasoning and recommendations,” Shin said. “Almost all of the Committee’s 18 members attended, and engaged in a lively exchange of views during the three-hour-long hearing.”

In their report, Shin, Straub and Lee propose a process that involves a series of increased exchanges with North Korea. This would be applied in a principled, systematic way, based largely on expanding a domestic consensus in South Korea that treats South Korean engagement of the North as necessary for improving the situation on the peninsula, not as incompatible with maintaining pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The report lays out four main steps that South Korea can implement to reduce the risk of regional conflict, while also creating a foundation for peaceful unification with North Korea.

• Focus on the pursuit of mutual interests and benefits rather than on symbolism and appeals to national sentiment.
• Apply market principles and international standards in economic activities.
• Collaborate with other countries and third-party companies in both economic and people-to-people projects.
• Be pragmatic and flexible in pursuing engagement at both the state-to-state and grassroots levels in complementary ways. 
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South Korea is well suited to engage the North because of their shared history, and its status as a major middle-power status has also increased its sway with both China and the United States.

No longer a “shrimp among whales,” South Korea has transformed since democratization, leaving that modest proverb behind and gaining an influential role in the region.

Now the country has an opportunity to begin to bridge the gap with North Korea, but first, it must create an internal structure that supports engagement.

In implementation

The North Korea problem is complex and wrapped in a varied history of engagement efforts by South Korea and other countries. Lessons of success and failure from past administrations provide important insight, the report says.

“The main impediment to South Korea’s assuming a greater international leadership role on the Korean question is not a lack of national power,” the report states, “but a lack of domestic political consensus about how to deal with North Korea and the consequent inconsistency in ROK policy across administrations.”

The South Korean government changes executive leadership every five years, and with it, there has been great inconsistency between conservative and progressive policies. The current administration that assumed office in 2013, led by President Park Geun-hye, pursues a North Korea policy of trustpolitik, wherein the government aims to build trust through a step-by-step process.

According to the report, the tailored engagement approach can inform and build on President Park’s policy. Three main actions can be taken by South Korea’s administration to implement productive engagement, the report states:

• Reorganize the Korean government itself to facilitate a more coordinated formulation and implementation of North Korea policy.
• Achieve much more consensus within South Korea on how to deal with North Korea.
• Seek to win support of the major powers, especially the United States and China for its approach to North Korea.

Developing trust is essential to de-escalate tension between the Koreas. Without progress in confidence-building, the two countries can hardly collaborate on even straightforward projects, such as expanding the existing Kaesong Industrial Complex, a bi-lateral industrial park located just north of the North-South border.

Solving more basic issues and participating in joint initiatives can help pave the way toward inter-Korean reconciliation during President Park’s administration, and the next.

“Reconciliation and convergence would improve many aspects of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including eventually facilitating North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program and the achievement of unification,” the reports says.

Asia Economy Daily wrote an article (in the Korean language) about the research team's presentation. A version of this article was also carried as a news release by the Stanford News Service. NK News, a news oufit focused on North Korea-related news, also wrote an article (in the English language) and can be found on NKNews.org. The Voice of America covered the presentation by Shin and Straub at the Brookings Institution. The article, written in Korean, can be accessed on the Voice of America online.