Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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Transitions from state socialism created a startling range of initial economic outcomes, from renewed growth to deep economic crises. Debates about the causes have largely ignored the political disruptions due to regime change that coincided with sudden initial recessions, and they have defined the problem as relative growth rates over time rather than abrupt short-run collapse. Political disruptions were severe when states broke apart into newly independent units, leading to hyperinflation, armed warfare, or both. Even absent these disruptions, the disintegration of communist parties inherently undermined economic activity by creating uncertainty about the ownership of state assets. The protracted deterioration of the party- state prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union generated widespread conflict over control of assets, which crippled economic activity across the Soviet successor states. A more rapid path to regime change was less disruptive in other post-communist states, and the problem was absent in surviving communist regimes. Comparative accounts of regime change frame an analysis of panel data from 31 countries after 1989 that distinguishes the early 1990s from subsequent years. A wide range of variables associated with alternative explanations have little evident impact in accounting for the onset and severity of the early 1990s recessions.

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American Sociological Review
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Andrew G. Walder
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China’s Communist Party seized power in 1949 after a long period of guerrilla insurgency followed by full-scale war, but the Chinese revolution was just beginning. China Under Mao narrates the rise and fall of the Maoist revolutionary state from 1949 to 1976—an epoch of startling accomplishments and disastrous failures, steered by many forces but dominated above all by Mao Zedong.

Mao’s China, Andrew Walder argues, was defined by two distinctive institutions established during the first decade of Communist Party rule: a Party apparatus that exercised firm (sometimes harsh) discipline over its members and cadres; and a socialist economy modeled after the Soviet Union. Although a large national bureaucracy had oversight of this authoritarian system, Mao intervened strongly at every turn. The doctrines and political organization that produced Mao’s greatest achievements—victory in the civil war, the creation of China’s first unified modern state, a historic transformation of urban and rural life—also generated his worst failures: the industrial depression and rural famine of the Great Leap Forward and the violent destruction and stagnation of the Cultural Revolution.

Misdiagnosing China’s problems as capitalist restoration and prescribing continuing class struggle against imaginary enemies as the solution, Mao ruined much of what he had built and created no viable alternative. At the time of his death, he left China backward and deeply divided.

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Harvard University Press
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Andrew G. Walder
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In the third annual Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Memorial Lecture on U.S.-East Asia Relations, Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford, former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, discusses U.S. policy toward China. The speech titled "The United States and China: Same Bed, Different Dreams, Shared Destiny" was delivered at The Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., on April 20, 2015. Links to English and Chinese versions are listed below.

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Fei Yan, a postdoctoral fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, has been awarded a prize from the China and Inner Asia Council (CIAC) for his paper on political rivalries during China’s Cultural Revolution. The award aims to recognize emerging scholarship and foster intellectual exchange among experts working on China and Inner Asia topics, according to the award website.

Yan was presented the award at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference on March 27. CIAC released the following statement:

“In his paper, Fei Yan offers a new interpretation of the factional rivalries that wracked China's provinces during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. His focus is on the dispute between the so-called ‘radical’ Red Flag faction and the so-called ‘conservative’ East Wind faction that came to a head in Guangzhou in 1967. Making use of previously unavailable archival sources, he offers a meticulous and detailed description of the extent to which this split was based less on deep ideological differences and more on intense power rivalries and disagreements over tactics.”

Yan specializes in Chinese politics and political culture, and comparative social policy within transitional economies and authoritarian settings. He will join the Department of Political Science at Tsinghua University as an assistant professor this fall.

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In China’s and Vietnam’s latest party congresses, the candidates for promotion with the highest public profiles failed to advance. In China, neither the “populist” Bo Xilai nor the “liberal” Wang Yang won a seat in the Politburo Standing Committee. In Vietnam, the charismatic Da Nang party secretary Nguyen Ba Thanh also failed to win a new position. Dr. Schuler will present a theory with evidence showing that the link between these candidates’ visibility and non-promotion was not accidental. His finding that the public profile of a candidate has an independent effect on his or her chance of advancement improves an analytic debate hitherto focused mainly on loyalty and performance.

Paul Schuler will be an assistant professor in government and public policy at the University of Arizona starting this fall. His publications have appeared in the American Political Science Review, the Legislative Studies Quarterly, and the Journal of East Asian Studies among other places. His researches focuses on institutions, elite politics, and public opinion in authoritarian regimes, particularly Vietnam. His 2014 PhD in political science is from the University of California, San Diego.

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Paul Schuler 2014-15 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow in Contemporary Asia, APARC
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A new generation of leaders has taken the helm in China. They inherit a China that has experienced more than three decades of hyper growth. Yet the Chinese development model is being tested by growing imbalances even while the Chinese leadership faces growing public expectations at home and rising demand abroad. In this lecture, Professor Yang Dali will discuss the challenges to and prospects for China’s governance.

Dali Yang (Ph.D., Princeton, 1993) is the author of numerous books and scholarly articles on the politics and political economy of China. Among his books are Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford University Press, 2004); Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (Routledge, 1997); and Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford University Press, 1996). He is also editor of Discontented Miracle: Growth, Conflict, and Institutional Adaptations in China (World Scientific, 2007) and co-editor and a contributor to Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in Post-Deng China (Cambridge University Press, 2004). He is a member of various committees and organizations and serves on the editorial boards of Asian Perspective, American Political Science Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and World Politics.

China’s Conflicting Policy Directions

A climate of uncertainty marks the Xi administration’s second year in power. The unfurling of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, including high-profile domestic and international targets, may have unintended effects on economic growth. But will these effects be short- or long-lived? Can this campaign build confidence, domestically and internationally, in the party’s governing capacity? Questions also swirl around the motivations for reviving Mao-era language in the political realm while maintaining a relentless urbanization drive in the social and economic realms. In foreign affairs, centrifugal regional forces and suspicion of US intentions in the Pacific must be reconciled with China’s deepening engagement with global institutions and commitment to “opening up” to the world. To address these issues, this series will bring together experts to share research and insights on the underlying logic for the seemingly contradictory policy paths recently chosen by China’s leaders. 

Please note: this talk is off the record.

Philippines Conference RoomEncina Hall616 Serra St., 3rd floorStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305
Dali Yang Professor University of Chicago
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A climate of uncertainty marks the Xi administration’s second year in power. The unfurling of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, including high-profile domestic and international targets, may have unintended effects on economic growth. But will these effects be short- or long-lived? Can this campaign build confidence, domestically and internationally, in the party’s governing capacity? Questions also swirl around the motivations for reviving Mao-era language in the political realm while maintaining a relentless urbanization drive in the social and economic realms.

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Joseph Fewsmith is the author of four books:  China Since Tiananmen:  The Politics of Transition(2001), Elite Politics in Contemporary China (2001), The Dilemmas of Reform in China:  Political Conflict and Economic Debate (1994), and Party, State, and Local Elites in Republican China:  Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1980-1930 (1985).  He is very active in the China field, traveling to China frequently and presenting papers at professional conferences such as the Association for Asian Studies and the American Political Science Association.  His articles have appeared in such journals as Asian Survey, Comparative Studies in Society and History, the China Journal, the China Quarterly, Current History, The Journal of Contemporary China, Problems of Communism, and Modern China.  He is also a research associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University.

Alice Lyman Miller is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches in the Departments of History and Political Science at Stanford. She is also a senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Miller's research focuses on foreign policy and domestic politics issues in China and on the international relations of East Asia. She is editor and contributor to the Hoover Institution’s China Leadership Monitor, which has since 2001 offered online authoritative assessments of trends in Chinese leadership politics to American policymakers and the general public. Miller has published extensively on policy issues dealing with China, including several articles and book chapters, as well as two books: Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Knowledge (University of Washington Press, 1996), and, with Richard Wich, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War II (Stanford University Press, 2011).  She is currently working on a new book, tentatively entitled The Evolution of Chinese Grand Strategy, 1550–Present, that brings a historical perspective to bear on China's rise in the contemporary international order.

China’s Conflicting Policy Directions

A climate of uncertainty marks the Xi administration’s second year in power. The unfurling of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, including high-profile domestic and international targets, may have unintended effects on economic growth. But will these effects be short- or long-lived? Can this campaign build confidence, domestically and internationally, in the party’s governing capacity? Questions also swirl around the motivations for reviving Mao-era language in the political realm while maintaining a relentless urbanization drive in the social and economic realms. In foreign affairs, centrifugal regional forces and suspicion of US intentions in the Pacific must be reconciled with China’s deepening engagement with global institutions and commitment to “opening up” to the world. To address these issues, this series will bring together experts to share research and insights on the underlying logic for the seemingly contradictory policy paths recently chosen by China’s leaders. 

Please note: this talk is off the record.

Philippines Conference RoomEncina Hall616 Serra St., 3rd floorStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305
Alice Lyman Miller Research Fellow Hoover Institution
Joseph Fewsmith Professor, Political Science Boston University
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Asia-Pacific leaders recently met in Beijing at the annual APEC summit, and after two days of discussion, concluded with some significant pledges and remarkable moments. President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan held a landmark meeting, and the United States and China discussed two agreements that are both symbolic, and lay groundwork for regional progress, say Stanford scholars.

High-level intergovernmental meetings are often more theatre than substance, but this year the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the oldest trans-Pacific regional organization, delivered important messages and may spur actions by member governments.

“Any summit is a ‘hurry up, get this done’ motivator,” says Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. “The head of state goes to the meeting – and generally speaking – he doesn’t want to arrive and say ‘my guys were asleep for the last year.’”

Fingar says the APEC summit prodded countries to work on “deliverables,” particularly the goals and projects on the agenda from previous meetings. He recently returned from Beijing, and shared his perspectives with students in the Asia-Pacific Scholars Program.

Writing for the East Asia Forum, Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said many of the commitments declared at the APEC summit, and at the subsequent meetings of the G20 in Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Myanmar, will have implications for global governance, particularly as China holds a more influential role in the region.

APEC countries account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and nearly half of global trade – and true to form, the grand vision of the summit is to advance regional economic integration.

Yet, “the ancillary things – things that went on in the margins – are in many ways more important,” Fingar says, referring to areas outside of the summit’s obvious focus, and what’s discussed on the sidelines of the public talks.

 

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Key outcomes from the 2014 gathering include:

  • The leaders of Japan and China met for the first time since coming into office, afterward acknowledging that the two countries have “disagreements” in their official statements. Of the Xi-Abe meeting, Fingar says, “it helps clear the way for lower level bureaucrats to go to work on real issues."

 

  • The United States and China announced a proposal to extend visas for students and businesspeople on both sides. While the immediate effects would be helpful, the change is symbolically superior. “You don’t give 5-10 year visas to adversaries,” he says, it shows that “‘we’re in [the relationship] for the long-term.’”

 

  • China proposed the development of a new “Silk Road,” pledging $40 billion in resources toward infrastructure projects shared with South and Central Asian neighbors. “It’s tying the region together and creating economy-of-scale possibilities for other countries,” he says. “A real win-win situation.”

 

  • The United States and China, the world’s two largest energy consumers, announced bilateral plans to cut carbon emissions over the next two decades. “It’s significant because those two countries must be the ones to lead the world in this area. Unless we are seen to be in basic agreement, others will hold back.”

 

  • China codified the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a global financial institution intended as an alternative to institutions like the World Bank. “China has been frustrated with its role in existing international institutions,” Fingar says, explaining a likely motivation behind the AIIB’s creation.

Emmerson said the outcomes of the APEC summit from the U.S.-China standpoint were better than expected, speaking to McClatchy News. The visa and climate deals, as well as their commitment to lowering global tariffs on IT products, will lessen chances of conflict between the two countries. 

However, the summit did leave some areas unsolved. One of the most important is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact proposed by the United States that includes 11 others countries in the region, but does not yet include China.

Leaders “made positive noises” coming out of the TPP discussions, Fingar says, but nothing was passed. The gravity and complexity of trade-related issues, especially agriculture and intellectual property, is likely to blame for slow action.

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Leaders pose for a group photo at the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Beijing, China. | APEC/(Xinhua/Yao Dawei)
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The pattern and logic of China’s interactions with other countries and the international system as a whole were clear and predictable for 35 years, but developments during the past few years suggest that Beijing may have concluded that it is no longer necessary to follow the strategy articulated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.  Is the break with the past more apparent than real, or has Xi Jinping determined that China can (or must) be more demanding and less accommodating than it was when the country was less prosperous and less powerful?  Is what we are witnessing now a temporary aberration or the first indication that we have entered a new phase of China’s rise and integration into the global system?

 

Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January to December 2009. 

 

From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–1994), and chief of the China Division (1986–1989). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

 

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969 and PhD, 1977 both in political science). His most recent book is Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).

 
This event is off the record.

 

Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow
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