This past July, I returned from my sabbatical. During my eight months away from the Stanford campus, I was based in Korea at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University and traveled through many other parts of Asia. It allowed me to take a step back and reflect—it was the longest time I had spent in Korea since leaving for the United States as a graduate student in 1983.

While I have visited Korea many times on business and other matters, living there for an extended period of time was quite a different experience. Korea is certainly a place with lots of excitement and convenience but also concerns and worries. 

What struck me most during my conversations with many colleagues and friends in Asia was a realization that they were all grappling with how to address and find breakthrough solutions to current societal challenges. They referred to numerous, interrelated problems arising from low birth rate, aging population, brain drain, pollution, political corruption and low cultural tolerance, to mention a few examples. Based on those conversations and my overall experience living in Korea, I am now preparing a book manuscript Korea seen from Inside and Outside.

Next Monday, we begin the new academic year at Stanford. And with that occasion, I extend my sincere thanks to colleagues who stepped in during my leave last year, in particular, to Takeo Hoshi who served as acting director.

Reengaging with academic writing and my duties as director has been invigorating. I remain convinced that Shorenstein APARC continues to play an important role in developing new knowledge and encouraging dialogue on policy-relevant challenges in contemporary Asia.
 
The Center will soon be launching a new multiyear research project, the New Asia Project, which aims to offer insight on the question: “what’s next for Asia?” Our faculty, fellows and researchers will delve into social, cultural and educational areas that could push Asia ahead. We will have completed our Divided Memories and Reconciliation Project after a decade of scholarly work on historical narratives of World War II in Asia. The Center will continue to convene seminars, workshops and conferences that bring together scholars, policymakers and regional experts from around the world and strive to make the multimedia available to all online.
 
Three postdoctoral scholars and four emerging and mid-career professionals are joining us this year as fellows. They carry a broad range of research interests—from hospital reform in Vietnam to the economic consequences of elite politics in China. The Center remains committed to nurturing a new generation of scholars and professionals working on Asia-Pacific issues. We also welcome a diverse cohort of Corporate Affiliate Visiting Fellows, who will work on ambitious research endeavors under the mentorship of our faculty.
 
Through our partnerships with Brookings Institution Press and Stanford University Press, we continue to publish our work. We have published 9 books in the past year and expect 4 books in the coming months. They include Divergent Memories, Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization and a translation from Korean of Peace on a Knife’s Edge, among other publications in leading journals and presses around the world.
 
The Center has changed quite a bit since I first began my directorship in 2005. We now have five vibrant research programs, one initiative and one corporate affiliate program. They are integral parts of the Center but also have emerged as robust entities in their own right. This year we will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of our China Program and Asia Health Policy Program.
 
For readers in Asia, a number of our faculty and fellows will be coming to Seoul and Tokyo for a public seminar series following the U.S. presidential election this November. A special alumni gathering will also be hosted in Seoul (Nov. 15) and Tokyo (Nov. 17). There will also be a conference on world-class universities on Nov. 4-5 at Stanford Center at Peking University. Stay tuned for an official announcement.
 
As I resume my duties as Center director, I look forward to another engaging year.

Gi-Wook Shin
Director

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford is now accepting applications for the Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship in Contemporary Asia, an opportunity made available to two junior scholars for research and writing on Asia.

Fellows conduct research on contemporary political, economic or social change in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to Shorenstein APARC’s publications, conferences and related activities. To read about this year’s fellows, please click here.

The fellowship is a 10-mo. appointment during the 2017-18 academic year, and carries a salary rate of $52,000 plus $2,000 for research expenses.

For further information and to apply, please click here. The application deadline is Dec. 16, 2016.

Last month, Admiral Scott H. Swift, the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, spoke to an audience at the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) and at Stanford via their linked Highly Immersive Classrooms (HIC). Against the backdrop of increasing tensions and hostility in the South China Sea, Swift stressed the importance of building a trust-based relationship between China and the United States. Stanford professor Jean Oi opened the roundtable by introducing Swift at SCPKU while Karl Eikenberry, director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, chaired the session at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business.

After his formal remarks, Swift engaged in a roundtable discussion with Chinese and American scholars on both sides of the Pacific. The participants at SCPKU included experts from Peking University and Chinese think tanks. Participants at Stanford included a diverse group of scholars from across campus with a number from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The HIC allowed a lively interactive session where Swift fielded questions from SCPKU and Stanford.

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On the heels of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, scholars, members of think tanks and former U.S. and Chinese government officials came to Beijing to discuss what many participants considered “the most important bilateral relationship” in the world: the relationship between the United States and China. As former U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte described during his opening remarks, the relationship, “if properly managed,” can result in an enormous boon for the world; but if mismanaged, can bring great harm to global stability and prosperity.

Stanford and Peking University jointly hosted a forum titled “A Changing Global and Political Order: Perspectives from China-United States Cooperation” on June 6-7 in Beijing. All attendees, who participated in their capacity as private individuals, acknowledged that a level of uncertainty and tension clouds the bilateral relationship, exemplified most clearly in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Having participated in the restoration of Sino-U.S. relations in 1972, Negroponte and former Chinese Ambassador Wu Jianmin remarked upon the geopolitical rationale that first motivated this rapprochement: to counter the Soviet Union. They noted that the bilateral relationship has grown increasingly robust and multi-dimensional over time. For example, Wu cited that trade between the United States and China has increased exponentially, from a mere US$1 billion in 1978 to $550 billion in 2015. Investment, economic cooperation and competition have also grown. Despite disagreements on regional security matters, both countries have worked together on global challenges such as climate change, North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, anti-piracy efforts and the Ebola outbreak.

However, with China’s rapid rise, both militarily and economically, and as the developing world has gained increasing clout on the world’s stage, many participants suggested that the current global order, originally envisaged in 1944 with the Bretton-Woods Agreement, needed an update. Many participants, especially on the Chinese side, stated that the “balance of power was shifting” with the G7/G8 yielding economic momentum to the G20. The American participants generally did not share Chinese views of a power transition, but conceded that reforms were necessary to the global order to take into account China’s meteoric rise.  Participants did not dispute the benefits that China has derived from the current international order and most agreed that some type of evolutionary change is needed to increase inclusivity. As one participant asked regarding China’s perception of the United States (and vice versa), “Are we foes, enemies or friends?” Despite such ambiguity, U.S.-China cooperation is essential to effecting any type of change.

Questions were rife and specificity was scant with respect to what the key changes were or the mechanisms by which those reforms should be effected, however. Which countries should partake in this decision-making body? Should other entities and institutions other than nation-states be included? What are the rules of participation and criteria for membership? How large should the governing body be? What key reforms need to be undertaken?

Both Negroponte and Wu disavowed the zero-sum mentality of the Cold War, which, Wu stated, continues to impact perceptions on both sides. They both highlighted the critical importance of frequent dialogue by the Chinese and American heads of state and by their militaries. Calling summit-level meetings between the two presidents “indispensable,” Negroponte emphasized that “[both] leaders have to understand [the] viewpoints and attitudes of each country” in order to formulate the right policies. Negroponte added, “[d]iplomacy at that level is probably more important than it has ever been.”

As this summary of the forum is posted, we note with sadness the untimely death of Ambassador Wu Jianmin on June 18, 2016, in a tragic car accident in Wuhan, China.

Related Links:

Photo gallery from the conference

As the inaugural meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sets to convene, Stanford researcher Thomas Fingar discusses findings from his new book that seeks to study China’s objectives and methods of engagement with other countries. Much of China’s behavior is determined by its own cost-benefit analysis of the perceived effect engagement would have on its security and development.

As China has pursued modernization over the past 35 years, patterns have emerged that shed light on the government’s foreign policy decision-making, according to new research by Thomas Fingar, a Stanford distinguished fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Since 1979, China’s foreign policy has been underscored by two priorities – security and development. Knowing those priorities, analysts can attempt to better study and anticipate China’s relations with other countries even in the wake of unforeseen events in the global system.

“China’s increased activity around the world has elicited both anxiety and admiration in neighboring countries eager to capitalize on opportunities but worried about Beijing’s growing capabilities. Yet as is the case with all countries, what China can do is shaped by global and regional developments beyond its control,” said Fingar, the editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

The book, which has a total of 13 authors, is the first in a series published by Stanford University Press that examines China’s changing relationships in Asia and with other portions of the world. It is also an outcome of the research project “China and the World.” Fingar, who heads the project, draws upon his experience from five decades working on Asia and more than 25 years in U.S. government, including as chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Framework to analyze China’s foreign policy

One dimension of the research project examines how China’s policies and priorities are shaped by China’s perceptions about how much a country threatens or addresses China’s security concerns; a second dimension examines China’s perceptions about how much a country can contribute to China’s pursuit of sustained economic growth and modernization.

To explore these relationships, Fingar developed a framework for analysis using a matrix that displays, on one axis, China’s perceptions about the threat to China’s security posed by a country or region, and on the other axis, China’s perceptions about a country or region’s capacity to contribute to China’s development.

By comparing the position of a given country or region from one period to another, the matrix both predicts the character of China’s policies and reveals a pattern over time. The figure below illustrates China’s views in 1979 and 2016.

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In 1979, India and countries in Central Asia figured high on the threat axis because of their relationship with the Soviet Union and low on capacity to provide the resources China needed to jumpstart its economy, Fingar said.

At that time, China sought to address both its priority security concerns and developmental goals by improving ties with Europe, Japan and the United States. South and Central Asia were afforded lower priority, he said.

In the 1990s, however, China’s perceptions shifted as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and a decade of economic success in China, Fingar explained. Shown in the matrix, China’s policies toward Central Asia changed as the region transitioned to a more favorable security position by 2000 and as China required additional resources (energy, technology, training, etc.) to fuel its growing economy.

Fingar said China’s increased engagement with South Asia was buttressed by a need for markets and investment opportunities, and furthered along by a reduction in the threat environment as India altered its relationship with Russia and Pakistan became a less valuable security partner.

Calculating who China will engage with and how has become much clearer, yet in some ways it has also become more complicated, according to Fingar.

“The countries that can do the most for China today often pose the greatest perceived long-term threat, namely the United States and its allies,” he said. “Conversely, China’s proclaimed closest friends—North Korea and Pakistan—can do little to assist China’s development and pose increasing danger to its security.”

Current policy applications

Over the past three years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on numerous projects with neighbors and other countries around the world, such as the “new Silk Road,” a trans-continental trade route that will link countries together, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that plans to lend money to poorer parts of Asia for building infrastructure.

The objectives of both initiatives are consistent with the China’s prioritization of security and development, Fingar said. The AIIB and Silk Road initiative indicate that China assumes there are gains from economic integration, and this is largely due to the fact that China has already benefited from past projects.

In 2001, the Chinese government launched concerted efforts to improve its relationships with Central Asian countries because of China’s concern that the United States was seeking to “contain” China, he said. Outcomes have included newfound markets for China’s manufactured goods and increased stability in separatist areas near or on its borders.

“By taking such a big stake in building infrastructure, China has changed the dynamic of the region,” he said. “Anybody can use a road, railroad or bridge. China has helped stitch together the economies of different countries in ways they have never been before.”

For China, the AIIB and the Silk Road initiative are also a form of “soft power,” said Fingar. The approach by the Chinese government evokes memories of U.S. “dollar diplomacy” early in the last century and Japanese “yen diplomacy” when financial assistance was extended to developing countries.

But Fingar doubts that “buying friends by building infrastructure” will be a major contributor to China’s quest for security and development. Going forward, the Chinese government must face the growing paradox between its foreign infrastructure projects and its principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, he said.

“When working in other countries, China cannot afford to dismiss internal stability, governance, rule of law,” he said. “Those facets are the baseline for building infrastructure.”

Related links:

The Diplomat - Q&A on Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century

A “radical uncertainty” now lies at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship, making it essential that the two countries find ways to rebuild the confidence they once shared or face a future with potentially catastrophic events, said Maxwell School Dean James Steinberg during a speech at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) on Wednesday.

“There is an urgent need for both sides to step back beyond the day to day back and forth to try to steer a different course,” he said. “We need to deal concretely – and in very pragmatic ways – with taking steps to give each other confidence that our paths are not necessarily in conflict.”

Steinberg’s call to action came as senior leaders of China and the United States set to meet for a dialogue on economics and strategy in Beijing. His speech was part of the Oksenberg Lecture series, an annual dialogue on U.S. policy toward China and Asia, named in honor of the late Stanford professor and Freeman Spogli Institute senior fellow Michel Oksenberg.

Oksenberg was a role model who “consistently urged the United States to engage with Asia in a more considerate manner,” China Program Director Jean Oi said in her welcome remarks. A reknowned China scholar, he served on the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter and was a driving force behind normalization of relations between China and the United States in the late 1970s.

A panel of experts from Shorenstein APARC including Michael Armacost, Thomas Fingar and Kathleen Stephens, all distinguished fellows at Shorenstein APARC, offered comments following the keynote speech. Steinberg worked with each of them in Washington at various points in his career that ranged from the State Department, where he served as deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, to the Brookings Institution, where he served as vice president.

Consensus approach to engagement

Oksenberg advocated a vision of engaging China based on pursing the goal of a creating a stable, secure and effectively governed China, Steinberg recounted. That vision became known as the consensus approach wherein the two countries agreed to work together by building trust and letting their priorities be known to each other.

That consensus held steady, weathering stressful events such as the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1996 and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Steinberg told the audience.

The mutual understanding that shaped the U.S.-China relationship remained relatively unscathed until the early twenty-first century. China pursued growth “without directly challenging the United States, our allies, or the post-World War II international order,” he said, but as 2010 came to a close, agreement began to wane as an “emerging security dilemma” took its place.

Part of the divergence in the U.S.-China relationship was caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, Steinberg argued. The crisis encouraged some in China to believe that the financial crisis foreshadowed an era of decline for the United States. Meanwhile, China began to increasingly assert sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas, despite objections from many of its neighbors and from the United States.

Toward strategic reassurance

While uncertainty is an inherent part of major power relations, China and the United States now each hold concerns about the other that are broader and more extreme compared to three decades ago, when the consensus approach was first shaped.

Armacost, a former U.S. ambassador to Japan, later noted that some ambiguity is to be expected. “In dealing with foreign policy issues of any consequence, there is an irreducible element of conjecture,” he said. “One doesn’t know the intensions of other countries – especially big complex societies like China.”

However, the level of uncertainty held by the United States and China is problematic because they are so deeply embedded in each other’s success, Steinberg said. The path to reducing uncertainty could be first addressed through “humble acknowledgement” of the unknown. Recognizing that neither side has an exact understanding of the other, he said, creates space for both sides to broach concerns and foster “strategic reassurance.”

But strategic reassurance by itself is not enough, the former senior State Department official said, and must be coupled with hedging. Steinberg described the United States’ pursuit of multiple strands of engagement with China as “hope for the best, prepare for the worst,” but also cautioned that too much emphasis on hedging could undermine progress.

Rebuilding confidence in the U.S.-China relationship will not be immediate or simple and requires sustained engagement and cooperation with other countries. Stephens, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, underscored the necessity of dialogue. She said the United States and its allies in the region must “talk more frankly and more often with each other, as well as managing that with China.”

The academy and policy community

Steinberg said an important role exists for academics and policy analysts in rebuilding lost confidence between the United States and China. Scholarship can give policymakers the tools to untangle some of the uncertainties and “help us not get the answers, but at least get the questions right,” he said.

Fingar, a former director of the National Intelligence Council, agreed with Steinberg and urged those communities to “do a better job of analyzing, explaining and perhaps buttressing confidence that the engagement with hedging strategy is actually still working.”

Steinberg lauded the example set by Oksenberg in his ability to bridge the academic and government sectors and of encouraging students to consider those career paths. “Our challenge…is to train the next generation of scholars – just as Michel Oksenberg trained his – to be able to talk and operate in both worlds,” he said.

Related links:

Video and transcript from the 2016 Oksenberg Lecture