Sony Pictures Entertainment was set to release a satirical comedy, “The Interview,” in late 2014, but a cyberattack hit the organization that leaked corporate information, leading the company to initially pull the film and opening up a string of theories over who was behind the attack and how to respond.

Speculation began to mount as a clearer picture of the unprecedented hacking, both comprehensive and large in size, began to emerge. The breach is thought to be retribution for Sony’s production of the film, which carries a plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Then, a threat was directed at movie theaters and moviegoers planning to screen and see “The Interview.” The message warned those against involvement ahead of the film’s Dec. 25 opening, indicating a “bitter fate” and alluding to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

An unknown group, The Guardians of Peace “GOP,” claimed responsibility for the cyberattack. Media and those familiar with North Korea began to point blame on the country, which had already publicly condemned the film last June and has a history of cybercrime. Responding to accusations, top North Korean leadership rejected any involvement in the attack.

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The White House responded as Sony canceled the film’s New York premiere and said it would discontinue distribution. Following his year-end press conference, President Barack Obama condemned the hacking, citing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s conclusion that North Korea was behind the attack. The President said the United States would respond “proportionally,” and on Jan. 2, signed an Executive Order that put into action a series of sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury.

David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University, answered questions about the Sony hacking and its policy implications for the United States and North-South Korean relations. Straub is the associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director.

What do we know about the Sony hacking? Who’s responsible?

Based on many types of evidence, including confidential information, U.S. government officials appear to be quite confident that North Korea did in fact conduct this operation. There’s still some disagreement in the media and among tech experts over who is responsible. They’ve cited a number of reasons but the main one is that the FBI’s official statement attributing the attack to North Korea provided evidence that they believe is far from conclusive. I myself am not a technical expert, but based upon my following North Korea for many years – the attack strikes me as being very likely to have been a North Korean operation. The FBI statement noted that the Sony attack is similar to an attack that the North Koreans conducted against South Korean banks and media outlets in March 2013. In that attack, many South Korean banks had their hard drives completely wiped clean. It was a hugely destructive attack and very similar to what happened to Sony.

Does North Korea’s response to the Sony hack coincide with past behavior?

In addition to the 2013 South Korean bank cyberattack, the North Koreans apparently sank a South Korean naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 sailors. In both instances, the North Koreans denied that they did it, expressed outrage over being accused, demanded that the South Koreans produce proof, said that they could prove that they didn’t do it, and then requested that the South Koreans conduct a joint investigation. These same demands are being made in response to the U.S. blaming Pyongyang for the Sony cyberattack. It couldn’t be more similar. More generally, the North Korean regime is very calculating. They know they can’t win an outright military confrontation with South Korea, much less the United States, so what they do is try to find a weak link and go after it in a way in which they have plausible deniability – a situation where it’s very difficult for the attacked party to prove who did it.

Describe North Korea’s hacking capabilities.

North Korea is a very secretive country, so it’s hard to be completely certain of their cyber capabilities. However, according to many accounts, the North Korean government has established professional hacking schools and units over the years, resulting in hundreds if not thousands of trained hackers. North Korea has engaged in a number of attacks in the past, the most prominent one was the attack on South Korean banks in March 2013. But also, a few years ago, North Korea conducted less sophisticated attacks on major U.S. government websites.

Why would they conduct an attack?

The North Koreans appear to have both the capability and the motivation to attack Sony. The nation’s entire political system rests on a cult of personality – now a cult of family, actually – that began with the founder of the regime, Kim Il-sung, and extends to his grandson today, leader Kim Jong-un, who has been in power since Dec. 2011. It’s the only thing holding the political system together at this point. The cult of personality is so strong that any direct criticism of the top leader is something that North Koreans will compete among each other to reject. From this standpoint, it seems very likely that they would feel they had to prevent the showing of a movie that features an assassination of Kim Jong-un. And, the hackers had plenty of time to prepare for and implement the attack because everyone knew well ahead of when the movie would be released.

The United States placed new financial sanctions on North Korea. What impact will the sanctions have?

President Obama made it clear that the U.S. government would respond at a time, in a place, and in a manner of its own choosing. Not all measures taken would be made public. So far, the first publically announced measure was the President’s Executive Order on Jan. 2 imposing additional sanctions on a number of North Korean agencies and officials. This in itself is unlikely to have major consequences because most of those entities were already sanctioned. But, the Executive Order states that the sanctions are being implemented not only because of the cyberattack against Sony, but more generally because of North Korea’s actions and policies, including its serious human rights abuses. So in a sense, the North Koreans got the United States to expand its reasons for sanctioning them.

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking, saying the United States will "respond proportionally," at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19.

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19. Photo credit: WhiteHouse.gov

What other steps will the United States likely take?

President Obama left open the possibility that North Korea might be returned to the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, from which the nation was removed in 2008. I think it was a mistake to remove North Korea from that list in the first place. It was done to promote progress on the nuclear talks, which eventually failed, and ignored a number of terroristic actions that North Korea has committed in recent years. Another possibility, which is being pushed by Republicans in Congress, is to increase financial sanctions that mirror the type that were successfully implemented in Iran.

How will the U.S. response influence cybersecurity policy going forward?

The attack on Sony is a huge wakeup call to American businesses, and even to the U.S. government. It’s the first attack of this size on a company located in the United States. It got tremendous profile in the media and the President has been personally engaged in responding. Nearly everyone has heard about it, so U.S. companies are now going to be focused much more on cybersecurity because it has exposed some potential vulnerabilities – a “if North Korea can do it, presumably others can too” mentality. Moreover, if an attack can be executed on a film company, it could also be done to other businesses and even to elements of U.S. critical infrastructure.

How do you view North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s possible offer to meet with South Korean leadership this year?

Kim Jong-un said that he was open to the possibility of a summit with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address, although he made no specific proposal. He made clear that the summit would be conditional on actions to be taken in advance by South Korea. Among these, Kim demanded ending U.S.-South Korean military exercises and halting the flow of propaganda-filled balloons sent over the border into the North by non-governmental activist groups in the South. Moreover, North Korea has a history of expanding its conditions later, without any warning. So, I think one has to be skeptical. The signal is unfortunately less likely to be a sincere effort toward real, sustained dialogue, and more likely to be a North Korean propaganda effort devised to confuse, divert and divide international public opinion. That said, South Korea has acted entirely appropriately in welcoming the signal and reiterating its own offer of high-level talks. Let’s hope for the best.

David Straub also participated in an interview with Public Radio International on Jan. 1 about the prospect for North-South talks, the audio can be accessed on the PRI website.

A unified Korea is likely but it won’t come easily, said Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin, in a recent interview with NK News. The most plausible scenario is reunification following a breakdown of the North Korean regime and eventual South Korean absorption of the North.

“Of course, I cannot predict the timing of such an occurrence, but it is likely that it will happen in the not-too-distant future,” said Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in a Q&A among a panel of experts on inter-Korean relations.

In the event of unification, Shin says he is convinced it will be on South Korean terms. He said he doubts that the North Korean government, led by leader Kim Jong-Un and the ruling Worker’s Party of Korea, would find a role in South Korea’s democratic system.

Shin heads a multiyear research project focused on understanding the domestic and global implications of North Korea’s future. Earlier this year, he coauthored a policy brief assessing the situation and policy context on the Korean Peninsula. The report recommends steps that the South Korean government can take to engage North Korea toward the ultimate goal of Korean unification and a sustainable security environment in Northeast Asia.

The full Q&A can be accessed on NK News online.

Seoul faces challenges that are not very different from other global cities, said Mayor Park Won Soon, the public figure who leads the South Korean city of over 10 million people, concluding that the key to solving them ­is by better engaging and empowering citizens.

“We tore down the silos,” said Park, speaking to a Stanford audience about his efforts to improve Seoul’s bureaucracy and access for citizens.

At McCaw Hall, Park discussed his background as a scholar, civic activist and philanthropist, emphasizing how it provides him perspective as a leader, and the acumen to think differently to address a wide range of issues affecting Seoul, including poverty, climate change and an aging population.

Park’s visit to Stanford University was sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The event was part of the Asia-Pacific Leaders Forum, a seminar series that brings Asian leaders to Stanford to share their experiences. In 2013, the series hosted Ban-Ki Moon, U.N. Secretary General, and in 2009, then-South Korean assembly member, now president, Park Geun-hye.

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Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC, introduced Mr. Park, referencing their connection and past projects to a crowd of nearly 275 people, including Korean community members and media.

“We’ve known each other as colleagues and friends for a number of years," Shin said, "so it is a pleasure to host Mayor Park, and hold a public forum to hear [his] vision."

Shin and Park established a fellowship for Korean NGO leaders, and awarded it to 30 leaders over three years.

Fighting for equality

As a university student in 1975, Park protested against South Korea’s government led by President Park Chung-hee, a military leader who ruled under highly authoritarian law. Mr. Park was imprisoned for his activism and eventually expelled from school, but his enthusiasm for justice and democracy never waned, he said.

He said the political and social chaos during those years in South Korea motivated him to pursue justice through other channels, going on to become a human rights lawyer and into public office as mayor in 2011.

South Korea gradually transitioned into a democracy in the 1980s, influenced in large part by many sweeping civil movements. The country has since stabilized, and now enjoys cultural and economic success in the world today. 

Park speaks to the audience about governance, emphasizing the importance of communication.

But, there is a “shadow behind the miracle,” said Park, referring to the myriad of societal problems that Seoul still faces, like many cities dealing with the effects of urbanization.

He said the only way to identify and address problems is through a highly participatory system of governance, and one that isn’t afraid to think of new solutions to old problems.

“A city that constantly collaborates and innovates to improve the quality of life for citizens,” he said, those are the efforts that create an environment “where people live in harmony and where people are happy.”

Park said listening to the voices of Seoul citizens is a cornerstone of his administration’s approach. And he has a motto that matches.

“Citizens are the mayor,” is the saying that Park administration attempts to fulfill through a variety of initiatives, including those led by the Seoul Innovation Bureau, a new administrative branch established to bring fresh ideas into the city’s paradigm.

Park’s administration holds town hall meetings and uses some of the latest technology to initiate dialogue with citizens, including SNS text messaging, social media and Wikiseoul, an online blog-style platform, to communicate policies and receive feedback.

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Park says Seoul’s success is because of 10 million citizens and many institutions that have supported the city’s growth. He holds popular support in the city, and was recently reelected for a second mayoral term in June 2014, winning by a wide margin.

He said other countries are beginning to replicate his administration’s model, from e-governance activities to energy policy, calling it the “Seoul effect.”

Closing out the speech, Park said inclusiveness is the essence of good governance.

“If you want to travel fast go alone, but if you want to travel far, go together,” he said, citing a well-known proverb.

Below is the full video and transcript of his presentation.

The 40-day disappearance from public view of North Korea's young leader Kim Jong Un and his sudden reappearance on Monday, walking with a cane but otherwise apparently well, made headlines around the world. International media ran countless reports that Kim was either seriously ill or had even been deposed. Why was this such a big story, and why did so many get it wrong?

David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center who formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director, was one observer who consistently challenged that media narrative. In the following interview, he offers his analysis of both the North Korean situation and the way it was misinterpreted by a majority of the media.

Why didn’t you give credence to the reports that Kim Jong Un was seriously ill or had lost out in a power struggle?

I've been following North Korea professionally on and off since 1978. Looking at similar incidents, I've grown wary of poorly sourced reports about North Korea, and especially speculation, even when it comes from so-called “experts.” Because North Korea is a black box, mostly closed to outside view, almost anyone can get away with claiming that he or she is an expert. There are also many governments, groups and individuals that have axes to grind. Ignorance, wishful thinking and even disinformation are all too common when reporting on North Korea.

What was the evidence that led you to believe that Kim Jong Un wasn’t seriously ill, much less deposed?

There were only a few facts that we actually knew to be true during his absence. His last public appearance was on Sept. 3. In July and August, there was video of Kim Jong Un walking with a pronounced limp. Later in Sept., North Korean media reported that he was suffering an uncomfortable physical condition. Kim is now quite overweight, and there are also photographs of him wearing platform shoes. Therefore, the most likely explanation for his disappearance from public view was that he was receiving treatment for whatever caused the limp, and that he needed to stay off his feet until he was better. At age 31, it was unlikely that he was suffering from a more serious ailment. Moreover, just like his grandfather and father, Kim has previously dropped out of public view for many weeks at a time.

What about the reports that Kim was deposed?

There were zero credible sources that Kim had been deposed or that his leadership position had even been challenged. And, a great deal of speculation existed about the Oct. 4 visit of three top North Korean officials to South Korea, who attended the closing ceremony of the Asian Games there. But if there had actually been trouble in Pyongyang, the last thing one would have expected is for those officials to visit South Korea in such a manner. Meanwhile, one North Korean defector has been arguing for a long time that Kim has only been a figurehead and that real power in North Korea is wielded by officials in his party. The issue of just how much power Kim actually holds is an important one. The answer remains unclear to observers outside North Korea, and is a different issue from the stories about Kim's health and whether he had been overthrown.

Why did Kim suddenly reemerge?

The short answer is probably that his physical condition had improved enough. The photographs that North Korea media published on Monday show him walking with a cane but otherwise apparently in good health and in good spirits, and leading some of the same North Korean officials who recently visited South Korea, speculated by the media to be the ones who encouraged a coup.

Do you think that North Korea felt the need to show that Kim was still in charge after the media attention?

That too is speculation, but it is quite plausible. It is likely that Kim wanted to show not only the international community, but even more so, his own people that his physical condition is not serious. Ordinary North Koreans were of course not able to access international reports about Kim, but they knew that he was not appearing in their national media and presumably were wondering how he was.

But isn't it a problem for Kim to be seen in a weakened physical condition?

Kim's power and legitimacy in North Korea derive from the fact that his grandfather Kim Il Sung was the country's first leader, not from his physical condition or personal qualities. It’s no longer taboo in North Korea to show the top leader suffering from ailments. In fact, Kim's father Kim Jong Il was shown repeatedly looking extremely unwell after his stroke in 2008. Similarly, Kim Jong Un himself had already been shown in July and August on North Korean television suffering from the limp. In both cases, the North Korean media characterized the two Kims as hardworking leaders even when they were unwell. Moreover, as Yonsei University Professor John Delury has pointed out, actually showing Kim using a cane may be intentional because it makes him look a bit older and more mature.

What are we to make of the attention on Kim’s absence over the past several weeks?

I think it would be valuable if the international media would begin to apply better standards for its reporting on North Korea. North Korea poses important challenges to the international community, and citizens need to be informed about what's actually happening there, not what people imagine or those with ulterior motives would have us believe.

There is another, even more basic lesson to be drawn from this episode. With the rise of the Internet, information and misinformation have proliferated about North Korea, along with the ability to store and recall all of that information quickly. In addition, in popular imagination, the end of the Cold War transformed North Korea from an adjunct of the Soviet Union to an entity in itself, one that is both abhorrent and ridiculous. The result has been an exponential increase in the number of people throughout the world producing, circulating and consuming any information even remotely plausible about North Korea, and the established media in turn report on what those people are saying.

An increase in global attention to all things North Korea is important because it means North Korea can no longer hide itself from the international community. Already, this has contributed to the United Nation’s current consideration of legal action against the regime and its leaders over the human rights situation in the North. That is what North Korea’s leaders must have been worrying about over the past month as they watched the media reports—not Kim Jong Un’s bad leg.

Straub also spoke with Public Radio International (PRI) just before Kim’s reemergence, audio from “The World” radioshow is available on the PRI website.

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South Korean activists continue to send balloons into North Korea filled with leaflets that reportedly contain information that is critical of Kim Jong Un’s regime. The latest campaign coincided with the anniversary of the founding of the North’s ruling Worker’s Party. The Koreas exchanged gunfire over the incident in the first-ever North Korean attack after such a balloon launch.

“The possible benefits of sending such balloons into the North are far outweighed by giving North Korea a pretext to attack the South,” said David Straub, the associate of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), in an interview the Voice of America.

Straub’s commentary coincides with recommendations in “Tailored Engagement,” a policy report published in Sept. 2014 by Straub, Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC and Joyce Lee, research associate for the Korea Program, which argues for increased engagement with the North through a series of precise steps taken on behalf of the South Korean government. Among those steps, the scholars recommend the South Korean government should not permit balloon launches.

The full article can be found on the Voice of America online, and the policy report can be found on the Shorenstein APARC website.

Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center,  and David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, presented their new study "Tailored Engagement: Toward an Effective and Sustainable Inter-Korea Relations Policy" to a Washington, D.C. audience at the Brookings Institution on Sept. 29. The Voice of America wrote an article in Korean about the presentation, citing Shin saying, "Engagement is important and essential but it must be carefully tailored or fitted to changing political and security realities on and around the Peninsula." 

With tensions between Japan and South Korea continuing over historical and territorial issues, Beijing is more than willing to use the history card to woo Seoul. In a recent visit to South Korea, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that "in the first half of the 20th century, Japanese militarists carried out barbarous wars of aggression against China and South Korea, swallowing up Korea and occupying half of China." Earlier this year, China opened an elaborate memorial hall in Harbin to honor Ahn Jung-geun, who killed Hirobumi Ito, the first Japanese resident-general of Korea. To Koreans, Ahn is a national hero; to Japanese, a terrorist. Xi's visit to Seoul was to repay South Korean President Park Geun-hye's own visit to Beijing last year. Neither Park nor Xi has visited Tokyo yet.

China is apparently seeking to pull South Korea over to its side in its widening strategic competition with the United States and Japan. Xi's "charm offensive" toward Seoul is based on the calculation that South Korea's strategic value will only increase in coming years.

For South Korea, there are compelling reasons to improve relations with China. Ties had been strained by Park's predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, emphasizing South Korea's alliance with the U.S. She must take into account that China is becoming ever more important to South Korea's economy. (Apart from Taiwan, South Korea enjoys the world's largest merchandise trade surplus with China, approaching $100 billion). Park also wants China to support her North Korea policy focused on ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and preparing for unification. 

While China actively asserts its claim to leadership in Northeast Asia in courting South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems to deliberately ignore, if not dismiss, the importance of South Korea. Japanese policymakers argue, wrongly, that the Park government is "pro-China" and that Japan needs only to worry about China itself. Conservative Japanese media regularly bash the South Korean government and South Korea more broadly, and anti-Korean sentiments in Japan are on the rise.

Japanese focus is understandably on its alliance with the United States. But American policymakers openly worry that continuing tensions between its main allies in the region will undermine its strategic position regarding China and North Korea. President Barack Obama brought Abe and Park together in March on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit, but with little to show for it. The United States is also concerned that the Abe government's nontransparent dealings with North Korea on the abductee issue could further damage Japanese-South Korean relations and vitiate U.S. efforts to press Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.

Northeast Asia is in flux. With its economic and military power growing, China is seeking to regain the dominant position in the region that it ceded to Japan over a century ago. In the process of reshaping a regional order, the Korean Peninsula will again be very important. Already, two major wars occurred over Korea when old and new powers competed for hegemony -- the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.  It is crucial for both Japan and South Korea to maintain friendly relations with a rising China, but it is just as important that they improve their own bilateral relationship. Both have much to lose if the current trajectory in the region is not corrected. Moreover, Japan and South Korea have much in common, from their social and economic systems to democratic values, much more in fact than either has with China.

So, what should be done?  Above all, both Japan and South Korea must work much harder to resolve the issues that continue to arise out of their shared history of colonial rule and war. South Korea needs to move beyond victim consciousness, and Japan needs to show more farsighted political leadership. Specifically, Japan should unequivocally reaffirm the Kono Statement regarding the "comfort women" issue, and Abe should make it clear that he won't visit Yasukuni Shrine again during his tenure as prime minister.

The 1993 statement was a key marker on the history question for South Koreans; the recent review of it sent the wrong message to Koreans. Japanese leaders are certainly entitled to honor those who sacrificed their lives for their country, but paying tribute also to convicted war criminals is an entirely different matter -- not only in the eyes of South Koreans but also of the international community as a whole. For its part, Seoul should make clear how much it values good relations with Japan and state that it is ready to work with Tokyo in a constructive fashion to fully and finally resolve the remaining historical issues.

Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea. It should be an occasion to celebrate what that has meant for both countries -- regional peace and stability and economic prosperity. But even more importantly, both Tokyo and Seoul should also use the anniversary as a golden opportunity to develop a new vision for their relationship. The future of Northeast Asia will be brighter for all the countries in the region if its two major democracies show greater wisdom.

Gi-Wook Shin is a professor of sociology and director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University. Shin's article (with Daniel Sneider, the associate for resarch at Shorenstein APARC), "History Wars in Northeast Asia," appeared in Foreign Affairs (April 2014).

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on 17 Sept. and reposted with permission.

Stanford researchers have introduced a major new study on North Korea policy at a hearing at the South Korean National Assembly. Entitled “Tailored Engagement,” the report concludes that South Korea is the only country today that may be both willing and able to try a new approach toward the worsening North Korea problem.

“There is considerable urgency for Seoul to act,” according to the report released by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, which comes in response to increasing tensions and heightened nationalism in Northeast Asia.

“Only the Republic of Korea has both the need and the potential influence to change this dangerous trajectory on the Korean Peninsula.”

Published by Gi-Wook Shin, the director of Shorenstein APARC; David Straub, the associate director of the Korea Program; and Joyce Lee, the research associate for the Korea Program, the report is the culmination of more than a year of intensive research activities at Stanford University, including three international conferences focused on Northeast Asia’s security and political situation.

During the past year, North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons and North-South Korean relations worsened, while increasing U.S.-China strategic mistrust has made it less likely that those two countries can cooperate to change North Korea's behavior.

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“I was very impressed by the concern that the Korean Congressmen showed about the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and by their interest in our reasoning and recommendations,” Shin said. “Almost all of the Committee’s 18 members attended, and engaged in a lively exchange of views during the three-hour-long hearing.”

In their report, Shin, Straub and Lee propose a process that involves a series of increased exchanges with North Korea. This would be applied in a principled, systematic way, based largely on expanding a domestic consensus in South Korea that treats South Korean engagement of the North as necessary for improving the situation on the peninsula, not as incompatible with maintaining pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The report lays out four main steps that South Korea can implement to reduce the risk of regional conflict, while also creating a foundation for peaceful unification with North Korea.

• Focus on the pursuit of mutual interests and benefits rather than on symbolism and appeals to national sentiment.
• Apply market principles and international standards in economic activities.
• Collaborate with other countries and third-party companies in both economic and people-to-people projects.
• Be pragmatic and flexible in pursuing engagement at both the state-to-state and grassroots levels in complementary ways. 
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South Korea is well suited to engage the North because of their shared history, and its status as a major middle-power status has also increased its sway with both China and the United States.

No longer a “shrimp among whales,” South Korea has transformed since democratization, leaving that modest proverb behind and gaining an influential role in the region.

Now the country has an opportunity to begin to bridge the gap with North Korea, but first, it must create an internal structure that supports engagement.

In implementation

The North Korea problem is complex and wrapped in a varied history of engagement efforts by South Korea and other countries. Lessons of success and failure from past administrations provide important insight, the report says.

“The main impediment to South Korea’s assuming a greater international leadership role on the Korean question is not a lack of national power,” the report states, “but a lack of domestic political consensus about how to deal with North Korea and the consequent inconsistency in ROK policy across administrations.”

The South Korean government changes executive leadership every five years, and with it, there has been great inconsistency between conservative and progressive policies. The current administration that assumed office in 2013, led by President Park Geun-hye, pursues a North Korea policy of trustpolitik, wherein the government aims to build trust through a step-by-step process.

According to the report, the tailored engagement approach can inform and build on President Park’s policy. Three main actions can be taken by South Korea’s administration to implement productive engagement, the report states:

• Reorganize the Korean government itself to facilitate a more coordinated formulation and implementation of North Korea policy.
• Achieve much more consensus within South Korea on how to deal with North Korea.
• Seek to win support of the major powers, especially the United States and China for its approach to North Korea.

Developing trust is essential to de-escalate tension between the Koreas. Without progress in confidence-building, the two countries can hardly collaborate on even straightforward projects, such as expanding the existing Kaesong Industrial Complex, a bi-lateral industrial park located just north of the North-South border.

Solving more basic issues and participating in joint initiatives can help pave the way toward inter-Korean reconciliation during President Park’s administration, and the next.

“Reconciliation and convergence would improve many aspects of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including eventually facilitating North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program and the achievement of unification,” the reports says.

Asia Economy Daily wrote an article (in the Korean language) about the research team's presentation. A version of this article was also carried as a news release by the Stanford News Service. NK News, a news oufit focused on North Korea-related news, also wrote an article (in the English language) and can be found on NKNews.org. The Voice of America covered the presentation by Shin and Straub at the Brookings Institution. The article, written in Korean, can be accessed on the Voice of America online.