This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.

For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.

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South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

Countries are in a high-stakes competition to develop AI talent and respond to the technology's transformative impact on labor markets and economic growth. As the race intensifies, a critical question looms large: What talent development strategies deliver proven outcomes?

In a recent book published by Stanford University Press, The Four Talent Giants, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, examines how countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world. Shin, who is also the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), explores how four vastly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – rose to economic prominence by pursuing distinct human resource development strategies, encompassing different approaches to education, migration, and transnational talent mobility.

The study provides a framework that extends beyond the four cases, offering policy lessons for other economies, particularly less developed nations. Below are four insights from the book on the evolution of talent strategies and why countries need to construct multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – to address new risks and capitalize on emerging opportunities.

1. Look for variation in mobilizing human resources for development

Several Asia-Pacific countries now rank among the world’s largest economies – a marked shift from the 1980s, when Japan was the only regional economy near the top. Shin cautions against interpreting this rise of Asia-Pacific nations as evidence of a single developmental regional “recipe.” Instead, his work shows that similar economic outcomes emerged from different national paths, shaped by distinct histories of colonial rule, nationalism, state-building, and higher education policy.

Rather than isolating one driver of growth, the analysis highlights how states structured education systems, migration pathways, and global connections to talent in ways that reflected domestic priorities and constraints.

2. Talent includes social capital, not just skills or credentials

Shin defines talent broadly as both human capital and social capital. In a transnational era, the value of talent lies not only in technical expertise but also in the networks, relationships, and institutional ties that connect individuals across borders.

This insight underpins a four-part framework for national talent strategies: brain train (developing domestic talent), brain gain (attracting foreign talent), brain linkage (maintaining ties with citizens and students abroad), and brain circulation (sending talent out and facilitating return). Successful countries rarely rely on a single approach; instead, they combine these strategies in different proportions over time.

3. Talent strategies must be diversified and rebalanced over time

A central contribution of Shin’s book is a framework he calls Talent Portfolio Theory, which likens national talent strategies to investment portfolios. Just as investors diversify assets and rebalance them as conditions change, states must continually adjust how they train, attract, and retain talent in response to economic shifts.

Japan’s experience illustrates both the strengths and limits of a concentrated strategy. Its post-WWII success rested on a robust domestic training system spanning universities, vocational schools, and workplace education. Nevertheless, as the global knowledge economy evolved in the 1990s, Japan struggled to adapt, facing demographic decline and hampered by institutional introspection. Only in the 2010s did Japanese policymakers begin to diversify talent development through study-abroad programs, attracting international students, and implementing limited immigration reforms.

Australia followed a contrasting path, relying heavily on foreign talent through skilled migration and international education. Its system emphasized work-migration pathways and relatively easy naturalization for international students, while more recent policies have focused on sustaining global alumni and diaspora networks. Each model carries risks, but together they demonstrate why diversification and timely rebalancing matter.

4. Political leadership and state policy shape talent outcomes

Across cases, Shin argues that talent strategies are not purely organic market outcomes. Political leadership and state capacity play decisive roles in shaping higher education systems and migration policy. China’s post-reform experience demonstrates how state-led overseas training and return programs helped address the loss of scientific expertise after the Cultural Revolution. Over time, China shifted from emphasizing the return of Chinese nationals to the country toward building broader transnational linkage and circulation mechanisms.

India offers a different model, where long-standing patterns of outward migration produced a global diaspora that functions as a form of “brain deposit.” Alumni of Indian Institutes of Technology and other elite institutions now serve as transnational bridges connecting India to Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs.

For developing countries, Shin offers a counterintuitive lesson: initial brain drain is often unavoidable and can be productive if governments invest in long-term linkage and circulation rather than restricting mobility. To the United States and other nations grappling with anti-immigration politics, Shin’s message is that erecting barriers to attracting and retaining global talent could undermine their long-term economic competitiveness.

This commentary originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

An economic response toward China will be a leading agenda item for the Group of Seven major economies this year, Michael Beeman, who served as assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan, South Korea and APEC affairs until January, told Nikkei.

"It is important to agree on the most pressing issues, which will send a message to the rest of the world," said Beeman, now a visiting scholar at Stanford University. The U.S. is urging European nations and Japan to align with export restrictions of advanced semiconductors. "The G-7 is the best forum for discussion," said Beeman, who stressed member nations should work together to address export curbs and other measures.