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Is it good governance that leads to growth or vice versa? Applying a "complexity" framework to China’s great economic and bureaucratic transformation, Professor Ang argues that governance and growth necessarily interact and coevolve. So-called good governance is not a universal set of institutions—its particular forms vary dramatically at early and late stages of development. Moreover, the adaptive processes of coevolution do not universally happen or work. Understanding how reformers tackled problems of adaptation illuminates the sources of China’s extraordinary dynamism and the new challenges in the 21^st century. 

Yuen Yuen Ang is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Michigan. Ang studies development and governance in developing countries, especially China, focusing on the coevolution of state and economy, bureaucracy, and corruption. Her research has appeared in The Journal of Politics, Comparative Politics, The China Quarterly, and other journals. Ang’s book project was supported by the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS)/Andrew Mellon Foundation, Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation, Overseas Young Chinese Foundation/1990 Institute, APSA Paul Volcker Junior Scholar Grant, and grants from Stanford, Columbia, and Michigan. A summary essay of Ang's forthcoming book is available at this link. She was awarded the Eldersveld Prize for outstanding research by the UM Political Science Department in 2014. Before joining Michigan, she was an Assistant Professor at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). She obtained her PhD from Stanford University.

This event is part of the New Approaches to China series.

The period from the arrest of the “gang of four” in October 1976 to the final step in the removal of Hua Guofeng in mid-1981 saw CCP rural policy go through a number of phases. The initial emphasis on a moderate version of the Dazhai model gave way to “traditional policies” (luoshi zhengce) by mid-1978; these policies were supplemented in 1979 by “responsibility systems,” the most radical of which, household contracting (baochan daohu), became a sharply divisive issue in 1980, but still not the main aspect of agricultural policy. The tide was moving strongly toward household contracting by mid-1981, but had not yet achieved unambiguous endorsement as the Party policy.

A number of inadequate approaches have dominated the literature, notably 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua Guofeng's neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition; 2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial reformers. The first has no validity, the second and third must be viewed through more complex lenses. The talk will explicate the key factors and present an alternative explanation of the success of rural reform.

Frederick C. Teiwes is Emeritus Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney. He received his B.A. from Amherst College and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He is the author of various books on Chinese elite politics including Politics and Purges in China (1979, 1993), Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China (1984), and Politics at Mao's Court (1990). Some of his most important work has been jointly authored with Warren Sun including The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955 (1993), The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1971 (1996), China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Emergence of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959 (1999), and The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (2007).

In recent years Chinese courts, in particular those in Henan Province, have begun to place a vast quantity of court options online.  This talk examines one-year of publicly available criminal judgments from one basic-level rural county court and one intermediate court in Henan in order to better understand trends in routine criminal adjudication in China.  The result is an account of ordinary criminal justice that is both familiar and striking:  a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting state interests, harshly while at the same time acting leniently in routine cases.  Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal cases in China today.  Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those who do not.  Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.  These findings provide insight into a range of debates concerning the roles being played by the Chinese criminal justice system and the functions of courts in that system.  Examination of cases from Henan also provides a base for discussing the future of empirical research on Chinese court judgments, demonstrating that there is much to learn from the vast volume of cases that have in recent years become publicly available.

Benjamin L. Liebman is the Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for Chinese Legal Studies at Columbia Law School. His recent publications include “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” Columbia Law Review (2013); “A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform,” in Mao’s Invisible Hand (edited by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry, 2011); and “Toward Competitive Supervision?  The Media and the Courts,” China Quarterly (2011).

SCID and SCP present a special seminar with Professor Xiaonian Xu

The Chinese economy has grown so fast and for so long. But the “miracle” has started fading in recent years.  Why?  Prof. Xu argues that the reform era can be divided into two fundamentally different phases.  Phase I, from 1978 to the mid-1990s, is characterized by market-oriented reforms, whereas Phase II, from the mid-1990s onward, is dominated by government-led investment and interventions. Though China’s growth performance looks identical in numbers over the two phases, the source of growth has changed from efficiency gains to increased use of resources. Phase II growth is thus unsustainable, and worse, it has brought about structural distortions that severely undermine the economy’s growth potential. To maintain growth even at a moderate level, China needs to go beyond what the leadership has promised and planned.

Dr. Xiaonian Xu is Professor of Economics and Finance at CEIBS. He worked for China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC) since 1999 as Managing Director and Head of Research. The research team under Dr. Xu was ranked No. 1 in 2002 among domestic brokerage firms by Chinese institutional investors. And Dr. Xu himself was voted in the same survey as the best in economics research. Prior to CICC, Dr. Xu was Senior Economist with Merrill Lynch Asia Pacific based in Hong Kong from 1997 to 1998. He worked as a consultant of the World Bank in Washington DC in 1996. Dr. Xu was appointed Assistant Professor of Amherst College, Massachusetts, from 1991 to 1995, teaching Economics and Financial Markets. He was employed by the State Development Research Center of China as a research fellow from 1981 to 1985.
 
Dr. Xu obtained Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, Davis, in 1991, and MA in Industrial Economics in 1981 from People's University of China . He received Sun Yefang Economics Prize in 1996, the highest Chinese award in the field, for his research on China 's capital markets. His research interests include: Macroeconomics, Finance, Financial Institutions and Financial Markets, Transitional Economies, and China 's Economic Reform. Dr. Xu is the recipient of the 2005 and 2006 CEIBS Teaching Excellence Award. Dr. Xu received the prestigious CEIBS Medal for Teaching Excellence in 2010.