Audio: APARC Scholars on China’s Belt and Road Initiative
The Southeast Asia Program is part of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.
FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.
Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.
This event is co-sponsored by Shorenstein APARC's China Program and the Southeast Asia Program
Analysts of China run two occupational risks: One is underestimating PRC capacities to achieve national objectives and the other is overestimating Chinese power. In this talk, David (Mike) Lampton will elaborate upon this observation by focusing on the PRC and Southeast Asian effort to build high speed- and conventional-speed rail connectivity between southern China and seven continental Southeast Asian neighbors, including Singapore. His talk will center on a research project he is undertaking with two Southeast Asian scholars involving field work in eight countries. In his preliminary assessment, “progress has been greater than widely realized, and the problems are very large.” Lampton will analyze: What factors in China and among its neighbors promote, and which retard, progress? Indeed, how do different countries define “progress” and what capacities do China's smaller neighbors have to shape and, in some cases, even resist developments? And, in light of all this, how might the United States think about appropriate economic, strategic, and diplomatic responses?
David M. Lampton is Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow and Research Scholar at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He also is Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies Emeritus at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Having started his academic career at The Ohio State University, Lampton has been Chairman of the The Asia Foundation (2015-2018), president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations (1988-1997), and former Dean of Faculty at SAIS (2004-2012). He is the author of: Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (2001); The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (2008); and, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy (editor, Stanford University Press, 2001). He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University where, as an undergraduate student, he was a fireman. Lampton has an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies. His newest book, Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, was first published in January 2014 and will be reissued in paperback with a new Preface early in 2019 by the University of California Press. His current field research and book-length project focuses on Beijing’s effort to build high-speed and other rail lines to Singapore from southern China and involves interview and field research in eight countries. He is undertaking this research with two colleagues.
This event is part of the China Program’s Colloquia Series entitled "A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations " sponsored by Shorenstein APARC's China Program.
A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations
Trade conflict has exploded. The media is rife with stories of China’s unfair trade practices, cyber theft, IP theft and forced technology transfers. Who will first scale the commanding heights of technological supremacy? Who will be the first mover in AI, robotics and biotechnology? What are the implications of Beijing’s ambitious infrastructure projects, including its Belt and Road Initiative? How is China’s “sharp power” deployed, and what are its implications for political and civic life in the U.S.? Can the Trump administration and Beijing’s leadership reach agreement on our trade disputes? Are these just the beginning salvos of an increasingly turbulent future? As U.S. policy towards China sharply veers away from “constructive engagement” to “strategic competition,” the Stanford China Program will host a series of talks by leading experts to explore the current state of our bilateral relations, its potential future, and their implications for the world order.
Co-sponsored by the Southeast Asia Program and
the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Indonesia features Southeast Asia’s most vibrant and dynamic democracy, but debilitating institutional dysfunctions persist. Age-old patronage-style practices remain commonplace, despite voter demands for governance reform. In effect, two mutually incompatible systems operate simultaneously: the rule of law on the one hand—“Ruler’s Law” on the other. The disarray provides space for mafias and Islamist fringe groups to wield clout. The contradiction tends to deter investment that Indonesia sorely needs in order to escape a “middle-income trap.” What are the prospects for change in the April 2019 national elections? Join the Indonesia political analyst Kevin O’Rourke for a presentation and discussion of poll data, political trends, and potential post-2019 scenarios in the world’s fourth most populous country.
Four member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have made territorial claims in the South China Sea that conflict with China’s professed entitlement to all of the “islands and the adjacent waters.” Because the “ASEAN Way” is to make decisions by consensus, each member state can, in effect, veto what the group might otherwise decide. Prof. O’Neill will explore how China has used its financial power to divide ASEAN’s members in order to prevent them from acting collectively to resolve their territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. He will compare China’s relations with Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar in order to highlight the key role that a recipient country’s type of regime plays in enhancing or constraining Beijing’s ability to use aid, loans, and investments to influence the policies and politics of developing states. He will argue that authoritarian institutions facilitate Chinese influence while democratic institutions inhibit it.
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
Malaysia's ruling National Front (BN) coalition ran one of the most durable authoritarian governments in the world. But in May 2018, a coalition of opposition parties won power, unseating the BN government for the first time in 61 years. In two complementary talks, APARC scholars Sophie Lemière and Sebastian Dettman will examine the roots of this victory in light of the strategies, coalitions, and messianic messages used by the opposition. Using findings from their fieldwork in Malaysia, they will show how and why the opposition parties were successful and draw implications of the victory for Malaysia’s future under its new coalition government. The speakers will also convey broader insights about political competition in Southeast Asia’s semi-authoritarian polities and beyond.
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
Singapore’s government is widely seen as competent, honest, and meritocratic—an exceptional case of post-colonial governance. Nor can any elected incumbent party anywhere match Singapore’s People’s Action Party’s 59-year record of uninterrupted rule. But recent events have cast doubt on the PAP government’s reputation for performance and stability. Despite acknowledging its need for new leaders, the government has been unable to select a clear successor to the current prime minister, even as his talented and popular deputy is sidelined, apparently due to his ethnic-minority background. When the government tried to ascertain public opinion on legislation against “deliberate online falsehoods,” the exercise descended into name-calling and threats against witnesses. Resentments have meanwhile risen over socioeconomic inequality and the mismanagement of public transport, housing, and health care.
How did this happen? In his talk, Dr. Thum will explore the historical forces that have shaped Singapore's politics and governance; explain the political economy of decision-making there; and recount his own experience with the turmoil affecting the country's government. He will argue that Singapore's post-colonial independence and governance are an evolution of—not from—British colonial rule. The government is responsive and accountable to international capital. But the PAP needs the approval of voting citizens to legitimize its continuation in power. The party’s leaders embody this dilemma in their struggles to reconcile two such different and competing sets of interests.
by Thom Holme
The start of a new academic year is always filled with excited anticipation by all of us at Shorenstein APARC. We're delighted to welcome a diverse cohort of accomplished postdoctoral fellows, research fellows, and visiting scholars to our research community for the 2018-19 academic year. Among them is Paul Schuler, who joins the Center as a Lee Kong Chian Fellow on Southeast Asia.
The Lee Kong Chian Visiting Fellowship on Southeast Asia is part of a joint initiative by the National University of Singapore (NUS) and Stanford, whose aim is to raise the visibility, extent, and quality of research on contemporary Southeast Asia. Here at Stanford, the infrastructures for research is supported by our Southeast Asia Program.
I recently spoke with Shuler about his research plans for the duration of his fellowship. An assistant professor at the University of Arizona's School of Government and Public Policy, Schuler specializes in institutions and public opinion within authoritarian regimes, with a particular focus on Vietnam. He was also a 2014-15 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow on Contemporary Asia. The following conversation has been edited for clarity and length.
A. It's great! It feels like I'm coming home again. It's very rare to have an institution with so much expertise on East Asia as APARC, and that contextual knowledge helps both inform the issues I'm working on and generate new research ideas. The opportunity to benefit from intellectual exchange with China experts at Stanford would be especially useful for me as I'm writing a book comparing the evolution of particular Vietnamese political institutions to those in China.
A. It is often assumed that, in China and in Vietnam, democratic politics and elections have been slowly becoming more meaningful, and that the forces that support or push for these quasi-democratic openings are the reform-minded people or the soft-liners in the regimes.
My argument is that the expansion of these democratic forces in Vietnam isn't always driven by soft-liners or reform-minded people wanting to open the institutions for democratic purposes. Oftentimes, the more conservative elements of authoritarian regimes are the ones looking to attack their more reform-minded rivals within the party. In some cases, it's actually the conservatives and the hardliners who increase the visibility of the democratic institutions for such short-term tactical reasons.
However, it's very hard to shut down the institutions once they open up. So, in some ways, conservatives facilitate democratization, but not because it was initially pushed by people supporting that process.
What trust actually does, in our opinion, is breed conservatism. If you happen to live in a democracy, then it's great because it helps breed support for that system; if you live in an autocracy, then it means that it is also hard to change that system...
Paul Schuler
A: I’m fascinated by how political systems evolved the way they did. In the United States, people are largely drawn to politics because of the captivating figures and their personalities, the elections, the campaigns. By contrast, politics in Vietnam is very different. What you read in the newspapers is very much an attempt to play down the individual. In fact, many people in Vietnam have a hard time naming their politicians and top leaders.
And while this situation has changed somewhat in China with Xi Jinping, in Vietnam it's still the case that people don't have that high level of engagement with politicians that we see in democracies. And so I wondered, "How do people engage with politics? Is this, in fact, a better arrangement? Are the people satisfied with it, or just take it for granted? And, ultimately, what would it take to change that type of system?”
A. With counties like Vietnam, one of the topics that people are most interested in is if—and when—there will be a transition to a more democratic system. Vietnam, like China, has been shown to have a high-degree of social trust. Francis Fukuyama observed how trust helps facilitate democracy, given that people are willing to make compromises with others if they somehow trust them. Vietnam and China are anomalous in that regard because both exhibit high levels of this generalized trust, yet they are obviously not democracies. In our forthcoming paper, my coauthor and I theorize that trust does not facilitate democracy; rather, what it does is facilitate support for whatever the status quo happens to be. People who are highly trusting assume that whatever system is currently in place must be working.
What trust actually does, in our opinion, is breed conservatism. If you happen to live in a democracy, then it's great because it helps breed support for that system; if you live in an autocracy, then it means that it is also hard to change that system to something new, because generalized trust basically makes people adverse to change. We find that in Vietnam, people who score higher in this sort of trust are much less likely to advocate for regime reforms.
A. There is always a debate in Vietnam as to whether or not they should follow certain choices made by China. China, on average, has grown 2-3% faster than Vietnam annually. And while Vietnam has done very well, there is this sense for some that moving towards a system that looks more like China could actually help further increase their growth.
There are people, particularly in the Organization Committee in Vietnam and at higher levels in the Politburo, who are trying reduce the division between the party and the state; trying to centralize power in party institutions. It's not yet clear whether they'll be able to go as far as China did, let alone if they will be successful at putting forward the reforms they've already suggested.
One big difference is that in Vietnam, the president and the general secretary are different positions, whereas in China, Xi Jinping holds both roles. While there have been attempts by Vietnamese general secretaries to combine these positions, they have been rebuffed by the central committee, and I don't think that's going to happen. And while Vietnam is making changes elsewhere that mirror China, I think the greater degree of separation between the government and the party will probably survive.
A. It’s hard to study to the impact of social media on political attitudes, but one thing I've found through surveys is that people who are active online appear more likely to find their local government corrupt. They also tend to be more pessimistic about corruption.
In Vietnam, another thing we found is that social media may have different effects depending on whether one lives in an urban or rural area. There’s evidence that social media in rural areas might actually inhibit protests and social movements, because the central government is much more aware of what is happening in the countryside and can quickly launch a crackdown on protesters.
In urban areas, however, the dynamics are somewhat different: the conditions exist for more spontaneous protest, as horizontal communication overwhelms the central government’s ability to move in and stop it.
So yes, I believe social media is having an impact on people’s relationship to the government in Vietnam, but it's a complex impact. To some extent, it is inhibiting the possibilities for rural revolt, but at the same time it’s helping to facilitate spontaneous urban protest movements.
On September 27, 2018, Paul Schuler delivers his seminar "Shadows on the Wall: Legislative Politics in Post-Reform Vietnam"
In Malaysia, criminality is a highly political question, and that is mainly why local scholarship on the topic is rare. Yet political participation by outlaws and criminalized groups is not new. Begun in 2008, Dr. Lemière’s research explores uncharted territory: how criminality related to politics in semi-authoritarian Malaysia, with a focus on the ruling party (UMNO) from 2008 to 2018. She shows how gangs have created umbrella (Malay) NGOs, like Pekida (shown here in caricature), to formalize their ties to political parties. For gangs, political militancy has become a business; political parties (mostly UMNO) have sub-contracted political actions and violence to such groups. Dr. Lemière’s research raises question regarding the nature of civil society and democratization, and offers a new perspective of ethno-religious controversies and clashes in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Sophie Lemière is a political anthropologist at Harvard’s Ash Center for Democracy in its program on Democracy in Hard Places. Her research examines the nexus between religion, politics, and criminality in a comparative perspective. She will be at Stanford in the fall before transferring to the National University of Singapore in the spring.
Dr. Lemière has held research positions in Singapore at the Asia Research Institute (NUS) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (NTU). She has been a visiting fellow at the University of Sydney, Cornell, UC Berkeley, and Columbia. She received her PhD from Sciences-Po in Paris. Her dissertation was the first study on the political links between gangs and umbrella NGOs in Malaysia. Her master’s research on apostasy controversies and Islamic civil society was awarded second prize for young scholars by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (1998-2008) in Leiden.
Dr. Lemière believes it is essential for academics to disseminate their research findings widely, especially in the countries they study. Accordingly, her publications have been written both general and academic readers within and beyond Malaysia. She is the editor of a series of books on “Malaysian Politics and People.” Misplaced Democracy was released in 2014. Illusions of Democracy (2017) will be re-published in 2018, and a third volume is expected in 2019, when her monograph “Gangsters and Masters: Complicit Militancy and Authoritarian Politics” will also appear. She is currently working on a political biography of Malaysia’s current prime minister during his recent campaign: “The Last Game: Malaysian Politics through Mahathir’s Eyes.”
Dr. Lemière maintains a blog on Mediapart and contributes regularly to New Mandala, The Conversation, Le Monde, and Libération among other outlets. She has also begun to develop several documentary film projects with French production companies, including a series on arts and politics. Her first film “9/43” featuring the Malaysian cartoonist Zunar was chosen one of the 25 best movies at the French short-film festival Infracourt in 2016.
Recent scholarship suggests that, under authoritarian regimes, quasi-democratic institutions such as elections and legislatures—the velvet gloves of autocratic rule—actually enable political stability and economic growth. The political economies of China and Vietnam are indeed remarkably stable and dynamic, and compared with China’s ostensibly democratic institutions, those in Vietnam are open and raucous. That makes Vietnam a likely place to find election and legislatures performing their hypothetically salutary functions. But are they?
Even in Vietnam, Prof. Schuler will argue, the legislature’s main function is to convey regime strength and cow possible opposition. Using evidence drawn from more than ten years of fieldwork, survey research, and close readings of legislative debates and the debaters’ lives, he finds that electoral and legislative activity reflect intra-party debates rather than genuine citizen opinion. His results should temper expectations that such institutions can serve either as safety valves for public discontent or as enablers of tangibly better governance. Single-party legislatures are more accurately seen as propaganda tools that reduce dissent while increasing disaffection. That said, Schuler will acknowledge that opponents of authoritarian rule may manage, under certain conditions, to repurpose seemingly democratic institutions toward undermining the regime whose longevity they were developed to prolong.
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Street, Stanford, CA 94305
Paul Schuler joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as a Lee Kong Chian Southeast Asia Fellow for 2018 from the University of Arizona's School of Government and Public Policy where he is an assistant professor.
His research focuses on institutions and public opinion within authoritarian regimes, with a particular focus on Vietnam. During his fellowship, he will be completing a book project on the evolution of the Vietnam National Assembly since 1986, which he compares to the Chinese National People's Congress. During his fellowship, he will also begin projects examining public support in Vietnam for climate change mitigation policies as well as other research on the role of personality in determining regime support. For more information on these projects, see his website: www.paulschuler.me.
Schuler's other work has appeared in top-ranking journals such as American Political Science Review, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of East Asian Studies. He holds a Ph.D in political science from the University of California, San Diego.
The future of ASEAN is necessarily unknown. Its futures, however, can be guessed with less risk of being wrong. The purpose of this article is not to predict with confidence but to "pandict" with reticence—not to choose one assured future but to scan several that could conceivably occur. Also, what follows is merely a range of possible futures, not the range. The five different ASEANs of the future all too briefly sketched below are meant to be suggestive, but they are neither fully exclusive nor jointly exhaustive. Potentiality outruns imagination. The author's hope is that by doing the easy thing—opening a few doors on paper—he may tempt analysts more knowledgeable than himself to do the hard thing. That truly difficult challenge is to pick the one doorway through which ASEAN is most likely to walk or be pushed through—and to warrant that choice with the comprehensive evidence and thorough reasoning that, for lack of space and expertise, are not found here. That said, this "pandiction" does start with a prediction, and thereafter as well the line between speculation and expectation—the possible and the probable—will occasionally be crossed. In addition, by way of self-critique, the author's postulations may overestimate the importance of China in ASEAN's futures