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Beyond his childhood ties to Hawai'i and Indonesia and his self-styled designation as "America's first Pacific President," President Barack Obama has demonstrated significant and genuine interest in Asia and in developing trans-Pacific ties. He embarked on November 5 for the second presidential visit to Asia during his term, and while there he will visit India, Indonesia, South Korea to attend the summit of the Group of 20 (G20), and finally to Japan to attend the annual heads of state meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel a week ahead of Obama to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Vietnam, followed by visits to Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Australia. Her trip will include an added-in stop to China's Hainan Island. To address major issues surrounding the President's trip to Asia--including the "China question" and historic U.S. bilateral alliances--four scholars from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) gathered for a public panel discussion on October 27.

Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, spoke about the symbolic aspects of Obama's visit, noting the importance of a presidential visit for showing a sense of real commitment to the region and an acknowledgement of the "rise" of countries like China and India. On a more pragmatic side, he also suggested that meeting in person with other leaders is crucial in order to "bring about deliverables." The omission of a visit to China should not be weighed too heavily, Fingar said, pointing out that the President visited China last year. The stops in Japan and South Korea are tied to important multilateral meetings, though they will also reaffirm longstanding ties with those allies, while the visit to India is an indication of growing relations between the two countries. Of particular importance is Obama's participation in the G20 Summit in South Korea and the APEC meeting in Japan because, Fingar stated, a major purpose of the visit is about the "United States having a role in building new multilateral institutions." Finally, while much of the success of the Asia trip rests on how well Obama conducts himself, Fingar expressed confidence that the President would skillfully manage the visit.

During his visit to Indonesia, Obama will meet with Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for a bilateral discussion of such issues as economics, security, and higher education. Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, said that the postponement of earlier-planned visits to Indonesia has lessened some of the enthusiasm for Obama's "homecoming" to Jakarta. China's omission on the trip agenda is noteworthy, he suggested, and Clinton's addition of a stop in Hainan is due, in part, to help alleviate recent tension between the United States and China regarding China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Clinton's involvement in the EAS is an "important multilateral engagement" for the United States because of the presence of its ally Japan and the fact that the United States and China both have a voice there, unlike the ASEAN Plus Three meetings that do not include the United States. While in recent months the U.S.-China relationship has become more strained, Emmerson asserted that the "United States is not going to get into a cold war with China."

Obama will travel from Indonesia to South Korea for the G20 Summit, another major multilateral engagement during his travels. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program, described several significant aspects of this time in South Korea. While not technically an organization, Straub said, the Summit is an important forum for the discussion of economic stability and growth. Similar to Fingar, Straub noted the efficacy and significance of in-person meetings. The Summit provides an opportunity for world leaders to have face-to-face discussions on non-economic issues, such as North Korea's political situation. Straub suggested that President Lee Myung-bak's investment in the Summit is based, in part, on raising South Korea's global prestige, which is tied also to increasing the status of the G20 to become the premiere global financial organization. Finally, Straub stated that alongside the G20 meeting, Obama and Lee are expected discuss bilateral relations, which are at an all-time high, including the stalled U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (Korus FTA). The FTA, which would be the most significant free trade agreement for the United States since NAFTA, has faced opposition and mixed support on both sides.

Obama's visit to India will be the third U.S. presidential visit there in the past decade, which is indicative of changing U.S. perceptions of India brought about through the IT boom and growing economic ties, suggested Daniel C. Sneider, associate director of research for Shorenstein APARC. Sneider pointed to a broader shared agenda despite a lack of clarity on some issues, such as Pakistan, and a focus on India as Asia's "other" growing economy. He stated that he would be watching for the United States and India to work together to emphasize India's role in East Asia, highlighted by India's participation in the EAS. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has championed a "look east" policy and expressed stronger interest in East Asia, especially China. In terms of Obama's visit to the APEC heads of state conference in Japan, Sneider noted the importance of this trip also for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The newly formed government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has worked to ease tensions in the alliance and both countries hope to use the visit to bolster a more positive image of the alliance. Certain points of contention, like the move of the U.S. military base on Okinawa, have been put aside for the time being. Sneider stated that recent China-Japan tensions have also served to reinforce the importance of the relationship.

Events during Obama's Asia visit in the next two weeks will help to solidify or possibly call into question his image as the "Pacific President," and undoubtedly influence the role of the United States in Asia for the future.

An international forum on North Korea was held in Palo Alto on October 26, 2010, in an effort to educate the public on reunifying the two Koreas. The San Francisco Chapter of the National Unification Advisory Council organized the forum. Approximately 150 audience members heard panelists speak about the economic, social, and political challenges that face South Korea today in its preparation for a peaceful reunification, as well as about their visions for the future of North Korea.

Gi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), moderated the presentations and the panel discussion. The panel of four experts included John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow at APARC and a former British ambassador to North Korea, speaking about diplomacy and security; Greg Scarlatoiu, director of public affairs and business issues at the Korea Economic Institute, on economic issues; Sang-Hun Choe, 2010-2011 Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC and a reporter at the International Herald Tribune, on factionalism; and Jung Kwan Lee, the South Korean Consul General in San Francisco, on South Korea's policy toward North Korea.

Everad analyzed North Korea's development during the Cold War of a diplomatic technique by which it repeatedly attempted to play one ally off against another in its relationships with the Soviet Union and China. While arguing that North Korea continues to make effective use of this technique against South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, Everad noted that North Korea's current political uncertainty, following the succession, and its ongoing economic concerns will together create a situation in which it may be very difficult for North Korea to maintain political solidarity.

Scarlatoiu, meanwhile, contended that North Korea's is a post-Stalinist, neo-patrimonial economy. Thus, with recent efforts such as the 2002 market reforms and the 2009 currency reform, the North Korean regime has found itself confronted with a major dilemma. According to Scarlatoiu, while economic reforms are necessary to the long-term survival of the regime, they could also lead to the regime's collapse. This predicament, he added, must be considered as the regime undergoes a leadership transition in the succession to Kim Jong-un.

Choe spoke on the process of succession to Kim Jong-un as well, pointing out that while Kim Jong-un is indisputably the heir to the leadership of North Korea, he has yet to prove his competency as North Korea's future leader. In addition, Choe emphasized that difficulties judging North Korea's intentions and anticipating its behavior stem from the outside world's inability to understand the North Korean leadership and the goals that it truly has in mind.

Finally, Lee stressed that the basic objectives of South Korea's policy on North Korea are to promote a common prosperity and to peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues. However, he also made it clear that the South Korean government is seeking to keep North Korean nuclear issues distinct from the issue of inter-Korean relations.

 

The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.

Song explored reasons why previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.

Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the "slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more conciliatory approach toward North Korea.

To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States, the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small, strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations. Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared, solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different scenarios and the roles each country should play.

Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.

The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.

What was learned last week about the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?

The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.

Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?

There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao, ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.

The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.

What is known about Kim Jong-un?

He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.

Who now heads North Korea? What is the power structure like?

The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a dominant place today.

A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.

Does a period of transition put the regime in danger? What took place before?

It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.

What legacy does he leave his son Kim Jong-un?

Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s. Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.

The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.

What is the situation at the diplomatic level?

North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.

Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.

The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that  it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.