On November 10th, the APARC China Program convened an expert panel focused on the Decision of the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which took place on October 26-29.  The Fifth Plenum Decision outlines not only China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), but also Beijing’s economic blueprint through 2035 and the “goal of fully building a modern socialist country."  The CCP leadership recently articulated its “dual circulation” policy – viz., a drastic reduction in China’s dependence on U.S. technologies and increased reliance on domestic consumption while maintaining exports and attracting foreign direct investments.  At this critical juncture when the coronavirus pandemic has shrunk global trade and tensions between the U.S. and China continue to intensify, panel members were asked to examine what the Fifth Plenum Decision might signify.  Does it mark a significant shift in Beijing’s strategic economic orientation?  What are the short- and long-term implications of the Decision for China’s economic development strategy, U.S.-China relations, as well as the world’s economic and technology ecosystems?  

Guests heard from experts James Green, Damien Ma, and Xiaomeng Lu.  James Green, Senior Research Fellow at Georgeton University's Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, has worked for over two decades on U.S.-Asia relations.  He has held several positions in government, including Minister Counselor for Trade Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and China Director of the White House’s National Security Council.  Damien Ma is the Director and co-founder of MacroPolo, the Think Tank of the Paulson Institute, which focuses on China's economics, technology, and politics.  He is also adjunct faculty at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University.  Finally, Xiaomeng Lu is a senior analyst in Eurasia Group's geo-technology practice.  She focuses on many of the most important issues related to China right now, including cybersecurity, data protection, artificial intelligence, internet governance, 5G, and trade.  The panel concluded with a discussion of audience questions. Watch:

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Professor Min Ye of Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies on October 14, 2020. Her program, moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, focused on the much-discussed but poorly-understood Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. While it is not widely known exactly what the BRI is or what Beijing hopes it will accomplish, it has been described as something of a modern silk road, connecting China to dozens of other countries through trade and extensive infrastructure projects. Based on research conducted for her recently published book, The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998-2018, Professor Ye enlightened the audience on a surprisingly critical element of this global program: the domestic component.

While Ye began her research with the assumption that many hold about the BRI—that it is primarily a global, internationally-focused initiative—as she continued her research, she found that many, if not most, BRI projects are either entirely domestic or have strong ties to domestic programs. To this end, she posed three questions during her program: Why did Chinese leadership launch the BRI in 2013? How did the Chinese state and businesses implement the BRI? and, What are the internal and external outcomes of the BRI?

To answer these questions, Ye explained the theoretical frameworks she used to understand both the BRI and China's "state-mobilized globalization." Firstly, Ye's "Chinese-State Framework" breaks the Chinese governmental system into three parts: Party Leadership, State Bureaucracy, and Subnational Actors. Each of these elements affect the others, as well as policy surrounding the BRI. However, this division also creates fragmentation in authority and ideology. Secondly, her “State-Mobilized Globalization” framework explains the process surrounding Chinese national strategy. Ye posits that national strategies are generally prompted by crises faced at lower levels of government, particularly when a lack of efficiency or communication is causing “state paralysis.” Once the strategy is announced in order to coordinate efforts and solve the crisis, it enters a feedback loop in which plans are adjusted and changed according to ground-level conditions. These frameworks informed the empirical studies used to answer Ye’s research questions.

The drivers of the BRI, argues Ye, were threefold: strategic, diplomatic, and economic. It was believed by interested parties within China that such an international initiative could ease tensions related to the United States and maritime Asia, as well as generally improve diplomatic relations for the country. China’s industries were also facing problems related to overcapacity, and economic and financial groups wished to use their excess capital to invest abroad. Actors from several different levels in China, including national agencies, local governments, and private entrepreneurs, were involved in executing BRI projects intended to alleviate these tensions. Different cities saw different sides of this implementation: Chongqing, one of China’s largest cities, is heavily dominated by state capital, with its main BRI actors being State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang province, is by contrast dominated by private entrepreneurs.

With diverse implementation comes diverse outcomes. Ye argues that some BRI projects have been helpful in reforming cities’ structural economy, while others have helped upgrade industry. The BRI has managed to alleviate some of the tensions listed above, but at the same time, it has created its own problems. While there has been a massive internal mobilization effort for BRI projects, there exists a disconnect between the domestic situation and demands for transparency from outside actors.

Ye concluded her talk by tying her research to current developments related to COVID-19. While one might imagine that a global pandemic would be a significant inhibitor to an international trade and infrastructure project, Ye finds just the opposite. Because the BRI is, in fact, quite domestically focused, many BRI projects are continuing at a rapid pace, albeit with digital adjustments. Some projects, such as the New Infrastructure Plan, were actually fast-tracked in the wake of the pandemic outbreak. Ye predicts that as COVID-19 restrictions ease and the world returns to “normal,” these domestic and digital elements will be combined with the BRI’s original projects.

An audio recording of this program is available at the link below, and a video recording is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.

This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

Last week, the world was waiting to see whether U.S. President Donald Trump would be reelected. Four days later, the verdict was in. Joe Biden, winning more overall votes than any other candidate in U.S. history, will be the 46th president of the United States.

While the United States was fixated on the final days of campaigning, China didn’t miss a beat in its aggression toward Taiwan. The day before the U.S. presidential election, Chinese aircraft flew into Taiwan’s airspace eight separate times. These military maneuvers are part of a disturbing trend of increased Chinese military activity over the past two months. Since Sept. 9, Beijing has flown near-constant sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), sometimes conducting as many as 30 in a day. On Sept. 21, China claimed that the median line, the boundary between the airspace of Taiwan and China that both sides had generally respected for decades, no longer existed.

These are the tense cross-strait circumstances a newly elected Biden will step into when he takes the oath of office in January. The decisions he makes concerning Taiwan will shape the future of the self-governing island, a democracy of nearly 24 million people and the 21st- largest economy in the world, as well as the tenor of U.S.-China relations regional stability.

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So what can we expect from the next president on Taiwan? We can already see some differences emerge. For example, when Trump won the 2016 election, he received congratulations from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen via phone. This made him the first president or president-elect to speak directly to the president of Taiwan since the United States normalized relations with Beijing in 1979. On the occasion of Biden’s election, no such phone call took place. Instead, Tsai sent her congratulations via Twitter, avoiding direct contact between the two.

This is just one anecdote. But does it suggest that Biden’s approach to Taiwan will differ greatly from that of the Trump administration?

Yes and no. The cornerstones of U.S. Taiwan policy—arms sales and strategic ambiguity—will change little under a Biden administration. The big difference will be in how Biden tries to maintain stability across the Strait.

The Trump administration has been bold in its arms sales, approving over $17 billion worth of arms over the past four years and blurring the line between offensive and defensive weaponry. Moreover, the Trump administration agreed to sell 66 F-16s to Taiwan in one of the largest arms sale packages ever offered to the island nation.

Yet while Trump earned praise for bolstering Taiwanese defenses against a possible mainland invasion, his approach to arms sales did not deviate significantly from his predecessors. The stated goal of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to ensure the “security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan” and to further the “principle of maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific.” In other words, arms sales are largely dependent on the military threat Beijing poses.

For example, relations between the PRC and Taiwan deteriorated during the early 1990s, leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and a spike in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the beginning of the Clinton administration. Trump was also not the first president to sell high-end aircraft to Taiwan; President George H. W. Bush sold F-16s. And while Clinton, the second Bush, and Obama all decided against selling the F-16, choosing instead to help upgrade and maintain aircraft already in Taiwan’s possession, the recent sale received bipartisan support largely because of the heightened threat posed by Beijing today.

Biden will maintain similar policies, continuing to offer arms to Taipei to address the growing threat across the Strait. Biden is a strong supporter of the policy; he was one of the original senators who voted for the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as the basis for the sales. But that doesn’t mean that he will offer similarly large packages to Taipei; some of the island’s need for weaponry and equipment has already been fulfilled through recent sales. It is also possible that Biden may try to soften the blow to Beijing by not overly publicizing sales or by notifying Beijing privately before sales are announced. But the sales themselves will continue regardless.

When it comes to America’s overall position, strategic ambiguity has guided U.S. policy on Taiwan for decades. Presidents have periodically questioned the policy, but none have gone so far as to change it.

The same can be said for Trump. Initially, the direct call between him and Tsai caused many to speculate that he may choose to support Taiwan’s independence openly. But he was cautious in the following years to avoid actions that Beijing or Taipei could construe as recognition. Indeed, despite attempts from within his party to discard strategic ambiguity, Trump limited himself to the vague, “China knows what I’m gonna do.”

Recently, there has been a flurry of debate about whether it’s time to abandon the policy as a warning to Beijing. But such views likely do not represent those of the president-elect. Biden is on record with his support of strategic ambiguity, which he has described as “reserv[ing] the right to use force to defend Taiwan but [keep] mum about the circumstances in which we might, or might not, intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait.”

Continuing to embrace strategic ambiguity doesn’t mean Biden will be less supportive of Taiwan than Trump. Biden was the first Democratic presidential candidate to extend congratulations to Tsai when she won reelection in January. But he correctly views strategic ambiguity as the best way to deter Beijing without emboldening Taiwan. In his words, “The president should not cede to Taiwan, much less to China, the ability automatically to draw us into a war across the Taiwan Strait.”

If the main contours of U.S.-Taiwan policy remain the same, then does it make a difference who is president? Absolutely. While Biden will work towards the same goal of deterring Beijing without emboldening Taipei, he will embrace different, more effective ways for achieving it.

Trump could not protect Taiwan’s international space because he purposefully reduced U.S. influence in international institutions. He pulled out of numerous international organizations and deals, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. So there was little that could be done when China forced Taipei out of the WHO’s World Health Assembly in 2017, where it had been an observer since a 2009 agreement. In 2020, China forced Taiwan’s exclusion even though its COVID-19 response was one of the most successful in the region, and condemnation from the State Department was largely ignored. Similarly, Taipei has also been kept at the margins of the United Nations Climate Change Conference since the United States left the Paris Agreement. And although entry into the TTP is a priority for Taiwanese leaders, Taipei lost its best path to joining without Washington to champion its candidacy.

Biden, as he has already shown through moves such as canceling Trump’s attempt to pull out of WHO, will be more involved in international institutions and strive to regain the United States’ global leadership role. This will give the United States more institutional power to advocate for Taipei’s inclusion and protect Taiwan’s international space better than the Trump administration’s unilateral efforts. Moreover, Biden is likely to reinstate the budgets for key U.S. organizations like USAID that Trump undermined and gutted. He also nominated a critic of the World Bank and IMF to oversee the U.S. role in both institutions. Reduced development aid and perceptions that American influence in the Pacific was declining have pushed countries toward China. In 2019, the Republic of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both switched recognition from Taiwan to mainland China in exchange for multi-million dollar infrastructure deals.

A Biden administration will also work more with allies to meet the broader challenges China poses. The United States would not expect its security partners to play an integral role in any armed defense of Taiwan. But even the diplomatic support of other countries could go far in cautioning an increasingly confident Beijing.

In contrast, the Trump administration has relied mainly on unilateral options to enhance deterrence against the PRC, like freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). These operations in which the U.S. navy sails through areas over which China has illegally declared sovereignty will likely continue under a Biden administration, but less frequently as he shifts to utilizing nonmilitary tools as well.

But the bigger change will be Biden’s tone. Trump has focused on provoking Beijing—using Taiwan as “an instrument of pushback against China.” Last month, a second high-level visit from a U.S. official to Taiwan within two months prompted China to fly 18 military aircraft across the sensitive midline on the Taiwan Strait, forcing Taipei to scramble fighter jets in response. The sale of F-16s was delayed because Trump was using it as a bargaining chip in trade deal negotiations with China.

Biden’s goal will not be to threaten Chinese interests for its own sake but to maintain the status quo across the Strait. For example, he has stated publicly that the United States should not come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan provokes war by declaring independence.

This more balanced approach will do much to reassure Beijing. Deterrence requires both reassurance and credible threats. The Trump administration has been effective at the former, signaling to Beijing that Washington is willing to defend Taiwan if necessary. But Washington must also avoid making Beijing believe that it will punish it no matter what, or else the United States loses the power to shape China’s potential use of force. Thus, reassuring Beijing that the United States is not attempting to change the status quo by encouraging Taiwanese independence is equally important. Hopefully, Biden will reinstate this balance.

On October 28th, the APARC China Program hosted a panel of experts for the panel "Caught in the Crossfire: Strategic Competition, U.S.-China Science Collaboration, and U.S. Universities." Reports of Chinese espionage, IP theft and military-civil fusion strategy have all fueled concerns regarding U.S. universities’ open research ecosystem, especially in STEM. Many of the concerns focus not only on research integrity but also on potential adverse consequences to U.S. military and economic security. The October 28th panel discussed open access to U.S. universities, security risks involved, as well as the potential adverse consequences of limiting international access in science and technology (S&T) research.  

The discussion began with Professor Susan Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center at UC San Diego, who gave the audience an overview of current China science and technology policy and its relationship with US-China competition and universities. Shirk was followed by Arthur Bienenstock, co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Scientific Partnerships and Professor of Photon Science, Emeritus at Stanford. Bienenstock provided important perspective from the STEM side of this debate, arguing that collaboration with China--and other foreign countries--is vital and should be encouraged. Elsa B. Kania, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security's Technology and National Security Program, gave a different perspective, explaining China's "civil-military fusion" and why many in the United States consider it a threat. Finally, Tim Stearns, the Frank Lee and Carol Hall Professor in the Department of Biology, brought things back home to Stanford. As the Senior Associate Vice Provost of Research, Stearns was able to give a unique insight into university administration and how Stanford is approaching these challenges. The panel concluded with a discussion between the panelists of audience questions. Watch:

FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro joins NPR's Weekend Edition host Scott Simon to discuss the rising tensions between China and Taiwan and how the United States should respond.

Listen to the complete interview below. This conversation originally appeared on NPR's website.

On September 29, the APARC China Program hosted Thomas Fingar and Stephen Stedman for the program “Rebuilding International Institutions.” The program, which was moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, examined the future of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Health Organization (WHO) in our evolving global political landscape. While Fingar and Stedman acknowledged that such institutions facilitated attainment of unprecedented peace and prosperity after WWII, they also asked difficult questions: Are these institutions still adequate? And if not, how will we change them?

Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar kicked off the session by asking whether or not US-China tensions would impede cooperation on major global challenges, or if those challenges were so serious as to render such rivalries immaterial. Perhaps the most obvious example of such a crisis is the current COVID-19 pandemic. The efforts to curb the virus’ spread not only by individual countries, but also by international organizations like the WHO, have proven largely inadequate. According to Fingar, our existing institutions need to be reformed or supplemented to deal with these types of threats. However, such an overhaul of our international systems will be difficult, he says.

How, then, will we go about such a massive project? Stephen Stedman, Deputy Director at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), responded by explaining that the current failure of international cooperation makes such undertakings tough. Globalization has been a double-edged sword: On one hand, more contact, perhaps inherently, leads to increased tension. The resurgence of traditional notions of sovereignty in 2010, kickstarted by the opposition of countries like Russia and China to what was seen as UN overreaching, has led to a reduction of international cooperation overall. On the other hand, Fingar posits that our interconnectedness may force us toward cooperation despite rivalries as we face more and more transnational threats. International institutions create rules to organize and manage our many interconnected relationships so that we can deal with our problems effectively and reduce friction.

Stedman also pointed to the upcoming US elections and the major impact their outcome will have on how these problems are addressed—or not. In the last four year, the United States has pulled back significantly from international institutions and agreements, leaving a gap that China has started to fill. Furthermore, despite the US’s retreat from international responsibility, the country still remains a critical actor in global initiatives. China’s embrace of a global leadership role is not inherently negative, but its future relationship with the US will need to be “managed in a way that you get greater cooperation and not just paralysis.” Stedman says that it is likely that progress will need to be made on a bilateral front in order to have productive conversations about international issues with China.

Concluding on an optimistic note, Fingar voiced his hope that the current tensions and negative perceptions between rivals might ultimately “be mitigated by success in dealing with a common problem,” because “experience does shape perceptions.”

A video recording of this program is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce its new China Policy Fellowship, which will bring to Stanford mid-career to senior-level experts with extensive research experience on issues vital to U.S. China policy and influence in the policymaking process. With this new offering, APARC seeks to apply cutting-edge academic analysis to pressing challenges affecting U.S. policy toward China and to strengthen U.S.-China relations.

The fellowship will be awarded annually to one expert. While at Stanford, the China Policy Fellow will undertake original research in his/her area of expertise and will play a lead role in organizing a major conference on a topic central to the U.S.-China policy agenda. Each fellow’s work and annual conference will result in a publication that will help advance a deeper understanding of China and its aims.

The fellowship will be hosted by APARC’s China Program, whose mission is to facilitate multidisciplinary, social science-oriented research on contemporary China, with a dual emphasis on basic and policy-relevant research. The appointment of the inaugural 2021-22 China Policy Fellow will begin in the fall quarter of 2021. The new fellowship is made possible thanks to the generosity of an APARC supporter.

“The need to enhance understanding within the United States about China has never been more critical,” says China Program Director Jean Oi, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics. “In these times when divergent claims and bellicose propositions are regularly made by politicians and policymakers in the United States and in China, the China Policy Fellowship will help us promote dialogue between the two nations and empirically-driven research relevant to U.S. China relations. I am delighted that we are able to offer this new fellowship opportunity.”

The application deadline for the 2021-22 China Policy Fellowship is February 15, 2021.