When the semiannual Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum convened in Seoul in late 2010, North Korea had just attacked South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island and revealed to American experts its work on a nuclear enrichment facility. These events capped a year that also witnessed the alleged sinking by North Korea of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and telling signs of succession preparations underway in North Korea. There have been no major incidents in recent months, but these events and the uncertainty they engendered weigh heavily in the minds of Korea observers and officials in South Korea and the United States.

Views on North Korea’s intentions and domestic political situation are mixed, as are voices on the appropriate U.S. and South Korean response to the events of 2010. These issues fit within a greater discussion of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the Northeast Asia region wherein China plays a major economic and political role. The most recent Forum, held June 2011 at the Walter. H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), provided an arena for informed, policy-oriented discussion of major peninsular and regional issues impacting South Korea and the United States.

Twenty subject experts and former senior officials from the United States and South Korea gathered at Stanford University on June 8 for an exchange of views. Amidst a diversity of opinions, collectively the participants expressed a wish for regional stability and the continued need for a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance in order to achieve it. The full executive report of this sixth session of the Forum is now available online, and includes discussion of:

• The current state of North Korea’s nuclear program and possible scenarios for reducing the risk of proliferation
• North Korea’s 2010 military actions and increasingly strong rhetoric toward South Korea since, especially in relation to its domestic political situation and the impending succession
• China’s response to North Korea last year and the complex relationship between the two countries, including Kim Jong Il’s frequent recent visits to China
• Northeast Asian regional cooperation with a focus on the South Korean-Chinese-Japanese leaders’ summit
• The factor of U.S., South Korean, and Chinese domestic politics in shaping policy toward North Korea, and the upcoming U.S. and South Korean elections
• The U.S. security role on the Korean Peninsula and in greater Northeast Asia

The Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum was established in 2006 by Shorenstein APARC to serve as an ongoing forum for the exchange of views on issues of significance to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Co-sponsored with the Sejong Institute, a leading South Korean think tank, the Forum alternates between Stanford and Seoul. Summaries and agendas from past Forums are available on the Shorenstein APARC website.

The ‘fair society' motto has been the centerpiece in the second half of the Lee Administration.

-Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC and KSP

On August 8, 2010, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak put into place the largest cabinet reorganization since he took office, nominating 48 year-old Kim Tae-ho as prime minister. However, after only 21 days, failing to pass a confirmation hearing of Parliament, Kim Tae-ho took the initiative to declare his resignation while waiting for Parliament to take action following the vote on his prime minister nomination. South Korea's prime minister [post] is without any real power; however, with a high parliamentary status, it is also in reality an important auxiliary to the president. Now into the second half of Lee Myung-bak's term, confronted with the dilemma of needing to identify a prime minister for a fourth time, one cannot help but raise the question: what is going on with South Korean politics?

The ruling Grand National Party hoped to pariah Kim Tae-ho, who in the prime of life, would have been able to give Li Myung-bak's government an infusion of "reform," "communication," and a "fresh" approach, but the opposition party also questioned Kim Tae-ho's political qualifications. From August 24-25, when the Parliament confirmation hearings convened, the Democratic Party also threw in several heavy accusations-Kim Tae-hoe's receiving bribes and illegal loans to raise campaign funds, having a public bus for his personal use, ordering full-time civil servants to do housework, and his wife accepting bribes and improperly managed properties-and strongly opposed Kim Tae-ho as Prime Minister. Gi-Wook Shin, director of Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says: "These allegations are not new. Though the prosecution has cleared Kim of bribery charges, I think the fact that he lied about his ties with Park Yeon-cha, a convicted businessman at the center of a high-profile bribery scandal, was the last straw. A photo also surfaced after the hearing showing Kim standing next to Park at a date several months earlier than Kim testified to having made his first acquaintance with Park." Park Yeon-cha is the former chairman of Taekwang Industrial. By the end of 2008's "Park Yeon-cha Gate" [scandal], numerous South Korean political figures were involved in the bribery scandal,  and former President Roh Moo-hyun also committed suicide.

"Kim Tae-ho's ambiguous statements have also left the ruling party and the public feeling disappointed. Kim Tae-ho was not widely known outside of his South Gyeongsang Province office. President Li Myung-bak praised him to South Korean society for being young, for having strength and charisma, and for being an honest, reliable politician. Now voters naturally are questioning his integrity and this has become a barrier for Lee Myung-bak's administration," says Dr. Insung Lee, director of Yonsei University's East Asia International Studies Institute.

Kim Tae-ho believes there are some accusations that are not very fair. Dr. Shin suggests: "What Kim meant by "unfair" was the fact that his confirmation hearing focused in large part on making personal attacks on Kim, and throwing harsh criticism of the ruling party, rather than serving its purpose to prove he was unqualified for the PM position." This no doubt exposed the intense power struggle between South Korea's political factions, and even differences within the Grand National Party.

"Lee Myung-bak should not introduce the subject of Kim Tae-ho when talking about matters of the next presidential election," says Dr. Lee. In 2004, Kim was elected governor of South Gyeongsang Province, becoming the youngest governor. During the time that he was the provincial governor, he actively promoted the "South Coast Sunbelt" development plan as a national project. Through word of mouth, he easily won the 2008 local government re-elections. According to the Constitution, Lee Myung-bak is unable to run for president again. Because of this, public opinion holds that he had the intention to train Kim Tae-hoe for the 2012 presidential candidacy. "The opposition party members at the hearing increasingly attacked Kim Tae-ho, in part to prevent this kind of arrangement from taking place," says Dr. Lee.

Dr. Chung-In Moon, professor of political science at Yonsei University pointed out: "People believe that Lee Myung-bak selected Kim Tai-ho to compete in the 2012 general election against in-party rival Park Geun-hye. Since this card is obsolete, Lee Myung-bak now cannot help but stand with Park Geun-hye. I cannot decide for certain how long this will last-the Lee camp will certainly find their own candidate." The internal struggle between the Grand National Party's inner factions was exposed in the battle of the recent Sejong City construction plan amendment. Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the leading "Second Faction's" former president Park Chung-hee, publicly sang a different tune towards Lee Myung-bak, displaying a hope to follow up with the plan to promote the construction of Sejong City. At the time of Parliament's vote, 50 of the ruling party's 168 members voted against the pro-Park opposition party. After former Prime Minister Chung Un-chan announced he would resign, Park Geun-hye raised the issue, holding Lee Myung-bak to be the primary lead of the Sejong City amendment and the one who should bear the responsibility.

On the day that Kim Tae-ho made his declaration to resign the prime minister nomination, those nominated to be the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and Minister of Education and Economics, also took the initiative to resign because of the suspicion of having accepted bribes. After several days, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan was also forced to resign due to the incident of his daughter's receiving "special admission" to become a senior civil servant. President Lee Myung-bak expressed: "I accept their resignation. I believe this will lead to the starting point of a fair society." Dr. Gi-Wook Shin believes: "The 'fair society' motto has been the centerpiece in the second half of the Lee Administration. As President Lee said in his liberation day speech in August 2010, 'A fair society is where each individual has to take responsibility for the outcome of his or her undertakings . . . A fair society constitutes the ethical and practical infrastructure for the advancement of the Republic.' To this effect, Lee reportedly instructed his secretariat to toughen the screening of ethical backgrounds of candidates for top government posts. Putting emphasis on higher ethical and moral standards can be seen as a positive sign of Korea's democratic advancement. It is not the only measure, but it is also an important measure for the betterment of South Korean politics."    

Translation by Sarah Lin Bhatia

In the waning days of the Clinton administration, the momentum for engagement with North Korea, building from the earlier agreement to freeze its nuclear program and a moratorium on ballistic missile launches, accelerated to the brink of full-scale normalization of relations. The U.S. presidential election in 2000 brought that diplomatic freight train to an abrupt halt.

Will the 2008 election bring yet another dramatic change in U.S. Korea policy?

The answer, based on the published positions of the two candidates and conversations with his senior Asia policy advisors, seems to be NO. There are important differences of emphasis in the approaches of both candidates, which I will discuss, but the bottom line is that both men are likely to pick up where President George W. Bush leaves off.

There are two fundamental reasons why U.S. policy toward Korea – and more broadly in Northeast Asia --- will not change dramatically. First, Asia will continue to suffer from a deficit of presidential attention. The arc of crisis – Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan -- will necessarily still command, as it has for almost 8 years, the attention of senior American policymakers. Even that will have to fight for space with the growing global financial crisis.

Second, both candidates agree on the broad outlines of an Asia policy, one that does not depart radically from the one pursued by the Bush administration. As a senior McCain advisor put it to me: “There is not a huge difference on Asia between Obama and McCain.” Privately, Obama advisors also stress that there will not be a huge break with current U.S. policy.

Both campaigns are critical of the lack of attention paid to Asia and the need for the U.S. to be more proactive to strengthen existing alliances and to join the discussion about new forms of regional integration. Both candidates support the need to engage, rather than confront, a rising China. Both men call for the U.S. to pay more attention to management of our alliances with South Korea and Japan. And both Obama and McCain support the North Korean nuclear negotiations carried out by President Bush in his second term, although privately both campaigns are critical of the deal that has been struck.

If there are differences, they can be found in two areas – support for the Korea US free trade agreement and the willingness to directly engage North Korea and its regime.

Free Trade and the KORUS Free Trade Agreement

If there is one single issue regarding Korea on which Senators Obama and McCain clearly part company, it is the future of the free trade agreement negotiated with the Bush administration. Senator McCain is an unambiguous supporter of the FTA, not only as a trade pact but also as a symbol of the broader partnership between the U.S. and South Korea.

Senator Obama also supports free trade but is critical of this and other agreements, such as NAFTA, for failing to ensure market access and the protection of labor rights and the environment. Privately, Obama’s advisors understand the symbolic value of the FTA to the alliance, but they plan to ask Seoul to reopen talks on market access, particularly for the automobile industry. Their position reflects the importance of trade unions and the role of some key states – Michigan most of all – in the election outcome. Even if Obama loses, the Democrats are likely to strengthen their control of Congress, making approval of the FTA difficult under any circumstances.

Negotiating with Pyongyang: Back to the Future?

Both the McCain and the Obama camps publicly back the Bush administration’s negotiations with Pyongyang, but both are also privately critical, though for different reasons.

The Obama team is heavily populated by former Clinton administration officials who were involved in the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. They see the current deal as an inevitably flawed bargain, the result of the refusal of the administration to seriously engage the North directly until it had crossed the red line of nuclear weapons testing. With little leverage, not least the credible threat of coercion, we are left with containing the plutonium production of the North, and hoping that a grand bargain down the line can yield full denuclearization.

Obama recognizes the need for “close coordination and consultation with our allies South Korea and Japan,” as one of his advisors put it in a published interview, and supports continuing the Six Party Talks. But the emphasis is clearly on direct talks with North Korea, though conducted with a principled toughness that the Bush administration has not exhibited in its final months in office.

That readiness to conduct direct negotiations, up to conclusion of a peace treaty with Pyongyang and full normalization of relations, is where the two candidates part company. The Republican nominee is clearly uncomfortable with direct dealings with Pyongyang – his position resembles the first term of the Bush administration more than the second in that respect. His advisory team combines realists, mainly veterans of the Powell State Department, and neoconservatives, reproducing the divisions that thwarted coherent policy-making in that first Bush term.

In the end, the views of McCain himself may be decisive. He was an opponent of the Agreed Framework, an agreement he characterized as “appeasement.” He maintained this stance into the Bush administration, vocally opposing any direct negotiations with the North Koreans as long as they maintained the right to develop nuclear weapons. He has been critical as well of the main deal struck by President Bush in his second term – “I didn’t believe in the KEDO agreement that President Clinton made and I don’t believe in this one,” he said in January.

McCain, according to an interview with one of his senior Asia advisors, would “seek a return to the core principles of denuclearization known as CVID, or complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement.” The demand for CVID was the watchword of the Bush administration’s earlier stance, in effect a call for Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear option as a first step. But that demand was dropped after Pyongyang called the Bush administration’s bluff by exploding a nuclear device in October, 2006.

McCain also wants to “broaden our policy goals related to North Korea” beyond nuclear issues, to including human rights, economic and political reform, and reduction of the conventional military threat from North Korea, goals also set out at the outset of the Bush administration. McCain has repeatedly referred to the North Korean regime, and its leader, Kim Jong Il, in harsh terms and embraced a policy of “rogue state rollback.”

Realistically, however, McCain offers no credible, practical means to reach these goals. He reserves, as does Obama, the option to use force. But concretely he comes back to the strategy of pressing China to bring North Korea to heel. Unfortunately the Bush administration also relied on China and found there were clear limits to Beijing’s ability to control or its willingness to press its North Korean client. In the end, McCain may have little option but to follow Bush to Pyongyang’s doorstep.

One Caveat – Events Matter

Despite the powerful impetus to maintain continuity in U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, no matter whom is elected in November, there is one important caveat to keep in mind – events matter. Unplanned, and unforeseen, developments could force Korea to the top of the President’s agenda. Already we have seen the reports of Kim Jong Il’s serious illness trigger fresh concerns about a possible collapse of political authority in Pyongyang. A simultaneous rush by China, South Korea and the United States to fill a vacuum of power in the North could upset all calculations. For South Korea, and President Lee Myung-bak, it is always best to prepare for the unexpected.

Stanford, Calif. - The visit this week of South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, offers a rare opportunity to put the American-Korean relationship back on a more solid footing. President Lee, who won a decisive victory in last December's election, has expressed views on the security alliance, a bilateral free trade agreement, and policy toward North Korea that are thoroughly compatible with US interests. And Mr. Lee's authority was bolstered by his party's substantial victory in legislative elections April 9.

The question is whether Washington is poised to take advantage of this convergence of views.

For the past eight years, a major perception gap between Seoul and Washington has been painfully evident. Our governments often worked at cross-purposes in the six-party talks to denuclearize North Korea. Progressive governments in South Korea encouraged peaceful coexistence with the North through a pattern of unreciprocated engagement. For much of that time, the Bush administration sought to isolate and pressure Pyongyang into relinquishing its nuclear ambitions, and it made little effort to conceal its hopes for a regime change in Pyongyang.

When Washington decided to move its military headquarters out of Seoul in 2003, many Korean officials suspected that the Americans were just eager to get troops out of North Korean artillery range. President Roh Moo Hyun at times seemed interested in carving out a role as a balance wheel between the major powers in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the US was preoccupied by problems in the Middle East, and some American officials wondered if the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance could long survive when one party dismissed the North Korean threat while the other viewed it as increasingly menacing.

Now comes Lee, a former mayor of Seoul and Hyundai construction executive with a reputation for tough-minded, pragmatic conservatism, eager to correct what he described as the misguided priorities of past ROK administrations. In a recent meeting with New Beginnings, a group of American policy experts on Korea, Lee appeared determined to accord priority to the alliance with the United States, exact a measure of reciprocity from the North, forestall major economic concessions to the North until it abandons its nuclear activities, and design a more ambitious global role for his country.

Surely Washington welcomes Lee's priorities. The tougher question is whether it can work effectively with him to translate shared aims into concrete results. This will pose three particular challenges.

First, on the nuclear issue, undeniably, bilateral talks with Pyongyang can facilitate diplomatic progress. There are dangers as well. Disconnects with the Japanese have deepened, and their officials occasionally complain about American "betrayals" in the discussions with Pyongyang. The North has consistently sought to use the negotiations to split the US and its allies. Success in the talks requires coordinated diplomacy between the US and the North's neighbors – especially with South Korea. In the past it often appeared that South Korean presidents worried less about Pyongyang's nuclear activities than Washington's possible reactions to them.

Today, there is the danger that South Korean conservatives may fear that Washington will ultimately acquiesce in North Korea's nascent nuclear status. No attempt to contain, let alone eliminate, the North Korean nuclear program can succeed unless the US and ROK governments work closely together. This will require a higher standard of candor and mutual trust in bilateral consultations than has been typical in recent years.

Second, the ratification of the Korea-US free-trade agreement (FTA) is a vital piece of unfinished business. Lee appears prepared to resume imports of US beef (halted due to mad cow disease concerns), essential to moving the FTA forward in Congress. Unfortunately, the Democratic presidential contenders are pandering to special interests on trade issues in a way they will probably later regret. Both sides have strategic and commercial interests at stake. The US stands to gain much more in increased exports from the FTA, while the Koreans hope that liberalizing foreign access to their economy will make them more competitive. So there is much to gain by nailing down this deal. A failure to complete it would be a significant strategic setback for our partnership.

Third, there is the question as to whether our political cycles will again diverge. For the past eight years, the US has been led by one of its most conservative administrations, while South Korea was headed by its most liberal president. Missteps were, perhaps, inevitable. And they have persisted, even though some effective work was done behind the scenes to forge cooperative arrangements on trade and force-deployment issues.

Lee's election signifies a conservative swing in South Korea's politics, while polls suggest the US may be moving in the opposite direction. Thus, a felicitous convergence of US and ROK official perspectives could prove fleeting. Yet the interests we share in expanded commerce, in modernizing our alliance, and in approaching the North with a joint strategy for "denuclearization" are compelling. They transcend partisan politics. They serve our respective national interests. The time to capitalize on them is now.

New Beginnings: Post-Election Prospects for U.S.-ROK Relations, a non-partisan study group of distinguished former American senior officials and experts formed by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society, will release their report on how to revitalize the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance on Monday, April 14, in Washington, DC., followed by a presentation in New York on April 15.

The report is being issued on the eve of the arrival in the United States of newly elected and inaugurated President of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak. The report provides an analysis of the significance of the change in administration in South Korea and recommendations to American policymakers on steps to improve the partnership between the two countries. It reflects what the group learned during extensive meetings in Korea in early February, including discussions with then President-elect Lee and his senior advisors, as well as leading businessmen, security officials and experts, journalists, the leadership of the then ruling party, as well as senior American diplomats and military officials.

The full text of the report is available below. Press coverage of this project and the report can also be found in the links below.

New Beginnings was formed in anticipation of both the change in power in Korea and the upcoming U.S. national elections. The group plans to brief the presidential campaigns of all the major candidates on its recommendations, as well as key congressional leaders and senior administration officials.

Panel discussions by members of New Beginnings, looking ahead to President Lee’s visit to New York and Washington, will take place on:

Monday, April 14th, from 3:00-5:00 PM at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Rome Building, Room Auditorium, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC) hosted by Don Oberdorfer, Chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute at John Hopkins University.

Tuesday, April 15th, from 10:00-11:30 AM at Korea Society: New Beginnings: Post-Election Prospects for U.S.-ROK Relations (950 Third Ave, 8th Fl, New York, NY 10022) hosted by Evans Revere, president of The Korea Society.

Study group members are:

Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University

Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea

Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief

Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration

Thomas C. Hubbard, McLarty Associates; former U.S. ambassador to South Korea

Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent

Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea

Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University

Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist

David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director

New York and Stanford, CA., Jan. 10, 2008 -- With South Koreans having elected a new president last month and Americans going to the polls in November to choose a new leader, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society today announced the formation of a non-partisan group of distinguished American former senior officials and experts to study ways to strengthen the alliance between the two countries.

The New Beginnings' study group will gather at the end of the month at Stanford University to discuss and analyze the implications of the Korean election for alliance relations. The group will then proceed to Seoul in early February for meetings with South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak and his top aides, as well as other leading figures in Korean business, academic, media and policy circles. Based on these meetings, the group will prepare a report in March on their findings and recommendations to present to American policymakers, including those from the leading U.S. presidential campaigns.

Korea Society President Evans J.R. Revere and Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin said group members believe that U.S.-South Korean relations are critically important to the United States' role in East Asia and that the inauguration of new administrations in both the U.S. and South Korea offers a unique opportunity to create "new beginnings" in the alliance relationship.

They also noted that the two presidential elections coincide with a critical phase in multinational talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and that close U.S.-South Korean cooperation is essential to successful diplomacy in dealing with North Korea.

Shin and Revere said that the Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, after initial policy differences over North Korea especially, had recently significantly improved their cooperation, but that the two countries could do much more to strengthen bilateral relations.

Shin and Revere said they regarded the study project as a continuing collaborative effort by their two institutions. After issuing the report in March, they intend to continue to meet with U.S. and South Korean policymakers and other leaders. They plan to update the report and recommendations after the U.S. presidential election.

Study group members are:

• Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University
• Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief
• Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration
• Thomas C. Hubbard, Kissinger McLarty Associates, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent
• Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea
• Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society, and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University
• Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist
• David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director