International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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3D mockup cover of APARC's volume 'South Korea's Democracy in Crisis'

Like in many other states worldwide, democracy is in trouble in South Korea, entering a state of regression in the past decade, barely thirty years after its emergence in 1987. The society that recently had ordinary citizens leading “candlelight protests” demanding the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2016-17 has become polarized amid an upsurge of populism, driven by persistent structural inequalities, globalization, and the rise of the information society. 

The symptoms of democratic decline are increasingly hard to miss: political opponents are demonized, democratic norms are eroded, and the independence of the courts is whittled away. Perhaps most disturbing is that this all takes place under a government dominated by former pro-democracy activists.

The contributors to this volume trace the sources of illiberalism in today’s Korea; examine how political polarization is plaguing its party system; discuss how civil society and the courts have become politicized; look at the roles of inequality, education, and social media in the country’s democratic decline; and consider how illiberalism has affected Korea’s foreign policy. 

Table of Contents

Introduction
Korea’s Democratic Decay: Worrisome Trends and Pressing Challenges
Gi-Wook Shin and Ho-Ki Kim

1. Why Is Korean Democracy Majoritarian but Not Liberal?
Byongjin Ahn

2. Uses and Misuses of Nationalism in the Democratic Politics of Korea
Aram Hur

3. The Weakness of Party Politics and Rise of Populism in Korea
Kwanhu Lee

4. The Politicization of Civil Society: No Longer Watchdogs of Power, Former Democratic Activists Are Becoming New Authoritarian Leaders 
Myoung-Ho Park

5. The Politicization of the Judiciary in Korea: Challenges in Maintaining the Balance of Power
Seongwook Heo

6. Two Divergences in Korea’s Economy and Democracy: Regional and Generational Disparities
Jun-Ho Jeong and Il-Young Lee

7. Democracy and the Educational System in Korea 
Seongsoo Choi

8. Social Media and the Salience of Polarization in Korea
Yong Suk Lee

9. Illiberalism in Korean Foreign Policy
Victor Cha

10. The Democratic Recession: A Global and Comparative Perspective
Larry Diamond

Epilogue
Korea’s 2022 Presidential Election: Populism in the Post-Truth Era
Ho-Ki Kim and Gi-Wook Shin

Media Coverage

To celebrate the publication of South Korea's Democracy in Crisis, APARC held a book launch seminar in Seoul on June 14, 2022. The event received extensive coverage in Korean media, including the following:

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization

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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

On January 30, North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile from the north province of Jagang, its seventh rocket test this year. At first glance, this may not seem like a huge deal. The rockets are not, after all, the nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that North Korea has tested in the past. Russia is currently massing troops on the Ukrainian border, and COVID-19 cases are surging around the world thanks to the Omicron variant. By comparison, the launches may look like a lesser concern—just another routine military provocation from Pyongyang.

But the tests aren’t coming at a routine moment. Instead, they are occurring at a time of stark, rising competition between the United States and the Pacific’s other great power: China. Washington sold nuclear submarines to Australia as part of a new, trilateral security arrangement along with the United Kingdom. U.S. assistant secretary of defense Ely Ratner declared that deterring China from attacking Taiwan is “an absolute priority.” In explaining the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. President Joe Biden argued Washington needed to refocus its energy and resources on the “serious competition with China.” The pivot to Asia, long elusive, is clearly underway.


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In this context, North Korea’s tests take on a new meaning—and it is dangerous for U.S. ambitions. The heightened threat of North Korean missile attacks incentivizes both Japan and South Korea to avoid alienating Beijing, which they hope will help keep Pyongyang in check. (China is North Korea’s main patron and sole ally.) It also means both Japan and South Korea are likely to redouble their militaries’ focus on Pyongyang rather than support U.S. operations elsewhere in Asia. And if the United States has to bolster its armed posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether to assuage Seoul’s and Tokyo’s fears, better deter North Korea, or fight in an actual conflict, Washington will need to reposition forces designed to constrain China elsewhere. Pyongyang’s weapons program was long seen as a liability for Beijing, given the erratic and unpredictable behavior of North Korea’s leaders. Now, it is becoming an asset.

For China, this switch comes at an opportune time. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has grown more impatient, expansionist, and belligerent. It is increasingly possible that China will try to seize control of Taiwan, especially since the peaceful unification of the mainland and the island is clearly no longer an option. Xi is closely watching the U.S. response to North Korea’s provocations and drawing lessons about Washington’s credibility. To prevent conflict in the Korean Peninsula and keep pace in its competition with Beijing, the United States will need to come up with new ways to unite its allies and prove its resolve in the region.

Cracking Through

North Korea’s latest rockets may not be capable of reaching the continental United States, but that hardly means they aren’t dangerous. Missile defense systems cannot see low-flying objects until they are near their targets, and this year’s first and second tests were of hypersonic advanced boost-glide vehicle missiles, which can travel at low altitudes, evade radar, and maneuver to avoid last-second interception. In the third test, the North Korean military successfully launched a missile off a moving train, indicating that Pyongyang can fire rockets from a mobile system, in turn making both tracking and targeting even more difficult (especially given the country’s vast railway system). In other words, these recent tests may have neutralized U.S. missile defense capabilities, such as the U.S.-deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system.

These capabilities were designed to protect Japan and, especially, South Korea. Their erosion comes at a tricky time for the United States’ relations with the latter. Biden has yet to designate a U.S. ambassador to Seoul, and he appointed a special envoy for North Korea only in May of last year. The president placed new sanctions on North Korea in December 2021, but they were human rights-related and largely viewed as symbolic. In response to January’s missile threats, the Biden administration implemented its first weapons-related sanctions, but they were relatively limited in scope. Some South Korean analysts now believe that the administration discusses North Korean issues with Seoul not because it seriously intends to resolve them but more to persuade the South Korean government to help the United States compete against Beijing. South Koreans fear that the Biden administration’s prioritization of China comes at the expense of the denuclearization of North Korea.

North Korea has explicitly tied its missiles to U.S. involvement in Taiwan.
Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro

This is a welcome development for Beijing. Chinese analysts view South Korea as a weak link in the United States’ East Asian alliances, and Beijing is trying to divide Washington and Seoul through a combination of compliments and threats. In August 2020, Chinese media praised South Korea’s efforts to "be objective and keep its friendship with China," and several weeks later, Chinese scholars commended South Korea’s “kindness to China” in a time of “U.S. suppression.” But after South Korean President Moon Jae-in discussed Taiwan with Biden at their May 2021 summit, China’s Foreign Ministry warned South Korea not to “play with fire.” It is telling that Chinese scholars at a government-affiliated institute are arguing openly that China needs to raise the cost of South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on Taiwan.

North Korea’s missile capabilities are helping accomplish this task. The newer rockets more effectively threaten South Korea, and they increase Seoul’s doubts about the efficacy of U.S. deterrence. North Korea has explicitly tied its menacing assets to the issues surrounding the island. Pyongyang has publicly criticized the United States policies’ on Taiwan and threatened that “tragic consequences” will result from U.S. support. “The indiscreet meddling by the U.S. into the issue of Taiwan entails a potential danger of touching off a delicate situation on the Korean peninsula,” North Korea’s vice foreign minister said in a statement. These words could make Seoul think twice about backing the United States in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan is more difficult to split from Washington. But North Korea’s activities can certainly draw some of Japan’s attention away from Beijing. Although Tokyo was getting onboard with playing a greater role in deterring China and defending Taiwan, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has identified North Korea’s military capabilities as a “grave and imminent” threat, and there is no doubt that the government’s focus will shift if Pyongyang escalates its provocations. In the White House’s statement regarding Biden’s January 21 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Taiwan was mentioned only once. In comparison, the two leaders cited North Korea three times, condemned the country’s recent missile tests, and committed to work with South Korea more closely. Although Tokyo could theoretically focus on both North Korea and China, in practice it might struggle. Pyongyang poses a far more direct threat to Japanese lives and territory than does Beijing, and it would be hard for Japanese leaders to concentrate on China if North Korea grows more belligerent.

Drawing the Heat

North Korea’s new capabilities don’t help Beijing just diplomatically. The tests provide tangible, military benefits. The United States has been attempting to enlist South Korea in its efforts to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But Pyongyang’s new missiles mean Seoul is less likely to focus its military somewhere other than North Korea, especially if it continues the provocations. Indeed, a South Korean expert on Chinese politics has argued that when Washington asks for support in its contest with Beijing, Seoul should explain that it is too busy handling Pyongyang.

To reassure its allies, the United States may also need to refocus military attention on the Korean Peninsula, reducing its ability to operate in other parts of Asia. In 2017, when North Korea conducted ICBM and nuclear tests, the United States responded by sending more strategic assets, including heavy naval power, near the Korean Peninsula. If tensions rise high enough, Washington may have to do so again, including by shifting the Seventh Fleet’s operational focus to the area. Stationed in the middle of Japan, this fleet has been one of the United States’ primary tools for deterring Beijing, conducting patrols near the Taiwan Strait and promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But given past positioning patterns, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would also most certainly drag the fleet farther north, undermining Washington’s ability to carry out operations elsewhere.

A major war on the Korean Peninsula would prove particularly devastating to the United States’ competition with Beijing. In addition to the Seventh Fleet, the United States Forces Korea’s 28,000 soldiers, 40 F-16 fighters, 90 military aircrafts, 40 attack helicopters, and other assets would immediately become unavailable for operations beyond the peninsula. A majority of the United States Forces Japan’s aircraft, ships, and approximately 55,000 military personnel would also be deployed to Korea. Japan’s own military, which could help the United States if it needed to fight China, would grow busy providing combat support to protect U.S. naval forces—including antisubmarine operations and sea minesweeping—as U.S. troops prepared for an amphibious landing on the peninsula.

For China, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would be a golden opportunity.
Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro

Beijing, by comparison, is in a better position. The United States has to worry that China will use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan, but the inverse isn’t true: Beijing isn’t concerned that Seoul or Washington will start a war over Taiwan if Pyongyang launches an attack. China’s commitment to North Korea is also not as comprehensive as the United States’ is to Seoul. In the event of a renewed Korean war, China plans to send mostly ground forces into the North. Its air and naval assets would remain focused across the Taiwan Strait.

For China, therefore, a crisis on the peninsula—especially one that evolves into a conflict—would be a golden opportunity to expand its power. It may even make it possible to defeat Taipei. With U.S. intelligence assets supporting troops in Korea, a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without giving the United States advanced warning. China could establish beachheads on Taiwan long before U.S. forces, bogged down on the peninsula, have time to arrive. The war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.

North Korea’s latest tests may have already made a Chinese attack more likely. As Chinese media happily pointed out, Pyongyang’s January 11 missile launch briefly confused the United States Northern Command’s warning system, grounding some commercial airplanes for 15 minutes. China has the most advanced ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. If North Korea’s offensive strike capability can jeopardize the U.S. early warning system, it surely bodes well for Beijing’s ability to surprise and defeat Washington’s forces.

Better Together

To counter North Korea’s new missile threats and prevent them from helping China, the Biden administration needs a stronger North Korea strategy—one that deters further provocations, reassures South Korea, and demonstrates Washington’s continued resolve and credibility to Beijing. That means Washington must support South Korea’s efforts to advance its offensive capabilities, such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, must scale up its combined exercises with the United States. A stronger U.S.–South Korean alliance will improve the two countries’ combat readiness, which is especially critical at a time when North Korea appears to be building up to another round of ICBM and nuclear tests. Finally, closer ties would make it easier for the United States to marshal allies in its competition against China, including in the Taiwan Strait.

The United States should also use the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to encourage closer Japanese–South Korean cooperation. Seoul has long had highly fraught relations with its former colonial ruler, and the two states have especially struggled to get along in recent years. But for better or worse, the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait are increasingly intertwined in the current era of strategic competition. Pyongyang's provocations against the United States and its allies on the peninsula can embolden the Chinese Communist Party to act in other regions. And if Beijing can weaken or defeat the United States and its Asian allies anywhere, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kim regime will be emboldened to act on the peninsula. To cope with this changing security environment, it makes sense for strategists in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to package these issues together. By demonstrating greater coordination, the three countries would also make it harder for China or North Korea to fracture Washington’s East Asia alliances, regardless of the contingency.

Finally, these three states must prepare for simultaneous provocations in East Asia, including concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. In consultation with one another, the United States and its allies must demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate and take strategic risks. They should hold more trilateral defense minister meetings, more thoroughly review various contingency scenarios, and discuss how to enhance their combined capabilities. Hopefully, these countries will never need to put these plans and abilities into practice. But to deter Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, they need to prove that they can fight two wars—and win both—if the need arises.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Fracture America’s Alliances

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This event is made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation and other friends of the Korea Program.

On the heels of South Korea's presidential election, an expert panel will examine the election results and their likely policy implications.

Speakers:

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Jae-ho Yeom is an Emeritus Professor of Policy Studies at Korea University where he also served as the 19th President. Previously, he served as President of Korean Association for Policy Studies; President of Korean Association for Contemporary Japanese Studies; and Chief Editor of Asian Research Policy. He also served in government as a leader in Inspection and Evaluation Group at the Ministry of Planning and Budget; Chair of Policy Advisory Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chair of Committee for Innovation and Development at the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea; and as Advisor for Korean Presidential Commission of Science and Technology Policy. He wrote columns in major Korean newspapers, and moderated a debate show on SBS and a 2002 presidential debate. He is regarded as a scholar who has a discerning eye on social transformations, keen understanding of changing societies and corporate social values. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University.

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portrait of Eunjung Lim

Eunjung Lim is an Associate Professor at the Division of International Studies at  Kongju National University where she also serves as Vice President for International Affairs, Dean of Institute of International Language Education, and Dean of Institute of Korean Culture and Education. Her specializations include international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, comparative and global governance, energy, nuclear, and climate change policies of East Asian countries. Since 2018, she has served as a board member of Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, and is currently a member of Policy Advisory Committee at the Ministry of Unification. Previously Dr. Lim was an Assistant Professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, in Kyoto, Japan. She also taught at Johns Hopkins University, Yonsei University, and Korea University. She has been a researcher and a visiting fellow at the Center for Contemporary Korean Studies at Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies at the University of Tokyo, the Institute of Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, the Institute of Japan Studies at Kookmin University, and Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. She received a B.A. from the University of Tokyo, an M.I.A. from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

Moderator: Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC and the Korea Program, Stanford University

Via Zoom. Register at https://bit.ly/34kA4tO

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The Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowship supports Stanford students working within a broad range of topics related to contemporary Asia. APARC is now accepting applications for the 2022-23 Predoctoral Fellowship. Up to three fellowships are available to Ph.D. candidates who have completed all fieldwork and are nearing the completion of their dissertation. Applications are due by April 15, 2022.

The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2022-23 academic year.

This opportunity is open to current Stanford students only.

APARC offers a stipend of $37,230 for the 2022-23 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

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Call for Stanford Student Applications: APARC Hiring 2022 Summer Research Assistants

To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center is offering research assistant positions for summer 2022. The deadline for submitting applications and letters of recommendation is March 1, 2022. 
Call for Stanford Student Applications: APARC Hiring 2022 Summer Research Assistants
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2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2022 award through February 15.
2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries
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Up to three fellowships are available to Stanford Ph.D. candidates. Submissions are due by April 15, 2022.

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Shorenstein APARC invites highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate- and graduate-level students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the duration of the summer 2022 quarter. The research assistants work with assigned APARC faculty members on projects focused on contemporary Asia, studying varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

All research assistant positions are open to current Stanford students only.

Apply Now
 

APARC is now accepting applications for our summer 2022 RA positions. The deadline for submitting applications and letters of recommendation is March 1, 2022

All summer research assistant positions will be on campus for eight weeks. The hourly pay rate is $17 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

Decisions regarding the options for telecommuting work will be made closer to the appointment start dates in accordance with the evolving COVID-19 situation and the University's recommendations.

 

Please follow these application guidelines

I. Prepare the following materials:

II. Fill out the online application form for summer 2022, including the above two attachments, and submit the complete form.

III. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC.
Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents.

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Stanford arch and text calling for nominations for APARC's 2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award.
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2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2022 award through February 15.
2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries
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To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center is offering research assistant positions for summer 2022. The deadline for submitting applications and letters of recommendation is March 1, 2022. 

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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for interdisciplinary research, education, and engagement on contemporary Asia, invites nominations for the 2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award. The award recognizes outstanding journalists who have spent their careers helping audiences worldwide understand the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2022 award will honor a recipient whose work has primarily appeared in American news media. APARC invites 2022 award nomination submissions from news editors, publishers, scholars, journalism associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region.  Submissions are due by Tuesday, February 15, 2022.

Sponsored by APARC, the award carries a cash prize of US $10,000. It alternates between recipients whose work has primarily appeared in Asian news media and those whose work has primarily appeared in American news media. The 2022 award will recognize a recipient from the latter category. For the purpose of the award, the Asia-Pacific region is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia and Australasia. Both individual journalists with a considerable body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in traditional forms of print or broadcast journalism and/or in new forms of multimedia journalism. The Award Selection Committee, whose members are experts in journalism and Asia research and policy, presides over the judging of nominees and is responsible for the selection of honorees.

An annual tradition since 2002, the award honors the legacy of APARC benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. Over the course of its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of coverage of the Asia-Pacific region and help advance mutual understanding between audiences in the United States and their Asian counterparts. Recent honorees include Burmese journalist and human rights defender Swe Win; former Wall Street Journal investigative reporter Tom Wright; the internationally esteemed champion of press freedom Maria Ressa, CEO and executive editor of the Philippine news platform Rappler and winner of the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize; former Washington Post Beijing and Tokyo bureau chief Anna Fifield; and Editor of the Wire Siddharth Varadarajan.

Award nominations are accepted electronically through Tuesday, February 15, 2022, at 11:59 PM PST. For information about the nomination procedures and to submit a nomination please visit the award nomination entry page. The Center will announce the winner by April 2022 and present the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in the autumn quarter of 2022.

Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

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APARC Announces 2022-23 Fellowships for Asia Specialists

The Center offers fellowships for postdoctoral scholars specializing in contemporary Asia, Japan, and Asia health policy and for experts on Southeast Asia.
APARC Announces 2022-23 Fellowships for Asia Specialists
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How to Solve the North Korean Conundrum: The Role of Human Rights in Policy Toward the DPRK

APARC's new edited volume, 'The North Korean Conundrum,' shines a spotlight on the North Korean human rights crisis and its connection to nuclear security. In the book launch discussion, contributors to the volume explain why improving human rights in the country ought to play an integral part of any comprehensive U.S. engagement strategy with the DPRK.
How to Solve the North Korean Conundrum: The Role of Human Rights in Policy Toward the DPRK
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Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2022 award through February 15.

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To watch the recording of the event, click here.

This event is co-hosted with the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea.

Event Time: November 18, 4:00 - 6:00 PM (PST) / November 19, 9:00 - 11:00 PM (Japan and Korea)
Please register for this event at EAI event page.

The ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan joint statements have increased expectations for a possible expansion of security and economic cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. However, heightened U.S.-China strategic competition, as well as persistent challenges in the region such as historical tensions and the North Korea threat, have complicated the strategic calculus of U.S., South Korea and Japan. Under these circumstances, the South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must define their economic and security interests and seek ways to maintain friendly relations among the three countries. This seminar will discuss security and economic cooperation among Korea, the United States and Japan in the era of strategic competition between the U.S. and China.

Panel 1 on security:

Park Joon Woo, former Chairman of the Sejong Institute; former South Korean Ambassador to E.U. and to Singapore

Tomiko Ichikawa, Director General of the Japan Institute of International Affairs

Gen. Vincent Brooks, former USFK Commander

Moderated by Young Sun Ha, Chairman of East Asia Institute; Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University

Panel 2 on economic cooperation:

Young Ja Bae, Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy, Konkuk University, Korea

Andrew Grotto, Director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance, FSI, Stanford University

Kimura Fukunari, Professor of Economics, Keio University, Japan

Moderated by Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University

 

Via Zoom. Register at https://bit.ly/3w7Ak9g

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Cover of book "Drivers of Innovation"

Innovation and entrepreneurship rank highly on the strategic agenda of most countries today. As global economic competition intensifies, many national policymakers now recognize the central importance of entrepreneurship education and the building of financial institutions to promote long-term innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. Drivers of Innovation brings together scholars from the United States and Asia to explore those education and finance policies that might be conducive to accelerating innovation and developing a more entrepreneurial workforce in East Asia. 

Some of the questions covered include: How do universities in China and Singapore experiment with new types of learning in their quest to promote innovation and entrepreneurship? Is there a need to transform the traditional university into an “entrepreneurial university”? What are the recent developments in and outstanding challenges to financing innovation in China and Japan? What is the government’s role in promoting innovative entrepreneurship under the shadow of big business in South Korea? What can we learn about the capacity of services to drive innovation-led growth in India? 

Drivers of Innovation will serve as a valuable reference for scholars and policymakers working to develop human capital for innovation in Asia.

Contents

  1. Educating Entrepreneurs and Financing Innovation in Asia 
    Fei Yan, Yong Suk Lee, Lin William Cong, Charles Eesley, and Charles Lee
  2. Fostering Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Education, Human Capital, and the Institutional Environment 
    Charles Eesley, Lijie Zhou, and You (Willow) Wu
  3. Entrepreneurial Scaling Strategy: Managerial and Policy Considerations 
    David H. Hsu
  4. Innovation Policy and Star Scientists in Japan 
    Tatsuo Sasaki, Hiromi S. Nagane, Yuta Fukudome, and Kanetaka Maki
  5. Financing Innovation in Japan: Challenges and Recent Progress 
    Takeo Hoshi and Kenji Kushida
  6. Promoting Entrepreneurship under the Shadow of Big Business in Korea: The Role of the Government 
    Hicheon Kim, Dohyeon Kim, and He Soung Ahn
  7. The Creativity and Labor Market Performance of Korean College Graduates: Implications for Human Capital Policy 
    Jin-Yeong Kim
  8. Financing Innovative Enterprises in China: A Public Policy Perspective 
    Lin William Cong, Charles M. C. Lee, Yuanyu Qu, and Tao She
  9. Forging Entrepreneurship in Asia: A Comparative Study of Tsinghua University and the National University of Singapore 
    Zhou Zhong, Fei Yan, and Chao Zhang
  10. Education and Human Capital for Innovation in India’s Service Sector 
    Rafiq Dossani
  11. In Need of a Big Bang: Toward a Merit-Based System for Government-Sponsored Research in India 
    Dinsha Mistree
  12. The Implications of AI for Business and Education, and Singapore’s Policy Response 
    Mohan Kankanhalli and Bernard Yeung

 

 

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Entrepreneurship, Education, and Finance in Asia

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Yong Suk Lee
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North Korea remains one of the worst human rights catastrophes in the modern era. Yet in recent years, the momentum to bring human dignity to the citizens of North Korea has ground to a halt. The predominant focus has been on nuclear security issues to the exclusion of the human rights crisis in the country. But human rights ought to play a key role in any comprehensive policy toward the DPRK. This is the premise of APARC’s new volume, The North Korea Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and International Security.

Edited by APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Ambassador Robert R. King, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Korea Chair and former special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State, the book draws on the work of scholars and practitioners presented and discussed at a conference on North Korean human rights held by APARC’s Korea Program. On October 28, 2021, APARC and CSIS gathered contributors to the volume for a book launch discussion of the intertwining relationship between the North Korean denuclearization and human rights agendas.

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Studies of human rights in North Korea are even more important now, in light of North Korea’s response to COVID-19, said Shin at the opening of the discussion. The DPRK has kept its borders closed for nearly two years, resulting in reduced trade and worsening the economic and social situation of its population.

Ambassador King, who was also a 2019-20 Koret Fellow and Visiting Scholar at APARC, identified the guiding questions of the volume, indicating that “This conundrum that we talk about in the title is an interaction between security and human rights. Is there a tradeoff? If we focus on human rights, does that make it more difficult for us to deal with security issues? If we focus on security issues do we have to ignore human rights?” 

The first principle we must accept is that integrating human rights into our strategy is not a choice, but a necessity. Moreover, mainstreaming human rights in the U.S.–North Korea agenda strengthens U.S. leverage in negotiations and is politically smart.
Victor Cha
Senior Vice President and Korea Chair, CSIS

An Error of Zero-Sum Thinking

While North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the security threat it poses have occupied the center stage and eclipsed other issues in recent years, the book’s contributors posit that human rights promotion remains an integral part of U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula. In his chapter, Victor Cha, Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at CSIS and former Koret Fellow and Visiting Scholar at APARC, analyzes the error in the zero-sum logic of North Korean human rights. "The United States sees a zero-sum relationship between pressing for human rights and denuclearization negotiations, while South Korea sees a zero-sum relationship between pressing for human rights and inter-Korean engagement," explains Cha. But the denuclearization and human rights agendas are inextricably intertwined.

The lost ground on addressing the North Korean human rights crisis is still recoverable, the contributors to The North Korean Conundrum believe. How could North Korea engage on human rights? The chapters in the volume lay out a number of ways. One opportunity to address human rights issues is through health and humanitarian assistance. Another way is to promote the economic and consumer rights of North Korean citizens to improve their quality of life and help foster a nascent civil society. And yet another way is to support information flow to the North. 

Interwoven Challenges

Nat Kretchun, Vice President for Programs at the Open Technology Fund, examines in his chapter the changing information environment in North Korea, observing how the information control system North Korean authorities are constructing is broadly characterized by an effort to move communications and media consumption onto state-controlled networks via state-sanctioned devices. The central aim is to create a “clean” information environment in which North Korean citizens use approved networked devices that technologically prevent the consumption and spread of unsanctioned content. At the same time, North Korean authorities have come to terms with a more marketized economic future. "Mobile phones have the ability to facilitate market-based economic transactions, the primary driver of much of what (limited) internal economic growth the country is seeing," notes Kretchun.

The contributors all agree that the challenge of human rights in North Korea is a complex one. It is intertwined with a host of issues, including life in the North Korean police state, inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, access to information, and international cooperation—all topics the volume addresses. We frequently separate these issues for analytical purposes or because they are dealt with in different ways or by different entities. But in fact, they are inseparable. Recognizing this interrelationship is the first step toward moving forward in a way that addresses the very serious North Korean security concerns while at the same time bringing human rights and humanitarian concerns into the equation.

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Why North Korean Human Rights Matter: Book Talk with Robert R. King

In his new book, "Patterns of Impunity," Ambassador King, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights from 2009 to 2017, shines a spotlight on the North Korean human rights crisis and argues that improving human rights in the country is an integral part of U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula.
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APARC's new edited volume, 'The North Korean Conundrum,' shines a spotlight on the North Korean human rights crisis and its connection to nuclear security. In the book launch discussion, contributors to the volume explain why improving human rights in the country ought to play an integral part of any comprehensive U.S. engagement strategy with the DPRK.

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This is a joint event with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Event Time: October 28, 12:00 PM (PDT)/3:00 PM (EDT)
Please register for this event at the CSIS event website, https://bit.ly/3DC4zI3.

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Book cover of The North Korean Conundrum
While North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the security threat it poses have occupied the center stage and eclipsed other issues in recent years, human rights remain important to U.S. policy. The edited volume, The North Korean Conundrum, explores how dealing with the issue of human rights is shaped and affected by the political issues with which it is so entwined. In this book launch event, contributors of the book will discuss the relationship between human rights and denuclearization, and how North Koreans’ limited access to information is part of the problem, and how this is changing.

Speakers:
Victor Cha is Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at CSIS; Vice Dean for Faculty and Graduate Affairs & D.S. Song-KF Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He left the White House in 2007 after serving since 2004 as director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the White House, he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Australia/New Zealand, and Pacific Island nation affairs. He was also the deputy head of delegation for the United States at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing and received two outstanding service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. He was the 2019-20 Koret Fellow for the winter quarter at Stanford.

Robert King served as the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, an ambassadorial-ranked position, at the Department of State, from 2009 to 2017. He is a senior advisor to the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a senior fellow at the Korea Economic Institute, and a board member of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea in Washington, D.C. Ambassador King was the 2019-20 Koret Fellow for the fall quarter at Stanford.

Nat Kretchun is Vice President for Programs at the Open Technology Fund (OTF), a congressionally funded non-profit organization that supports the development and deployment of anti-censorship, privacy, and security technologies for populations living under repressive information censorship regimes.

Moderator:
Gi-Wook Shin, Director of Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Korea Program; the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Stanford University

Online event. Register at https://bit.ly/3DC4zI3

Victor Cha
Robert King
Nat Kretchun
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E301
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
(650) 724-8480 (650) 723-6530
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor, by Courtesy, of East Asian Languages & Cultures
Gi-Wook Shin_0.jpg PhD

Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the founding director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) since 2001, all at Stanford University. In May 2024, Shin also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC. He served as director of APARC for two decades (2005-2025). As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, democracy, migration, and international relations.

In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is a new research initiative committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges in Asia. Across four research themes– “Talent Flows and Development,” “Nationalism and Racism,” “U.S.-Asia Relations,” and “Democratic Crisis and Reform”–the lab brings scholars and students to produce interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India to be published by Stanford University Press in the summer of 2025, is an outcome of SNAPL.

Shin is also the author/editor of twenty-seven books and numerous articles. His books include The Four Talent Giants: National Strategies for Human Resource Development Across Japan, Australia, China, and India (2025)Korean Democracy in Crisis: The Threat of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II (2014); New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (2014); History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (2011); South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society (2011); One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (2010); Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007);  and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic and policy journals, including American Journal of SociologyWorld DevelopmentComparative Studies in Society and HistoryPolitical Science QuarterlyJournal of Asian StudiesComparative EducationInternational SociologyNations and NationalismPacific AffairsAsian SurveyJournal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.

Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, but also continues to actively raise funds for Korean/Asian studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations, historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia, and talent strategies. He serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea and promotes policy dialogue between the two allies. He regularly writes op-eds and gives interviews to the media in both Korean and English.

Before joining Stanford in 2001, Shin taught at the University of Iowa (1991-94) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1994-2001). After receiving his BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his MA and PhD from the University of Washington in 1991.

Director, Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)
Director, Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab at APARC
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