Water scarcity is one of the key problems that affect northern China, an area that covers 40 percent of the nation's cultivated area and houses almost half of the population. The water availability per capita in North China is only around 300 m3 per capita, which is less than one seventh of the national average. At the same time, expanding irrigated cultivated area, the rapidly growing industrial sector and an increasingly wealthy urban population demand rising volumes of water. As a result, groundwater resources are diminishing in large areas of northern China. For example, between 1958 and 1998, groundwater levels in the Hai River Basin fell by up to 50 meters in some shallow aquifers and by more than 95 meters in some deep aquifers.

Past water policies have not been effective in solving water scarcity problems. China's leaders have put priorities on increasing water supply through developing more canal networks or building more reservoirs. In 2001, the State Council started the South-to-North Water Transfer Project. However, these supply-side approaches cannot meet the increasing demand for water from all of the different sectors and cannot solve water scarcity problems in the long run.

The purpose of this executive summary is to provide a concise statement about what we have learned about investment into China's rural environment. The overall purpose is to help the Bank understand what is happening in rural China, what farmer's are thinking about the current trends and what they are hoping will happen in the future (if they had a say). One of the most important questions is answer what should the role of the state be.

Theories about political movements typically posit models of actor choice that contain untested static assumptions about context. Short‐run changes in these contexts-induced by rapid shifts in the properties of political institutions-can alter choices and actors' interests, rapidly transforming the political landscape. China's Red Guard Movement of 1966-68 is a case in point. A generation of scholarship has attributed its violent factionalism to the opposed interests of different status groups. New evidence about the origins of the movement in Beijing's universities indicates that to the contrary, factions emerged when activists in similar structural positions made opposed choices in ambiguous contexts. Activists subsequently mobilized to defend earlier choices, binding them to antagonistic factions. Rapid shifts in the contexts for political choice can alter prior connections between social position and interests, generating new motives and novel identities. Close attention to these contextual mechanisms can yield novel accounts of the nature and origins of political movements.

The dynamics of a global economy is being reshaped by the economic emergence of two Asian giants, China and India. How the world's two most populous countries manage globalization as they pursue economic reform and liberalization will impact significantly their societies, the rest of Asia, and the world.

This book brings together articles by first rate scholars of China and India to share and discuss their research findings in four areas: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses to Globalization; Social Security and Governance; National Security in the age of Globalization; and Ethnicity and Identity in the New World.

The book includes an opening address by Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, from his speech on Managing Globalization: Lessons from China and India, delivered at the official opening of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy on 4 April 2005.

These essays reveal how China's Communist Party selected a new generation of leaders in late 2002 to maintain the position of a regional and world power. They explain how China's leaders are promoting a market economy and undertaking gradual political reforms and note the problems they are having in handling mounting political corruption, spreading unemployment, growing disparity of wealth and income, and a crisis of belief.

Gradual change has been a hallmark of the Chinese reform experience, and China's success in its sequential approach makes it unique among the former command economies. Since 1979, with the inception of the continuing era of reform, the Chinese economy has flourished. Growth has averaged nine percent a year, and China is now a trillion dollar economy. China has become a major trading power and the predominant target among developing countries for foreign direct investment. Despite all this, China remains poor and the reform process unfinished.

This book takes its defining theme from Deng Xiaopeng's famous metaphor for gradual reform: "feeling the stones to cross the river." How far has China progressed in fording the river? The experts who contributed to this volume tackle many aspects of that question, assessing Chinese progress in policy reform, priorities for further reform, and the research still needed to inform policymakers' decisions.

Command economies gave Communist-era elites administrative control and material privilege but severely restricted money income and private wealth. Markets and privatization inject new value into public assets and create unprecedented opportunities for elite insiders. These opportunities depend on the extent of regime change and barriers to asset appropriation. Regime change varies from the survival of the entire party hierarchy to its rapid collapse and defeat in competitive elections. Barriers to asset appropriation vary with the extent, pace, and form of privatization, and the concentration and liquidity of assets. Different combinations of such circumstances jointly affect the extent to which elites obtain ownership of control of privatized assets, use political office to extract larger incomes, move into salaried elite occupations, or fall out of the elite altogether. Regime change and barriers to asset appropriation affect change at the national level, but outcomes vary across economic sectors because of characteristics of organizations, elite positions, and assets. This elementary theory serves to integrate varied findings from recent research on Central Europe, China, and Russia, and yields predictions for other regions.

The overall goal of our paper is to explore this question of how China's policy will likely respond as the nation enters the WTO. Specifically, we will have three objectives. First, we briefly review China's existing agriculture policy and past performance of China's agriculture and how it has changed during the past 20 years of reform. Next, we examine the main features of the agreement that China must adhere to as they enter WTO. Finally, we consider a number of possible ways that policy makers may respond, primarily focusing on the national government's viewpoint.