International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Thomas Fingar
David M. Lampton
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Note: this piece builds on a previous article by the authors, published by The Washington Quarterly.


No foreign policy challenge is more important, or difficult, than finding a way to simultaneously deter and engage China without provoking unwanted behaviors. Achieving this requires understanding the perceptions and priorities shaping Beijing’s actions.  

Despite China’s worsening economic problems and waning international trust, the March 2024 session of the National People’s Congress has reaffirmed Beijing’s determination to stick with policies fuelling domestic discontent and alienating foreign partners. The reasons are structural, not simply strong-man egoism. Policies in China are tightly interconnected, reflecting hard-to-change perceptions reinforced by bureaucratic and personal interests. Changing one facet requires changing the entire policy package. For now, that package prioritizes domestic stability and security over economic growth.

Beijing has fallen into an old mindset that sacrifices growth to reduce vulnerability to external and internal threats that leaders believe endanger the regime and China’s future. This is not good for China, the United States, or the world. Washington cannot achieve immediate or fundamental changes in China’s behavior but ill-considered actions can make things worse. The best we currently can achieve is wary coexistence, careful management to reduce dangers, and keeping the way open for a better day.

Read the rest of the essay online at the East Asia Forum.

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US-China meeting at the Filoli estate prior to APEC 2023 in San Francisco
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Stopping the Spiral: Threat Perception and Interdependent Policy Behavior in U.S.-China Relations

A new article for The Washington Quarterly, co-authored by Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton, investigates the drivers of Chinese policy behavior, assesses the role of U.S. policy in shaping it, and suggests steps to reduce the heightened tensions between the two superpowers.
Stopping the Spiral: Threat Perception and Interdependent Policy Behavior in U.S.-China Relations
U.S. Seaman Xi Chan stands lookout on the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) transits the Taiwan Strait during routine underway operations.
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This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.
This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan
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U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen shakes hands with People’s Republic of China Vice Premier He Lifeng in front of U.S. and Chinese flags
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen (R) greets People’s Republic of China (PRC) Vice Premier He Lifeng at the start of a bilateral meeting at the Ritz Carlton Hotel on November 09, 2023 in San Francisco, California. | Photo by Justin Sullivan/Getty Images
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While China's current policy prioritizes regime security over economic growth, the United States should hold open the door to a shift by Beijing back to a policy package emphasizing openness. Washington should also restore credibility to its One China Policy and lower the rhetorical temperature.

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Flyer for the webinar "China, the US, and the International Order" with a headshot of speaker Wei Da.

In an era marked by rapid shifts in global power dynamics, the ascent of China as a formidable force on the world stage poses one of the most critical challenges to the international order of the 21st century. The prevailing notion that China is a revisionist power, intent on establishing a parallel international order to rival that of the United States and the West, raises pivotal questions. Is there truth to this belief? How did China and the United States lose their consensus over the desirable international order? Which elements are we satisfied or dissatisfied with? Towards what kind of order or orders are we moving?

Our upcoming webinar, "China, the US, and the International Order: Are We Moving Towards Parallel Systems?" aims to dissect the narrative of China's emergence as a power intent on sculpting a new world order—a vision that starkly contrasts with the U.S.-led system that has dominated global affairs for nearly a century. Join us on April 3 for an in-depth discussion of this critical issue with Wei Da, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University.

DA Wei

Wei Da is the director of the Center for International Security and Strategy  (CISS) at Tsinghua University and a professor in the Department of International Relations, School of Social Science, Tsinghua University. Dr. Da’s research expertise covers China-US relations and US security & foreign policy. He has worked in China’s academic and policy community for more than two decades. Before his current positions, Dr. Da was the assistant president of University International Relations (2017-2020) and director of the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (2013-2017). He has written hundreds of policy papers for the Chinese government and published dozens of academic papers in journals in China, the US, and other countries. He earned his BA and MA from UIR and his Ph.D. from CICIR. He was a visiting senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States from 2006 to 2007, and a visiting senior associate at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University from 2008 to 2009.

Online via Zoom Webinar

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2023-2024
China Policy Fellow, 2023-2024
Tsinghua University
Da_Wei.jpg Ph.D.

Wei Da joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Policy Fellow for the winter quarter of 2024. He currently serves at Tsinghua University as Professor in the Department of International Studies, as well as Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy. While at APARC, he conducted research with the China Program and Professor Jean Oi regarding contemporary China affairs and U.S.-China policy.

Wei Da, Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and China Policy Fellow, APARC
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People’s Republic of China in the Baltic States
Edited by Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Kārlis Bukovskis, Riga, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2023, 154 pp., ISBN 978-9934-567-67-4


This collection of analytic essays describing political/security, economic, and people-to-people interactions between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provides a welcome and useful elucidation of similarities and differences among the Baltic states. It also identifies (albeit without specifically doing so) the kinds of challenges facing all small and mid-sized countries in their dealings with much larger powers. Asymmetries of scale in the size of populations, firms, government bureaucracies, and other capacities make it difficult to identify and exploit opportunities, maintain multifaceted relationships, and manage the deluge and sometimes manipulative intent of initiatives from the larger partner. Small state governments must play a larger brokering and facilitating role than is true in bigger economies because sub-national actors have limited knowledge and capacity. This is certainly the case with respect to Baltic state interactions with China. Moreover, as these essays make clear, disparities in size and national objectives create vulnerabilities and dependencies that can be manipulated by the larger partner. A recurring leitmotif of the book is that China attempts to exploit dependencies for political reasons.

For the complete book review, read it online or download the text above.

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Journal of Baltic Studies
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Thomas Fingar
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U.S.-China relations have deteriorated to a level unforeseen since the early 1960s. China’s rapid military modernization, maritime posturing, and diplomatic withdrawals signal a persistent security-focused approach from Beijing. What is to be done in an era of great power competition, where policies promoting careful coexistence and reduction of tensions are deprioritized?

In a new article for The Washington Quarterly titled “China’s America Policy: Back to the Future,” co-authors Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC fellow, and David M. Lampton, a senior research fellow at the Johns Hopkins—SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and a former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI, explain the current tensions through a comprehensive analysis of the historical drivers of Chinese policy. The article enhances the understanding of Chinese grand strategy and proposes a series of policy prescriptions to help reduce the dangerous externalities of the diplomatic feud between Beijing and Washington.


March 2024 update: Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton joined Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast, to discuss their Washington Quarterly article. Listen:



The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored the talk entitled "China's America Policy: Origins and Implications" by Dr. Tom Fingar on February 15, 2024. Watch:

 


Unhelpful Caricatures of China

Fingar and Lampton begin the article by acknowledging that U.S. policy is an important driver of Chinese behavior. They argue that U.S. policy has often been based on inaccurate and oft-counterproductive characterizations of China.

The authors challenge reductivist portrayals of Chinese strategy as purely ideological are misleading, asserting that “describing the PRC as an autocracy means interpreting its behavior as part of an ideological crusade to preserve the regime and thwart U.S. ambitions” and that  “Beijing’s Communist Party leaders, like leaders in all countries, seek to preserve their political system, but that is not their only objective.”

Fingar and Lampton also dispute the prevailing view in Washington of China as an “unstoppable juggernaut determined — and/or destined — to displace the United States and remake the international system,” emphasizing instead that current PRC behavior is better understood as the product of perceived weakness and fragility.

To manage the current impasse, the authors suggest that Washington must avoid exacerbating the situation and must shape Chinese perceptions in a way that might facilitate a transition to a more cooperative coexistence.

The True Drivers of China’s Strategy

The authors purport that, over the centuries, China’s policy options have coalesced into one of two comprehensive approaches: one that prioritizes national and regime security, and another prioritizing economic and social development.

The first approach assumes a hostile international environment and promotes “economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners.” The second “emphasizes the gains to be made through interdependence and openness, places less emphasis on ideology, and instead underscores the importance of experts, pragmatism, initiative and innovation.”

These two drivers, in the authors’ view, neatly explain the last century of Chinese grand strategy and frame the current administration’s emphasis on security and coercive Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.

Theories of Encirclement

The authors add that, both historically and currently, an important category of factors shaping Chinese policy is assumed subversion, that is, “persistent attitudes […] centered on suspicion and fear of outsiders (foreign countries and groups) and social forces swirling in China itself [...] Almost any action that could be negative for China is perceived as taken to weaken the regime.”

Chinese commentators often cite U.S. foreign policy activities — including Secretary of State Clinton’s statements about maritime claims at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” NATO’s and other security groupings’ involvement in Asia, and alleged U.S. efforts to foment regime change through “peaceful evolution” — as a rationale for Beijing’s increased assertiveness.

However, Fingar and Lampton see these as excuses and contributing factors to decisions primarily motivated by concerns about a perceived growing danger of domestic instability that would impede economic growth and erode regime legitimacy.

What can be done?

In the final section of the article, the authors reflect on the poor state of U.S.-China ties, arguing that “relations will spiral unless domestic factors persuade Beijing to reprioritize growth and development.” Indeed, Xi Jinping’s return to the security-minded policy package signifies a departure from the cooperative approach prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century. The authors emphasize that an escape from the current downward trajectory in U.S.-China bilateral relations “will not occur without joint efforts and a change in the domestic politics of both societies.”

For this to happen, Beijing must first perceive less hostile intent from Washington. According to the authors, this will be no easy feat. Despite common expressions of intent to improve relations and to put a “floor” under the relationship voiced at ministerial-level meetings and recent meetings between Biden and Xi, little has improved in real terms. “Even limited and tangible efforts to pick low-hanging fruit such as mutual reduction of tariffs, restoration of academic exchanges, and reopening closed consulates remain dormant or ineffective.”

For Fingar and Lampton, Washington needs an approach that does not depend on prior or simultaneous moves by Beijing. The authors provide three concrete areas that may help bolster U.S.-China ties. The first is to avoid behaviors that push “PRC hot buttons” and trigger predictable reactions that stymie meaningful dialogue. The U.S. must continue to conduct necessary and appropriate military exercises in international waters and airspace and should call out dangerous or unprofessional actions by the PLA Navy or Air Force.

To this end, the U.S. should also avoid making statements and take actions that make it difficult for Beijing to respond positively, as “many third country observers are spring-loaded to criticize US inaction to reduce tensions [...] Conversely, PRC initiatives should be treated seriously, examined carefully, and addressed appropriately.”

The second area of improvement is to avoid declaring preconditions for discussions or taking actions that may not be in U.S. interests. Such preconditions rarely, if ever, have eased or accelerated desirable outcomes, and imposing conditions further complicates the resolution of issues and indicates to third countries that the United States is solely responsible for tensions.

To start the process, the authors suggest that “both sides ought to pick some low-hanging policy fruit like reopening consulates in Houston and Chengdu and increasing mutual media access [...] Both sides should see the benefit of having more than 350 American students studying in China.”

The third and most complicated issue is Taiwan. “Taiwan-related issues are the elephant in the room that cannot be ignored, but there is nothing to be gained by abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity or further muddying the US position,” write Fingar and Lampton.

The authors suggest that the correct response to speculation on this issue should be “restatement of the USG position that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is unacceptable, that there will be absolutely no support for Taiwan independence unless Taipei and Beijing peacefully reach agreement, and that relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States will remain unofficial [...] Washington needs to stop nibbling around the edges of the One China Policy.”

Only when progress is made on these three areas will perceived threats to Beijing begin to diminish. In the meantime, the current U.S. and Chinese framework of great power competition that “justifies efforts to hobble the other, is harmful to both countries and impedes international efforts to address global challenges.”

The authors deploy the “first law of holes” as a good place to start: “When you are in a hole as we are now in the relationship with China, stop digging. Making things worse is a poor way to seek improvement.” A reduction in tensions will not be easy, but tangible and modest measures to avoid hostility and work toward bounded competition and even cooperation on transnational challenge areas like pandemic disease and climate change mitigation should remain a possibility. 

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Stanford colonnade with text "Call for Nominations: 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award"
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2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in covering the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2024 award through February 15.
2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries
L to R: Laura Stone, Matthew Goodman, Michael McFaul
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Policy Professionals and Scholars Consider the Fate of Multilateral Institutions Amid Great Power Competition

The fourth installment of Shorenstein APARC’s fall seminar series examined the future of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, focusing on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Policy Professionals and Scholars Consider the Fate of Multilateral Institutions Amid Great Power Competition
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US-China meeting at the Filoli estate prior to APEC 2023 in San Francisco
U.S.-China meeting at the Filoli estate prior to APEC 2023 in San Francisco. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
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A new article for The Washington Quarterly, co-authored by Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton, investigates the drivers of Chinese policy behavior, assesses the role of U.S. policy in shaping it, and suggests steps to reduce the heightened tensions between the two superpowers.

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Debating China - The Washington Quarterly, Vol 46, Issue 4.

In this article, authors Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton discuss US policies to manage relations with China, and argue that they cannot succeed if they are based on a distorted understanding of PRC politics.

The authors provide critiques of the flawed characterizations of PRC politics and policymaking that often prevail in Washington, then offer their own explanation of what has driven the shift in PRC behavior. Concluding with recommendations for policy and approach, the authors thereby suggest realistic and modest measures to avoid unmitigated hostility and pave the way toward a future guided by the search for coexistence, bounded competition, and productive cooperation.

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The Washington Quarterly
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Thomas Fingar
David M. Lampton
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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2023-2024
China Policy Fellow, 2023-2024
Tsinghua University
Da_Wei.jpg Ph.D.

Wei Da joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Policy Fellow for the winter quarter of 2024. He currently serves at Tsinghua University as Professor in the Department of International Studies, as well as Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy. While at APARC, he conducted research with the China Program and Professor Jean Oi regarding contemporary China affairs and U.S.-China policy.

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The 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met in San Francisco from November 11-17 at the APEC Leaders’ Week to discuss trade, sustainable development, technological innovation, and other pressing issues. The occasion also provided opportunities for APEC member leaders to hold bilateral meetings, of which perhaps the most highly anticipated was a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Shorenstein APARC experts explain the implications of the APEC convening, analyze the deliverables from the Biden-Xi meeting, and examine issues that cast a shadow on the U.S. relations with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous country. Continue reading below for a roundup of our experts’ analysis and commentary featured in U.S. and international media.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our experts' analysis >


Meeting face-to-face for the first time in a year on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Biden and Xi discussed issues spanning military and trade relations, signaling a willingness to bring a degree of stability to the rocky U.S.-China bilateral relations. Ties between the two countries have deteriorated amid tensions like those in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, disputes about technology competition, and the February 2023 Chinese spy balloon incident. APARC fellows consider the significance of the Biden-Xi meeting in numerous articles and interviews in the press.

[China’s] economic difficulties and their implications for social stability and regime legitimacy have made Beijing more eager to improve relations with countries important to its economy than was the case six to 12 months ago.
Thomas Fingar

The United States and China each have reasons to meet now and reduce hostilities. For President Biden, the upcoming 2024 presidential election is ample impetus to work for a better relationship with the Chinese. For Beijing, as Center Fellow Thomas Fingar tells the Japan Times, the country’s “economic difficulties and their implications for social stability and regime legitimacy have made Beijing more eager to improve relations with countries important to its economy than was the case six to 12 months ago.” And Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro notes in the Christian Science Monitor that “both sides are trying to present to the rest of the world that they have things under control,” something that requires “predictable, high-level engagement.”

Most analysts, however, held low expectations for substantive outcomes from the meeting between the two leaders. According to Mastro, there is no indication of improvement in the tension between the two sides because neither the United States nor China is ready to make “any significant concession,” she argues on NBC News.

One reason for that is an aversion to political risk. As Mastro tells KCRW’s Madeleine Brand on Press Play: “There’s no political appetite for [thinking outside the box]. Political leaders want to make sure any policy will 100% work before they're willing to embark on it. But in the world of geopolitics, it's really hard to know that before you try things and experiment and assess and reassess.”

That said, just the very fact of the meeting taking place could represent an essential signal to Chinese officials, as Fingar points out to NBC News: “For there really to be a movement for lower levels of the [Chinese] system to engage in specifics, it needs a refreshed endorsement from Xi.” 

One outcome many were looking for was a resumption of U.S.-China military communications, what defense analysts call “mil-to-mil exchanges.” The Chinese severed these in 2022 when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. With close encounters between American and Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea becoming almost commonplace, communications at the military senior level are critical to prevent escalation. But restoring these ties would have limited value because, as Mastro tells NPR, “You can expect that, the next time [the Chinese] get unhappy about something, maybe after the Taiwan election, they cut them off again. So, unless we have some sort of commitment to sustained engagement, the mil-to-mil exchanges are unlikely to be sufficient to stabilize the relationship.”
 

Unless we have some sort of commitment to sustained engagement, the mil-to-mil exchanges are unlikely to be sufficient to stabilize the [U.S.-China] relationship.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

The Biden-Xi meeting took place on the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The United States is concerned that China — as a good friend of Iran and one of the largest importers of its gas and oil — could complicate diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and potentially exacerbate tensions. However, Mastro argues that bringing up the Middle East in the context of the U.S.-China bilateral meeting only serves to aid Beijing in its propaganda efforts. As she says on KTVU Fox 2 News, “China does not really care what happens [in the Middle East]. But they are leveraging the support, especially in the developing world, in the Global South, for Hamas to push back against the United States and basically use Israel as a proxy for discontent about what they call ‘American unilateralism,’ ‘American hegemony.’” 

The conflict in the Middle East came up in another high-level meeting when Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Biden in Washinton before heading to the APEC forum. Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, Jakarta is unhappy with the White House for several reasons. Among these, the war in Gaza was probably foremost in Widodo’s mind, writes Ambassador Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rholen Fellow at APARC, in an essay for The Diplomat magazine. “Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire.” Thus, Indonesian public opinion has put Jakarta and Washington at odds over the Israel-Hamas crisis, explains Marciel.

Indonesians also remain upset by the snub of Biden skipping the recent East Asia Summit and by “what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership, under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy,” Marciel writes, urging Washington to engage Jakarta seriously on these issues before Indonesia is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024.


More Media Coverage

For more coverage of the APEC forum and Biden-Xi meeting with analysis by APARC scholars, visit the links below:

Kishida and Xi Aim for Trade Progress Despite Lingering Tensions
The Japan Times, November 17, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 17, 2023

Oriana Skylar Mastro on the Xi-Biden Meeting on the Sidelines of APEC 
BBC Sounds, November 15, 2023

Biden, Xi Eye Economic, Military Thaw in High-Stakes Meeting
Bloomberg Technology, November 15, 2023

US Grants Chinese Journalists Hundreds of Visas to Cover APEC
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

Xi’s Arrival in US Brings Protesters and Fans Onto Streets
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

U.S.-China: One Summit, Two Different Goals for Biden and Xi
Nikkei Asia, November 14, 2023

Presidents Xi and Biden Seek to Turn Back the Clock in San Francisco
Time Magazine, November 14, 2023

China's Xi Jinping to meet with Biden in San Francisco
NPR, November 11, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 11, 2023

Biden and Xi to Seek to Stabilize Relations in California Meeting
New York Times, November 10, 2023

APEC Offers Important Chance to Stabilize Tense U.S.-China Relations
San Francisco Examiner, November 10, 2023

Joe Biden, Xi Jinping Set to Steal APEC Spotlight with Talks to Steady Ties
Reuters, November 8, 2023
 

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Larry Greenwood, Larry Goulder, Thomas Fingar
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Scholars and Experts Discuss APEC’s Role in Addressing Energy Challenges in Asia

The third installment of Shorenstein APARC’s fall seminar series examined energy challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in facilitating collaborative clean energy solutions.
Scholars and Experts Discuss APEC’s Role in Addressing Energy Challenges in Asia
Panelists gather to discuss APEC
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Trade Experts Gather to Discuss APEC’s Role and Relevance

Ahead of the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) convening in San Francisco, APARC kicked off its fall seminar series, Exploring APEC’s Role in Facilitating Regional Cooperation, with a panel discussion that examined APEC’s role and continued relevance in a rapidly-evolving Asia-Pacific region.
Trade Experts Gather to Discuss APEC’s Role and Relevance
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World leaders sit around a table during the APEC 2023 summit in San Francisco.
World leaders sit around a table during the APEC Leaders Retreat on the last day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders' Week at Moscone Center on November 17, 2023, in San Francisco, California. Photo credit: Kent Nishimura/Getty Images | Kent Nishimura/ Getty Images
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The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, which concluded the 2023 APEC host year for the United States, included a highly-anticipated meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Shorenstein APARC scholars weigh in on the significance of the meeting in the context of China’s geopolitical ambitions, the outcomes of the APEC summit, and other topics.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.


For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

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For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

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This announcement was updated on October 6, 2023, to reflect the addition of two new fellowship offerings focused on contemporary Taiwan.


The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2024.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy; contemporary Japan; contemporary Asia broadly defined; postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the new Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab; and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded annually to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

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Stanford architectural columns with text "Call for Applications: Fall 2024 Fellowships" and APARC logo.
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The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin in fall quarter 2024. These include postdoctoral fellowships on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.

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Flyer for Asia in 2030, APARC@40 Conference and Celebration with an image of Encina Hall facade

The culmination of a special event series celebrating Shorenstein APARC's 40th Anniversary, "Asia in 2030, APARC@40"

Join us in celebrating APARC's 40 years of research, education, and engagement. Recognizing the accomplishments of the past four decades and looking forward to the future, the two-day program will highlight multiple aspects of APARC’s core areas of expertise and examine key forces affecting Asia’s present and shaping its future.

1-1:30 p.m.

Opening Session

Opening Remarks

Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC and the Korea Program
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Congratulatory Remarks

Kathryn Ann “Kam” Moler
Vice Provost and Dean of Research
Marvin Chodorow Professor
Professor of Applied Physics, Physics, and Energy Science Engineering
Stanford University

Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution
Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution
Denning Professor of Global Business and the Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Scott D. Sagan
Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


1:30-2:45 p.m. 

The Future of Diplomacy

John Everard
Former Ambassador to Belarus, Uruguay, and North Korea for the United Kingdom
Coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea
Former Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Laura Stone
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives
Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Mongolia;
Former Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Former Director of Economic Policy Office in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Visiting Scholar and Inaugural China Policy Fellow at Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University

Moderator

Michael Beeman
Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Visiting Scholar at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University


2:45-3 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


3-4:15 p.m.

The Future of Asian Studies

Panelists

Donald K. Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC
Affiliated Faculty with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated Scholar with the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Thomas B. Gold
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

Jisoo Kim
Korea Foundation Associate Professor of History, International Affairs, and East Asian Languages and Literatures
Director of the Institute for Korean Studies
Co-Director of the East Asia National Resource Center
The George Washington University

Moderator

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Deputy Director of Shorenstein APARC
Director of the Japan Program
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


4:15-4:30 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


4:30-6 p.m.

Oksenberg Panel: The Future of U.S.-China Relations

Introduction

Jean C. Oi
Director of the China Program at Shorenstein APARC
Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University
William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Panelists

M. Taylor Fravel
Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director, Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Michael Lampton
Professor Emeritus and former Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University
Former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Moderator

Thomas Fingar
Former U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and Chief of the China Division
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Fellow at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
 

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