The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the privilege of hosting Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies​ (CSIS). The program, entitled "What’s ‘Communist’ about the Communist Party of China?," explored the goals and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as what they might mean for the future of China in the global community. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the goals of the CCP became less clear. As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In his talk, Blanchette discussed the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism. Watch now: 

On February 24, 2021, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC hosted Dr. Thomas Wright, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

The program, entitled "U.S.-China Relations in the Biden Era," explored the future of US-China relations based on experience from past administrations. Under former President Trump, U.S. relations with China evolved into outright rivalry. In his talk, Dr. Wright discussed whether this rivalry will continue and evolve during a Biden administration by analyzing the roots of strategic competition between the two countries and various strands of thinking within the Biden team. According to Wright, the most likely outcome is that the competition between the two countries will evolve into a clash of governance systems and the emergence of two interdependent blocs where ideological differences become a significant driver of geopolitics. Cooperation is possible but it will be significantly shaped by conditions of rivalry. Watch now:

On February 10, 2021, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC hosted Professor Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies​ for the virtual program "Military Competition with China: Harder to Win Than During the Cold War?" Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

As US-China competition intensifies, experts debate the degree to which the current strategic environment resembles that of the Cold War. Those that argue against the analogy often highlight how China is deeply integrated into the US-led world order. They also point out that, while tense, US-China relations have not turned overtly adversarial. But there is another, less optimistic reason the comparison is unhelpful: deterring and defeating Chinese aggression is harder now than it was against the Soviet Union. In her talk, Dr. Mastro analyzed how technology, geography, relative resources and the alliance system complicate U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility of its deterrence posture and, in a crisis, form any sort of coalition. Mastro and Oi's thought-provoking discussion ranged from the topic of why even US allies are hesitant to take a strong stance against China to whether or not Taiwan could be a catalyst for military conflict. Watch now: 

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Professor Min Ye of Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies on October 14, 2020. Her program, moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, focused on the much-discussed but poorly-understood Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. While it is not widely known exactly what the BRI is or what Beijing hopes it will accomplish, it has been described as something of a modern silk road, connecting China to dozens of other countries through trade and extensive infrastructure projects. Based on research conducted for her recently published book, The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998-2018, Professor Ye enlightened the audience on a surprisingly critical element of this global program: the domestic component.

While Ye began her research with the assumption that many hold about the BRI—that it is primarily a global, internationally-focused initiative—as she continued her research, she found that many, if not most, BRI projects are either entirely domestic or have strong ties to domestic programs. To this end, she posed three questions during her program: Why did Chinese leadership launch the BRI in 2013? How did the Chinese state and businesses implement the BRI? and, What are the internal and external outcomes of the BRI?

To answer these questions, Ye explained the theoretical frameworks she used to understand both the BRI and China's "state-mobilized globalization." Firstly, Ye's "Chinese-State Framework" breaks the Chinese governmental system into three parts: Party Leadership, State Bureaucracy, and Subnational Actors. Each of these elements affect the others, as well as policy surrounding the BRI. However, this division also creates fragmentation in authority and ideology. Secondly, her “State-Mobilized Globalization” framework explains the process surrounding Chinese national strategy. Ye posits that national strategies are generally prompted by crises faced at lower levels of government, particularly when a lack of efficiency or communication is causing “state paralysis.” Once the strategy is announced in order to coordinate efforts and solve the crisis, it enters a feedback loop in which plans are adjusted and changed according to ground-level conditions. These frameworks informed the empirical studies used to answer Ye’s research questions.

The drivers of the BRI, argues Ye, were threefold: strategic, diplomatic, and economic. It was believed by interested parties within China that such an international initiative could ease tensions related to the United States and maritime Asia, as well as generally improve diplomatic relations for the country. China’s industries were also facing problems related to overcapacity, and economic and financial groups wished to use their excess capital to invest abroad. Actors from several different levels in China, including national agencies, local governments, and private entrepreneurs, were involved in executing BRI projects intended to alleviate these tensions. Different cities saw different sides of this implementation: Chongqing, one of China’s largest cities, is heavily dominated by state capital, with its main BRI actors being State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang province, is by contrast dominated by private entrepreneurs.

With diverse implementation comes diverse outcomes. Ye argues that some BRI projects have been helpful in reforming cities’ structural economy, while others have helped upgrade industry. The BRI has managed to alleviate some of the tensions listed above, but at the same time, it has created its own problems. While there has been a massive internal mobilization effort for BRI projects, there exists a disconnect between the domestic situation and demands for transparency from outside actors.

Ye concluded her talk by tying her research to current developments related to COVID-19. While one might imagine that a global pandemic would be a significant inhibitor to an international trade and infrastructure project, Ye finds just the opposite. Because the BRI is, in fact, quite domestically focused, many BRI projects are continuing at a rapid pace, albeit with digital adjustments. Some projects, such as the New Infrastructure Plan, were actually fast-tracked in the wake of the pandemic outbreak. Ye predicts that as COVID-19 restrictions ease and the world returns to “normal,” these domestic and digital elements will be combined with the BRI’s original projects.

An audio recording of this program is available at the link below, and a video recording is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.

On September 29, the APARC China Program hosted Thomas Fingar and Stephen Stedman for the program “Rebuilding International Institutions.” The program, which was moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, examined the future of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Health Organization (WHO) in our evolving global political landscape. While Fingar and Stedman acknowledged that such institutions facilitated attainment of unprecedented peace and prosperity after WWII, they also asked difficult questions: Are these institutions still adequate? And if not, how will we change them?

Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar kicked off the session by asking whether or not US-China tensions would impede cooperation on major global challenges, or if those challenges were so serious as to render such rivalries immaterial. Perhaps the most obvious example of such a crisis is the current COVID-19 pandemic. The efforts to curb the virus’ spread not only by individual countries, but also by international organizations like the WHO, have proven largely inadequate. According to Fingar, our existing institutions need to be reformed or supplemented to deal with these types of threats. However, such an overhaul of our international systems will be difficult, he says.

How, then, will we go about such a massive project? Stephen Stedman, Deputy Director at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), responded by explaining that the current failure of international cooperation makes such undertakings tough. Globalization has been a double-edged sword: On one hand, more contact, perhaps inherently, leads to increased tension. The resurgence of traditional notions of sovereignty in 2010, kickstarted by the opposition of countries like Russia and China to what was seen as UN overreaching, has led to a reduction of international cooperation overall. On the other hand, Fingar posits that our interconnectedness may force us toward cooperation despite rivalries as we face more and more transnational threats. International institutions create rules to organize and manage our many interconnected relationships so that we can deal with our problems effectively and reduce friction.

Stedman also pointed to the upcoming US elections and the major impact their outcome will have on how these problems are addressed—or not. In the last four year, the United States has pulled back significantly from international institutions and agreements, leaving a gap that China has started to fill. Furthermore, despite the US’s retreat from international responsibility, the country still remains a critical actor in global initiatives. China’s embrace of a global leadership role is not inherently negative, but its future relationship with the US will need to be “managed in a way that you get greater cooperation and not just paralysis.” Stedman says that it is likely that progress will need to be made on a bilateral front in order to have productive conversations about international issues with China.

Concluding on an optimistic note, Fingar voiced his hope that the current tensions and negative perceptions between rivals might ultimately “be mitigated by success in dealing with a common problem,” because “experience does shape perceptions.”

A video recording of this program is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.