Security

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President Obama’s inauguration one week from today invites us to consider the
immediate agenda and outlook for U.S.-ROK relations. That agenda might usefully
address the following items:

  • Setting an appropriate tone and atmosphere for the bilateral relationship
  • Identifying first year goals for the alliance – and beyond
  • Crafting a mutually agreed vision and strategy for managing the challenges posed
  • by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, economic frailty and looming succession
  • Confirming and strengthening overall alliance and security policy
  • Finding a way to proceed on KORUS – the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
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Shorenstein APARC
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Don Keyser
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Recent analyses of U.S.-Korea relations have tended to focus on rising anti-American sentiments in South Korea and the changing nature of the overall alliance relationship. Either attributed to a case of Korean exceptionalism or U.S. exceptionalism, the current trend of anti-Americanism in Korea is treated as a unique watershed moment that portends the transformation of bilateral relations. Park argues that mobilization of anti-Americanism in Korea, however, is also a manifestation of anti-Great Power-ism, which is not new in the history of Korean politics. In fact, President Roh’s election platform of finding autonomy and self-reliance demonstrates close parallels with the anti-Qing mobilization in turn-of-the-century Korea. Anti-Great Power-ism (anti-sadae) emerged as a potent tool of political mobilization in the late 19th century, when the newly created Reform/Enlightenment Party made their criticism of the existing policy of “revering Great Powers” (sadae) the centerpiece of their attack against the conservative establishment. Even though sadae was originally a pragmatic policy of accommodating the powerful Qing, marking a departure from a cultural-ideological emulation of Ming China, it was stigmatized during 19th century politics as subservient and Great Power-dependent.

By comparing the progressives’ political mobilization processes in the late 19th century and in 2002-2006, the speaker argues that today’s anti-Americanism is actually a continuation of anti-China-ism seen from a broader historical perspective. At the same time, such anti-Great-Power mobilizations demonstrate the importance attached to relations with the “Great Powers” in Korean politics. Korean leaders have historically sought to generate political legitimacy by achieving different types of status in relations with the region’s dominant power in the context of regional hierarchy. A key implication of this study is that the social context of hierarchy continues to play an important role in alliance politics as well as East Asian security.

Seo-Hyun Park is an acting instructor in the Korean Studies Program at APARC and a PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University. Her dissertation project explores enduring patterns of strategic thinking and behavior in East Asia, examining how the hierarchical regional order has conditioned conceptions of state sovereignty and domestic security politics through comparative case studies of Japanese and Korean relations with China in the traditional East Asian order and with the United States in the post-1945 regional alliance system.

Park received a B.A. in Communications from Yonsei Universitiy in Korea and an M.A. in Government from Cornell University.

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Acting instructor
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Seo-Hyun Park is an acting instructor in the Korean Studies Program at APARC and a PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University. Her dissertation project explores enduring patterns of strategic thinking and behavior in East Asia, examining how the hierarchical regional order has conditioned conceptions of state sovereignty and domestic security politics through comparative case studies of Japanese and Korean relations with China in the traditional East Asian order and with the United States in the post-1945 regional alliance system.

Park has been a recipient of the Japan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, the Mellon Fellowship, and the Cornell University Einaudi Center’s Carpenter Fellowship, and most recently, the Predoctoral Fellowship at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. She has also conducted research in Japan and Korea as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo and the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University.  She received a B.A. in Communications from Yonsei Universitiy and an M.A. in Government from Cornell University.

Seo-Hyun Park Acting Instructor, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University Speaker
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As the new year begins, the administration of ROK President Lee Myung-bak faces an unusually complex and rapidly evolving regional security landscape as he seeks to craft a strategy that simultaneously deepens ties with the U.S., protects South Korean equities in North Korea, continues to reduce tensions with neighboring countries and promotes economic objectives in Northeast Asia (including eastern Siberia). What are his options, considerations and prospects for success?

The past year witnessed an accelerated pace and apparent deepening in substance of the nascent security ties between and among the nations of Northeast Asia. A veritable whirlwind of diplomatic activity featured “upgraded” dialogue and symbolic steps. Meanwhile, as token of warming relations and impetus for even closer regional cooperation, China, Japan and the ROK met trilaterally on an array of issues. Ambitious proposals – and cutthroat bargaining – attended competition for a stake in Russian energy resources and potential infrastructure projects in the conjunction of eastern Siberia, Korea and China. Through the year all involved parties – the ROK, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. – met in the Six-Party talks context. Each party, excepting North Korea, paid public obeisance to the goal of “transforming” the talks into a new regional security mechanism.

But the year 2009 dawns against the backdrop of uncertainties that cast a cloud over the promise suggested by these developments: the global economic and financial crisis; battered, untested or unpopular political leaderships; competing nationalisms – and national interests; and the import and implications of China’s “rise.”

Mr. Keyser retired from the U.S. Department of State in September 2004 after a 32-year career. He had been a member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1990, and held Washington-based ambassadorial-level assignments 1998-2004. Throughout his career he focused on U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Fluent in Chinese and professionally conversant in Japanese, Russian and French, he served three tours at the American Embassy in Beijing, two tours at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and almost a dozen years in relevant domestic assignments. In the course of his career, Keyser logged extensive domestic and foreign experience in senior management operations, conflict resolution, intelligence operations and analysis, and law enforcement programs and operations.

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Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2703 (650) 723-6530
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Pantech Fellow, 2008-09
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Donald W. Keyser retired from the U.S. Department of State in September 2004 after a 32-year career.  He had been a member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1990, and held Washington-based ambassadorial-level assignments 1998-2004.  Throughout his career he focused on U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Fluent in Chinese and professionally conversant in Japanese, Russian and French, he served three tours at the American Embassy in Beijing, two tours at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and almost a dozen years in relevant domestic assignments.  In the course of his career, Keyser logged extensive domestic and foreign experience in senior management operations, conflict resolution, intelligence operations and analysis, and law enforcement programs and operations.  A Russian language major in college and a Soviet/Russian area studies specialist through M.A. work, Keyser served 1998-99 as Special Negotiator and Ambassador for Regional Conflicts in the Former USSR.   He sought to develop policy initiatives and strategies to resolve three principal conflicts, leading the U.S. delegation in negotiations with four national leaders and three separatist leaders in the Caucasus region.

Keyser earned his B.A. degree, Summa Cum Laude, with a dual major in Political Science and Russian Area Studies, from the University of Maryland.  He pursued graduate studies at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., from 1965-67 (Russian area and language focus) and 1970-72 (Chinese area and language focus).   He attended the National War College, Fort McNair, Washington (1988-89), earning a certificate equivalent to an M.S., Military Science; and the National Defense University Capstone Program (summer 1995) for flag-rank military officers and civilians.

Don Keyser Pantech Fellow, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University Speaker
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Somewhere on the long list of problems that President Barack Obama will inherit next January will be the ongoing negotiations to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The announcement on October 11, removing North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for a verification mechanism, has the virtue of keeping the diplomatic
avenue open. But if we look carefully at what it took even to get to this interim point,
there should be no illusions about the difficulties of finishing the job.

The latest deal merely closes the second phase of an agreement that was originally signed in February 2007. This phase was supposed to be completed in 60 days. Instead it has taken 19 months. This 19-month saga of negotiation over what may be the easiest step in the process—freezing the status quo—should caution against any expectation that the next administration can easily step in and pick up the negotiating reins.

There are three options it can reasonably consider come January. One would be to try to regain what has been given away in these talks—the inclusion of undeclared sites and proliferation activities—by returning to tactics of international sanctions and Chinese pressure. Japan, which is unhappy with the deal, may be ready for this but there is no evidence that Beijing or even the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government in South Korea is interested in returning to confrontation. At the other end of the spectrum would be an effort to leapfrog the drawn-out phases by offering Pyongyang most of what they claim to want—normalization of relations, economic aid, security assurances, a formal peace treaty to end the Korean war—in a "grand bargain."

Finally, there is the least attractive but most likely course: to lock in the gains of plutonium containment and to continue the diplomatic slog into the dismantling phase, albeit with a more rigorous approach. The U.S. could also try to encourage regime transformation in the North through both engagement and pressure. Given the uncertainties over the health of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, this may be the only viable path to ending the North Korean nuclear threat.

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The Oriental Economist
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In addition to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the financial crisis, and the housing crisis (as if that were not enough!), the next American president will have his hands full with matters on the Korean peninsula.  What will be the future of Six Party talks?  What is the status of the leadership in Pyongyang?  How do changes in leadership in Washington (and potentially in Pyongyang) affect outcomes?  What are the prospects for US-ROK relations?  And what of the KORUS FTA?  Victor Cha, former director of Asian affairs at the White House, will lead a discussion on these issues.

Professor Cha is director of Asian Studies and holds the D.S. Song Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.  He left the White House in May 2007 after serving since 2004 as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.  At the White House, he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean peninsula, Australia/New Zealand and Pacific Island nation affairs.   Dr. Cha was also the Deputy Head of Delegation for the United States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing, and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the NSC.  

He is the award-winning author of Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize) and co-author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (Columbia University Press, 2004).  He has written articles on international relations and East Asia in journals including Foreign Affairs, International Security, Political Science Quarterly, Survival, International Studies Quarterly, and Asian Survey.   Professor Cha is a former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University, two-time Fulbright Scholar, and Hoover National Fellow,  CISAC Fellow, and William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford University.

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beyond the final score
He serves as an independent consultant, and has testified before Congress on Asian security issues.  He has been a guest analyst for various media including CNN, ABC Nightline, NBC Today Show, CBS Morning Show, Fox News, MSNBC, CNBC, BBC, ESPN, Sports Illustrated, and National Public Radio.

His new book Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (Columbia University Press, 2008) looks at the politics of sports and the Beijing Olympics. Cha holds a BA and Ph.D. from Columbia University, MA from University of Oxford.

This event is sponsored by the Pantech Group in Korea.

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Victor D. Cha Director of Asian Studies Speaker Georgetown University
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In the waning days of the Clinton administration, the momentum for engagement with North Korea, building from the earlier agreement to freeze its nuclear program and a moratorium on ballistic missile launches, accelerated to the brink of full-scale normalization of relations. The U.S. presidential election in 2000 brought that diplomatic freight train to an abrupt halt.

Will the 2008 election bring yet another dramatic change in U.S. Korea policy?

The answer, based on the published positions of the two candidates and conversations with his senior Asia policy advisors, seems to be NO. There are important differences of emphasis in the approaches of both candidates, which I will discuss, but the bottom line is that both men are likely to pick up where President George W. Bush leaves off.

There are two fundamental reasons why U.S. policy toward Korea – and more broadly in Northeast Asia --- will not change dramatically. First, Asia will continue to suffer from a deficit of presidential attention. The arc of crisis – Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan -- will necessarily still command, as it has for almost 8 years, the attention of senior American policymakers. Even that will have to fight for space with the growing global financial crisis.

Second, both candidates agree on the broad outlines of an Asia policy, one that does not depart radically from the one pursued by the Bush administration. As a senior McCain advisor put it to me: “There is not a huge difference on Asia between Obama and McCain.” Privately, Obama advisors also stress that there will not be a huge break with current U.S. policy.

Both campaigns are critical of the lack of attention paid to Asia and the need for the U.S. to be more proactive to strengthen existing alliances and to join the discussion about new forms of regional integration. Both candidates support the need to engage, rather than confront, a rising China. Both men call for the U.S. to pay more attention to management of our alliances with South Korea and Japan. And both Obama and McCain support the North Korean nuclear negotiations carried out by President Bush in his second term, although privately both campaigns are critical of the deal that has been struck.

If there are differences, they can be found in two areas – support for the Korea US free trade agreement and the willingness to directly engage North Korea and its regime.

Free Trade and the KORUS Free Trade Agreement

If there is one single issue regarding Korea on which Senators Obama and McCain clearly part company, it is the future of the free trade agreement negotiated with the Bush administration. Senator McCain is an unambiguous supporter of the FTA, not only as a trade pact but also as a symbol of the broader partnership between the U.S. and South Korea.

Senator Obama also supports free trade but is critical of this and other agreements, such as NAFTA, for failing to ensure market access and the protection of labor rights and the environment. Privately, Obama’s advisors understand the symbolic value of the FTA to the alliance, but they plan to ask Seoul to reopen talks on market access, particularly for the automobile industry. Their position reflects the importance of trade unions and the role of some key states – Michigan most of all – in the election outcome. Even if Obama loses, the Democrats are likely to strengthen their control of Congress, making approval of the FTA difficult under any circumstances.

Negotiating with Pyongyang: Back to the Future?

Both the McCain and the Obama camps publicly back the Bush administration’s negotiations with Pyongyang, but both are also privately critical, though for different reasons.

The Obama team is heavily populated by former Clinton administration officials who were involved in the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. They see the current deal as an inevitably flawed bargain, the result of the refusal of the administration to seriously engage the North directly until it had crossed the red line of nuclear weapons testing. With little leverage, not least the credible threat of coercion, we are left with containing the plutonium production of the North, and hoping that a grand bargain down the line can yield full denuclearization.

Obama recognizes the need for “close coordination and consultation with our allies South Korea and Japan,” as one of his advisors put it in a published interview, and supports continuing the Six Party Talks. But the emphasis is clearly on direct talks with North Korea, though conducted with a principled toughness that the Bush administration has not exhibited in its final months in office.

That readiness to conduct direct negotiations, up to conclusion of a peace treaty with Pyongyang and full normalization of relations, is where the two candidates part company. The Republican nominee is clearly uncomfortable with direct dealings with Pyongyang – his position resembles the first term of the Bush administration more than the second in that respect. His advisory team combines realists, mainly veterans of the Powell State Department, and neoconservatives, reproducing the divisions that thwarted coherent policy-making in that first Bush term.

In the end, the views of McCain himself may be decisive. He was an opponent of the Agreed Framework, an agreement he characterized as “appeasement.” He maintained this stance into the Bush administration, vocally opposing any direct negotiations with the North Koreans as long as they maintained the right to develop nuclear weapons. He has been critical as well of the main deal struck by President Bush in his second term – “I didn’t believe in the KEDO agreement that President Clinton made and I don’t believe in this one,” he said in January.

McCain, according to an interview with one of his senior Asia advisors, would “seek a return to the core principles of denuclearization known as CVID, or complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement.” The demand for CVID was the watchword of the Bush administration’s earlier stance, in effect a call for Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear option as a first step. But that demand was dropped after Pyongyang called the Bush administration’s bluff by exploding a nuclear device in October, 2006.

McCain also wants to “broaden our policy goals related to North Korea” beyond nuclear issues, to including human rights, economic and political reform, and reduction of the conventional military threat from North Korea, goals also set out at the outset of the Bush administration. McCain has repeatedly referred to the North Korean regime, and its leader, Kim Jong Il, in harsh terms and embraced a policy of “rogue state rollback.”

Realistically, however, McCain offers no credible, practical means to reach these goals. He reserves, as does Obama, the option to use force. But concretely he comes back to the strategy of pressing China to bring North Korea to heel. Unfortunately the Bush administration also relied on China and found there were clear limits to Beijing’s ability to control or its willingness to press its North Korean client. In the end, McCain may have little option but to follow Bush to Pyongyang’s doorstep.

One Caveat – Events Matter

Despite the powerful impetus to maintain continuity in U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, no matter whom is elected in November, there is one important caveat to keep in mind – events matter. Unplanned, and unforeseen, developments could force Korea to the top of the President’s agenda. Already we have seen the reports of Kim Jong Il’s serious illness trigger fresh concerns about a possible collapse of political authority in Pyongyang. A simultaneous rush by China, South Korea and the United States to fill a vacuum of power in the North could upset all calculations. For South Korea, and President Lee Myung-bak, it is always best to prepare for the unexpected.

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The inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as president in February represented a significant shift in South Korea's foreign policy. After ten years of "progressive" rule in Seoul, Lee's skepticism about North Korean intentions and his unambiguous support for the U.S. alliance stand out in great contrast. Prof. Paik will analyze President Lee's foreign policy and its implications for dealing with North Korea and for relations with the United States, including in view of the upcoming change in U.S. administration.

Jin-Hyun Paik is a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Seoul National University (SNU). He is also director of its Institute of International Affairs (IIA), which publishes, among others, the Journal of International and Area Studies (formerly Asia Journal). He specializes in Korea’s foreign and security policy, international security and conflict management, and international law and organization. Educated at Seoul National University (LL.B.), Columbia Law School (LL.M.), and Cambridge University (Ph.D.), Prof. Paik has been a research associate at the Hague Academy of International Law; a visiting fellow at the Rand Corporation and the Hoover Institution, Stanford; and a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He was a member of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, Korea, and of official advisory committees to a number of Korean government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the National Security Council. Prof. Paik has edited six books and written over 100 articles in his fields of interest, in both English and Korean. He is also a frequent contributor and commentator on international affairs to major Korean newspapers and international media. Prof. Paik is an attorney-at-law (a member of the New York Bar). He is currently president of the Korean Academic Council on the United Nations System (KACUNS).

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Jin-Hyun Paik Professor, Seoul National University Speaker
Conferences

Kim argues anti-Americanism belongs to a category of political opposition which may be divided into orthodox dissent and unorthodox dissent: the former involving "efforts to improve the existing system in keeping with its underlying ideological values," while the latter is mainly concerned with the change in political and socioeconomic structures.

In the South Korean context, orthodox dissent is the conservative-rightist whereas unorthodox dissent the progressive-leftist. While sometimes criticizing the U.S. on selected issues, the conservative-rightist accounts cooperation with the U.S. crucial for keeping North Korea from provoking military actions against the South. On the other hand, the progressive-leftist regards the North Korean regime a partner to live together and unification with the North most valuable, transcending ideologies and systems. The progressive-leftist naturally regards "dependence" on the U.S. being against its national autonomy, and in the extreme, the U.S. an obstacle to its unification with the North.

This talk brings its focus on anti-Americanism derived from the progressive-leftist or unorthodox dissenting argument, and its influence on the ROK-U.S relations.

Hakjoon Kim is a visiting scholar at Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford and is the Chairman of Dong-a Il Bo, South Korean newspaper.  He was the President of Korea Political Science Association and Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations.  Kim was Scholar at the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation in Germany, and Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

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Hakjoon Kim Visiting Scholar, CEAS Speaker
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Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2703 (650) 723-6530
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Pantech Fellow, 2008-09
Keyser,_Don.jpg

Donald W. Keyser retired from the U.S. Department of State in September 2004 after a 32-year career.  He had been a member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1990, and held Washington-based ambassadorial-level assignments 1998-2004.  Throughout his career he focused on U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Fluent in Chinese and professionally conversant in Japanese, Russian and French, he served three tours at the American Embassy in Beijing, two tours at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and almost a dozen years in relevant domestic assignments.  In the course of his career, Keyser logged extensive domestic and foreign experience in senior management operations, conflict resolution, intelligence operations and analysis, and law enforcement programs and operations.  A Russian language major in college and a Soviet/Russian area studies specialist through M.A. work, Keyser served 1998-99 as Special Negotiator and Ambassador for Regional Conflicts in the Former USSR.   He sought to develop policy initiatives and strategies to resolve three principal conflicts, leading the U.S. delegation in negotiations with four national leaders and three separatist leaders in the Caucasus region.

Keyser earned his B.A. degree, Summa Cum Laude, with a dual major in Political Science and Russian Area Studies, from the University of Maryland.  He pursued graduate studies at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., from 1965-67 (Russian area and language focus) and 1970-72 (Chinese area and language focus).   He attended the National War College, Fort McNair, Washington (1988-89), earning a certificate equivalent to an M.S., Military Science; and the National Defense University Capstone Program (summer 1995) for flag-rank military officers and civilians.

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