FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.
FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.
Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.
Student Isabelle Foster asks Lieutenant Commander Daniel McShane about his time defending the DMZ as they stand on a platform overlooking North Korea. Photo by Nicole Feldman.
Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and of the Korea Program, regularly writes on Korean affairs for Korean audience. His recent articles in Munhwa Ilbo, a South Korean daily newspaper, are listed below. Note: these articles are written in Korean.
The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.
With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.
Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?
With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.
With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.
North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.
CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.
Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.
The Korea Program invites junior faculty, post-doctoral fellows, and graduate students to apply for travel awards to attend an upcoming two-day conference organized by the Korea Program at Stanford' Asia-Pacific Research Center. The workshop titled "Future Visions: Challanges and Possibilities of Korean Studies in North America" will be held on November 1st and 2nd, 2018 at Stanford University.
The awards will cover accepted applicants' lodging, domestic airfares, and/or ground transportation. To apply for the travel awards, please submit your CV and 2-page statement as a single file by July 15here.
About the conference:
“Future Visions: Challenges and Possibilities of Korean Studies in North America,” is designed to bring together leading scholars in the fields of language education, literature, history, social sciences, and library studies. Each panel will consist of three-four scholars who will be tasked with presenting a report on the state of the field. The purpose of the panels is to generate discussion around some of the following questions:
What are the research trends in each field?
What kinds of directions can we expect in the near future?
What are some of the disciplinary or other challenges in each field?
How does each field interact with related fields?
What are some of the limitations and possibilities around graduate student training?
How can faculty with graduate students cultivate supportive and critical scholarly communities?
How are junior faculty encouraged, and what institutional structures may offer better support?
Accepted applicants are expected to actively participate in discussion sessions and to engage in networking with other scholars during the 2-day conference.
The recent developments in North Korea's summit diplomacy and the feasibility of CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) of the nuclear program have received unprecedented responses, both optimistic and pessimistic, from the international community.
Please stay tuned to this page for APARC researchers' commentary and analysis on the CVID of the North Korean nuclear program through articles published in various news media.
Ambassador Kathleen Stephens shares reactions following the Trump-Kim summit, including her thoughts on President Trump's pledge to cancel military exercises on the Korean Peninsula (KQED's Forum, 06/12/18)
On April 27, 2018, the Shorenstein APARC Korea Program held a special public panel discussion following the dramatic summit that took place but hours earlier that day between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the village of Panmunjom. Titled “North Korea Summit Diplomacy: Round 2,” the panel featured Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. APARC fellow in the Korea Program and former ambassador to South Korea; Philip Yun, executive director and chief operating officer of Ploughshares Fund; and Yong Suk Lee, Korea Program deputy director, who moderated the discussion.
Same Movie, Different Actors?
Panelists admitted to feeling a sense of déjà vu. “We’re watching a replay of an old movie,” observed Professor Shin. “There are new actors, but will it be more than that?” They agreed, however, that the fact the summit happened at all was still a sign of progress. “It’s great that inter-Korean dialog is back after a decade of confrontation,” stated Professor Shin. “But is it really possible to achieve complete denuclearization?” he continued. “How far will the North go, and what will it get in return?”
Noting that similar optimism surrounded talks held by the Koreas in 2000—only for it to ultimately amount to little—the panel argued that a key difference between this summit and previous ones was the nature of the actors, particularly the North Korean representation.
“What has changed from past efforts?”, Shin asked the audience. “Kim Jong-un grew up; he was groomed to behave like a king, and we saw him [at the summit] acting like one.” Ambassador Stephens added that “Kim wants to present himself as a different kind of Korean leader, a respected leader of a normal state; the complete opposite style from his predecessors.”
Breaks from the past exist on the South Korean side as well. “This was a process driven by South Korea in a way we’ve never seen before,” said Stephens. “For South Koreans, it’s amazing to see that the leaders were not using interpreters, they were just speaking Korean; it underscores the nationalist issue underpinning this conflict, which the Americans need to be aware of.”
No seats at the Table
The U.S. administration’s reaction to the summit was swift, with President Trump tweeting both that the U.S. people should be proud and, perhaps more interestingly, praising President Xi of China for his support that has made the recent breakthrough possible.
However, Yun expressed concern about “Japan and China feel[ing] left out.” He noted that this might yet again prove to be another instance of a Kim dynasty member setting other actors against each other for North Korea’s benefit, and that regional actors have doubts about the American level of commitment. “I think the Japanese are afraid the United States is going to cut a deal on long range missiles and then go home.”
“What we’re going to see regionally is a competition or a battle for Trump’s word,” he continued. “Who can be the last person to talk and convince him that their perspective is the correct one.”
From left to right, Yong Suk Lee, Korea Program deputy director; Philip Yun, executive director and chief operating officer of Ploughshares Fund; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. APARC fellow in the Korea Program and former ambassador to South Korea; and Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC.
(From left to right, Yong Suk Lee, Korea Program deputy director; Philip Yun, executive director and chief operating officer of Ploughshares Fund; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. APARC fellow in the Korea Program and former ambassador to South Korea; and Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC.)
What Comes Next
Any optimism expressed by the panelists was further tempered with calls for patience on further progress. “Denuclearization of the North isn’t only difficult, it will take time,” said director Shin. “I want to be optimistic, but I must also be cautious.”
Additionally, change in the North will likely need to happen at a measured pace. “[I]n a place like the North, you can’t move from zero to 100,” said Yun.
Ambassador Stephens looked to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland as a hopeful precedence. While the sentiment of “we’ve tried this before” very much surrounded that process, it ultimately paved the opportunity for a final breakthrough, noted Stephens.
Time will only tell whether the summit is a true success or simply a repeat of the past. At the panel’s conclusion, Shin swapped out the earlier film analogy for one about sports. Comparing the recent diplomacy to a soccer game, Shin observed that “President Moon did a nice pass to Trump. But can Trump now score the goal?”
"Moon's proposal of a trilateral summit between the two Koreas and the United States, undermining China's influence, turned out to be nothing more than a pipe dream," said researchers at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in a recently published article. "The series of summits that began with Kim's visit to Beijing should lead to Four Party Talks — involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China."
The full article in The Diplomat is available here.
Hero Image
President Moon of South Korea meeting at Cheong Wa Dae with Mr. Kim Yong-nam of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea
Under the guidance of the Aspen Institute Congressional Program, thirteen members of Congress convened at Stanford University from March 2-5 to discuss policy options regarding the current North Korea crisis. The representatives deliberated with scholars and practitioners to acquire a better understanding of North Korea and its ruling regime, review the regional actors and their interests, assess the range of potential solutions to the crisis, and determine the role of Congress on this issue.
A report summarizing the program’s dialogue is now available for download. In addition to providing non-attributed comments from the proceedings, the document also includes the itinerary for the three days, the names of participants, as well as a collection of relevant publications.
The Aspen Institute Congressional Program was established in 1983 by former U.S. Senator Dick Clark. The program is for members of the United States Congress, and is both nongovernmental and nonpartisan in design. The program gives senators and representatives the opportunity to delve into complex and critical public policy issues with internationally recognized experts. Lawmakers are given the opportunity to explore policy alternatives in off-the-record settings, while simultaneously building relationships crucial to finding solutions.
“…factually Japan has made many apologies; but many Koreans and Chinese at the same time feel that those apologies have not been sincere. So there’s a gap between facts and interpretations or public sentiments.”
Twenty years after the Kim-Obuchi summit raised hopes for “a new Japan-Korea partnership for the 21st century”, the Carnegie Endowment for Internatonal Peace gathered diplomats and scholars, including APARC Director Gi-Wook ShIn, for reflection on what polices and initiatives have succeeded or failed since 1998 and why.
FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
From left to right, Yong Suk Lee, Korea Program deputy director; Philip Yun, executive director and chief operating officer of Ploughshares Fund; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. APARC fellow in the Korea Program and former ambassador to South Korea; and Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC.
