The United States remains a leader in the global economy, yet over the past decade, it has taken a sharp turn away from its traditional support of free, rules-based trade. Since 2016, Washington has withdrawn from international trade agreements it once championed, opting for a more unilateral approach and pivoting from many of the obligations and norms it had shaped and insisted others honor to make trade fair, equitable, and mutually beneficial. How did the United States arrive here, and what steps should it take to leverage its strengths in the global trade system moving forward?

APARC visiting scholar Michael Beeman addresses these questions in his new book Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (published by APARC, distributed by Stanford University Press). As a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, Beeman brings an insider’s perspective to the recent transformation of U.S. trade policy. He provides a timely analysis of the forces driving this shift, examines its implications for America’s role in the global economy, and offers prescriptions for a robust U.S. trade policy that still serves American interests while allowing for compromise among competing ones.

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Beeman joined APARC Communications Manager Michael Breger to discuss his new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. You can also download a transcript of the conversation.

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A Departure From the Norm

In Beeman's analysis, the tactic of "walking out" as a means to renegotiate international agreements reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. trade policy, marked by a rejection of established conditions, obligations, and norms that had previously facilitated global trade and reduced conflict. This shift has had significant repercussions, as Washington has increasingly distanced itself from the principles it once championed, such as non-discrimination, transparency, openness, and reciprocity in trade. The change represents more than the inability to agree to a specific trade deal. According to Beeman, it is a rejection of Washington's long-held principles in pursuit of new goals.

Beeman attributes the collapse of the decades-long bipartisan consensus supporting free trade to a domestic political climate, where “the emergence of America’s zero-sum-centered politics [is] the new, defining feature of its political system.” In this new system, trade is viewed not as mutually beneficial but as a competition for limited resources. This transformation began gaining traction during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which galvanized new political movements, like the Tea Party and the so-called New Right, that simultaneously criticized free trade agreements.

Acknowledging the effects of domestic politics on trade policy, Beeman explores how the current political landscape, marked by extreme division, shapes trade decisions and reflects broader societal tensions. The author draws parallels between historical trade policy and the contemporary environment, noting that just as the 1930s saw dramatic swings in U.S. tariff policies, today’s new political geometry is “forged from extreme new levels of domestic political division [...] On trade, it is a geometry of acute angles and no longer one of curves and tangents.”

This political backdrop has resulted in an increasingly politicized trade policy that hampers efforts to find consensus. Beeman emphasizes that the transformation of U.S. trade policy is not merely a reflection of external pressures but a byproduct of internal political dynamics that redefine the goals and assumptions underpinning U.S. trade strategy.

Trade Policy Tensions
 

Among the many trade agreements that the U.S. has recently abandoned was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). According to Beeman, internal divisions regarding the TPP's stringent rules and demands — especially concerning auto manufacturing — highlighted a rift between America's expectations of its trading partners and its willingness to accept compromise.

Various rules and regulations dictated by the TPP stoked domestic contention and “had scrambled the usual pathways to achieve the vote margins needed for these agreements. [They] also revealed the sharp new tension between what America expected and wanted from others and what it was willing to agree upon and accept for itself.” The Biden administration's decision to abandon its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) trade agreement in late 2023 further illustrated ongoing tensions in U.S. trade policy, underscoring a lack of coherent strategy following the TPP's collapse.

The book explores how the Trump and Biden Administrations have grappled with the contradictions in their trade policies. While Robert Lighthizer, the former trade representative under Trump, embraced a confrontational approach, Beeman criticizes the fallout from these decisions, arguing they often left established commitments unfulfilled and damaged international relationships. But Beeman also maintains that the Biden Administration's attempts to repair and redefine trade relationships have resulted in a series of inconsistent policies, reflecting internal domestic tensions yet to be resolved.

“As a set of social values and domestic priorities in search of a means to express themselves through America’s external trade policies, [the Biden] Administration attempted to explain its approach in ways that often only raised contradictory distinctions.” Once these “became harder to explain and justify, [it] began developing what amounted to a new theory of global trade disorder and dysfunction in an attempt to more convincingly frame its decisions.”

According to Beeman, disruptions from Covid-19 were a “helpful backdrop,” but, he argues, “if set against the vastly more immense challenges of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when America made an intentional policy choice to work with other countries to commit to open, rules-based trade to lead the world out of crisis, the problems of 2020-21 were challenges that policymakers from that time undoubtedly would have preferred.”

Barriers to Progress
 

The current political landscape has made it challenging for Congress to reach a consensus on trade issues. The failure to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provided tariff relief to developing countries, exemplifies the paralysis in U.S. trade policy. Beeman remarks upon how, “after the bipartisan mainstream that advanced open and freer trade […] was swept away by America’s New Right and progressive Left, their shared interest in adding new and ever more conditions to America’s imports was insufficient to overcome their sharp disagreements over which conditions to add.” For Beeman, the inability to agree on new conditions for trade reflects broader ideological divides that hinder progress.

Ultimately, Beeman warns that America’s zero-sum approach to trade may lead to a cycle of self-inflicted isolation. He argues that this shift is not solely a reaction to China’s rise but represents a deeper ideological rift in American politics. “International trade adds a foreign, or external, dimension to zero-sum thinking that has facilitated a surprising degree of alignment between the New Right and the progressive Left,” he writes, specifically the “zero-sum belief that America is made worse off by freer trade, which benefits ‘them.’” Such an alignment has created an environment where bipartisan support for trade agreements has eroded, complicating efforts to establish a coherent and effective trade policy moving forward.

An essential read for anyone interested in the international political economy of trade and the future of America’s role in the global economy, “Walking Out” highlights the urgent need for the United States to reconcile its domestic divides to reestablish its role in the global economy. The current trajectory, characterized by a rejection of its foundational principles, risks fostering new conflicts with allies and adversaries alike, contradicting the original goals of the international trading system.

Since its formation in 1989, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has functioned as a platform for economic engagement and cooperation across the Pacific Rim. The forum, which expanded to include 21 member economies, emerged following the success of other regional trade blocs, aiming to draw upon the increasing level of interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies to make progress on multiple member-defined priorities. Traditionally trade-focused, APEC has expanded its cooperation to other areas such as human resources, marine conservation, and public health.

On October 6, 2023, Shorenstein APARC kicked off its fall 2023 seminar series, Exploring APEC’s Role in Facilitating Regional Cooperation, to accompany APEC’s upcoming convening in San Francisco on the week of November 12. Meetings between the member economies will cover trade, innovation and digitalization, energy, and other related issues, with a special emphasis on fostering sustainable economic growth and prosperity across the region.

The first event in the series, APEC’s Role in the Evolving Asia-Pacific Order, featured panelists Aida Safinaz Allias, the minister for economic affairs at the Embassy of Malaysia to the United States and a former APEC senior official for Malaysia; Ambassador Kurt Tong, a managing partner at The Asia Group, former U.S. Ambassador for APEC, and former U.S. consul general and chief of mission in Hong Kong and Macau; and moderator Michael Beeman, a visiting scholar at APARC and former assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

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Beeman opened the session by acknowledging that “these are very complicated and often tense times in the Asia-Pacific region.” APEC has been charged with being a facilitator for economic cooperation in the region and “current challenges in the region have impacted and, in many ways, limited the ambition that APEC held at its inception,” said Beeman.

Beeman recognized that there are many who question the value of multilateral groupings like APEC, but said that “APEC is in its 34th year and the level of activity and work in APEC going on under the surface is as high as it's ever been…although it has faded from public attention, it is still valued by its members and there are hundreds of meetings going on every year in APEC, with thousands of participants joining.”

Throughout the session, participants examined the extent to which APEC still has value in the region, can still shape the region and its future, and whether APEC is “worse for wear.” The panelists investigated the degree to which the forum remains a flexible way of maintaining cohesion on economic cooperation and setting an agenda while promoting ongoing engagement “under the surface.” For Beeman, APEC still maintains its usefulness because of its flexibility, and “in many ways, APEC has bent but not broken, which is an important attribute in this day and time, and it may be more valuable today in the current environment.”

Speaking from her experience as a former APEC official, Aida Safinaz Allias outlined the relevance of APEC over the years and its distinct mechanisms that separate it from other multilateral groupings. Allias discussed the unique elements of APEC’s mission and its voluntary, non-binding, and consensus-building principles.

Allias referenced the three pillars of APEC's agenda: Trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. “APEC’s three pillars are very important for a country like Malaysia because it balances out things like liberalizing trade and investment, but it also builds [Malaysia’s] capacity to work out its own issues further…It's not just liberalizing the digital regime but upgrading skills and infrastructure in many parts of the Pacific.”

In 2020, during the height of the COVID pandemic, Malaysia hosted APEC and members agreed upon the tenets of a new 20-year plan, Putrajaya Vision 2040. Allias outlined the initiative to establish an open, dynamic, resilient, and peaceful Asia-Pacific community by 2040. The Vision is predicated upon the goals of driving trade and investment to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains a dynamic and interconnected regional economy driven by innovation and digitalization to empower people and businesses and promote sustainable and inclusive growth to increase resilience to shocks, crises, and pandemics.

Ambassador Kurt Tong further elaborated on some of the prevailing challenges facing APEC member economies and forecasted that such challenges would dominate the upcoming forum discussions in San Francisco. First and foremost, according to Tong, is the issue of global supply chain resilience, which “is not really a liberalization issue but rather an information issue.” Tong questioned whether solutions to global supply chain interruptions might be found and made useful through coordination between economies at the upcoming APEC convenings.

Tong also listed green growth as a top priority for member nations and asked, “Can APEC capture the desire of every economy to have less of an environmental impact while still growing rapidly?” He indicated that the primary impediment to energy transformation is the question of “who's going to pay for it, and can APEC make a contribution?” Tong listed other pressing issues including the mobility of people between economies, educational coordination, and cooperation between economies in the digital age.

The participants agreed that APEC still has an important role to play in bridging the divide between different constituent groups in the Asia-Pacific and directing economic policy that may lead to genuine public-private cooperation across boundaries, not just within economies but across economies. For Ambassador Tong, “APEC is well organized to accomplish that kind of discussion… [which is] very important if you want to try and drive things forward.”

This essay originally appeared in Korean on October 27 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

How should Korea navigate this turbulent landscape? For some time, experts and policymakers called for relying on the United States for security while partnering with China for the economy (an-mi-gyeong-joong). This paradigm is now obsolete.[4] The Yoon administration has proclaimed a values-based foreign policy to strengthen solidarity between liberal democracies. In his opening statement at the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh on November 11, President Yoon reiterated Korea’s support for “strengthening a rule-based international order built on universal values” to foster “freedom, peace, and prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific.[5]

Will this approach be sufficient, however? Conflicting trends in Korea’s domestic public opinion complicate the picture. On the one hand, anti-China sentiment is worsening by the day, even surpassing anti-Japan sentiment. At the same time, there are also growing complaints about the United States, especially after the exclusion of consumer tax credits for Korea’s electric vehicles in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Taking these developments into account, this essay seeks to explore the path ahead for Korea by analyzing the nature of U.S.-China tensions and assessing the durability of Pax Americana.

Heading into Thucydides Trap?

U.S.-China relations are widely characterized as “Thucydides Trap.” The Peloponnesian War is regarded as one of the main reasons behind the decline of ancient Greek civilization. Thucydides, an Athenian general and historian, famously wrote that the fundamental cause of this war was due to Spartan fears over the growth of Athenian power. Drawing from Thucydides, international relations theorists have used the concept of a Thucydides Trap to explain tensions between a rising power and a status quo hegemon. Graham Allison, a professor of political science at Harvard, popularized this concept by applying it to Sino-U.S. relations in Destined for War. Beginning from the clash between Portugal and Spain in the late 15th century, Allison notes that there have been 16 instances where an emerging power challenged the hegemonic power. There was a war in all but four cases. When an emerging power is strong enough to challenge the hegemon, this creates structural stresses that frequently lead to a violent conflict.

Based on his analysis of the historical record, Allison warns that the rift between the United States (America First) and China (the Chinese dream) is much wider and deeper than most people perceive it to be. There is now a heightened risk of an armed confrontation between the two countries over Taiwan. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a catastrophic hegemonic war still remains low. Instead, there is likely to be a prolonged conflict and competition between Washington and Beijing centered on advanced technologies.

Made in China 2025 and the Chinese Dream

The U.S.-China trade war began under the Trump administration. Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), a policy roadmap published by the Chinese government in 2015, drew the attention of the United States and other Western countries. In its opening paragraph, it states that “building an internationally competitive manufacturing industry is the only way China can enhance its comprehensive national strength, ensure national security, and build itself into a world power.”[6]

From the emphasis on “the only way,” it is clear that MIC 2025 is not just an industrial policy. It is an integral element of China’s national security strategy. Under this plan, China seeks to achieve progress in advanced manufacturing technologies such as big data, information technology, aerospace, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. The goal is to become the world’s leading manufacturing power by surpassing the United States.

After MIC 2025 sparked controversy in the West, the Chinese government has refrained from referring to it in public. Nonetheless, it has continued to implement this policy in practice. At the 2021 Lianghui, the concurrent annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political and Consultative Conference, the Chinese government strengthened its resolve to reduce its dependence on U.S.-led global value chains as it sought to develop advanced technologies. Specifically, it emphasized the economic policy of dual circulation, which aims to raise domestic consumption while expanding exports of high value-added goods to foreign markets.

The advanced technologies that China is focusing on have potential military applications. For example, drones, artificial intelligence, and facial recognition technology can be used for reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles. China is pursuing military-civil fusion through the Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee, chaired by President Xi. This indicates that Xi intends to personally oversee China’s ambitious efforts to challenge the United States. At this year’s Lianghui, Xi stressed that China is in a strategically advantageous position in its deepening competition with the United States. Furthermore, he unveiled a plan to achieve his “dream of a strong military” by modernizing China’s armed forces through mechanization and the use of advanced information technology. Despite a slowdown in China’s economy, Xi increased defense spending by 7.1 percent.[7]

Those who analyze Xi Jinping’s character classify him as an ideological purist, a true believer of socialism. He sees a historic opportunity for China to become a global superpower, and believes that it is his calling to realize socialism in the 21st century. Unlike his predecessors, he does not shy away from conflict with the United States. In a September 30, 2022, essay in Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leading theoretical journal, Xi stated that “today, we have never been so close to achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we have never been more confident in our faith and ability to achieve this goal.”[8] Only two weeks before the CCP’s 20th party congress, where he would secure a third term as general secretary, Xi stressed the need for strong leadership to prepare for the intensifying competition with the United States.

Under Xi’s leadership, the CCP is driven by the zeitgeist of the Chinese dream, of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The goal is to make the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the most powerful economic and military power in the world. The emphasis on achieving this goal by 2049 is no coincidence, as it will mark the centennial of the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War, where it defeated the Kuomintang and established the PRC. This timeline also aligns with Xi’s vision of building an advanced socialist country by 2050, which he proclaimed at the 19th National Congress of the CCP. China has a truly ambitious vision, one that leaves the United States no choice but to respond.

From America First to Made in America

When Donald Trump proclaimed “America First” as his slogan in his bid for the White House, his primary target was China. He blamed China for the loss of American jobs, claiming that the United States was suffering greatly from China’s unfair trade practices and interference in markets. This message bolstered his support among white blue-collar workers in the Rust Belt, as they had witnessed a dramatic decline in manufacturing jobs. This enabled him to win key swing states in the Midwest, leading to his victory in the 2016 election.

Upon entering office, Trump consistently maintained a hardline policy against China. For example, the “Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2020” passed the House 413–3 and cleared the Senate on March 6, 2020. The intent of this law was to create a “whole-of-government approach” to protect America’s telecommunications networks from national security threats posed by Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE, which played a major role in the rollout of 5G networks across the world.[9] His administration increased government oversight of Chinese investment in or acquisition of U.S. tech companies and scrutinized partnerships between American universities and Chinese entities. It tightened visa review procedures for students and visiting scholars from the PRC. It also designated Confucius Institutes in the United States as a “foreign mission” that “[advances] Beijing’s global propaganda and malign influence campaign on U.S. campuses and K-12 classrooms.”[10] All of these measures stemmed from a recognition that China was rapidly closing in on the United States. The National Intelligence Council estimates that if current trends continue, China will surpass the United States to become the world’s largest economy between 2030 and 2035.

The American public’s view of China has continued to deteriorate after Trump left office. According to Pew Research, 47% of respondents held a negative view of China in 2018. This surged to 60% in 2019 and 82% in 2022.[11] Despite a transfer of power to the Democrats in 2020, the overall orientation of U.S. policy toward China has remained unchanged. Under the banner of “Made in America,” the Biden administration has carefully crafted a dense web of policies aimed at China.

In the past three months alone, there have been a raft of legislative and executive measures that encompass semiconductors, electric cars and batteries, and biotechnology. This includes the CHIPS and Science Act (August 9), the IRA (August 16), and an Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation (September 12). These steps are intended to check China’s rise and promote the growth of America’s advanced technology and clean energy sectors. The CHIPS and Science Act sets aside $52.7 billion dollars for America’s semiconductor industry.[12] Companies that receive subsidies under this law are barred from expanding operations or otherwise investing in China for the purpose of manufacturing advanced semiconductors.[13] As noted below, certain provisions of the IRA will also have significant ramifications for Korea’s exports of electric cars to the U.S. market.

As it undertakes a series of legislative steps at home, the Biden administration has pursued multilateralism abroad. This is a key difference from Trump, who preferred bilateral arrangements. The Biden administration is seeking to institutionalize economic and technological alliances through initiatives such as IPEF and the Chip 4 alliance, and it is encouraging Korea and other allies to participate. By stressing intellectual property rights and China’s unfair economic practices, strengthening its own technological capabilities, and reinforcing relevant international norms, Washington is compelling Beijing to operate within a U.S.-led international order. Even in Silicon Valley, where anti-China sentiment is not as deeply rooted as it is in Washington, there are serious concerns about the risk of Chinese industrial espionage and intellectual property theft. There is a palpable hesitation among start-ups to accept funding from Chinese investors. Chinese investment in America increased throughout the 2000s until reaching a peak of $46 billion in 2016. This plummeted by almost 90% to $5 billion in 2018, due in part to political tensions.[14]

Will Pax Americana Endure?

Since the beginning of Pax Americana in 1945, there have been three challenges to America’s status as a global hegemon: by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Japan in the 1980s, and China in the present day. The Soviet Union engaged in a tense military confrontation with the United States for decades, but collapsed in the late 1980s due to the limitations and internal contradictions of its communist system. Japan once threatened to displace America from the apex of the global capitalist order, but lapsed into the “Lost Two Decades” after its economic bubble burst in the early 1990s. What can we say about the future of China, which is engaging in fierce competition against the United States? In short, I believe that China will not surpass the United States in our time.

Those who predict that China will eclipse the United States point to economic trends. China surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second-largest economy. It also became the world’s largest exporter in 2014, when its gross domestic product exceeded 60% of U.S. GDP. In purchasing power parity terms, China has already leapfrogged the United States. Both present-day statistics and long-term economic trends point in one direction. If the Chinese government makes a concerted effort to invest in key strategic industries, as outlined in MIC 2025, it is certainly feasible for China to surpass the United States to become the world’s leading manufacturing power by 2049.

However, China still lags far behind the United States in many areas, including military power. In absolute terms, for example, its defense spending is only one-third of what the United States spends on its military. There are also a host of political, social, demographic, and economic challenges that hamper China in its campaign to attain global supremacy.[15] Xi’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign is an indication of widespread corruption in Chinese society. There are also serious human rights issues in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the three Ts of Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen cannot be openly discussed. China’s problems extend beyond its borders. With a land border of nearly 14,000 miles with 14 countries, managing territorial disputes is a tall order. There are also tensions with its maritime neighbors in the South China Sea. China’s efforts at public diplomacy have been unsuccessful, as can be seen from the widespread rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea and other countries.

Amidst these challenges, Xi Jinping secured a third term as president at the 20th party congress on October 16. Since Deng Xiaoping, China has managed leadership transitions in a relatively stable fashion. Under a system of collective leadership, the leader served two five-year terms and appointed his successor in advance. These practices created a certain degree of predictability, stability, and transparency, thereby facilitating  China’s dramatic economic growth and making it powerful enough to compete with the United States. Xi Jinping has sharply broken from this tradition as he seeks to become a 21st-century emperor.

Some argue that China is destined to become an imperial power. However, it will be difficult for a fast follower such as China to build an empire. In general, a country must be a first mover or trendsetter to become a hegemonic power. For example, in the corporate sector, Xiaomi may catch up to Samsung, but can it replace Apple? Tech companies such as Alibaba and Baidu have achieved rapid growth thanks to a sizable domestic market, but they have emulated the business models of Amazon and Google. They have not created a new, transformative platform. China’s growth was enabled in no small part by talented individuals who studied abroad and then returned home to apply their experiences and insights. As China closes its doors to the outside world, it is also limiting its potential to become a leader in innovation.

Furthermore, China is failing to serve as a role model for other countries. Except for a few countries in Africa and Asia, the Belt and Road Initiative has yet to yield meaningful results. If anything, anti-China sentiment is deepening across Europe, North America, and Asia. While the Soviet Union had the communist bloc, China lacks a reliable group of allies. China has indeed achieved remarkable growth in the past 30 years, presenting lucrative economic opportunities for individuals and companies in China and abroad. However, talented individuals across the world would arguably prefer to study, work, and live in the United States than in China. Japan’s postwar growth inspired a “Japan boom,” a desire to study and emulate Japan. There is no comparable “China boom” to speak of.

Rich Mandarins

The Palo Alto area, where I have lived and worked for over two decades, has some of the highest housing prices in the United States. A small condo, which is equivalent to an apartment unit in Korea, costs over $1 million. Since I moved to Stanford in 2001, the Bay Area has seen three significant surges in housing prices. The first two waves resulted from a sudden increase in wealth among young tech workers when Google and Facebook went public. On the other hand, the third surge is said to be related to Chinese residents. Locals call these individuals, who purchase high-end housing in cash, “rich mandarins.”

This group includes company founders and investment professionals, as well as entrepreneurs who have listed their companies on New York’s Stock Exchange. They are mostly in their 50s, and they played a critical role in China’s economic growth through their contributions to the IT sector. Although they have amassed an enormous amount of wealth, they are anxious about China’s prospects and the country’s uncertain political future. They are also worried that the government could seize their companies or their individual property. Their families have already moved to America, and they conduct business by shuttling between China and the United States. Some have left China in search of a new life and career.

As long as those who have attained success in China eventually end up in the United States, China cannot become the world’s leading superpower. These individuals are voting with their feet. Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University has said that “the day the U.S. truly declines is when visa lines in front of its consulates are no longer crowded.”[16] There is pessimism even among China’s economic elite about the country’s future, especially as Xi Jinping further tightens political control under a one-man dictatorship.

For China to surpass the United States and lead the international order, we should see the opposite. Instead of China’s elites rushing toward the United States, there should be an outflow of American elites to China. Only then can we truly speak of a Pax Sinica. In addition, countries across the world should seek to emulate the Chinese model, not the American model. Based on my own knowledge and experience, I am convinced that the likelihood of such trends emerging in the next 20 or 30 years is vanishingly small. It is thus realistic and reasonable to expect Pax Americana to continue into the next generation, with clear implications for Korea’s foreign policy going forward.

An Empire of Liberty

The United States is a hegemonic power that wields unparalleled influence across the world. It exercises its economic and military power to uphold its political, military, and cultural dominance. Institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are critical elements of Pax Americana, as are programs such as the Peace Corps and Fulbright Scholarships. During the War on Terror, the United States sacrificed many lives and trillions of dollars in prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the past 100 years, the United States took part in 35 wars, large and small.It will likely be recorded as the country that has participated in the most armed conflicts. Pax Americana appears to be much more robust than Pax Romana or Pax Britannica.

For these reasons, Korea’s progressives criticize American imperialism and advocate for cultivating closer ties with China. We should ask, however, whether a Pax Sinica would be preferable to Pax Americana.

Compared to that of the Soviet Union or present-day China, America’s empire is far more sophisticated. History also tells us so. Although the United States is criticized at times for failing to live up to its proclaimed values, it has shown the strongest commitment to democracy and human rights of any superpower. In an ideal world, the international order would be built solely on sovereign equality. However, any superpower will seek to construct its preferred international order and defend it using various levers of power, including the use of force. To maintain its global hegemony, the United States has effectively deployed a mixture of hard power, soft power, and smart power.

Based on historical experience and a critical analysis of the current state of the world, it would be dangerous to presuppose that Pax Sinica will displace Pax Americana anytime soon. From Korea’s standpoint, it would be unwise to call for strategic ambiguity or for maintaining an equidistant posture between the United States and China. As previously noted, the paradigm of an-mi-gyeong-joong is no longer viable.[17] The Yoon administration’s clear articulation of its intent to build a values-based alliance with the United States and other liberal democracies is commendable. In fact, there are only a handful of countries other than Korea—Israel, Canada, and Australia—that have both a defense treaty and a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Korea must foster relationships with these countries, which are a valuable diplomatic asset.

At the same time, it would be imprudent to focus only on abstract values and neglect vital economic or security interests. Let us consider a recent example. Korea’s leading conglomerates—including Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor Group, and SK—have pledged to invest $26 billion in the United States this year alone. However, the recently passed IRA only provides consumer tax credits to electric vehicles manufactured in North America. There is deep disappointment and anger in Korea, as this creates a significant disadvantage for Korea’s auto companies. To put it bluntly, Korea’s companies are paying the cost of the Korean government’s failure to address stark economic realities.

If the Yoon administration indeed seeks to reduce Korea’s economic dependence on China, it should have a roadmap to strengthen economic ties with the United States while protecting Korea’s own interests. As the United States brings economic security to the forefront, Korea should devise a strategy to avoid repeating the same mistake. Furthermore, even if Korea partners with the United States in advanced technologies that affect national security, it can still maintain economic relations with China in other sectors, including retail, consumer goods, and manufacturing. For values-based diplomacy to be successful, it must be upheld by interest-based diplomacy.

In Search of a Non-Partisan Foreign Policy

In this context, it is worth closely examining two recently published columns regarding the IRA controversy. The first is an op-ed entitled “Yoon Has Been Played by the United States” (September 20) by Park Hyeon, a senior columnist at the progressive Hankyoreh. The second is an op-ed entitled “The IRA Undermines Trust in the Alliance” (September 26) by Lee Mi-Sook, a well-known conservative commentator, in the Munhwa Ilbo.[18] As former Washington correspondents, Park and Lee both have firsthand knowledge of America’s inner workings. Park’s column focuses on criticizing the Yoon administration, while Lee’s piece expresses concern about a weakened U.S.-Korea alliance. Nevertheless, they both show that U.S. policies aimed at China could spark anti-American sentiment in Korea.

Park writes that “the United States, under the banner of economic security, is tying its allies and friendly countries into a U.S.-led economic bloc, weakening China—the hegemonic challenger—while seeking a revival of its domestic manufacturing industry.” He begins from the premise that “this kind of protectionism is harmful for open, export-driven economies such as Korea.” With full knowledge of this state of affairs, Hyundai Motor Group pledged to invest more than $10 billion in the United States, expecting its cars to be granted subsidies in return. Instead, it was given the cold shoulder. Park adds that “the Presidential Office fell into disarray” and missed a golden opportunity to raise these concerns with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who visited Korea shortly after the final text of the IRA was released on July 27. This failure is characteristic of Yoon’s foreign policy, Park concludes.

In her column, Lee writes that “the IRA could once again imperil the U.S.-Korea alliance, which faced a serious crisis under the Trump administration.” She goes on to say that “the exclusion of Korean electric vehicles from subsidies, despite the ‘national treatment’ clause in the Korea-U.S. FTA, is raising suspicions about an underlying lack of concern for Korea in the United States.” Moreover, she adds that “there are signs this dispute over subsidies could turn into something far worse—a question of hurt national pride.” She warns that “if America fails to show flexibility and sticks to the original provision of the IRA, this will not only erode Koreans’ trust in the alliance, but also provide political fodder for progressives (former pro-democracy activists) to stoke anti-Americanism.” In closing, Lee calls upon the United States “to consider Korea’s view of the situation and act in a way that honors the spirit of the U.S.-Korea alliance.”

As these op-eds indicate, both progressives and conservatives are openly expressing their concern about the United States’ failure to show adequate concern for Korea. It is commendable for the Yoon administration to focus on strengthening the U.S.-Korea alliance and building solidarity around shared values, but it must also call on Washington to reciprocate Seoul’s efforts. For instance, as Lee Mi-Sook notes in her column, Korea could suggest an amendment to the IRA to apply subsidies to electric vehicles produced in countries that have an FTA with the United States. Policy missteps could lead to a resurgence of anti-American sentiment in Korea, putting the Yoon administration in a political quagmire. The controversy over the IRA may be the first of many such issues, especially if the Biden administration intensifies its “Made in America” policy.

To overcome the unforgiving realities of Korea’s foreign policy environment, the Yoon administration must be able to rely on a robust domestic consensus and strong popular support. Foreign policy requires a high level of expertise. Some issues have to be resolved behind the scenes, with experts and government officials playing a leading role. That said, foreign policy should not be left entirely in the hands of policy elites, and it should not be a partisan political football. On several occasions, minor incidents during President Yoon’s recent overseas visits received undue attention in the press and became the subject of ridicule back home. This is entirely unnecessary. For example, take the controversy surrounding a hot mic moment during a visit to New York in September.[19] Looking from the outside in, it is difficult to understand why the whole country became engulfed in a bitter partisan debate about a trivial gaffe. Little attention was paid to the substance of the visit.

It is vital to establish a norm whereby important foreign policy issues are addressed in a non-ideological, non-partisan manner that garners broad public support. To do so, the Korean government must increase transparency in its decision-making process when it comes to major issues. It must also endeavor to gather and incorporate public opinion in foreign policy, so that the public does not feel unduly detached from the policymaking process. Governments across the world now recognize domestic public opinion as a critical element of their foreign policy strategy. Diplomacy cannot be effective without public support. Korea’s diplomats, who are in the trenches of international diplomacy, need all the support they can get.

There is no telling when Korea might be battered by a perfect storm in its foreign policy, given the current state of U.S.-China relations. As Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warn in Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, the race between the United States and China may end up being a sprint, not a marathon. This decade may be the most dangerous period in U.S.-China relations. In the early 20th century, Korea lost its sovereignty after failing to establish a coherent foreign policy, with different factions supporting China, Russia, and Japan. Upon liberation in 1945, extreme ideological confrontation split the peninsula in two. Korea cannot afford to make the same mistake again.