International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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In the United States since 9/11, there has been a tendency to reduce Southeast Asia's connections to the Middle East to religion: that is, to the Muslim faith shared by majori-ties east of the Mediterranean and south of the South China Sea, not to mention the Muslim minorities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While addressing the changing nature and importance of this overlap, Professor von der Mehden will also analyze how and why these two regions, spatially so far apart, have been interacting on a range of economic, security, and political issues, including the question of Palestine. He will argue that there is more interaction today between the two regions than ever before. Each region has become more involved in the affairs of the other. But these burgeoning connections are not what they were expected to be. Nor are they all benign.

Fred von der Mehden is internationally known for his extensive scholarship on politics, religion, and development in Southeast Asia. His talk will update and expand on his 1993 book, Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. A senior editor of the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995), Professor von der Mehden's many other books include Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia (1986); Southeast Asia 1930-1970 (1974); Comparative Political Violence (1973); and Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (1963). He has just returned from Southeast Asia, where he has lectured or done research almost every year since the 1950s. He is California-trained, having earned a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley; an M.A. from Claremont Graduate School; and a B.A. from the University of the Pacific.

Okimoto Conference Room

Fred von der Mehden Professor of Political Science Emeritus Rice University
Seminars
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Octobers and democracy in Thailand are inextricably entwined. On 14 October 1973, thirty years to the day before Dr. Pitsuwan will speak at Stanford, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Thailand's strongman prime minister, was driven into exile. Parliamentary democracy flourished for three years until it was violently shut down in October 1976 following Thanom's return. On 12 October 2002 in Bali, extremist Muslims took more than 200 lives and made terrorism an urgent priority for Thailand and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Relevant events in Southeast Asia in October 2003 include three summits--of ASEAN (Bali, 7-8 Oct.), of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Kuala Lumpur, 16-18 Oct.), and of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (Bangkok, 20-21 Oct.), the latter to include U.S. President George W. Bush. Dr. Pitsuwan will this unusual conjunction of anniversaries and summits to explore some of the ways in which democracy, terrorism, regionalism, and Islamism in Southeast Asia overlap and intersect. About the speaker Surin Pitsuwan served as Thailand's foreign minister from 1997 to 2001. He was the first Muslim to hold that post. He has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Thailand's House of Representatives since 1986. He has also been a columnist for Thai newspapers and a political science lecturer in Thammasat University. In 1983-84 he was a legislative assistant to U.S. Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro. He earned a PhD from Harvard University in 1982 after graduating cum laude from the Claremont Men's College in Claremont, California.

Okimoto Conference Room

Surin Pitsuwan Member of Parliament Democratic Party, Thailand
Seminars
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On 19 January 2001, General Angelo Reyes, then chief of staff of the armed forces, led a transfer of military support from democratically elected but disgraced President Joseph Estrada to his vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. A day later, Arroyo became president. At the time, the general defended his action as "promot[ing] the public good under extreme circumstances." Soon thereafter, President Arroyo named him her secretary of defense. In July 2003, nearly 300 heavily armed junior military officers seized the center of Manila?s business district, rigged explosives around the buildings, and demanded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?s resignation. They accused Reyes of corruption and urged him to resign as well. Reyes denied the charge as baseless. Saying he wanted to spare his family and the armed forces further abuse, he resigned in August. In October, President Arroyo appointed him Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism. What if any conditions justify military intervention in the name of the public interest? In this lecture, Reyes will argue that in certain extreme circumstances, civilian democracy can be served by military intervention. He will also warn, however, that such intervention can undermine democracy in the long run. Angelo Reyes' military career lasted thirty-five years. He commanded at all levels of the Philippine armed forces. His field experience included counter-insurgent operations in Mindanao and Luzon. He holds advanced degrees from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Asian Institute of Management in Manila. On Wednesday, October 1, 2003 he was appointed Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Philippines Conference Room

Angelo Reyes Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism and former Secretary of National Defense Republic of the Philippines
Seminars
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Potentially the most divisive issue to be addressed at the upcoming summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bali on October 7-8, 2003 concerns the membership of Burma. Traditionally ASEAN has been regarded as among the most successful regional institutions anywhere. Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN member states have never waged war against each other. Southeast Asia has become an enduringly peaceful security community. This achievement reflects ASEAN's commitment to the norm of national sovereignty, its refusal to violate that norm by interfering in a fellow member's domestic affairs, and its consensual style of diplomacy--the confrontation-shunning "ASEAN Way." But these facilitators of regional peace have at the same time reinforced the more or less authoritarian character of the Association's ten member regimes. Nowhere in Southeast Asia is this anomaly of an "illiberal peace" more acute than in the crisis now facing ASEAN over the lack of democracy in Burma. Recently the junta in Rangoon arrested and imprisoned the leader of the Burmese opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi. The Burmese regime was able to crack down partly because of ASEAN's adherence to the principle of sovereignty and its reluctance to allow criticism of one member state by other member states. Will ASEAN's faith in sovereignty survive? Or will the Burmese dilemma force ASEAN's leaders at the Bali summit to rethink the very meaning of the Association in a globalizing and democratizing world? Erik Kuhonta recently completed his dissertation on the politics of equitable development in Malaysia and Thailand. He specializes on the comparative and international politics of developing countries with a focus on Southeast Asia. A citizen of the Philippines, he was born in Sri Lanka, grew up in Italy, and now considers Thailand his home. Kuhonta holds a B.A. magna cum laude from the University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.

Okimoto Conference Room

Erik M. Kuhonta 2003-2004 Shorenstein Fellow APARC
Seminars
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Donald K. Emmerson
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August was a bloody month. There was barely time to mourn between the exploding bombs: first at the Marriott hotel in Jakarta on Aug. 5, at U.N. headquarters in Baghdad and on a bus in Jerusalem on Aug. 19, then the two in Bombay on Monday. These were the latest sites in a chronology of carnage running from Casablanca through Riyadh and Bali to Manhattan's crumbling towers.

Each atrocity involved local actors and local motives. Each was perceived differently by the local populace, and the local repercussions of each terrorist act varied widely. Yet all were attributed to a single global menace: jihad. For three years now, acts of violence done in Allah's name have made terrorism and Islam almost synonymous, not just in Westerners' vocabularies but around the world.

From this blight, who will rescue Islam?

The nearly reflexive association of Islam and terrorism is not simply the creation of rush-to-judgment pundits and politicians. Not when the terrorists proudly proclaim religious inspiration for their acts. Both Jerry Falwell and Osama bin Laden have maligned Islam. But it is, above all, the jihadists who have distilled their faith to sacred hatred - of Americans, Christians, Jews and the millions upon millions of moderate or secular Muslims who disdain this perversion from within.

Muslims respond in different ways to Islamist violence. In Jakarta a few days after 11 Indonesians and a Dutchman were killed in the blast at the Marriott, I met up with two Muslim friends. They were brimming with conspiracy theories. Why, they asked, had 20 Americans reportedly canceled their reservations before the bomb went off? Could these no-shows have known in advance of the attack? Why was the severed head of the alleged perpetrator later found on the hotel's fifth floor? Had the CIA planted it there? Why were arrests made so soon? Could the U.S., or perhaps the Indonesian military, have staged the event?

Behind their questions lay an unspoken one: How could Muslims have done such a thing?

It would be convenient if my two friends despised Americans and were products of Islamist schools. But both men hold advanced degrees from top universities in the U.S. and exhibit no obvious animosity toward Americans. That two such people could give voice to such dark misgivings about U.S. intentions shows that Islam is not alone in its association with violence.

The flip side of denial is demonization. For some in the West, the enemy is not jihadists but all Islamists. Never mind that the vast majority of Muslims who promote their faith do so peacefully. The PowerPoint charts of counter-terrorism experts that ignore Muslim diversity and feature the evil genius Bin Laden reinforce a distorted, top-down view of Islam.

Al Qaeda's responsibility is all too real. But local context matters. For jihad to succeed, an outside agitator needs inside sympathizers, and their receptivity to recruitment will depend on local circumstances. Recognizing that Muslim societies are autonomous and heterogeneous is a necessary first step to realizing that Bin Laden and his version of Islam aren't absolute control.

Defenders of Islam in the West stress the fact that most of its billion-plus adherents are moderates who reject violence. Such reassurance is far preferable to demonization. But understanding is not served by exaggerations - that Islam or Muslims are always peaceful, or that jihadists entirely lack sympathy in the Muslim world. In Muslim communities, extremist and mainstream views intersect in many places, including schools, mosques and organizations. It is in these myriad local settings that Islam's connection to violence will or won't be broken.

Regrettably, reassurance sometimes lapses into denial. In Indonesia recently, several leading Muslim figures urged journalists to stop using the words "Islam" and "Muslim" in their coverage of the Marriott bombing. I've even heard Muslims object to the phrase "moderate Muslims" because it implies the existence of immoderate ones. Islam will never be rescued by language inspectors who would substitute deflection for introspection.

Can reform rescue Islam? In principle, yes, but in practice, not necessarily. There are at least a few individuals and groups in every Muslim society striving to make the practice of their faith more tolerant of difference and dissent, less restrictive toward women, more compatible with secular democracy and less preoccupied with imposing Islamic law. Liberal American observers tend to celebrate these reformers as rescuers of Islam.

Yet the sheer diversity of Muslim societies suggests that efforts to liberalize Islamic doctrine will face varying prospects of success. Before assuming that liberals and jihadists have nothing in common, one should remember that both advocate far-reaching changes that threaten the conservative views and habits of many mainstream Muslims. Reformers deserve American support. But preventing the status quo from getting worse may be a more realistic goal of such help than winning "hearts and minds" for humanism, let alone making the Muslim world look as secular and democratic as, say, Turkey.

Is America responsible for Islam's predicament? Some U.S. actions have fueled jihad. The American presence in Iraq could become a magnet for holy warriors comparable to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Muslims pressed by Washington to oppose the hijacking of Islam by jihadists may instead decry the hijacking of U.S. foreign policy by hard- liners around President Bush.

But jihadists were fighting enemies long before the United States was born. The drive to create Islamist states is more than an attempt to check American hegemony. Different U.S. policies might shrink Muslim hostility toward U.S. actions. But intransigent theocrats will not be assuaged by the compromises necessary to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Nor will either the failure or success of U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq remove the reasons for Islamist violence in other Muslim societies.

Also shaky is the notion that "they hate us for our values." The democracy Americans espouse remains popular in the Muslim world. American notions of equal treatment for women are less welcome. But a woman's opportunities vary among Muslim-majority countries, including those in Asia that preceded the U.S. in having female heads of state.

Americans are disproportionally responsible for a modern world most Muslims feel they never made. Extremists have used such alienation to justify jihad. But it is not up to Americans to rescue Islam.

Non-Muslims can avoid unnecessary provocations and false reassurances. They can facilitate liberal reform. But it is Muslims, acting in diverse local circumstances, who will or won't break the cycle of jihadist demonization and naive denial that is ruining the image of their religion. Whether to rescue their faith is a choice only they can make.

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5:30 pm registration 6:00 pm program followed by reception Public Policy Institute of California 500 Washington Street, Founders' Room, 5th Floor, San Francisco $12 Members of the Asia Society $15 Non-members $8 Student with ID Please contact that Asia Society to register for this event. They can be reached at 415-421-8707. Experts on Indonesia's political, social, and economic climate will share their insights on the challenges and opportunities ahead for the world's fourth most populous country. Organized in conjunction with the upcoming release of Asia Society's Asian Update on decentralization in Indonesia, this panel will assess some of the key issues facing the largest Muslim society in the world. With presidential elections scheduled for April 2004, what progress has been made toward political reforms and increased accountability in Indonesia? As regional conflicts in Aceh and Papua continue to simmer and expanded military authority is being debated, how will Indonesia balance its needs for effective central authority and greater regional autonomy? Will transferring power and resources downward merely decentralize corruption? How will Indonesia's economy fare in the face of the war in Iraq, sagging American and global markets, and the prospect of higher energy prices? How have the AmericanÑled wars against terrorism and the Iraqi regime affected Indonesia's domestic politics and relations with the United States? Please join us for a timely and informative briefing on political, economic, and social developments in Indonesia today.

Public Policy Institute of California, 500 Washington Street, Founders' Room, 5th floor, San Francisco, CA

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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL
Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
aparc_dke.jpg PhD

At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

Selected Multimedia

Date Label
Donald K Emmerson Professor Speaker
Yuli Ismartono Executive Editor Speaker TEMPO Magazine, Jakarta, Indonesia
Nancy Peluso Professor of Environmental Social Science Speaker Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley
Harry Bhaskara Managing Editor Moderator Jakarta Post
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How is the American-led war in Iraq affecting Asian countries and their relations with the United States? Is a clash of civilizations underway? Will Islamist rage in Southeast Asia spawn terrorist attacks on Americans there? Will Islamist parties in Indonesia be able to ride this wave of anger into power in the elections to be held in April 2004? Will the regime in North Korea take advantage of American preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan to escalate tensions in Northeast Asia? How will the economies of Southeast and Northeast Asia be affected by the conflict in Iraq? Will Washington's priority on ousting Saddam Hussein undermine its effort to stabilize Afghanistan? And what will the repercussions in Asia be if, against the expectation of many observers, the Iraq war turns out to be short and the seeds of Iraqi democracy are successfully sown?

Founders Room, 5th floor
Public Policy Institute of California
500 Washington Street, San Francisco

Robert Scalapino Professor Emeritus Panelist Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
Theordore Eliot, Jr. Dean Emeritus Panelist Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Greg Fealy Visiting Professor Panelist School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Workshops
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Educational achievement in Malaysia is racially skewed across its three main cultural groups: The Malay-Muslim majority lags behind the country's Chinese and Indian minorities. This poses a dilemma. Should the state give the majority preferential access to education in the name of group equality? Or permit such access to be decided by merit alone, in the name of fairness among individuals? Malaysia has chosen to expand opportunities for schooling while maintaining a strict policy of affirmative action for Malays, all within a centrally controlled and standardized system of national education that relies on the Malay language and includes emphasis religion and morality. After showing how this pattern evolved from the secular, English-language format adopted by the British when they ruled Malaysia, Dr. Bakri Musa will assess the costs and benefits of affirmative educational action in the country today. Bakri Musa has written extensively on Malaysia. His latest book, An Education System Worthy of Malaysia (2003), has been described as "a severe critique" and "a comprehensive proposal for reform." Earlier titles include Malaysia in the Era of Globalization (2002), and The Malay Dilemma Revisited (1999). Shorter commentaries have appeared in Asiaweek, Education Quarterly, The Far Eastern Economic Review, and The International Herald Tribune, among other print media, and been aired by National Public Radio on its program, "Marketplace." A surgeon in private practice in Silicon Valley, Dr. Musa earned his medical and graduate degrees at the University of Alberta in Canada.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

M. Bakri Musra Columnist Speaker Malaysiakini (Malaysia Today)
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Asked his reaction to the Iraq war, the accused Bali bomber Amrozi said: "It just goes to show I was not wrong to bomb." The October 2002 bombings of two nightclubs on Bali were the worst act of terrorism since 9/11. 202 people died; 350 were seriously injured. Preliminary analysis of what the suspected perpetrators have said about the case suggests that they were motivated mainly by deep hatred of the United States. This lecture will explore the ideology and psychology of the accused bombers and, more broadly, the likely impact of the war in Iraq on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Greg Fealy is a leading specialist on Islam and the history and politics of Indonesia. His publications include two co-edited books, Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalism and Modernity in Indonesia and Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation. He has worked as an Indonesia analyst for the Office of National Assessments in Canberra and as a consultant for the Asia Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development in Jakarta. The history of Indonesia's largest Muslim party was the subject of his dissertation (PhD, Monash University, Australia, 1998).

Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central Wing

Greg Fealy Visiting Professor, Southeast Asian Studies Program School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University
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Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recently pointed to gold mining on the island of Mindanao as a possible solution to her country's chronic financial problems. Philippines gold reserves are among the world's largest, and gold prices are near a six-year high. But the metal is no panacea; damage to the environment and battles over land rights are among the risks and impediments. The president is not the first in her country to have focused on gold. In pre-Hispanic times the metal was both a medium of exchange and a sign of status. Ferdinand Marcos' rise to power is still widely, if credulously, attributed to his discovery of a famous hoard of gold. This lecture will show how scholarly attention to precious metals, including silver, can yield a perspective on Philippine history that challenges conventional narratives. By foregrounding precious metals, the archipelago's past can be relocated--away from the peripheral position it occupies in most world histories and toward a strikingly central role in global events and trends. About the Speaker: Martin W. Lewis came to Stanford in Fall 2002 from Duke University, where he co-directed the Program in Comparative Area Studies. His first book examined the interactions of economic development, environmental degradation, and cultural change on the Philippine island of Luzon. His other publications include The Myth of Continents (1997), coauthored with Karen Wigen. He received his PhD in geography from the University of California, Berkeley in 1987.

Okimoto Conference Room, Encina Hall, Third Floor, East Wing

Martin Lewis Lecturer in International Affairs Stanford University
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