After stirring international media attention and drawing criticism from its neighbors and the United States, North Korea’s controversial launch of a rocket under the guise of installing an “Earth observation” satellite in orbit took place on Apr. 13.

David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program, assesses the likely responses of the United States and other concerned countries, and provides historical context for the actions of North Korea’s leadership.

How is the launch going to impact North Korea’s relations with the United States and other countries?

We have already “been there, done that.” This will be the third North Korean test of a long-range rocket in six years. Shortly after the launches in 2006 and 2009, the North Koreans tested their first nuclear devices. The concern is that they will again use the expected international condemnation of their launch as a pretext for conducting another nuclear test.

But sometimes experience changes perspective. The United States and other countries will want to try to respond to the rocket test in a way that complicates any North Korean effort to justify a new nuclear test.

The international community really cannot remain silent, because United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874, which was passed in 2009, forbids North Korea from conducting precisely this kind of launch. I anticipate the UNSC will meet to discuss the situation but will not be able to issue a formal resolution. It will probably wind up issuing only a UNSC presidential statement criticizing the launch. China is the main obstacle. It does not approve of North Korea’s activities, but it is more concerned that putting great pressure on North Korea will result in instability. 

The United States, South Korea, and Japan will continue to consult and coordinate closely with one another. They may take additional measures to collect intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. They may also look to bolster their cooperation on missile defense, and take further steps to restrict North Korea’s access to nuclear- and missile-related materials and technology. They may apply additional economic sanctions to show their disapproval of North Korea’s actions.

Do you think the launch is going make it more difficult for North Korea to conduct trade and obtain aid and development assistance?

North Korea’s behavior now is part and parcel of its behavior over the past several decades. For the North Korean regime, the wellbeing of its people is clearly a secondary priority compared to its own survival.

At least since the end of the cold war, North Korea has faced a dilemma: Open up or fail, or open up and fail. In other words, it needs to open up to receive outside investment and technology if it is ever to have a successful economy. If it does not do that, the regime is unsustainable over the long run. But North Korea’s leaders fear that opening to the outside world would bring down their regime because it will expose the country’s weaknesses to its people. In order to get out of this dilemma, they have reached for weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear devices and the missiles they hope eventually can carry them. That is why there is no indication the North Korean leadership is prepared to completely give up those programs, at least on any terms that the United States, Japan, or South Korea could accept.

This is a long-term challenge for the United States and its allies. We have to see the situation for what it is, and deal with it accordingly. That means we must never “accept” North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. As long as North Korea maintains these programs, we must make it clear that we will not establish diplomatic relations or ease sanctions. But that also does not mean that we should not continue to hold out to North Korea the possibility of a negotiated settlement, should it really be prepared to completely give up these programs.  

What are some of the key things to keep in mind about North Korea’s recent actions and about the country in general?

To understand what North Korea is doing, we have to get back to basics. The fundamental situation stems from the 1945 division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate states. North Korea’s Stalinist-style system developed into a totalitarian dictatorship with a personality cult, and it has been spectacularly unsuccessful, especially compared to its rival state South Korea.

The leaders in North Korea are reasonably well-informed and intelligent people. They saw what happened to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and decided it would not happen to them. For them, the lesson was: Do not open up or even receive aid, unless it is completely controlled to minimize outside influences. Most of the North Korean elite believes their regime is the legitimate Korean regime. They also understand that regime collapse could well mean absorption of the North by the South, and the possibility that they could go on trial for crimes against their own people. I anticipate that most of the elite will try very hard to hold the regime together in the coming years, even if it means continuing to pursue nuclear and missile programs and threatening and even attacking South Korea again.

But sooner or later major change is inevitable in such a rigid system. This requires the concerned countries to have a clear-headed analysis of the situation, take a long-term perspective, and consistently implement a principled policy. It is very challenging to do this with so many countries involved. But it can be done. Over the long term, the strengths of democracies far outweigh their weaknesses in dealing with countries like North Korea.  

North Korea’s government announced it will launch a long-range rocket to orbit a satellite within a few days of the 100th anniversary of founder Kim Il Sung’s birthday on Apr. 15.

The statement comes on the heels of an important U.S.-North Korea agreement on Feb. 29, in which the United States promised to provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of food aid over the next year while North Korea would refrain from nuclear and long-range missile tests and allow international inspection of its declared nuclear facilities. The situation echoes that of 2009, when North Korea also gave advance notice of a "peaceful" long-range rocket launch. North Korea’s 2009 missile test prompted a United Nations condemnation, after which North Korea conducted its second test of a nuclear device.

David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program and a former State Department Korea expert, speaks about North Korea’s latest statement.

Why is the new North Korea announcement of possible concern?

This type of launch is something the U.N. Security Council earlier condemned and forbade North Korea to do again. There is a large overlap in the technologies used for such a rocket and for a long-range ballistic missile, and the international community is deeply suspicious that North Korea will use what it learns from such launches to develop long-range missile technology.

The larger concern is that North Korea intends eventually to pair long-range missiles with nuclear warheads, creating a much greater threat to other countries, including the United States.

Was there any indication North Korea would issue this statement?

Given North Korea’s history of reneging on deals, the Obama administration wisely noted at the time of the Feb. 29 announcement that it was a "limited" agreement. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that North Korea’s upholding of its side of the agreement would be the key to the deal’s overall success.

There is no doubt the U.S. government would not have announced this agreement if it had anticipated that North Korea would almost immediately have declared its intention to launch another long-range rocket.

Why would North Korea decide to announce a rocket launch?

At this point, we can only speculate about North Korea’s motivations for the announcement. It could be related to the recent leadership succession in North Korea. Kim Jong Un, the grandson of Kim Il Sung, is an inexperienced leader still in his 20s. He and his advisors may feel it is necessary to defy the United States so blatantly to demonstrate at home how strong a leader he is. 

Or perhaps, after testing two nuclear devices and several long-range missiles, the North Korean government has become more confident about its diplomatic ability to withstand international condemnations and sanctions.

In any event, it is a stunning slap in the face of the Obama administration, which will need to react firmly. Already, less than 24 hours after the North Korean announcement, the Department of State has publicly said that the entire Feb. 29 agreement, including the delivery of food aid, has been put on hold.  

What should we expect to happen next?

A real danger is that the events of 2009 will be repeated. The North Korean government reacted angrily to the U.N. Security Council’s presidential statement against it three years ago, and withdrew from the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang then proceeded to conduct a nuclear test only a month later.

The most worrisome aspect is the possibility that the new leadership in North Korea feels insecure at home and thus obliged to act tough, and also has poor judgment about the United States and the international community as a whole. If so, the North Korea issue could become significantly more confrontational—and dangerous—in the coming months.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

U.S. Department of State: North Korean announcement of missile launch

Reuters: North Korea’s missile and "satellite" programs

Since Kim Jong Il’s death on Dec. 17, North Korea has a young new leader: Kim’s 28-year-old son Kim Jong Un. What does the new leadership hold in store for the future of the Korean Peninsula, U.S.-Korea relations, and the stability of Northeast Asia? David Straub, who attended the seventh U.S.-Korea West Coast Strategic Forum in Seoul just days before Kim’s death, shares highlights from the Forum and offers insight into the current North Korea situation.

Straub is associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University and a retired senior U.S. foreign service official with over 30 years of Northeast Asia experience.

The U.S.-Korea West Coast Strategic Forum is held semi-annually, alternating between Stanford and the Sejong Institute in Seoul.

The West Coast Forum opened with a discussion about the current situation in North Korea. After Kim Jong Il’s death, how much do you think that picture will change?

Most Forum experts believe there will be relative stability in North Korea for some time to come.

The reason Kim Jong Il chose Kim Jong Un as his successor is because he is the least controversial person in North Korea to succeed him. Anyone else would be the object of great suspicion and jealousy within the elite there.

North Korea has already had one succession—from founder Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jong Il—and that went smoothly. The succession from Kim Jong Il to his youngest son Kim Jong Un is natural within that context—it is a dynastic succession. As with other dynastic successions, the easiest person to accept is normally someone who represents a continuation of the person in power.

Do you foresee possible areas for improvement in relations between North and South Korea or for negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program?

Apr. 15 is the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, which is going to be a large celebration. North Korea probably will want to commemorate it without a lot of distractions. The North Korean leadership also wants to provide more food and supplies to its people, and provocations toward South Korea would make it harder to get international aid. 

A number of Forum experts are concerned that North Korea might conduct another nuclear or long-range missile test this year. Most tests so far have not been fully successful, so from a military and technology perspective they probably want to try again. North Korea has been slapped with international trade sanctions for its previous tests, but China has always stepped in to help. Sanctions will probably not deter the North Koreans from conducting future tests.

As far as inter-Korean relations are concerned, it is unlikely that North Korea will take any major new initiatives toward the South. The leadership does not like conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak because he came into office saying that he would not continue giving large-scale aid to North Korea until it abandoned its nuclear weapons program. That was contrary to the Sunshine Policy of his two progressive predecessors.

President Lee’s term is almost up, and South Korea will hold a hold a presidential election on Dec. 19 this year. North Korea probably hopes that the progressives will win the election and restore the Sunshine Policy.

Will North Korea be a major issue for debate in South Korea’s upcoming 2012 presidential election?

Current polling shows that North Korea is the top concern of only 8 percent of the South Korean electorate. As in the past, the main issues for voters there are the economy, their standard of living, and social welfare issues. North Korea will not be the top issue unless something very dramatic happens between now and the election. On the other hand, if the race is close, feelings about North Korea policy could help to decide the outcome.

Among South Korean citizens, is there more fear or hope—or maybe a mixture of both—about North Korea’s new leadership?

Recent opinion polls show that 80 percent of South Koreans feel that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. There is not much reason for optimism. That being said, most South Koreans are concerned about North Korea’s 2010 attack of Yeonpyeong Island and hope for improved relations. And, of course, Kim Jong Un is a different leader and most South Koreans hope he will move in a more positive direction. But they feel it is unlikely to happen in the next few years—if ever.

Does uncertainty over the future of North Korea have the potential to impact or strengthen any aspects of the U.S.-South Korea alliance?

This year, the U.S. and South Korean administrations will likely focus on managing the North Korean situation and continue to prioritize the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The two countries closely cooperate on North Korea policy.

The real question for the alliance in terms of North Korea policy will be who is elected as president in both countries. If a progressive South Korean candidate wins, that person will probably pursue some variation of the Sunshine Policy. Especially if a Republican is elected in the United States, we may see echoes of the difficult U.S.-South Korea relationship we had during the George W. Bush administration.

If President Obama is re-elected, another South Korean Sunshine Policy would also pose challenges. The administration has taken a very firm position that the United States will not significantly improve relations with North Korea until it gives up its nuclear weapons program. South Korea’s Sunshine Policy focuses on embracing North Korea in the hope that relations will improve over time and that North Korea will eventually voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons in that long-term context. 

China, the country in Northeast Asia with the most influence over North Korea, recently issued a statement in support of Kim Jong Un. Does this signify any major change in relations between these two countries?

The Chinese government has particular interest in North Korea. China is focused on developing its own economy, including the relatively poor northeastern area that borders North Korea. The last thing China wants is instability on the Korean Peninsula, which would detract from its economic development.

China does not believe it can force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons without risking instability. In the absence of progress in the Six Party negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, China has unilaterally increased economic and diplomatic support for North Korea. Its support is independent of who serves as the North Korean leader.

China tried very hard to get Kim Jong Il to open up the North Korean economy more, but did not succeed, primarily because Kim feared that doing so would also allow in more outside information and undermine his regime. China probably hopes that the younger Kim Jong Un may eventually have not only the power but also the desire to reform the economy.