The North Korean regime has adjusted to international sanctions by shifting that economic pain away from cities to the countryside, new Stanford research using satellite night lights data shows.

U.S. policy toward North Korea has been based on the expectation that economic sanctions could deter North Korea from developing nuclear weapons or change the behavior of the regime, according to Yong Suk Lee, a Stanford economist at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Since 1950, both the United States and the global community have adopted a series of economic sanctions against North Korea. The latest came in 2013 when the United Nations approved restrictions on banking, travel and trade in response to North Korea's underground nuclear test and threat to launch nuclear strikes against the United States and South Korea.

In a working paper, Lee examined how North Korea's Communist rulers have adapted to the increasingly tougher sanctions through the years.

"North Korea is one of many autocratic regimes that refuse to yield to sanctions, and its isolation and hereditary dictatorship make it a particularly good example to study the impact of economic sanctions in autocratic regimes," said Lee, the SK Center Fellow and a faculty member of the Korea Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, Lee noted. Its leaders follow an economic model based on a centrally planned economy and self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world.

Satellite data

Lee's research was based on nighttime views of lights from data collected by the U.S. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The researcher created "average luminosity" measures of lights across North Korea based on a 1-mile-by-1-mile grid for the years 1992 through 2010. Light usage was examined for brightness on one-minute intervals.

To predict the impact of sanctions on economic activity in North Korea, Lee used a formula that transformed the luminosity measures into GDP measures. For example, a 10 percent change in the satellite lights is associated with about a 3 percent change in GDP.

According to Lee, satellite data is of greatest utility in assessing the economies of cities and regions in the developing world. In a country like North Korea, a large part of economic activity happens during the evening and night and involves light. For example, lights at night are generated by peoples' consumption of goods and services as well as transportation. And some production activities happen during the evening hours.

"Economists have found that how bright night lights are can predict national and sub-national GDP quite well, especially in countries where GDP data is not reliable," he said.

Lee found that economic sanctions decreased luminosity in the hinterlands, but increased luminosity in urban areas, especially toward the centers. As for whether additional sanctions affected luminosity, he found they increased the urban-rural luminosity gap by about 1 percent. When he examined the more central urban areas, the gap increased by about 2.6 percent.

"The results suggest that the dictatorship countered the effects of sanctions by reallocating resources to the urban areas," Lee said. One could surmise that the economic sanctions do not affect the country's leadership much, he said.

The hinterlands responded to declining economic fortunes by relying more on trade with China near those border areas, Lee added. In fact, the sanctions generated more North Korean migration to China and reliance on Chinese merchants and goods. North Korea's border with China is relatively porous as opposed to its heavily militarized border with South Korea.

'Increasing inequality'

The upshot, Lee said, is that sanctions that fail to change the behavior of an autocratic regime may eventually increase urban-rural inequality.

"Sanctions will likely be inefficient as long as North Korea can maintain powerful centralized control and oppress any discontent that arises due to increasing inequality," he said.

Lee added that sanctions will most likely not deter North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. They have not done so yet, and at this point, North Korea's leaders view sanctions as inconveniences, but not regime-threatening. Plus, even the harshest sanctions would be unlikely to stem the flow of all goods, energy and money into North Korea. Not all countries would go along with draconian trade restrictions that hurt the poorest people the hardest, he said.

"Even if sanctions were imposed to full capacity, the marginalized population would suffer the most," said Lee, adding that he was actually surprised about his project's findings.

"One can always hypothesize a story but to actually find such effect in the data was quite exciting. Frankly, I pursued this project expecting that I wouldn't find any impact of sanctions on lights," he said.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Two weeks ago, North Korea surprised the world by sending three of its top leaders to the South to attend the closing ceremony of the 17th Asian Games in Incheon. The visit occurred in the midst of growing speculation that North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong Un, was seriously ill, or even that he had been removed from power. That dramatic and unprecedented visit gave renewed hope for improved inter-Korean relations, which have been frozen since the sinking of a South Korean vessel in 2010.

The strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula has continued to worsen over the past several years. To produce material for more nuclear devices, Pyongyang has proceeded with a large-scale uranium enrichment program. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently expressed concern that North Korea may also have reactivated its plutonium production facilities, another means of making fissile material for nuclear bombs. Meanwhile, having rocketed its first satellite into orbit in December 2012, the North is busily developing longer-range missiles to target not only the South but also Japan and the United States.

Unfortunately, there is no initiative on the horizon likely to change this dangerous trajectory. The United States was willing to negotiate with Pyongyang when there was a chance of preventing it from developing nuclear weapons. With that goal now deemed unachievable, Washington is instead intent on containing the threat through increased sanctions and counterproliferation efforts, missile defense, and heightened defense cooperation, with South Korea and Japan. U.S. engagement with North Korea, much less negotiation, is off the table and likely to stay that way.

China's buffer     

Earlier hopes that China would prove to be a deus ex machina have also foundered. While Beijing does not want Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons, it has always been more concerned about preventing instability in the North that might spill across their shared border. More recently, deepening suspicions among Beijing's leaders about U.S. strategic intentions have made North Korea even more important to China as a strategic buffer. China remains by far Pyongyang's most important foreign supporter, as reflected in the burgeoning trade across their border.

That leaves South Korea as the only country that could play a larger and more positive role in tackling the North Korea problem. South Korea is no longer a "shrimp among whales," as it used to think of itself, but a major "middle power." Strategically, Seoul is increasingly important not only to Washington but also to Beijing.

South Korea, however, has been a house divided when it comes to how to deal with the North. Conservative administrations, fearing that a North Korean nuclear arsenal would change the long-term balance of power on the peninsula, have made the North's denuclearization a condition for virtually all engagement with it. Progressive governments, on the other hand, have glossed over the nuclear issue, believing that increased contact will eventually promote change for the better in Pyongyang. The result has been South Korean policies that, whether from the left or the right, have proved unsustainable and ineffective.

"Tailored engagement"     

Based on a yearlong study, my colleagues and I have called for more active South Korean leadership to ameliorate the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We call the concept "tailored engagement." It is based on the conviction that engagement is only one means of dealing with North Korea, but an essential one, and it must be carefully "tailored" or fitted to changing political and security realities on and around the peninsula. It eschews an "appeasement" approach to Pyongyang as well as the notion that inter-Korean engagement under the current circumstances would be tantamount to accepting the North's misbehavior, especially its nuclear weapons program.

Such engagement would not immediately change the nuclear situation, but, if carefully considered and implemented, it need not encourage Pyongyang in that regard, either. Meanwhile, it could help to reduce bilateral tensions, improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans and bring the two societies closer together. It could reduce the risk of conflict now while fostering inter-Korean reconciliation and effecting positive change in the North.

South Koreans must first, however, develop a broader domestic consensus in areas and in ways that do not undermine the international effort to press Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. That is possible because many forms of engagement are in fact largely irrelevant to the nuclear program. For example, South Korea could provide much more humanitarian assistance to ordinary North Koreans; it could also engage in more educational and cultural programs, including sports exchanges. Concrete offers of expanded economic exchanges and support for the development of the North's infrastructure could become part of an incentive package in renewed six-party talks on ending the North's nuclear program.

Speculation about the state of Kim Jong Un's health and the North Korean leaders' visit to the South underline the fact that North Korean politics and society are experiencing great flux. For the outside world, this creates uncertainty, but also offers the possibility of positive change. Tailored engagement can at least test, and perhaps also influence, a changing North Korea.

Even a carefully "tailored" engagement strategy is no panacea. It is only one tool for dealing with the North -- military deterrence, counterproliferation and human rights efforts are among the others that are essential -- but why not try all available means when the situation is so worrisome? Japan should support such an approach because its interests, too, are threatened by the increasingly precarious situation on the peninsula.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on Oct. 16 and reposted with permission.

The 40-day disappearance from public view of North Korea's young leader Kim Jong Un and his sudden reappearance on Monday, walking with a cane but otherwise apparently well, made headlines around the world. International media ran countless reports that Kim was either seriously ill or had even been deposed. Why was this such a big story, and why did so many get it wrong?

David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center who formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director, was one observer who consistently challenged that media narrative. In the following interview, he offers his analysis of both the North Korean situation and the way it was misinterpreted by a majority of the media.

Why didn’t you give credence to the reports that Kim Jong Un was seriously ill or had lost out in a power struggle?

I've been following North Korea professionally on and off since 1978. Looking at similar incidents, I've grown wary of poorly sourced reports about North Korea, and especially speculation, even when it comes from so-called “experts.” Because North Korea is a black box, mostly closed to outside view, almost anyone can get away with claiming that he or she is an expert. There are also many governments, groups and individuals that have axes to grind. Ignorance, wishful thinking and even disinformation are all too common when reporting on North Korea.

What was the evidence that led you to believe that Kim Jong Un wasn’t seriously ill, much less deposed?

There were only a few facts that we actually knew to be true during his absence. His last public appearance was on Sept. 3. In July and August, there was video of Kim Jong Un walking with a pronounced limp. Later in Sept., North Korean media reported that he was suffering an uncomfortable physical condition. Kim is now quite overweight, and there are also photographs of him wearing platform shoes. Therefore, the most likely explanation for his disappearance from public view was that he was receiving treatment for whatever caused the limp, and that he needed to stay off his feet until he was better. At age 31, it was unlikely that he was suffering from a more serious ailment. Moreover, just like his grandfather and father, Kim has previously dropped out of public view for many weeks at a time.

What about the reports that Kim was deposed?

There were zero credible sources that Kim had been deposed or that his leadership position had even been challenged. And, a great deal of speculation existed about the Oct. 4 visit of three top North Korean officials to South Korea, who attended the closing ceremony of the Asian Games there. But if there had actually been trouble in Pyongyang, the last thing one would have expected is for those officials to visit South Korea in such a manner. Meanwhile, one North Korean defector has been arguing for a long time that Kim has only been a figurehead and that real power in North Korea is wielded by officials in his party. The issue of just how much power Kim actually holds is an important one. The answer remains unclear to observers outside North Korea, and is a different issue from the stories about Kim's health and whether he had been overthrown.

Why did Kim suddenly reemerge?

The short answer is probably that his physical condition had improved enough. The photographs that North Korea media published on Monday show him walking with a cane but otherwise apparently in good health and in good spirits, and leading some of the same North Korean officials who recently visited South Korea, speculated by the media to be the ones who encouraged a coup.

Do you think that North Korea felt the need to show that Kim was still in charge after the media attention?

That too is speculation, but it is quite plausible. It is likely that Kim wanted to show not only the international community, but even more so, his own people that his physical condition is not serious. Ordinary North Koreans were of course not able to access international reports about Kim, but they knew that he was not appearing in their national media and presumably were wondering how he was.

But isn't it a problem for Kim to be seen in a weakened physical condition?

Kim's power and legitimacy in North Korea derive from the fact that his grandfather Kim Il Sung was the country's first leader, not from his physical condition or personal qualities. It’s no longer taboo in North Korea to show the top leader suffering from ailments. In fact, Kim's father Kim Jong Il was shown repeatedly looking extremely unwell after his stroke in 2008. Similarly, Kim Jong Un himself had already been shown in July and August on North Korean television suffering from the limp. In both cases, the North Korean media characterized the two Kims as hardworking leaders even when they were unwell. Moreover, as Yonsei University Professor John Delury has pointed out, actually showing Kim using a cane may be intentional because it makes him look a bit older and more mature.

What are we to make of the attention on Kim’s absence over the past several weeks?

I think it would be valuable if the international media would begin to apply better standards for its reporting on North Korea. North Korea poses important challenges to the international community, and citizens need to be informed about what's actually happening there, not what people imagine or those with ulterior motives would have us believe.

There is another, even more basic lesson to be drawn from this episode. With the rise of the Internet, information and misinformation have proliferated about North Korea, along with the ability to store and recall all of that information quickly. In addition, in popular imagination, the end of the Cold War transformed North Korea from an adjunct of the Soviet Union to an entity in itself, one that is both abhorrent and ridiculous. The result has been an exponential increase in the number of people throughout the world producing, circulating and consuming any information even remotely plausible about North Korea, and the established media in turn report on what those people are saying.

An increase in global attention to all things North Korea is important because it means North Korea can no longer hide itself from the international community. Already, this has contributed to the United Nation’s current consideration of legal action against the regime and its leaders over the human rights situation in the North. That is what North Korea’s leaders must have been worrying about over the past month as they watched the media reports—not Kim Jong Un’s bad leg.

Straub also spoke with Public Radio International (PRI) just before Kim’s reemergence, audio from “The World” radioshow is available on the PRI website.

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South Korean activists continue to send balloons into North Korea filled with leaflets that reportedly contain information that is critical of Kim Jong Un’s regime. The latest campaign coincided with the anniversary of the founding of the North’s ruling Worker’s Party. The Koreas exchanged gunfire over the incident in the first-ever North Korean attack after such a balloon launch.

“The possible benefits of sending such balloons into the North are far outweighed by giving North Korea a pretext to attack the South,” said David Straub, the associate of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), in an interview the Voice of America.

Straub’s commentary coincides with recommendations in “Tailored Engagement,” a policy report published in Sept. 2014 by Straub, Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC and Joyce Lee, research associate for the Korea Program, which argues for increased engagement with the North through a series of precise steps taken on behalf of the South Korean government. Among those steps, the scholars recommend the South Korean government should not permit balloon launches.

The full article can be found on the Voice of America online, and the policy report can be found on the Shorenstein APARC website.

Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center,  and David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, presented their new study "Tailored Engagement: Toward an Effective and Sustainable Inter-Korea Relations Policy" to a Washington, D.C. audience at the Brookings Institution on Sept. 29. The Voice of America wrote an article in Korean about the presentation, citing Shin saying, "Engagement is important and essential but it must be carefully tailored or fitted to changing political and security realities on and around the Peninsula." 

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University is pleased to announce its search for two 2015–16 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellows in Contemporary Asia. The award will be given to two junior scholars, who have completed their Ph.D. (with degree conferral and approval by August 31, 2015).

The primary focus of the fellowship is to conduct research and writing on contemporary political, economic or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast and South Asia), or topics related to international relations and international political economy.

The fellowship provides the postdoctoral fellows an opportunity to expand their dissertation, explore new topics and work alongside the Center’s distinguished scholars.

Postdoctoral fellows are required to be in residence at Stanford University for the duration of the appointment, and take part in Center activities throughout the academic year. Fellows are also required to present their research findings in seminars, and participate in the Center’s publication program.

The fellowship is a 10-month appointment with a salary rate of $50,000, plus $3,000 for research expenses. Appointments will begin in the fall quarter of the 2015–16 academic year.

The fellowship is made possible through the generosity of Walter H. Shorenstein, the benefactor for whom the Center is named.

Please access the fellowship posting for complete details and how to apply. The application deadline is December 19, 2014.

With tensions between Japan and South Korea continuing over historical and territorial issues, Beijing is more than willing to use the history card to woo Seoul. In a recent visit to South Korea, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that "in the first half of the 20th century, Japanese militarists carried out barbarous wars of aggression against China and South Korea, swallowing up Korea and occupying half of China." Earlier this year, China opened an elaborate memorial hall in Harbin to honor Ahn Jung-geun, who killed Hirobumi Ito, the first Japanese resident-general of Korea. To Koreans, Ahn is a national hero; to Japanese, a terrorist. Xi's visit to Seoul was to repay South Korean President Park Geun-hye's own visit to Beijing last year. Neither Park nor Xi has visited Tokyo yet.

China is apparently seeking to pull South Korea over to its side in its widening strategic competition with the United States and Japan. Xi's "charm offensive" toward Seoul is based on the calculation that South Korea's strategic value will only increase in coming years.

For South Korea, there are compelling reasons to improve relations with China. Ties had been strained by Park's predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, emphasizing South Korea's alliance with the U.S. She must take into account that China is becoming ever more important to South Korea's economy. (Apart from Taiwan, South Korea enjoys the world's largest merchandise trade surplus with China, approaching $100 billion). Park also wants China to support her North Korea policy focused on ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and preparing for unification. 

While China actively asserts its claim to leadership in Northeast Asia in courting South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems to deliberately ignore, if not dismiss, the importance of South Korea. Japanese policymakers argue, wrongly, that the Park government is "pro-China" and that Japan needs only to worry about China itself. Conservative Japanese media regularly bash the South Korean government and South Korea more broadly, and anti-Korean sentiments in Japan are on the rise.

Japanese focus is understandably on its alliance with the United States. But American policymakers openly worry that continuing tensions between its main allies in the region will undermine its strategic position regarding China and North Korea. President Barack Obama brought Abe and Park together in March on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit, but with little to show for it. The United States is also concerned that the Abe government's nontransparent dealings with North Korea on the abductee issue could further damage Japanese-South Korean relations and vitiate U.S. efforts to press Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.

Northeast Asia is in flux. With its economic and military power growing, China is seeking to regain the dominant position in the region that it ceded to Japan over a century ago. In the process of reshaping a regional order, the Korean Peninsula will again be very important. Already, two major wars occurred over Korea when old and new powers competed for hegemony -- the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.  It is crucial for both Japan and South Korea to maintain friendly relations with a rising China, but it is just as important that they improve their own bilateral relationship. Both have much to lose if the current trajectory in the region is not corrected. Moreover, Japan and South Korea have much in common, from their social and economic systems to democratic values, much more in fact than either has with China.

So, what should be done?  Above all, both Japan and South Korea must work much harder to resolve the issues that continue to arise out of their shared history of colonial rule and war. South Korea needs to move beyond victim consciousness, and Japan needs to show more farsighted political leadership. Specifically, Japan should unequivocally reaffirm the Kono Statement regarding the "comfort women" issue, and Abe should make it clear that he won't visit Yasukuni Shrine again during his tenure as prime minister.

The 1993 statement was a key marker on the history question for South Koreans; the recent review of it sent the wrong message to Koreans. Japanese leaders are certainly entitled to honor those who sacrificed their lives for their country, but paying tribute also to convicted war criminals is an entirely different matter -- not only in the eyes of South Koreans but also of the international community as a whole. For its part, Seoul should make clear how much it values good relations with Japan and state that it is ready to work with Tokyo in a constructive fashion to fully and finally resolve the remaining historical issues.

Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea. It should be an occasion to celebrate what that has meant for both countries -- regional peace and stability and economic prosperity. But even more importantly, both Tokyo and Seoul should also use the anniversary as a golden opportunity to develop a new vision for their relationship. The future of Northeast Asia will be brighter for all the countries in the region if its two major democracies show greater wisdom.

Gi-Wook Shin is a professor of sociology and director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University. Shin's article (with Daniel Sneider, the associate for resarch at Shorenstein APARC), "History Wars in Northeast Asia," appeared in Foreign Affairs (April 2014).

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on 17 Sept. and reposted with permission.

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University formally changed many of its program names in tandem with the website project led by our parent organization, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

In its 31^st year, Shorenstein APARC continues to expand its research agenda as the Asia-Pacific region sees dynamic change and greater global significance. The Center has six key programs that support vibrant research, training and outreach goals focused on developing a greater understanding of Asia and improvement of U.S.-Asia relations.

The programs include:

• Asia Health Policy Program: the Program promotes the comparative understanding of health and health policy in the Asia-Pacific region through research, seminars and collaboration with scholars at Stanford and across Asia.

• China Program: the Program is a university-wide initiative to facilitate multidisciplinary, social science-oriented on contemporary China, with an emphasis on basic and policy-oriented research.

• Corporate Affiliates Program: established in 1982, the Program introduces Asia-based fellows to American life and institutions. Shorenstein APARC hosts a class of fellows each year, and allows them to interact daily with scholars and students from Stanford and abroad while conducting research and auditing courses.

• Japan Program: the Program facilitates multidisciplinary, social science-oriented research on contemporary Japan through both academic scholarship and policy-relevant research.

• Korea Program: the Program focuses on multidisciplinary, policy-relevant projects on Korean Peninsula-related topics, and supports teaching and fellowships that encourages collaborative research.

• Southeast Asia Program: the Program explores the histories, cultures and international relations of Southeast Asia’s ten countries and over half a billion people.

Further information about the programs can be found on the Shorenstein APARC website.