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Countries are in a high-stakes competition to develop AI talent and respond to the technology's transformative impact on labor markets and economic growth. As the race intensifies, a critical question looms large: What talent development strategies deliver proven outcomes?

In a recent book published by Stanford University Press, The Four Talent Giants, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, examines how countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world. Shin, who is also the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), explores how four vastly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – rose to economic prominence by pursuing distinct human resource development strategies, encompassing different approaches to education, migration, and transnational talent mobility.

The study provides a framework that extends beyond the four cases, offering policy lessons for other economies, particularly less developed nations. Below are four insights from the book on the evolution of talent strategies and why countries need to construct multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – to address new risks and capitalize on emerging opportunities.

Two-image collage: Gi-Wook Shin delivers a talk (left); stacks of Shin's book, The Four Talent Giants, on a desk.
Gi-Wook Shin presents findings from his book at a talk hosted by APARC, January 28, 2026. | Michael Breger

1. Look for variation in mobilizing human resources for development


Several Asia-Pacific countries now rank among the world’s largest economies – a marked shift from the 1980s, when Japan was the only regional economy near the top. Shin cautions against interpreting this rise of Asia-Pacific nations as evidence of a single developmental regional “recipe.” Instead, his work shows that similar economic outcomes emerged from different national paths, shaped by distinct histories of colonial rule, nationalism, state-building, and higher education policy.

Rather than isolating one driver of growth, the analysis highlights how states structured education systems, migration pathways, and global connections to talent in ways that reflected domestic priorities and constraints.

2. Talent includes social capital, not just skills or credentials


Shin defines talent broadly as both human capital and social capital. In a transnational era, the value of talent lies not only in technical expertise but also in the networks, relationships, and institutional ties that connect individuals across borders.

This insight underpins a four-part framework for national talent strategies: brain train (developing domestic talent), brain gain (attracting foreign talent), brain linkage (maintaining ties with citizens and students abroad), and brain circulation (sending talent out and facilitating return). Successful countries rarely rely on a single approach; instead, they combine these strategies in different proportions over time.

3. Talent strategies must be diversified and rebalanced over time


A central contribution of Shin’s book is a framework he calls Talent Portfolio Theory, which likens national talent strategies to investment portfolios. Just as investors diversify assets and rebalance them as conditions change, states must continually adjust how they train, attract, and retain talent in response to economic shifts.

Japan’s experience illustrates both the strengths and limits of a concentrated strategy. Its post-WWII success rested on a robust domestic training system spanning universities, vocational schools, and workplace education. Nevertheless, as the global knowledge economy evolved in the 1990s, Japan struggled to adapt, facing demographic decline and hampered by institutional introspection. Only in the 2010s did Japanese policymakers begin to diversify talent development through study-abroad programs, attracting international students, and implementing limited immigration reforms.

Australia followed a contrasting path, relying heavily on foreign talent through skilled migration and international education. Its system emphasized work-migration pathways and relatively easy naturalization for international students, while more recent policies have focused on sustaining global alumni and diaspora networks. Each model carries risks, but together they demonstrate why diversification and timely rebalancing matter.

4. Political leadership and state policy shape talent outcomes


Across cases, Shin argues that talent strategies are not purely organic market outcomes. Political leadership and state capacity play decisive roles in shaping higher education systems and migration policy. China’s post-reform experience demonstrates how state-led overseas training and return programs helped address the loss of scientific expertise after the Cultural Revolution. Over time, China shifted from emphasizing the return of Chinese nationals to the country toward building broader transnational linkage and circulation mechanisms.

India offers a different model, where long-standing patterns of outward migration produced a global diaspora that functions as a form of “brain deposit.” Alumni of Indian Institutes of Technology and other elite institutions now serve as transnational bridges connecting India to Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs.

For developing countries, Shin offers a counterintuitive lesson: initial brain drain is often unavoidable and can be productive if governments invest in long-term linkage and circulation rather than restricting mobility. To the United States and other nations grappling with anti-immigration politics, Shin’s message is that erecting barriers to attracting and retaining global talent could undermine their long-term economic competitiveness.

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Rahm Emanel in a fireside chat with Michael McFaul.
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"Trump Tries to Rule, Not Govern": Rahm Emanuel on America's Political Crisis and Fading Alliances

In a Stanford fireside chat and on the APARC Briefing podcast, Ambassador Rahm Emanuel warns of squandered strategic gains in the Indo-Pacific while reflecting on political rupture in America, lessons from Japan, and the path ahead.
"Trump Tries to Rule, Not Govern": Rahm Emanuel on America's Political Crisis and Fading Alliances
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From the practices of higher education institutions to diaspora networks, talent return programs, and immigration policies of central governments, a comparative analysis by Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin shows how different national human resource strategies shape economic success.

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Cover of the book "Walking Out," showing a group of Asian flags, with the American flag set apart from them.

About the Book

From tariff wars to torn-up trade agreements, Michael Beeman explores America's recent and dramatic turn away from support for freer, rules-based trade to instead go its own new way. Focusing on America's trade engagements in the Asia-Pacific, he contrasts the trade policy choices made by America's leaders over several generations with those of today–decisions that are now undermining the trading system America created and triggering new tensions between America and its trading partners, allies and adversaries alike.

With keen insight as a former senior U.S. trade official, Beeman argues that America's exceptionally deep political divisions are driving its policy reversals, giving rise to a new trade policy characterized by zero-sum beliefs about the kind of trade America wants with the world and about new rules for trade that it wants for itself. With enormous implications for the future of regional and global trade, this timely analysis unravels the implications of America's seismic shift in approach for the future of the rules-based trading order and America's role in it.

Walking Out is essential reading for anyone interested in the domestic and international political economy of trade, international relations, and the future of America's role in the global economy.

See also New Book Unravels the Shift in America's Trade Policy and Its Global Consequences 
APARC website, October 1, 2024

About the Author

Michael L. Beeman is a visiting scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and has taught international policy as a lecturer at Stanford University. From 2017–23, he was the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), where he led negotiations for the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement and for the updated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, among other initiatives. Prior to this, he served for over a decade in other positions at USTR, including as Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan. He holds a DPhil in politics (University of Oxford) and an MA in international relations (Johns Hopkins University).

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

"In Walking Out, Beeman discusses how the two administrations have bucked traditional U.S. trade policy in myriad ways. This shift in policy has undermined the international trading system and stoked trade tensions between the U.S., its allies and adversaries, he contends." —Jason Asenso

Read the complete article at Inside U.S. Trade's "World Trade Online" (paywall) >

In the Media


Trump Second Term May Consider Deleting KORUS FTA Government Procurement Chapter 
The Korea Herald Business, January 24, 2025 (interview)

Trump to Push for Universal Tariffs through Legislation, Not Executive Order: Ex-USTR Official
Korea Economic Daily, November 27, 2024 (interview)

On Korea-U.S. Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Yonhap News, November 20, 2024 (featured)

Trump Administration to "Reset Relations on the Assumption of Tariffs," Former USTR Official Says
Nikkei, November 15, 2024 (interview)
English version/ Japanese version

If Trump Is Re-elected, It Will be Impossible to Avoid Re-revision of the Korea-US FTA
JoongAng, October 31, 2024 (interview)

Can Democrats Win Back Voters from Trump on Trade Policy?
The New York Times, October 30, 2024 (quoted)

Multimedia from Book-Related Talks


US-South Korea Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Korea Economic Institute, November 19, 2024
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Book Talk: Walking Out
Wilson Center, October 28, 2024
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America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond

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This commentary originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.



An economic response toward China will be a leading agenda item for the Group of Seven major economies this year, Michael Beeman, who served as assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan, South Korea and APEC affairs until January, told Nikkei.

"It is important to agree on the most pressing issues, which will send a message to the rest of the world," said Beeman, now a visiting scholar at Stanford University. The U.S. is urging European nations and Japan to align with export restrictions of advanced semiconductors. "The G-7 is the best forum for discussion," said Beeman, who stressed member nations should work together to address export curbs and other measures.

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Michael Beeman

Dr. Beeman is a Visiting Scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center for calendar year 2023 to research and write about trade policy issues such as economic security between the United States and Asia.
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YOSHIKI and Ichiro Fujisaki at The Future of Social Tech conference.
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Japanese and American Innovators Gather at Stanford to Examine the Future of Social Tech

Kicking off a special event series celebrating the 40th anniversary of Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the Japan Program convened eminent entrepreneurs, investors, educators, and content creators, including global rock star YOSHIKI, to explore pathways for social impact innovation.
Japanese and American Innovators Gather at Stanford to Examine the Future of Social Tech
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Fumio Kishida speaking during the G7 Scholss Elmau Summit.
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Michael Beeman sees the group discussing trade sanctions that align with the U.S.

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Michael Beeman_0.jpg PhD

Dr. Beeman was a Visiting Scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) from 2023 to 2024. He researched and wrote about trade policy issues such as economic security between the United States and Asia. He also taught international policy as a lecturer with the Ford Dorsey Masters in International Policy program. 

From January 2017 until January 2023, he was Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). In that role, he led the renegotiation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement, among other initiatives. Prior to this, he served in other capacities at USTR and, between 1998 and 2004, at the U.S. Department of Commerce.  He received his D.Phil. (Ph.D.) in Politics from the University of Oxford in 1998 and an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1991.  He is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2024) and Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan (Routledge, 2003). 

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Event Banner card for APARC Japan Program webinar on May 9: "The New Landscape of Economic Security and the U.S. - Japan Alliance, featuring headshot photos (from left to right) of Kazuto Suzuki, Mireya Solís, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui

May 9, 5:00 p.m - 6:30 p.m. PT / May 10, 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. JT

Economic security has emerged as a key foreign policy issue in Japan in recent years. Arguably one of the most active players in this field, the Japanese government has developed a comprehensive policy on economic security that seeks to protect its economy from the vagaries of geopolitical disruptions. Recent legislative efforts have centered around supply chain risks, critical infrastructure, and sensitive technologies and patents. Prompted by risks associated with business with China and intensified further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerns about economic security require governments and businesses to adjust their reliance on market mechanisms in international trade and compel them to formulate new policies and frameworks that would address these concerns. Featuring two leading experts on economic security and trade in Japan and the United States, this panel will discuss what those new policies might look like and what roles the US-Japan alliance should play in building resilient economic frameworks that would mitigate the economic damages of geopolitical disruptions.

Panelists
 

 

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Photo portrait of Kazuto Suzuki

Kazuto Suzuki is a Professor of Science and Technology Policy at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan, and senior fellow of Asia Pacific Initiative (API), an independent policy think tank. He graduated from the Department of International Relations at Ritsumeikan University and received a Ph.D. from Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, England. He has worked in the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in Paris, France, as an assistant researcher, Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba from 2000 to 2008, and served as a Professor of International Politics at Hokkaido University until 2020. He served as an expert in the Panel of Experts for the Iranian Sanction Committee under the United Nations Security Council from 2013 to July 2015. 

Suzuki currently serves as the President of the Japan Association of International Security and Trade. His research focuses on the conjunction of science & technology and international relations; subjects including space policy, non-proliferation, export control, and sanctions.  His recent work includes Space and International Politics (2011, in Japanese, awarded Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities), Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration (2003), and many others.

 

 

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Mireya Solís is director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Prior to her arrival at Brookings, Solís was a tenured associate professor at American University’s School of International Service.

Solís is an expert on Japanese foreign economic policy, U.S.-Japan relations, international trade policy, and Asia-Pacific economic integration. She is the author of "Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries" (Stanford University Press, 2004) and co-editor of "Cross-Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia" (Springer, 2008) and "Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim" (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Her most recent book, “Dilemmas of a Trading Nation: Japan and the United States in the Evolving Asia-Pacific Order” (Brookings Press, 2017), offers a novel analysis of the complex tradeoffs Japan and the United States face in drafting trade policy that reconciles the goals of economic competitiveness, social legitimacy, and political viability. “Dilemmas of a Trading Nation” received the 2018 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Award.


Moderator
 

 

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Square photo portrait of Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor, Professor of Sociology, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Deputy Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where he is also Director of the Japan Program. He is the author of Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018), co-editor of Corporate Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Oxford University Press, 2016) and co-editor of The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (University of Michigan Press, 2021). 

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Kiyoteru Tsutsui

via Zoom Webinar

Kazuto Suzuki Professor Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo
Mireya Solís Director and Senior Fellow – Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies Brookings
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To watch the recording of the event, click here.

This event is co-hosted with the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea.

Event Time: November 18, 4:00 - 6:00 PM (PST) / November 19, 9:00 - 11:00 PM (Japan and Korea)
Please register for this event at EAI event page.

The ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan joint statements have increased expectations for a possible expansion of security and economic cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. However, heightened U.S.-China strategic competition, as well as persistent challenges in the region such as historical tensions and the North Korea threat, have complicated the strategic calculus of U.S., South Korea and Japan. Under these circumstances, the South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must define their economic and security interests and seek ways to maintain friendly relations among the three countries. This seminar will discuss security and economic cooperation among Korea, the United States and Japan in the era of strategic competition between the U.S. and China.

Panel 1 on security:

Park Joon Woo, former Chairman of the Sejong Institute; former South Korean Ambassador to E.U. and to Singapore

Tomiko Ichikawa, Director General of the Japan Institute of International Affairs

Gen. Vincent Brooks, former USFK Commander

Moderated by Young Sun Ha, Chairman of East Asia Institute; Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University

Panel 2 on economic cooperation:

Young Ja Bae, Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy, Konkuk University, Korea

Andrew Grotto, Director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance, FSI, Stanford University

Kimura Fukunari, Professor of Economics, Keio University, Japan

Moderated by Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University

 

Via Zoom. Register at https://bit.ly/3w7Ak9g

Panel Discussions
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Cover of book "Drivers of Innovation"

Innovation and entrepreneurship rank highly on the strategic agenda of most countries today. As global economic competition intensifies, many national policymakers now recognize the central importance of entrepreneurship education and the building of financial institutions to promote long-term innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. Drivers of Innovation brings together scholars from the United States and Asia to explore those education and finance policies that might be conducive to accelerating innovation and developing a more entrepreneurial workforce in East Asia. 

Some of the questions covered include: How do universities in China and Singapore experiment with new types of learning in their quest to promote innovation and entrepreneurship? Is there a need to transform the traditional university into an “entrepreneurial university”? What are the recent developments in and outstanding challenges to financing innovation in China and Japan? What is the government’s role in promoting innovative entrepreneurship under the shadow of big business in South Korea? What can we learn about the capacity of services to drive innovation-led growth in India? 

Drivers of Innovation will serve as a valuable reference for scholars and policymakers working to develop human capital for innovation in Asia.

Contents

  1. Educating Entrepreneurs and Financing Innovation in Asia 
    Fei Yan, Yong Suk Lee, Lin William Cong, Charles Eesley, and Charles Lee
  2. Fostering Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Education, Human Capital, and the Institutional Environment 
    Charles Eesley, Lijie Zhou, and You (Willow) Wu
  3. Entrepreneurial Scaling Strategy: Managerial and Policy Considerations 
    David H. Hsu
  4. Innovation Policy and Star Scientists in Japan 
    Tatsuo Sasaki, Hiromi S. Nagane, Yuta Fukudome, and Kanetaka Maki
  5. Financing Innovation in Japan: Challenges and Recent Progress 
    Takeo Hoshi and Kenji Kushida
  6. Promoting Entrepreneurship under the Shadow of Big Business in Korea: The Role of the Government 
    Hicheon Kim, Dohyeon Kim, and He Soung Ahn
  7. The Creativity and Labor Market Performance of Korean College Graduates: Implications for Human Capital Policy 
    Jin-Yeong Kim
  8. Financing Innovative Enterprises in China: A Public Policy Perspective 
    Lin William Cong, Charles M. C. Lee, Yuanyu Qu, and Tao She
  9. Forging Entrepreneurship in Asia: A Comparative Study of Tsinghua University and the National University of Singapore 
    Zhou Zhong, Fei Yan, and Chao Zhang
  10. Education and Human Capital for Innovation in India’s Service Sector 
    Rafiq Dossani
  11. In Need of a Big Bang: Toward a Merit-Based System for Government-Sponsored Research in India 
    Dinsha Mistree
  12. The Implications of AI for Business and Education, and Singapore’s Policy Response 
    Mohan Kankanhalli and Bernard Yeung

 

 

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Entrepreneurship, Education, and Finance in Asia

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This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.


The 2020 Summer Olympics have begun this week but public support among the Japanese public for the games has been generally low and their mood can be articulated through the succinct question: “Why are we doing this now?” says Stanford sociologist and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui.

 
Here, Tsutsui discusses how the various challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and other national scandals related to the games have led to a general dissatisfaction among the Japanese public towards their government and the International Olympic Committee. Despite low morale, the country’s mood may change once the Summer Games commence – barring any further complications or disruptions. But given that the games are pared down this year, it still may be hard to generate the same levels of excitement as in previous years, Tsutsui said.
 
Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and director of the Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Tsutsui is also a professor of sociology and his research focuses on social movements, globalization, human rights and Japanese society. He is the author of Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018).
 

Polls among the Japanese public show mixed support for the games and meanwhile, major advertisers in the country are pulling out. As a sociologist, how do you see this mixed public sentiment affecting overall mood and morale?

There is no question that there is a strong headwind against the Olympics in the lead-up to the opening ceremony. Opinion polls are still against the games, although the numbers improved a little in recent weeks. The general public sentiment can be summed up as “Why are we doing this now?”

The road to the Tokyo Olympics has been a long and winding one complicated by COVID-19, first and foremost, and various scandals. The Japanese public has been fed up with the COVID-19-related emergency declarations and other restrictions as well as the slower pace of vaccination compared to other developed countries. The perception, right or wrong, is that the government is making decisions based on whether they help in hosting the Olympics successfully, when the focus should be on public health and economic rescue in the COVID environment.

Morale is low, but many are hoping that things will change quickly once the games begin. Whether that happens or not depends on a whole host of factors, most importantly whether major public health incidents and other unfortunate accidents happen or not, how Japanese athletes fare, who might emerge as global stars, and so on.

To what extent has the International Olympic Committee (IOC) helped or hindered support for the games among the Japanese public?

The Japanese public sees the IOC as simply pushing its economic interest without the proper regard for their safety and health. Many people do not understand that the Japanese government does not have the authority to cancel the Olympics and could have faced a lawsuit with a huge compensation at stake if it tried to do so. The IOC looks like the IMF/World Bank during the Asian economic crisis in affected countries or the EU in some European countries – an international entity that pushes its agenda without accountability to the citizens. The frustration has nowhere to go but to the Japanese government, which combined with overall COVID-19-related dissatisfaction, has led to the most recent polls showing the lowest approval rating for the government under Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

For Japan, hosting the 2020 Olympic Games initially symbolized the country’s rebound from the devastating Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 and was poised to boost their economy. Then COVID hit, and meanwhile, Olympic expenses ballooned. Are there any opportunities for the Olympic Games to help the country bounce back? 

The 2020 Olympics was initially framed as a symbol of recovery from the triple disaster in 2011, but that slogan is no longer central. The expenses were justified as a way to develop infrastructure for foreign visitors and increase inbound tourists, and the government’s goals for the number of visitors from abroad have been met already. With no spectators allowed, Japan will lose money on hosting the Olympics, but the economic damage is not irrecoverable. Once the world gets out of COVID-19, the Japanese economy will likely rebound and tourists will come back.

It will be interesting to follow how socially, in terms of the national psyche and its unity, Japan will respond to the Tokyo Olympics. Even when the games take place in other countries, the Olympics often serve as a moment of national unity, especially in Japan. With Japan being the host, many thought that it would serve as an enormous booster towards national confidence and unity. We have yet to see how the games will turn out, but these psychological impacts will likely be lessened as the games are scaled down and may not get as much global attention as typical Olympics do.

There’s still a chance for a better outcome though if the games go smoothly and offer many compelling moments. People in many countries are still more homebound than usual and the contents that the games offer could be attractive. And the Japanese public is known to swing from one side to the other very quickly and on a massive scale, so once the games begin, TV personalities who were questioning whether the games should happen will likely quickly turn around and support Japanese athletes and tout their accomplishments. That is, if no serious outbreak incidents occur.

The Olympics are often celebrated as a nonpolitical event that can unite the world. In a globally turbulent world, what do you make of that assessment? Can the Olympics be nonpolitical?

The Beijing Winter Olympics in 2022 is a case in point. Boycott of the games seems unlikely, but House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has already floated an idea of diplomatic boycott. There’s a lot at stake for the host country, and the Olympics will likely be politicized when countries like China, Russia or even the U.S. host it.

Another problem is that not many democracies would be eager to host the games anymore. Public support is needed for democracies to host the Olympics, but the growing cost of the games, combined with increasingly less clear benefits of hosting, has made it difficult to find democracies that are eager to be the host country. Meanwhile, non-democracies like China and Russia, and even smaller countries like Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan campaign to become host nations. The pattern of dictatorships hosting the Olympics and the world demanding a change in their human rights practices and, threatening a boycott, might be a recurring pattern in the coming decades.

 
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Senior Fellow at FSI, Professor of Sociology, Director of the Japan Program
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President Biden and President Suga walk through the Rose Garden colonnade at the White House
Commentary

China Looms Large, Despite a Strong US-Japan Alliance

From Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands to economics, trade, and human rights issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the U.S.-Japan alliance has plenty to tackle with its policies towards China.
China Looms Large, Despite a Strong US-Japan Alliance
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A man cycles past a security fence outside the New National Stadium, the main stadium for the Tokyo Olympics, on June 23, 2021 in Tokyo, Japan.
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While public support in Japan has been lackluster for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, the mood may change once the games start – provided no major public health incidents and other unfortunate accidents occur, says Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui.

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Book cover showing a robotic hand holding an older human hand.

Demographic transition, along with the economic and geopolitical re-emergence of Asia, are two of the largest forces shaping the twenty-first century, but little is known about the implications for innovation. The countries of East Asia have some of the oldest age structures on the planet: between now and 2050, the population that is age 65 and older will increase to more than one in four Chinese, and to more than one in three Japanese and Koreans. Other economies with younger populations, like India, face the challenge of fully harnessing the “demographic dividend” from large cohorts in the working ages.

This book delves into how such demographic changes shape the supply of innovation and the demand for specific kinds of innovation in the Asia-Pacific. Social scientists from Asia and the United States offer multidisciplinary perspectives from economics, demography, political science, sociology, and public policy; topics range from the macroeconomic effects of population age structure, to the microeconomics of technology and the labor force, to the broader implications for human well-being. Contributors analyze how demography shapes productivity and the labor supply of older workers, as well as explore the aging population as consumers of technologies and drivers of innovations to meet their own needs, as well as the political economy of spatial development, agglomeration economies, urban-rural contrasts, and differential geographies of aging.

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

Table of contents and chapter 1, introduction
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Cover of the book 'Shifting Gears in Innovation Policy' on the background of an embossed map of Asia.

In the six Asian countries focused on in this book—China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—high economic growth has been achieved in many industrial sectors, the catch-up phase of growth has ended or is about to end, and technological frontiers have been reached in many industries. These countries can no longer rely on importing or imitating new technology from abroad and expanding imports, and instead have to develop their own innovations to maintain growth. The policy tools they often used to advance "innovation," for the most traditional industrial policies of identifying promising industries and promoting them, will no longer be effective. And indeed, governments in Asia have recently put forward new policies, such as China's push for mass entrepreneurship and innovation.

Domestic conditions in Asian economies have also started to change. Many countries are facing rapidly aging populations and low birth rates: Japan’s population, declining for several years, is the first population decline not caused by war or disease in the modern world; South Korea’s labor force started to shrink in 2018 as well; China’s huge population will start to age, even as a large part of the population remains poor.

Facing these challenges, today Asia is at a turning point. East Asia as a whole has greater real economic output than North America, South and Southeast Asia possess enormous economic potential due to size and resources, and countries within Asia are becoming more connected in both trade and diplomacy. It is at this juncture that the authors of Shifting Gears examine and reassess Asia’s innovation and focus on national innovation strategies and regional cluster policies that can promote entrepreneurship and innovation in the larger Asia-Pacific. Chapters explore how institutions and policies affect incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship; whether Asia's innovation systems are substantially different from those of other countries, and in which ways, and whether there are any promising strategies for promoting innovation.

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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Strategies from Asia

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Takeo Hoshi
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Shorenstein APARC
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