Stanford sociologist Andrew Walder spoke with Ian Johnson of the New York Times about his new book, China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Featured in a Q&A, Walder argues that Mao Zedong led Communist China based more on a simplistic understanding of Stalinist ideology than on a new vision. Walder also compares Mao and current president Xi Jinping.

Of Xi, "He’s adopting some of the symbolism of Mao in the Cultural Revolution," Walder said.

"What Xi is about is unity and stability and economic development, and that’s not what Mao was about. Mao was willing to throw things to the wind. He was willing to gamble. He never thought things could happen if it was orderly. He thought disorder was the midwife of progress. Xi is completely different."

The article can be accessed on the New York Times website.

China's Communist Party academies are drawing upon new ideas from formerly taboo places like business schools in the United States and Europe and sending delegations to absorb lessons from around the world, a Stanford scholar writes in a new book.

Once viewed as inflexible, China's party-managed training academies, or "party schools," are using many of the strategies found in China's hybrid, state-run private sector, said Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

"As communist parties fell from power in the 1980s and 1990s, there were many predictions of the Chinese Communist Party's demise," Lee said in an interview.

A perception exists, she said, that the party was too rigid to remain relevant and in power, given huge economic changes in China and throughout a more globalized world. But adapting is one way that it has managed to dominate for so long.

The Chinese Communist Party has now ruled China for more than six decades.

Signs of change 

"It is true that if you were to look at official party organization charts, many parts of the Chinese Communist Party are unchanged from the party's early years in power," Lee said. "Yet it is clear that the party has embraced new ideas and opened up to the world in recent decades."

The party schools are important, Lee explained, because they are a key set of organizations that exert political control over the knowledge, skills and careers of leaders throughout Chinese society.

In her new book, Training the Party: Party Adaptation and Elite Training in Reform-era China, Lee concludes that those seemingly static parts of the party have adjusted and that it is no longer "revolutionary," but has become, in its own words, a "learning party."

Lee's 264-page work draws on field research, datasets and trips to the party-run academies where party recruits and elites are trained.

Through conversations with people at the academy campuses she visited around the country Lee discovered the extent to which the schools, and the party, were changing.

For example, the schools are using as one of their core teaching methods the case method approach pioneered by Harvard Business School, which Lee described as a "force of inspiration" for the students.

As a sign of another change, Lee noted that the schools, once almost shrouded in secrecy from the rest of society, are now renting out their office parks to other organizations as a way to raise revenue.

"They are opening up in more than one way," Lee said, adding that the overall process began in the 1980s and accelerated in 2005 when China established state-of-the-art executive leadership academies that required a more legitimate educational approach. 

Organizational machinery

The success of the Chinese economy and market, as well as the rush for revenue and status by many people and organizations in the country, spurred the academies to change. Lee said the party schools are dynamic and entrepreneurial in the way they seek out new student populations and craft new programs, both educational and political.

"This shows how the party's organizational machinery has been more nimble than some would have predicted," she said.

Yet to be seen is whether the revised party-school approach is enough to turn around the larger Chinese Communist Party or deal with the problem of rampant political corruption in the country.

"There's some evidence of new organizational thinking in the party schools, but it is unclear whether this will help with resolving China's corruption problem or spark genuine democratic reform," Lee said.

While eight other political parties technically exist in China, there is no true opposition to the Chinese Communist Party.

Lee began her book while a political science doctoral student at Stanford.

Looking ahead, she is studying how China's education landscape is evolving and how China is constructing new international organizations, like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, that reflect its long-term global ambitions.

She asks, "To what degree might these organizations challenge or supplement the existing global order and how might the U.S. respond intelligently?"

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

China's tight control over its economy is one reason why it is facing an economic slowdown of global implications, Stanford scholars say.

China's stock market fall is now in its third week, and share prices have lost a third of their value since mid-June, though the market is still higher than a year ago. China has the world's second-largest economy, with deep financial links to the United States.

Nicholas Hope, director of the China Program at the Stanford Center for International Development, which is part of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, said the simple answer behind the slowdown is that "nothing grows at 10 percent forever."

However, the dropoff is sharper than the government of China expected or desires, he noted.

Hope said the deceleration is due to the effects of slow growth globally on international trade, slower progress than hoped in rebalancing the Chinese economy toward spending more on consumption and less on investment, and the inefficiency of much of Chinese investment. Another big problem is the debt load of local and regional governments.

Hope does not think the steep fall of China's stock market is comparable to the American crash of 1929 – "so long as the Shanghai market index remains comfortably above where it was a year ago."

Yet the "frighteningly sharp correction" over the past few weeks highlights the fragility of the Chinese financial system, he said. It also serves as a cautionary tale for the many small investors who speculated on high returns with borrowed money.

"Borrowed funds have financed many risky economic investments in infrastructure by subnational [regional and local] governments as well as stock purchases by unwise investors," he said. "The result threatens to be an unwanted increase in non-performing loans in the banking system as borrowers are unable to repay."

Hope believes China can overcome its problems if it adopts economic reforms aimed at fostering more private enterprise and less state control over the market. Back in 1993, China's Communist Party announced those reforms and updated them in 2013, so they are technically on the books.

"Paradoxically, current weaknesses could be a longer-term source of strength, as the shares of income and consumption in Chinese GDP rise, investment is increasingly more efficiently allocated by a transformed financial system and all factors of production – land, capital and labor – are put to more productive uses," he said.

To counteract the market drop, the government ordered state-owned companies to buy shares, hiked the amount of equities insurance companies can hold and offered more credit to finance trading. Hope said this may cause a problem.

"It is introducing considerable moral hazard by attempting to bail out small investors because of the concern over the potential for social unrest if too many of those investors lose all of their savings," he said.

Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says it is too early to tell if the market fall will diminish the credibility of the government and Communist Party in the eyes of the people. China's President, Xi Jinping, does want to maintain his popularity.

"The government's management of the economy is, however, one of the pillars of its credibility," Lee said.

She described this as a "small dent" in that credibility, as the government has many other ways it aids the Chinese people.

Opening up the economy

Stanford Professor Darrell Duffie says that it will be hard for China to maintain its past high growth rates.

"China's growth rate is still very high, but it is less high than it was because most of the giant pool of cheap and underutilized labor that China had 20 years ago has by now been put to work relatively productively," said Duffie, the Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business.

"Additional sources of productivity gains are harder to find," he added.

Duffie is concerned about excessive leverage in China's equity markets.

"Chinese investors have borrowed a lot of money to invest in equities. This margin financing was used too aggressively. China's corporations and local governments are heavily indebted, and that will be a drag on future growth," he said.

He suggests that China would do well to continue on its current course of opening up its economy to cross-border capital flows and reducing its economy's reliance on state-owned enterprises.

If China's economy slows down, the country will decrease its demand for American goods and services, he added. American businesses that plan to operate in China should learn as much as possible about how China's economy and government works.

And Duffie advised, "Whenever possible work with trusted partners in China."

Asian power games?

With China ramping up its military in recent years, what are the risks to U.S. national security if China's economy plunges?

Amy Zegart, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said it is possible that a slowing economy might make China behave differently in terms of its hard and soft power.

"For all the worry about a rising China, a fragile China is bad for the United States. The Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy rests on a promise of economic prosperity. The more China's growth falters, the more party leaders will be driven to stoke the fires of nationalism to secure domestic support," said Zegart, who is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

She added, "We've seen this movie before. It stars Vladimir Putin behaving recklessly abroad to win political support at home as his economy stalls."

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.