At a seminar co-hosted by the APARC’s Korea Program and Taiwan Program, Weitseng Chen, a professor of law at the National University of Singapore, examined how rule of law promotion, often assumed to foster democracy, can instead reinforce authoritarianism. Drawing from his comparative research on Taiwan, South Korea, and China, Chen challenged conventional legal modernization theory and urged a reconsideration of how law, state capacity, and democracy interact in East Asia.

Two Routes to Modernization
 

Legal modernization theory has long held that strengthening the rule of law triggers economic growth, which then creates demand for democratic reform. Chen revisited this assumption by analyzing how different approaches to rule-of-law promotion have unfolded in Asia. He identified two dominant models:

• State-First Approach: Adopted by Taiwan and South Korea during the Cold War, this strategy sought to bolster state capacity and counter communist influence. Legal and institutional reforms were state-centric and top-down, often guided by U.S. agencies such as USAID.
• Democracy-First Approach: Emerging after the Cold War and applied in places like China, this model defined the rule of law broadly, linking it to democratic reforms, civil society, and bottom-up participation.
   

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While these strategies differed in rhetoric and design, Chen argued that both could serve authoritarian ends. Rather than dismantling centralized control, external aid and rule-of-law promotion frequently strengthened state institutions and legitimized regimes resistant to political liberalization.

Law, Development, and Authoritarian Resilience
 

Chen observed that in Taiwan and South Korea, formal constitutional protections coexisted with widespread acceptance of rights violations under martial law. Legal modernization contributed to economic growth and institutional development, but it did not democratize political power. The legal system maintained a dual track: one for everyday justice, such as civil disputes, and another for politically sensitive cases, where judicial independence was curtailed by executive intervention.

In China, the judiciary remains integrated into the administrative hierarchy. Courts coordinate closely with local governments and party officials to maintain social stability and economic order. Chen noted that this collaboration yields efficiency and responsiveness, but at the cost of judicial autonomy. In this context, law functions primarily as a tool of governance rather than a mechanism for accountability.

Implications for Rule-of-Law Promotion
 

Chen asserted that the assumption that the rule of law leads to democracy is empirically weak. In East Asia, democracy made the rule of law possible, not the reverse. Rule-of-law promotion remains politically neutral with respect to regime type, and its democratizing effects are reactive rather than proactive.

He emphasized the need to prevent state capture by recognizing how legal frameworks can be co-opted by authoritarian leaders. International actors and aid agencies, he argued, must catch early signals of legal misuse, assess the political consequences of legal reforms, and tailor strategies to local aspirations for strong yet accountable governance.

Key Takeaways for Legal Modernization
 

• Rule-of-law promotion is not inherently democratic. In many contexts, it strengthens rather than constrains authoritarian states.
• Economic development does not guarantee liberalization. Legal modernization can expand markets and infrastructure without expanding rights.
• Sequencing matters. Building state capacity often precedes democracy; reversing the order can entrench authoritarianism.
• Preventing state capture is essential. Legal reforms must anticipate how laws can be manipulated for regime preservation.
• Context-specific strategies are vital. Effective rule-of-law promotion must align with local political realities rather than universal templates.
   

Chen’s analysis underscores the paradox at the heart of legal modernization: law can both constrain and empower authoritarian power. His research on Taiwan, South Korea, and China calls for a more nuanced understanding of how legal systems operate within different regime types.