The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.

What was learned last week about the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?

The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.

Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?

There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao, ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.

The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.

What is known about Kim Jong-un?

He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.

Who now heads North Korea? What is the power structure like?

The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a dominant place today.

A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.

Does a period of transition put the regime in danger? What took place before?

It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.

What legacy does he leave his son Kim Jong-un?

Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s. Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.

The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.

What is the situation at the diplomatic level?

North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.

Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.

The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that  it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.

Speaking on June 17, 2010 in a television interview in South Korea, Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University, said, "No one can now ignore or overlook the importance of Asia." He spoke of the rise of Asian countries in the past 50 years, particularly in the area of economics, and the world's growing awareness of Asia. Dr. Shin discussed the important role that Shorenstein APARC and its Korean Studies Program (KSP) play in the field of Asian studies, noting that Shorenstein APARC’s unique focus on research, policy, and the social sciences distinguishes it from most academic Asian studies centers in the United States. He explained that not only do scholars from Shorenstein APARC carry out academic research, but they also “produce some policy reports for the American government and…try to promote dialogue between the U.S. and Asian countries.”

In his interview with Heart to Heart (Arirang TV) host Kolleen Park, Dr. Shin discussed the history of the field of Asian studies, noting the growing importance of Korean studies in the past 15 years. Dr. Shin said that in the past 100 years of Korean history are found “the key elements that we talk about in the social sciences.” He then asked, “How can we use the Korean experience to generate a general model or theoretical experience for the rest of the world?”

Dr. Shin’s interview took place during his visit to South Korea for the POSCO Asia Forum where he was a keynote speaker. The theme of the 2010 Forum was the “Globalization of Asian Culture.” “Looking back, Asia had a great contribution to human society and human civilization,” Dr. Shin said. His motivation in addressing the attendees of the Forum, he explained was, “I felt that it was time to take Asia more seriously and think about how Asia can continue to make contributions to human society and civilization.”

Highlights from the POSCO Asia Forum, a summary of Dr. Shin’s new book One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (Stanford University Press 2010), and Dr. Shin’s thoughts on relations between the two Koreas are also covered in the interview. Watch the entire interview online here at the Shorenstein APARC website and learn more about the activities of Shorenstein APARC and KSP.

STANFORD, CA—In commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) is hosting a number of special events.

On May 27, Shorenstein APARC will pre-screen a major new South Korea film, "Into the Fire." Set in the desperate early days of the Korean War, the drama is based on actual events involving South Korean high school students defending the port of Pohang against advancing North Korean regular forces. The film is scheduled for commercial release in South Korea in June.

Immediately following the pre-screening, Shorenstein APARC will host a panel discussion about the film and the Korean War. Panelists will be the director, New York University-trained John H. Lee; actor Kwon Sang-woo; Scott Foundas, Associate Program Director, Film Society of Lincoln Center, and Contributing Editor, Film Comment; Kyung Hyun Kim, Associate Professor, East Asian Languages & Literature, and Film & Media Studies, University of California, Irvine; Chi-hui Yang, Director, San Francisco International Asian American Film Festival; and John R. Stevens, Lt. Col. USMC (ret), Commanding Officer of Able Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, when the 1st Marine Brigade arrived in Pusan on August 2, 1950. Daniel C. Sneider, Associate Director for Research at Shorenstein APARC, will moderate the discussion.

The film pre-screening and panel discussion will both take place in Cubberley Auditorium on campus, beginning at 6:00 P.M. Also, on the evening of the pre-screening, photographs taken in and near Pohang during the time of the events portrayed in the film will be exhibited in the lobby of Cubberley Auditorium, courtesy of the South Korean embassy in Washington, D. C., and the War Memorial of Korea, in Seoul.

On May 28, Shorenstein APARC’s Korean Studies Program will host a lecture by Bruce Cumings, Professor and Chairman of the History Department, University of Chicago, on "The Korean War After 60 Years: History and Memory in Korea and the United States." To attend, registration is required by 5:00 P.M. on May 25.

Shorenstein APARC’s director, Professor Gi-Wook Shin, commented: "The Korean War is often referred to as ‘the forgotten war,' but th at is not the case. As we can see from the rapidly unfolding events on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the sinking of South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, the Korean War is actually ‘the unending war.'" He said that the pre-screening of "Into the Fire," the panel discussion, and the Korean War lecture are intended to recall the significance of the Korean War and underline the magnitude of current issues on the peninsula.  Noting that Shorenstein APARC has conducted a great deal of research and offered policy recommendations on U.S.-Korean relations, Professor Shin said that the pre-screening of "Into the Fire" was also intended to contribute to increased cultural exchanges between the United States and South Korea. Shorenstein APARC has organized similar events, including the screening of Clint Eastwood’s film "Letter from Iwo Jima," which was also followed by a discussion with the director. Shorenstein APARC also hosts speeches by major figures in U.S.-Korean relations, including last year’s address by former ruling party leader Madam Park Geun-hye.

Shorenstein APARC is a unique Stanford University institution focused on the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia. Shorenstein APARC’s mission is to produce and publish outstanding interdisciplinary, Asia-Pacific–focused research; educate students, scholars, and corporate and governmental affiliates; promote constructive interaction to influence U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific, and guide Asian nations on key issues of societal transition, development, U.S.-Asia relations, and regional cooperation.  Shorenstein APARC’s research spans the worlds of scholarship, business, and government, and cuts across traditional academic disciplines to provide broad, deep perspective.

The Center supports many ongoing projects, and also launches new studies every year to respond to its primary research goals. All projects are interdisciplinary and collaborative, involving faculty, students, and experts at Stanford, across the United States and around the globe. New projects currently under way consider topics ranging from nationalism in Asia and regionalism in Southeast Asia to the rise of high technology in Greater China, outsourcing to Southeast Asia, and globalization in Korea.

The Stanford Korea Program was formally established in 2001 at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) with the appointment of Professor Gi-Wook Shin, as the founding director. The Stanford KSP offers courses on Korea, hosts seminars related to the study of Korea, sponsors workshops and conferences, conducts research projects, supports fellowships, and collaborates with a broad range of visiting scholars. Stanford KSP also works closely with Stanford's Center for East Asian Studies (CEAS), which offers a Master's Degree in East Asian Studies with a specialty in Korea.

Stanford KSP's many activities include the "New Beginnings" policy research study group on U.S.-Korean relations, which since 2008 has made annual recommendations to the United States government on strengthening bilateral ties. Stanford KSP has an active program of visiting senior Korean officials and scholars. In recent years, visitors have included Hyong O Kim, speaker of the National Assembly; Sei Hoon Won, head of the National Intelligence Service; Won Soon Park, Executive Director, The Hope Institute; Seoul National University Professor Se-Il Park; Seoul National University Professor (and former foreign minister) Young-Kwan Yoon; Jong Seok Lee, Senior Fellow, Sejong Institute (and former unification minister); and General (ret.) Byung Kwan Kim, former Deputy Commander, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Visiting scholars currently include Byongwon Bahk, a former vice minister of finance and former senior secretary to the President for economic affairs.