This interview was originally conducted and published by Melissa De Witte on behalf of the Stanford News Service.

September 2, 1945, is recognized in many American history books as the day World War II formally ended in Asia. But according to Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the conflict was never fully resolved in the region, leading to strains in diplomatic relations today.

On the 75th anniversary of this historic milestone, Shin discusses the legacy of World War II in the Asia-Pacific, specifically the failure among nations to fully address past wrongdoings and reach a mutual understanding of the conflict.

As a result, there is a “mismatch” in how Koreans, Chinese, Japanese and also Americans memorialize the war: China celebrates its victory against Japan while Korea commemorates its liberation from Japanese oppression. Meanwhile, Japan honors the victims of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki – an atrocity many Americans still feel uncomfortable talking about today, Shin points out.

Here, Shin discusses how these diverging perspectives of World War II have led to misgivings today and how, some 75 years later, relations can still be improved in the region.

Shin is a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, director of the Korea Program and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has led a decade-long study on historical memory in wartime period in Asia called 'Divided Memories and Reconciliation.'

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As the world remembers 75 years of the war ending in Asia, what legacies from this period persist today?

War has not really ended in Asia. Even before war settlements were signed, another war broke out on the Korean peninsula and technically never ended. Furthermore, “history wars” that began in the 1980s have intensified in recent years, as Japan and its neighbors continue to fight over the unfortunate past and dispute over territories. Despite increased economic, cultural, and educational exchanges and interactions, war legacies persist to strain regional relations.

Is there anything in this history that you think has been largely forgotten, overlooked or misunderstood?

While U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur formally accepted Japan’s surrender to allied forces aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay some 75 years ago, legacies from the war have persisted, straining regional relations to this very day, according to Shin. (Image credit: United States Navy/Wikimedia Commons)

America celebrates World War II victory in Europe (Victory in Europe Day) but remains relatively quiet on its victory in the Asia-Pacific war. In contrast to the moral clarity and nobility of purpose associated with the war in Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany, the path to war with Japan and its conclusion is far less clear and many Americans still feel uncomfortable talking about the use of atomic weapons – even if it was militarily necessary but morally questionable. Also, it was during the war that about 120,000 people in the U.S. of Japanese ancestry (62 percent being U.S. citizens) were incarcerated in concentration camps.

Compared to Europe, U.S.-led post-war settlements in Asia such as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and San Francisco Peace Treaty were insufficient in addressing atrocities committed by Japan during wartime and the colonial period, sowing the seeds of current disputes and tensions between Japan and its neighbors. The Tokyo tribunal focused on Japanese actions that had most directly affected Western allies (the attack on Pearl Harbor and the mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war) and thus failed to address the massive suffering of the Chinese and the Koreans. The 1951 Peace Treaty expunged Japan’s obligations to pay reparations for its wartime acts but neither the Republic of Korea nor the People’s Republic of China was party to the treaty.

You have written extensively about the repeated failure among Koreans, Chinese and Japanese to produce a shared, historical view of World War II. Can you briefly describe what are these conflicting, historical memories? 

For Koreans and Chinese, Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing massacre, sexual slavery and forced labor are key events that shape their historical memories. For Japanese, on the other hand, actions related to the U.S. such as the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor and American bombings (fire and atomic) on Japanese cities are most important to the formation of their memories of war, which led to a widely held view that they were also victims of American aggression and that post-war settlements were “victor’s justice.” These divergent memories are reflected in the ways that they commemorate the end of the war. China celebrates its victory against Japan in the war, while Korea commemorates its liberation from Japanese oppression. Japan holds its annual ceremony to honor victims of atomic bombings.

According to your scholarship, what explains these divergent perspectives?

The divergence comes from the different weight each country places on historical events in their respective memory formation. Japanese actions figure prominently for Chinese and Korean, but China and Korea are not as significant to Japanese war memories as much as the U.S. is. This mismatch creates perception gaps and misgivings, hindering historical reconciliation.

How has this tension affected relations in the region? Do you think, some 75 years later, these tensions persist today?

Yes, they are very much alive. Look at the current Japanese-South Korean relations. They are two leading economies with liberal democracies in Asia and also key U.S. allies. They are important trade partners and are facing the same demographic crisis. They share strategic interests in the face of a rising China and North Korean aggression. Nonetheless, the resurfacing of the unresolved historical issues has continued to strain the bilateral relationship. For example, the relationship deteriorated since late 2018 when the South Korea supreme court ruled that Japanese companies should compensate Koreans who were conscripted as forced laborers during the war. In response to the ruling, the Japanese government removed Korea from a list of favored trade partners and the Korean government followed suit. These governmental actions are now fueled by populist nationalism (the rightist in Japan and the leftist in Korea), which has proven to be very effective in the politics of both nations.

Can the U.S. play any role to help achieve historical reconciliation?

The U.S. can take a more proactive role in encouraging Japan to work toward achieving regional reconciliation. As noted above, Japan does not seem to be taking its Asian neighbors as seriously as it should be when it comes to historical matters, but is rather predominantly focused on reconciling with the U.S. For example, Japan had been calling for the U.S. president to visit the sites of atomic bombings as a way of “removing a historical thorn” in the relationship and President Obama did make a historic visit to Hiroshima in 2016. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe followed suit soon after by visiting Pearl Harbor to pay respects to the victims of the 1941 attack. But the reconciliation efforts stopped there and did not expand to other victim countries of the war.

When you teach this history of World War II, what do you remind students about this period? How might the past shape students’ understanding of Northeast Asia or the U.S. in the present day?

To avoid repeating the unfortunate past (colonialism and war), I ask, what and how we can learn from history? For example, was the war with Japan necessary, or was it the result of a series of accidents and miscalculations or lack of political leadership? How does the war help us to understand the current tensions between the U.S. and China? What can we learn from the experience of the Japanese internment during the war? Even though President Reagan made an official apology of the internment in 1988, why do we still see similar racialist politics in American society? Addressing these questions requires a critical reflection of the history.

<< The original interview is available via Stanford News >>

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to take massive tolls on lives and livelihoods at home and abroad, students have been thrown into turmoil and are facing uncertainties about funding, graduation, research opportunities, and career choices. At Shorenstein APARC, we are committed to supporting Stanford students as best we can. We are therefore announcing today new quarter-long research assistantships for current undergraduate and graduate students working in the area of contemporary Asia. These opportunities are in addition to our recent internship and fellowship offerings.

Guidelines

Shorenstein APARC is seeking to hire motivated and dedicated undergraduate and graduate students as paid research assistants who will work with assigned APARC faculty members on projects focused on contemporary Asia, studying varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

2020-21 research assistant positions will be offered in the fall, winter, spring, and summer quarters. We expect to hire up to 10 research assistants per quarter.

Application Cycles
Students should submit their applications by the following deadlines:

• Applications for fall 2020 by September 1, 2020;
• Applications for winter 2020 by December 1, 2020;
• Applications for spring 2021 by March 1, 2021.
   

The positions are open to current Stanford students only. Undergraduate- and graduate-level students are eligible to apply.

All positions will be up to 15 hours per week for undergraduate students and up to 20 hours per week for graduate students (minimum of 10 hours per week). The hourly pay rate is $17 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

Hiring is contingent upon verification of employment eligibility documentation.

The fall-quarter employment start date is September 16, 2020.

Successful candidates may request appointment renewal for a consecutive quarter.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these 3 required attachments:
  • CV
  • A cover letter (up to 1 page)
  • Completed Student Information Sheet
• Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.
   

We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents.

U.S.-China relations have been deteriorating at an alarming speed, and as distrust grows on both sides, it is unclear how to stop the downward spiral. What does China want and how can we best assess Chinese intentions?

This is a key question on the research agenda of East Asian security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI’s newest Center Fellow. Mastro, an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, will begin her appointment at FSI on August 1 and be based at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), where she will continue her research on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. She will also work with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), and teach students in both the CISAC Honors program and the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program.

Here, Mastro discusses Chinese ambitions and the rapidly increasing tensions in U.S.-China relations; talks about her military career and new research projects; shares how she first became interested in East Asian security issues as a Stanford undergraduate student; and even reveals some things we don’t know about her.

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You have argued in your writings that although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of the global order, its strategic goal in the Indo-Pacific region is nearly as consequential. Why is it so? What do you foresee for Chinese aims and the U.S.-China rivalry as we near the U.S. presidential election?

Mastro: My claim is that China doesn't want to replace the United States but rather displace the United States. It’s an important distinction because it’s become popular to assume that China wants to have everything that we, the United States, have and that its view of power is the same as ours. But if you look throughout history, every time a country rises, it exercises its power differently. The United States, for example, didn't build colonies because Great Britain had had colonies. It is equally unlikely to assume that China is going to build a global military and engage in foreign military interventions.

Therefore, I argue that China doesn't want to dominate the world. This doesn’t mean that its ambitions are limited, but rather that it thinks that the U.S. in-depth global involvement is an ineffective and costly way of doing business. Outside of Asia, China relies mainly on political and economic influence to ensure that no one goes against its interests. It is only in Asia where China’s military goals are problematic for the United States and where it wants to dominate and see the U.S. military less active. Again, this isn't due to lack of ambition: from China’s viewpoint, whoever dominates Asia, the world’s most dynamic and economically important region, is a superpower, just like whoever dominated Europe during the Cold War would have been a superpower. In short, I think we make assumptions about what China wants and how it will get there based on our own experiences, and those tend to be incorrect.

As for what’s ahead for the U.S.-China relationship and the coming presidential election, I think it’s a misconception to interpret the frictions between the two countries as stemming from the Trump administration. There are aspects of Chinese behavior that both the Republican and Democratic parties find problematic and I believe we will see a tougher policy towards China, regardless of who wins the election. A Democratic president might be less willing to risk confrontation with the Chinese the way the Trump administration is, but either way, I see increased tensions between the two sides as the norm for the next several years.

In your recent testimony on China’s maritime ambitions before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, you distinguish between China's aims in its near seas and far seas. How do these intentions differ and why is it important to make the distinction between them?

Mastro: In the near seas — the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS) — China is concerned with sovereignty, which is absolute control of these waters, and with regional hegemony. In the far seas — the Indian Ocean and beyond — China aims to operate, but it doesn’t aspire to exclude others from doing so. In these waters, China's ambitions are driven primarily by the desire to protect its strategic lines of communication and its economic and political interests.

It’s important to make this distinction for strategy reasons, which goes right to my previous point. There’s a growing sense now that “whatever China does is bad and the United States needs to counter everything China does,” but that's not quite true. While China's objectives in the SCS and ECS are detrimental to U.S. interests, some aspects of its objectives in the Indian Ocean and beyond are legitimate and do not necessarily threaten U.S. interests, although they are not without risks.

U.S. policy needs to consider these differences in the degree of threat because prioritization is crucial for strategy. If we are to prioritize our strategies, then we should prioritize countering China’s ambitions in its near seas and try to shape its objectives in the far seas, perhaps through more cooperative policies. Perceiving everything that China does as bad isn’t the right approach to competing with it.

In addition to your academic career, you have an extensive military portfolio: for over ten years, you have served in the United States Air Force Reserve. You have just been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal. Tell us more about this award, how your academic and military careers influence each other, and what it’s like to balance the two.

Mastro: I'm a special type of reservist called Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), which means that I have a custom duty schedule and work with my active-duty supervisors to help meet mission requirements of whatever the priority is at the time. The award I just received, the Meritorious Service Medal, which is a recognition of commendable noncombatant service, is for my last role as a senior China analyst at the Pentagon. My main duties in that role were to prepare intel products and brief the senior leadership of Headquarters Air Force at the Pentagon.

I think that the mix of my two careers makes me a better military officer and a better scholar. My experiences in the military inspire a lot of my research projects, oftentimes regarding questions that I don't have good answers for. As an officer, I need the power of argumentation on my side if I am to make a difference. After I engage in the good academic practice of spending a year or more researching something in-depth, I can then go back and provide inputs into the Department of Defense. There is a synergy between the two careers in terms of topics.

Moreover, my experiences in the military have taught me leadership and teamwork skills that we don’t necessarily learn from being professors. There’s a vast difference in leadership and teamwork dynamics between the military and academia. When I’m on active duty, I'm there as Major Mastro to provide my expertise but also be a strong part of a team with a chain of command.

Of course, managing both civilian and military careers demands considerable planning and balancing. I schedule my deployments around my teaching schedule, but sometimes there are urgent assignments given current world events. For example, last semester, I was on duty one day a week while teaching full time. So that requires planning and flexibility on the part of my family, as well as support from the people who employ me.

How did you first become interested in China and East Asian security issues, and what made you pursue a military career?

Mastro: This is a fun topic to talk about at Stanford because it's all thanks to my experiences as an undergraduate student on The Farm. As a freshman, I began learning Chinese, and in the following years, being humanities- and arts-focused, I mainly studied ancient China and Chinese literature. When I returned to campus after a year of intensive study in China, I was looking for a research opportunity and heard about the CISAC Honors Program in International Security Studies. So it was only in my senior year that I took my first course in political science and was exposed to international security studies. I discovered a passion for this topic like nothing else I had studied before. I wanted to learn more and got my first job, at the Carnegie Endowment, researching security issues, and then decided to continue with graduate studies.

During my Ph.D. at Princeton, I met a General in the Air Force who told me I should join the military. At that point, I'd never met anyone in the military. I thought, “I’m not very tough; what could I possibly contribute?” But I took up on his suggestion to do an internship with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and realized that my Chinese language skills and knowledge about China could be useful. I wanted to serve and planned to do my duty for four years and be done, yet here we are, nearly 11 years later. It’s been a blessing to make a whole career out of this and it’s truly all thanks to many memorable experiences at Stanford and the CISAC Honors Program. I’m thrilled to be back and looking forward to teaching and mentoring students in the Honors program and the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program.

What are some of your current research projects and what do you plan to work on at APARC and Stanford at large?

Mastro: My main project is researching a book about what China wants – a framework for understanding how to assess Chinese intentions. This is a policy-relevant book that engages with international relations theory and literature, where understanding state intentions plays a key role. The framework I’m developing assesses information to answer what China’s intentions are in several areas and regarding several cases. There will be chapters on China’s regional ambitions, global ambitions, approach to international institutions, and intentions towards the economic and technological order. As part of this project, you may see me currently publishing works on the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean.

Another project, in its beginning stages, focuses on the China-Russia relationship. Here the overarching framework is an attempt to understand state cooperation. This relates to alliances, though the notion of alliances is rather outdated. China doesn't have any alliances, but that doesn't mean it isn’t aligned or working with other countries. The question is what types of cooperation between China and Russia are problematic for the United States and what types are not. Again, we need to prioritize: is it so bad if China and Russia back each other in the UN, or is it worse that they exercise together? I don't know yet, but I think that international relations theory can shed some light on these questions.

Tell us something we don’t know about you.

Mastro: It may seem that I constantly work because I have a military career in addition to being very involved in the policy and academic worlds, but many people don't realize that I'm a big fan of leisure. I spend plenty of time with my children and have multiple hobbies that I engage in daily: I read novels, do yoga and CrossFit, play the piano, and manage to sleep! I was a very serious pianist and still take Skype lessons with my old teacher back in Chicago. Now with the move to California, I’ll finally be able to enjoy the grand piano my parents bought me for my 16th birthday, which I never had room for. I'm a firm believer in work-life balance. It's just that my work, too, is a passion and a hobby of mine.

To celebrate its May Release, the Stanford China Program hosted a virtual book launch event for Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press) on June 2^nd. Joining co-authors Thomas Fingar (Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University) and Jean C. Oi (Director, Stanford China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University) were contributors Karen Eggleston (Senior Fellow at FSI; Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University), Barry Naughton (Sokwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego), and Andrew Walder (Senior Fellow at FSI; Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, Stanford University). As Fingar and Oi point out in their volume, despite China’s extraordinary growth over the past 40 years, the country’s future is uncertain. China has enjoyed optimal conditions for development since the 1980s, but new hurdles including an aging populace, the loss of comparative economic advantage, a politically entrenched elite, and a population with rising expectations will test the country’s leaders. With each focusing on a different facet of China’s challenges, the panelists gathered to share their expertise and provide the audience with a glimpse into what the future might hold for this important country.

Available Now: Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future

Following an introduction from Professor Jean Oi, the program kicked off with Professor Barry Naughton of University of California, San Diego, who discussed his chapter entitled “Grand Steerage.” Professor Naughton argued that, as it plans for the future, China’s policymaking is becoming increasingly technology-focused, particularly in the realm of economic policy. Naughton further notes that China’s economy is becoming simultaneously more state-guided and more centered around technology. This decision is a gamble, though: China is investing heavily in high-tech industries, advancing massive, centrally steered projects like the Greater Bay Area initiative and the Xiong’an New District. If they are successful, says Naughton, this will indeed be an incredible success. But, if they are not, China’s losses will be major: “There’s not really a middle ground.”

After Professor Naughton was Professor Karen Eggleston, an expert on health policy in Asia. Professor Eggleston’s chapter, “Demographic and Healthcare Challenges,” deals with emerging obstacles for China’s healthcare system, including population aging and the problems that come with it, like chronic diseases and elder care. Although China’s healthcare system has improved dramatically in recent decades, it has done so unevenly, notes Eggleston: life expectancy has greatly increased, but with disparities according to income, region, and urban vs. rural status; universal healthcare is available, but the benefit level is low, effectively limiting the standard of care many can receive. The ratio of health spending to GDP is also increasing, yet it is still modest compared to high-income countries. The COVID-19 crisis has, of course, introduced even more challenges: Will China be able to distribute future vaccines equitably? Will this crisis negatively affect young people’s decisions to choose healthcare as a career? Will telemedicine, which has seen a surge under the pandemic, improve or exacerbate existing disparities? China faces a multitude of constraints and choices going forward if it hopes to meet its population’s healthcare needs.

The audience then had a chance to hear from co-editor Thomas Fingar, speaking on his chapter, “Sources and Shapers of China’s Foreign Policy.” Fingar noted three key takeaways from both his chapter and his talk: Firstly, China’s foreign policy is a fundamental part of its national policy. Secondly, the global political environment plays an important role in shaping both foreign and domestic policy which, thirdly, plays an important role in shaping foreign policy. The conditions that allowed China to flourish over the past 40 years, emphasized Fingar, are very different from those of the present. In the 1970s and 80s, China was able to take advantage of Cold War bipolarity, globalization was in its infancy, and “China was the only significant developing country willing to embark, at that time, on the export-led path of development.” In recent years, though, China’s behavior internationally has alienated other countries; there are many competitors pursuing its style of development; and its needs and aspirations have changed, requiring more raw materials and depending upon multi-national economic agreements. Fingar suggests two potential foreign policy options: China could continue with its wolf warrior diplomacy, which has “alienated essentially all China’s neighbors to some degree,” or it could return to a style more similar to that of the 1980s and 90s Reform and Opening era. It remains to be seen which style will win out.

Finally, Professor Andrew Walder concluded the program with his discussion of China’s political future at large. His chapter, “China’s National Trajectory,” follows China’s remarkable advancement in recent years and “tr[ies] to divine what a lower growth era will mean for China’s political future.” The last 40 years of rapid growth have generated support for China’s political system, more patriotism, the near eradication of democracy movements, and an elite unity not seen in the 1970s and 80s. However, low growth rates could mean a reversal for many of these trends, says Walder. While the aforementioned support for and stability of the Chinese government was maintained by ever-improving living standards and upward mobility, a low growth period (coupled with an aging population) means the government will no longer be able to rely on these trends for popular support. Rather, it will need to improve its provision of public services to address present-day challenges. Regardless, argues Walder, the low growth era will undoubtedly lead to “dynamic changes underneath the façade of stability of Chinese politics….”

For more insights on the modern obstacles China faces and what they mean for the country’s future, check out Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China's Future, available for purchase now.

APARC's China Program recently hosted Center Fellow Thomas Fingar for the webinar "Was America’s China Policy a Foolish Failure? The Logic and Achievements of Engagement." In this talk, Fingar examines the longtime U.S. strategy of engagement with China as well as the potential shift toward a strategy of decoupling. "Much recent commentary on U.S. relations with China claims that the policy of 'Engagement' was a foolish and failed attempt to transform the People’s Republic into an American style democracy that instead created an authoritarian rival," he says. "This narrative mocks the policies of eight U.S. administrations to justify calls for 'Decoupling' and 'Containment 2.0.'” Fingar argues that the policy of Engagement has been fruitful and that Decoupling is not only inadvisable but also unattainable. Watch:

In 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) published the fourth installment in its effort to identify “megatrends” likely to shape world events a decade or more into the future. Shorenstein APARC Fellow and China expert Thomas Fingar, the then chairman of the NIC, oversaw that report, Global Trends 2025. The unclassified report uses scenarios to illustrate some of the ways in which the factors driving world events – from climate change to demographic decline to changing geopolitical powers – may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers. One of these scenarios is the emergence of a global pandemic that bears a chilling resemblance to COVID-19.

We sat down with Fingar for an online conversation about the NIC report and its pandemic scenario, the government action it spurred, the United States’ failed initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and the implications of the current crisis for U.S.-China relations. Watch:

Twelve years after its publication, the NIC’s "Potential Emergence of a Global Pandemic" scenario (p. 75) has proven to be woefully accurate:

“The emergence of a novel, highly transmissible, and virulent human respiratory illness for which there are no adequate countermeasures could initiate a global pandemic. If a pandemic disease emerges by 2025, […] it probably will first occur in an area marked by high population density and close association between humans and animals, such as many areas of China and Southeast Asia […] Slow public health response would delay the realization that a highly transmissible pathogen had emerged […] Despite limits imposed on international travel, travelers with mild symptoms or who were asymptomatic could carry the disease to other continents. Waves of new cases would occur every few months. The absence of an effective vaccine and near-universal lack of immunity would render populations vulnerable to infection.”

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It was not a prediction, recalls Fingar, but rather an attempt to urge policymakers to think “beyond tomorrow,” past the end of their administration, and to stimulate strategic thinking about how to reinforce positive trends and change or ameliorate negative ones. If the report and its global pandemic scenario are precise, he notes, it is because the NIC’s effort involved the best specialists within the U.S. intelligence community and engaged numerous and varied groups of non-U.S. Government experts.

Yet the United States has been unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis is now worsening U.S.-China tensions. To address the crisis, however, argues Fingar, both countries must cooperate in the international fora. “Let that be the way that builds towards a better bilateral relationship.”