International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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This is a revised version of a paper presented at a talk examining the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Contrary to widespread perception, the author argues that anti-Americanism in South Korea has a deep-rooted history, the expression of which was suppressed during decades of authoritarian rule. Anti-Americanism in South Korea involves a sophisticated ideology, constituting a kind of belief system. Hakjoon Kim traces the history of such anti-Americanism from 1945 until the present.

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Hakjoon Kim

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Stanford University
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Pantech Fellow, 2008-09
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Donald W. Keyser retired from the U.S. Department of State in September 2004 after a 32-year career.  He had been a member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1990, and held Washington-based ambassadorial-level assignments 1998-2004.  Throughout his career he focused on U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Fluent in Chinese and professionally conversant in Japanese, Russian and French, he served three tours at the American Embassy in Beijing, two tours at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and almost a dozen years in relevant domestic assignments.  In the course of his career, Keyser logged extensive domestic and foreign experience in senior management operations, conflict resolution, intelligence operations and analysis, and law enforcement programs and operations.  A Russian language major in college and a Soviet/Russian area studies specialist through M.A. work, Keyser served 1998-99 as Special Negotiator and Ambassador for Regional Conflicts in the Former USSR.   He sought to develop policy initiatives and strategies to resolve three principal conflicts, leading the U.S. delegation in negotiations with four national leaders and three separatist leaders in the Caucasus region.

Keyser earned his B.A. degree, Summa Cum Laude, with a dual major in Political Science and Russian Area Studies, from the University of Maryland.  He pursued graduate studies at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., from 1965-67 (Russian area and language focus) and 1970-72 (Chinese area and language focus).   He attended the National War College, Fort McNair, Washington (1988-89), earning a certificate equivalent to an M.S., Military Science; and the National Defense University Capstone Program (summer 1995) for flag-rank military officers and civilians.

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Visiting Scholar, 2008-09
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Park, Se-Il is a professor of law and economics in the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He is the founder and chairman of the board of Hansun Foundation for Freedom and Happiness, which is an independent, non-partisan think tank based in Seoul devoted to high-quality public policy research. The Foundation works to provide innovative and practical policy recommendations to the South Korean government.

Dr. Park is the author of many books including Communitarian Liberalism (2008); National Strategy for Sunjinwha in Korea (National strategy to make Korea to become a world class nation)(2006); Blueprint for Tertiary Education Reform in Korea (2003); Strategy for Presidential Success: Authority, Role, and Responsibility (2002); Growth, Productivity, and Vision for Korean Economy (2001); Reforming Labor Management Relations: lessons from the Korean experience: 1996-1997 (2000); Law and Economics
(2000).

Park is currently writing a book on globalization in which he plans to research several important political, social, and economic challenges, stemming from globalization. Based on that research he hopes to make comprehensive strategic recommendations for Korea to become a successful advanced nation in the age of globalization. The tentative title is Creative Globalization: Korean strategy for globalization.

Park has taught for more than 20 years at Seoul National University, College of Law and Graduate School of International Studies. He served as Senior Secretary to the president for policy planning and social welfare in the Office of the President of the Republic of Korea
from 1995 to 1998, and was a member of National Assembly of the Republic of Korea from 2004 to 2005. He also worked at the Korea Development Institute as a Senior Fellow from 1980 to 1985. He received the Chung-Nam Award from the Korean Economic Association in 1987 for his outstanding publications in economics. He served as President of the Korean Labor Economic Association (2001-2002), President of the Korean Law and Economic Association (2000-2003), and President of the Korean Institutional Economic Association (2002-2003). Park received his BA from Seoul National University and his MS and PhD from Cornell University.

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David Straub
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Korean Studies Program associate director David Straub argued in The Nelson Report, a top Washington, D.C. policy newsletter, that Korea needs to take a strategic approach toward the controversy with Japan over the Dokdo Islets ("Takeshima" in Japanese). Widely reported in Korea, Straub's message urged Korea to base its policy on the fact that it has effective control of the islets.

After the events of the past few days, I felt a need to update and expand on my note to you of last week about Dokdo.

First, as a preface for all that is to follow, I fully understand why Koreans feel very strongly about the Dokdo issue and, frankly, I personally sympathize with the ROK claim to the islets.

My basic understanding of the issue is as follows:

(1) The ROK has actual possession of the islets. Japan cannot take the matter to the international court unless the ROK agrees, and the ROK won't. Japan will not attempt to use force to take the islets. As far as I know, not a single country in the world wishes to get involved in the controversy between the ROK and Japan over Dokdo, and thus none will support Japan. In other words, there is no prospect that possession of the islets will ever change from the ROK to Japan (in fact, former Prime Minister Abe made a statement acknowledging this situation a few years ago).

(2) Because of (1) above, however, probably no country, much less the international community as a whole, is likely for the foreseeable future to formally support ROK sovereignty (as opposed to not challenging its actual possession) over Dokdo.

(3) Logically, therefore, the ROK's goals should be to (a) maintain actual physical possession of Dokdo, which, as explained above, is not a problem, (b) in the mid-term, persuade others in the international community that Korea's claim outweighs Japan's, and (c) thereby lay the basis, in the long run, for Japan's eventual dropping its claim and/or the international community actively supporting the ROK's claim.

(4) Given all of the above, tactically the ROK should take a confident, low-key, long-term, strategic approach toward Dokdo.

(a) Overreacting to offending Japanese steps or actions can play into the hands of the Japanese right-wing, both domestically in Japan where those Japanese not particularly interested in Dokdo may be offended and energized by Korean criticism of all "Japanese" and "Japan," and in the international community, where strong Korean reactions are widely reported and thus unintentionally result in increased publicity for the Japanese claim.

(b) Similarly, the ROK should take care not to "demand" that foreign countries support its position on Dokdo-for the time being that will not work and it risks offending those countries and thus hurting Korean interests overall-but confidently, diplomatically publicize its position based on the very best objective research on the issue.

(5) Regarding the recent controversy concerning the U.S., I agree fully that it was wise of President Bush to reverse the recent step by the Board on Geographic Names; the timing of the BGN step last week was extremely unfortunate. But for the ROK to develop a good strategy and good tactics on Dokdo for dealing with all countries, including the U.S., it is critically important for the ROK to correctly and fully analyze both the actions and the intentions of foreign countries.

As far as I can reconstruct what happened-and I caution that, as a former U.S. official, I have no access to confidential information and I am not a representative of the U.S. government-the BGN made a policy decision a year or more ago to note which territories are the subject of disputes around the globe.

Why then, the Korean media asks, did the BGN decide only last week to change the listing for Dokdo but not for other territories in the region, as has been asserted? It appears that bureaucratic procedures and resource limitations resulted in the BGN being very slow to make the actual changes mandated by its policy decision to specify territorial disputes.

What has not been noted in Korea, where the focus naturally is on the Dokdo issue, is that the BGN database has a huge number of errors and inconsistencies in its geographical listings, including territorial disputes, all over the world. Top U.S. government officials have publicly indicated that the BGN move was made by relatively low-level, technical officials who did not seek policy input from senior levels of the U.S. government. Clearly that was very unfortunate, and, for the U.S., the incident highlights the need for the BGN to seek such policy guidance in all cases.

As for the timing of the BGN change, it appears, ironically, that BGN officials were alerted to the controversy by media reporting about the strong Korean reaction to the latest Japanese step. (The Japanese step itself would have received virtually no coverage in the U.S. media if it had not been for the strong Korean reaction.) Acting without policy guidance related directly to Dokdo, the BGN officials apparently thought they were updating the database in response to the general policy change made a year or so earlier. I am aware of no indication that Japanese "lobbying" was behind the BGN move last week.

(6) I can thus easily understand why Koreans, based on their concerns and the information available to them, would construe the BGN action as "siding with" the Japanese position. But, in terms of developing ROK strategy and tactics, it is important, as I noted above, that the Korean government and people fully and accurately understand foreign intentions. In the U.S. case, it is clear that the U.S. government did not and does not intend to change its long-standing policy of not taking a position regarding Dokdo.

What happened in the U.S. was largely the result of pedestrian bureaucratic incompetence and failure to communicate internally within the government-not the result of a basic policy change, much less a conspiracy to support Japan. (I am reminded of the old and very wise saying that one should "never ascribe to conspiracy that which can be explained by stupidity.")

While Koreans of course want all countries, particularly their U.S. ally, to support their position on Dokdo, they should also recognize the fundamentally favorable situation of the ROK in regard to Dokdo: the international community, including the U.S., is not challenging and will not challenge the ROK's actual possession of Dokdo. Thus, as former Prime Minister Abe indicated, Dokdo will remain Korean, and Koreans can say confidently, "Dokdo is our land."

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With the collapse of Soviet Union and a lack of internal energy resources, North Korea has been in economic hardships since early 1990s. Chung will discuss how the shortage of electric power has affected not only the operations of factories but the daily lives of North Koreans. He will also examine how North Korea has attempted to rehabilitate its energy sector internally and in external relations with neighboring countries as well as in the Six-Party Talks.

Lee will evaluate North Korean nuclear technology based on his analysis of North Korea’s National Science and Technology Development Plan and of its historical background. He
will examine the priorities in disabling of North Korea’s nuclear capacity.

Joon Young Chung is a reporter at Yonhap News, a Korean news wire service, and has worked in various departments including the national desk, business desk and the North Korea desk for the past 14 years. Recently he has covered Inter-Korean Dialogue and the Six-Party Talks.

Choongeun Lee is a Research Fellow at the Science & Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) in Korea. Before joining STEPI, he worked at the Yanbian University of Science & Technology, Chinese Academy of Science, and Peking University in China. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. in engineering from Seoul National University in Korea, and Ph.D. in education from Beijing Normal University in China.

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Joon Young Chung is a reporter at Yonhap News, a Korean news wire service, and has worked in various departments including the national desk, business desk and the North Korea desk for the past 14 years. Recently he has covered Inter-Korean dialogue and the Six-Party talks.

Joon Young Chung Visiting Scholar, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University Panelist

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Choongeun_Lee_1.jpg PhD

Choongeun Lee is a Research Fellow at the Science & Technology Policy Institute(STEPI, Korea). Before joining STEPI, he worked at the Yanbian University of Science & Technology, Chinese Academy of Science, and Peking University in China. He received his B.A. and Ph. D in engineering from Seoul National University in Korea, and Ph.D. in education from Beijing Normal University in China.

His research has concentrated on science and technology systems (S&T) and policy of North Korea, China, and other transition countries. His recent publications include Linking strategy of military and civil innovation system based on recent change in security posture on Korean peninsula (2007, STEPI), Education and S&T System in North Korea (2006, Kyongin Publishing Co.), Nuclear Bomb and Technology in North Korea (2005, Itreebook), The S&T System and Policy of North Korea (2005, Hanulbooks), The S&T Cooperation of North Korea-China and its Implication (2005, North Korean Studies Review).

Choongeun Lee Visiting Scholar, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University Panelist
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Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow Michael H. Armacost discusses U.S.-South Korea ties and points out challenges ahead. "From free trade to North Korea's nuclear threat," writes Armacost in the Christian Science Monitor, "both sides must move past years of missteps."

Stanford, Calif. - The visit this week of South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, offers a rare opportunity to put the American-Korean relationship back on a more solid footing. President Lee, who won a decisive victory in last December's election, has expressed views on the security alliance, a bilateral free trade agreement, and policy toward North Korea that are thoroughly compatible with US interests. And Mr. Lee's authority was bolstered by his party's substantial victory in legislative elections April 9.

The question is whether Washington is poised to take advantage of this convergence of views.

For the past eight years, a major perception gap between Seoul and Washington has been painfully evident. Our governments often worked at cross-purposes in the six-party talks to denuclearize North Korea. Progressive governments in South Korea encouraged peaceful coexistence with the North through a pattern of unreciprocated engagement. For much of that time, the Bush administration sought to isolate and pressure Pyongyang into relinquishing its nuclear ambitions, and it made little effort to conceal its hopes for a regime change in Pyongyang.

When Washington decided to move its military headquarters out of Seoul in 2003, many Korean officials suspected that the Americans were just eager to get troops out of North Korean artillery range. President Roh Moo Hyun at times seemed interested in carving out a role as a balance wheel between the major powers in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the US was preoccupied by problems in the Middle East, and some American officials wondered if the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance could long survive when one party dismissed the North Korean threat while the other viewed it as increasingly menacing.

Now comes Lee, a former mayor of Seoul and Hyundai construction executive with a reputation for tough-minded, pragmatic conservatism, eager to correct what he described as the misguided priorities of past ROK administrations. In a recent meeting with New Beginnings, a group of American policy experts on Korea, Lee appeared determined to accord priority to the alliance with the United States, exact a measure of reciprocity from the North, forestall major economic concessions to the North until it abandons its nuclear activities, and design a more ambitious global role for his country.

Surely Washington welcomes Lee's priorities. The tougher question is whether it can work effectively with him to translate shared aims into concrete results. This will pose three particular challenges.

First, on the nuclear issue, undeniably, bilateral talks with Pyongyang can facilitate diplomatic progress. There are dangers as well. Disconnects with the Japanese have deepened, and their officials occasionally complain about American "betrayals" in the discussions with Pyongyang. The North has consistently sought to use the negotiations to split the US and its allies. Success in the talks requires coordinated diplomacy between the US and the North's neighbors – especially with South Korea. In the past it often appeared that South Korean presidents worried less about Pyongyang's nuclear activities than Washington's possible reactions to them.

Today, there is the danger that South Korean conservatives may fear that Washington will ultimately acquiesce in North Korea's nascent nuclear status. No attempt to contain, let alone eliminate, the North Korean nuclear program can succeed unless the US and ROK governments work closely together. This will require a higher standard of candor and mutual trust in bilateral consultations than has been typical in recent years.

Second, the ratification of the Korea-US free-trade agreement (FTA) is a vital piece of unfinished business. Lee appears prepared to resume imports of US beef (halted due to mad cow disease concerns), essential to moving the FTA forward in Congress. Unfortunately, the Democratic presidential contenders are pandering to special interests on trade issues in a way they will probably later regret. Both sides have strategic and commercial interests at stake. The US stands to gain much more in increased exports from the FTA, while the Koreans hope that liberalizing foreign access to their economy will make them more competitive. So there is much to gain by nailing down this deal. A failure to complete it would be a significant strategic setback for our partnership.

Third, there is the question as to whether our political cycles will again diverge. For the past eight years, the US has been led by one of its most conservative administrations, while South Korea was headed by its most liberal president. Missteps were, perhaps, inevitable. And they have persisted, even though some effective work was done behind the scenes to forge cooperative arrangements on trade and force-deployment issues.

Lee's election signifies a conservative swing in South Korea's politics, while polls suggest the US may be moving in the opposite direction. Thus, a felicitous convergence of US and ROK official perspectives could prove fleeting. Yet the interests we share in expanded commerce, in modernizing our alliance, and in approaching the North with a joint strategy for "denuclearization" are compelling. They transcend partisan politics. They serve our respective national interests. The time to capitalize on them is now.

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New Beginnings: Post-Election Prospects for U.S.-ROK Relations, a non-partisan study group of distinguished former American senior officials and experts formed by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society, will release their report on how to revitalize the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance on Monday, April 14, in Washington, DC., followed by a presentation in New York on April 15.

The report is being issued on the eve of the arrival in the United States of newly elected and inaugurated President of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak. The report provides an analysis of the significance of the change in administration in South Korea and recommendations to American policymakers on steps to improve the partnership between the two countries. It reflects what the group learned during extensive meetings in Korea in early February, including discussions with then President-elect Lee and his senior advisors, as well as leading businessmen, security officials and experts, journalists, the leadership of the then ruling party, as well as senior American diplomats and military officials.


The full text of the report is available below. Press coverage of this project and the report can also be found in the links below.


New Beginnings was formed in anticipation of both the change in power in Korea and the upcoming U.S. national elections. The group plans to brief the presidential campaigns of all the major candidates on its recommendations, as well as key congressional leaders and senior administration officials.

Panel discussions by members of New Beginnings, looking ahead to President Lee’s visit to New York and Washington, will take place on:

Monday, April 14th, from 3:00-5:00 PM at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Rome Building, Room Auditorium, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC) hosted by Don Oberdorfer, Chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute at John Hopkins University.

Tuesday, April 15th, from 10:00-11:30 AM at Korea Society: New Beginnings: Post-Election Prospects for U.S.-ROK Relations (950 Third Ave, 8th Fl, New York, NY 10022) hosted by Evans Revere, president of The Korea Society.

Study group members are:

Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University

Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea

Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief

Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration

Thomas C. Hubbard, McLarty Associates; former U.S. ambassador to South Korea

Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent

Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea

Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University

Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist

David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director

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With the inauguration in February 2008 of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, The Korea Society and Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center launched a nonpartisan group of former senior U.S. government officials, scholars, and other American experts on Korea to explore how to revitalize the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) after nearly a decade of strains and tensions.

New Beginnings group members believe that the United States cannot afford to lose the opportunity presented by President Lee’s desire to build a global partnership. The group has identified several steps that the United States, in cooperation with the ROK, could take to move the alliance into a new era.

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%people1%, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, gives a few cautionary lessons on U.S.-Korea relations.
Earlier this month I visited Seoul as a member of “New Beginnings,” a study group of former American policymakers and experts on Korea, co-organized by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford, and The Korea Society. We formed this group last year, anticipating that the upcoming Korean elections and the American presidential elections afterwards would offer an opportunity to embark upon a “new beginning” in our alliance.

After several days of meetings in Seoul, most importantly with President-elect Lee Myeong-bak and his senior advisors, we came away convinced that our hopes for a “new beginning” were more than justified. As President Lee takes office, it is clear that his administration is deeply committed to restoring the alliance to its previous place as the foundation of Korean foreign and security policy. Equally important, the new government is focused on the need to boost economic growth based on the free flow of trade and investment, and sees the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States as central to that goal.

For those of us who have long argued that a vibrant Korea is vital to America’s interests, these were welcome words. It is no secret that there was a perception in the United States that President Roh Moo-hyun, backed by a significant portion of the Korean people, no longer saw the alliance as a strategic imperative for Korea. Unfortunately, many Americans, particularly in Congress, had begun to share this view of the alliance, fueled by a mistaken belief that Koreans were “anti-American.”

This view of President Roh and of Korea was unfair and even distorted. President Roh deserves credit, particularly in the last two years, for taking important steps to improve alliance relations, not least his promotion of the negotiation of the FTA. He made unpopular decisions, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq, in order to preserve a cooperative atmosphere. And as we saw demonstrated in the election, public opinion in Korea regarding the United States has shifted dramatically since the emotional days of 2002.

The Lee administration can anticipate a warm greeting in Washington, as is already clear in the preparations for his visit next month. The new President has sounded all the right notes – seeking closer cooperation on North Korea policy, restoring positive ties with Japan, America’s other vital ally in Northeast Asia, and building a broader strategic partnership with the U.S. beyond the Korean peninsula.

Amidst the renewed embrace of the alliance, it is worth however keeping a few cautionary lessons from the past in mind:

1. Not everything will be Smooth Sailing

Despite the welcome official rhetoric, it is no secret that the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea has never been entirely smooth. From its earliest days, born out of Korea’s liberation and the trials of the Korean War, the alliance has been marked by both close cooperation and by clashes over key policy goals. While bound together by strategic necessity, the national interests of Korea and the United States have not always been identical.

There is nothing unusual about such differences among allies. Look for example at the tensions that plagued U.S.-European relations over the disastrous decision to invade Iraq. Even with the best of intentions, there will be moments of conflict between Seoul and Washington. What is important is how governments manage those differences to protect the underlying relationship. Both Koreans and Americans need to remember the virtues of quiet diplomacy, trying to avoid negotiating their differences through the media.

2. All politics is local

Alliance relations can no longer be managed solely by diplomats or by friends meeting behind closed doors. Those ties are crucial but both Korea and the United States are democracies in which the issues that are at the core of the relationship – from trade to the alignment of military forces – are matters of public discussion. Domestic politics shapes policy decisions but both Koreans and Americans sometimes forget the pressures operating on the other side.

This is particularly important in an election year. The Korean National Assembly election in April is already having an impact, delaying ratification of the FTA. The U.S. election will mean FTA ratification by the U.S. Congress this year may be impossible. Presidential candidates are taking positions that they may adjust after gaining power. On another level, the new government in Seoul needs to remember that the Bush administration is a lame duck affair and begin to prepare for a new government in Washington.

3. Expect the Unexpected, particularly with North Korea

The limited progress on the nuclear negotiations with North Korea has temporarily brought closer coordination between Korea and the US. But it would be foolish to assume that this trend will necessarily continue. The negotiations are already facing a slowdown as negotiators grapple with much tougher problems. If they break down, both Seoul and Washington, along with their other partners in the 6-party talks, will face some hard questions about how to respond. Any attempt to pressure Pyongyang is likely to bring an escalatory response, not least to test the new government in Seoul.

It is possible that Seoul and Washington will once again be somewhat out of synch. Ironically, the Bush administration – and whatever follows it -- may favor greater concessions than the new administration in Seoul would prefer to make.

These differences are manageable. The key is real policy coordination between the US and Korea – and the inclusion of Japan in a revived trilateral coordination mechanism. If both sides keep that commitment, we will indeed have made a “new beginning” in our alliance.

Daniel Sneider is the Associate Director for Research at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. A former foreign correspondent, Sneider covered Korea for the Christian Science Monitor.
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Shorenstein APARC has received a grant from the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul which enables the center to publish a series of books on Korea's democratization and social change, under the series title: Korean Democracy: From Birth to Maturity.

Under this three-year grant, the center will publish a series of studies which focus on: 1) the role of social movements in Korean democratization, 2) comparative relevance of the Korean experiences, and 3) impact of democratization on social and political changes.

For the first study the center will build upon its on-going research projects, particularly the Stanford Korean Democracy Project. This project seeks to understand the emergence and evolution of social movements and their role in Korean democratization. During the authoritarian years, when former military generals ruled Korea, various social groups participated in the movement to restore democracy and ensure human rights. Their activism was instrumental to democratic reforms that took place in the summer of 1987 and they continued to play an important role even after democratic transition.

The Stanford University Korea Democracy Project traces the dynamic of this social movement from 1970 to 1993. Based on sourcebooks obtained from the Korea Democracy Foundation, project researchers led by Dr. Gi-Wook Shin have created novel quantitative data sets. Specifically, they have coded the main features of nearly five thousand protest and repression events from 1970 to 1993, using a comprehensive coding scheme developed expressly for this purpose. In addition, researchers have coded an organizational directory that includes characteristics associated with 387 social movement organizations active during this same period. While there are many informative studies of particular movements - such as the Kwangju uprising - in Korea's democracy movement, the Stanford Korea Democracy Project aims to provide a systematic overview of the movement as it developed through the most authoritarian period (1972-84), democratic transition (1987), and the democratic period (post-1987). Two books are expected from this project.

The second study will address the comparative relevance of Korean experiences. The comparison between Korea and other non-Western societies raises many questions about the conditions necessary for democratic transformation, including the role of culture, national identity, social organization, labor politics, and economic modernization. There is also a need to understand how Korea's particular example provides lessons regarding effective democracy promotion. The center plans to host a conference on labor politics in Korean democracy that is designed to develop a theoretical challenge to the Euro-centric theoretical paradigm in labor studies and draw implications for other non-Western societies. In advancing comparative perspectives, the researchers will work closely with Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). The coordinator of their Democracy Program, Larry Diamond, has already published two books that looked at Korea's experience in this comparative framework.

Finally, the third study will assess the impact of democratization on broader social and political changes in South Korea. This will include not only domestic issues but also Korea's relations with other nations. The latter is particularly relevant since Korean democratization took place in the post-cold war era. As such, democratization has provoked Koreans to rethink their views of the North, US-ROK relations and Korea's role in the world. Clearly democratic change has significantly altered the environment in which Korean government policy is made, broadening the public policy dialogue to include non-governmental actors, new media, and politicians who are sensitive to the shifts of public opinion. Researchers at the center will explore this dynamic in supporting the research and publication of a new book on South Korea's democratization and the anti-American wave of 1999-2002, authored by a former senior American official, David Straub, currently a 2007-2008 Pantech Research Fellow at the Center. 

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