Taiwan is currently the single biggest point of contention in U.S.-China relations, and U.S. allies have a crucial role to play in efforts to prevent a great-power war over the island. South Korea, however, has remained relatively ambiguous about its willingness to support U.S. efforts to push back against China’s growing influence in the region, including in the Taiwan Strait. As the Yoon administration is now creating an opening for a more proactive approach, what can South Korea do in a Taiwan contingency?

A new article in The Washington Quarterly provides a framework for analyzing South Korea’s potential role in this era of strategic competition through the lens of war over Taiwan. The authors — Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Center Fellow at APARC, and Sungmin Cho, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies — build upon traditional concepts of balancing to create a nuanced, operationally relevant strategy for South Korea to contribute to the defense of Taiwan.

They explain South Korea’s approach to the Taiwan issue to date; evaluate South Korea’s strategic importance and what it can do to support U.S.-led efforts to compete with China; explore how China and North Korea may respond to increased South Korean cooperation with the United States, along with the potential obstacles this cooperation could create; and recommend ways to leverage the US-ROK alliance to enhance deterrence against China with respect to Taiwan.

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Mastro and Cho recognize that it is operationally and politically infeasible for South Korea to fight side-by-side with U.S. forces against China in a Taiwan scenario or to build its military sufficiently to deter Chinese aggression against Taipei. South Korean strategists must also consider the costs of China’s and North Korea’s potential responses to greater South Korean involvement in defending Taiwan. Still, Seoul can play a significant role in deterring Chinese aggression.

According to Mastro and Cho, South Korea’s optimal strategy to navigate the U.S.-China rivalry should meet two conditions. First, it should contribute to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, including deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Second, it should be able to make China hesitate to take punitive actions against South Korea. Thus, South Korea can provide rear-area support to the United States, such as intelligence gathering, ammunition supplies, or noncombatant evacuation. It can also support the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea (USFK) and be more proactive in deterring North Korean aggression and provocation to free up U.S. resources to focus on China in a contingency scenario.

Moreover, South Korea could contribute toward forms of “collective resilience” against China’s economic statecraft, such as collective economic sanctions, and leverage its position as one of the world’s leading producers of advanced semiconductors to complicate China’s calculus. Finally, Seoul’s diplomatic support of U.S.-led efforts to defend Taiwan can influence Beijing to take seriously the international community’s potential united response against any attempt to invade Taiwan.

“Given the heightened urgency over tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Seoul should pursue these options immediately to maintain peace and stability in the region before it is too late,” the authors conclude.

Over the past decade, as China’s might and assertiveness have grown, countries around the Indo-Pacific have increasingly embraced informal partnerships, or minilateral groupings, to deepen international policy action and defense coordination. Two prominent examples of the minilateral model are the Quad, which comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, which includes Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, deterring China with minilateral groupings is more complex than traditional deterrence theory might suggest. Can minilateral groupings deter coercion and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and if so, under what conditions? 

A collection of essays in a new Asia Policy roundtable tackles this question. Shorenstein APARC South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore is a co-editor of the roundtable. Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro is the author of the first essay in the collection.

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The roundtable brings together six leading security experts to explore the nexus between deterrence and minilateralism in Indo-Pacific security politics. The motivation for this endeavor, Tarpore and co-editor Brendan Taylor of the Australian National University explain in the roundtable introductory essay, is to fill the gap in the existing literature, which has largely not addressed the possible convergence between these two increasingly dominant trends in the region.

The roundtable opens with Mastro's essay, in which she identifies the unique characteristics of the China challenge and considers how minilateral groupings can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances. First, she explains why minilaterals, such as the Quad, could address some of the challenges of “deterrence by punishment.” This traditional form of deterrence employs the threat of severe penalties — ranging from economic sanctions to nuclear retaliation — to prevent attacks by an adversary. Here, Mastro says, “economic or political costs may have greater deterrent value against Beijing than military costs, thus creating an opportunity for the Quad.”

Next is the category of “deterrence by denial,” which includes strategies that prevent or limit aggressive actions of an adversary by creating the perception that they will not succeed. Such denial-based strategies are more effective than punishment-based ones in circumstances where China could blunt U.S. attempts at punishment or choose to incur the costs. But the United States, Mastro says, “does not have the regional force posture to deny China its objectives.” 

Mastro then considers a third, less analyzed category, “deterrence by resilience,” where the goal is to encourage the perception that disruptive events such as military operations will not be effective in attaining the adversary’s objectives. Here, “resiliency is about signaling to China that the benefits of a particular action are less than China believes them to be.” By building resiliency, smaller countries can push back against Chinese coercion to abide by China's interests. Countries in minilateral groupings should therefore prioritize this form of deterrence as they consider ways to cooperate, Mastro concludes.

This commentary was first published by the Los Angeles Times.

The 104-minute speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the country’s 20th party congress reveals a leader who believes he is on a historic mission to save China’s self-described socialism in the 21st century.

Xi’s Oct. 16 speech launched the twice-a-decade meeting, which concludes this weekend, where the national Communist Party appoints its leadership and announces China’s policy direction for the coming years. The address reads very much like a sequel to his previous one five years ago. At that time, Xi cryptically said China had entered a “new era” of socialism. This time, he characterized his aim as “building a modern socialist country,” which the state media touted as the highlight of the speech. This statement clarifies his ambition to prove the superiority of socialism by 2049, with an implicit aim to surpass the U.S. by the centennial anniversary of the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949.

Xi is driven by the grand “Chinese dream,” the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that he referenced in his 2017 and 2022 National Congress speeches. He appears to view himself as the sole individual who can achieve this dream in the 21st century, perhaps casting himself as a 21st-century Mao Zedong. His plans — including “common prosperity” and “socialist modernization” — are long term and unlikely to shift even following the recent turmoil caused by COVID-19, China’s harsh lockdowns in response and the resulting economic pains.

These ambitions are the same ones promoted by the Xi administration over the last decade. But by the end of this latest congress, Xi will have cemented an unprecedented third term as president, and he can now be more aggressive than before in their pursuit.

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It follows then that U.S.-China relations are unlikely to improve in Xi’s next term. He has shown, time and again, that he differs from his predecessors, except Mao, in that he does not shy away from conflict with the United States. Xi has felt comfortable declaring that “the East is rising while the West is declining” and positioning the U.S. as a challenge to overcome, rather than an obstacle to avoid, on the road to the Chinese dream.

On the other hand, China will probably strengthen ties with Russia, North Korea and other like-minded authoritarian nations, just as the U.S. is strengthening alliance networks in the region, including with Japan and South Korea. We are, as Henry Kissinger once said, in the “foothills of a Cold War.”

The Taiwan Strait remains central to how quickly and drastically conflict could escalate. Xi’s latest speech reiterated that China wanted to gain Taiwan peacefully but “will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” He frames unification not as a choice but as a historical responsibility, which has been placed on his shoulders. Xi’s direct mention of Taiwan unification at the party congress suggests that he will use that issue as a justification for his long-term reign.

One factor that will help determine the actual longevity of Xi’s rule is whether meaningful protests against him will emerge. Xi’s policies and crackdowns against dissent have yielded sporadic protests that made international headlines. In China, however, the threshold for revolution is quite high, creating major barriers to a regime change. A large dose of state-led nationalism and indoctrination convinces people that the U.S. in particular is determined to torpedo China’s quest for modernity, creating an enemy to rally the country around.

China’s economic challenges pose another hurdle for Xi’s long-term agenda. The country’s rigid zero-COVID policy has limited growth, and Xi has displayed a heavy-handed approach toward private businesses, dampening entrepreneurial spirit. If Chinese people come to think of Xi’s anti-market tendency as the underlying problem, it will erode his authority.

To stave off such threats, Xi is likely to continue his iron-fist rule. He has purged enough rivals and earned enough grievances over the years that relaxing his power grip at this juncture will likely invite criticism, if not revenge, toward him. He is eager to turn China into a global power that will awe the West. As Xi put it at the 2017 party congress, China is increasingly taking “center stage in the world.” With Xi still at the helm, we should expect a more aggressive China and increasing turbulence in the regional and global order.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. Seong-Hyon Lee is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2023.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on contemporary Japan and contemporary Asia broadly defined, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2023. The application deadline is December 1, 2022.
 

This commentary originally appeared in The Economist.

But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. China has not fought a war since 1979, when it made heavy weather of a “punitive” invasion of Vietnam. An amphibious attack, and to a lesser degree a blockade of the type the exercises off Taiwan were simulating, would demand complex joint operations (involving army, air force and navy), which in turn require impeccable logistics and command and control. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, launched a massive organizational reform to improve in these areas, and the PLA undoubtedly has. But the war in Ukraine may have given him heightened anxiety, given that the Russians struggled precisely with logistics and command.

For this reason, we should see the massive exercises off Taiwan less as a signal, and more as a rehearsal for combat. Mr Xi wants progress on the Taiwan issue, and domestically talk in the press is shifting from peaceful reunification to armed reunification. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

China will seize the opportunity to practice as much as possible. It has announced already that this round of exercises will continue and that another round in the Bohai Gulf/Yellow Sea is next. And it won’t just be large-scale exercises. It is unlikely that Beijing will return to its previous level of operations. Instead, China might attempt to normalize greater Chinese activity around Taiwan. That makes war more probable. Through a series of exercises the PLA, and the party leadership, might gain confidence that China’s forces are ready to take Taiwan sooner than they would otherwise have thought.

Of course, this all depends on how the exercises and operations go. From the outside, this is hard to assess. The missiles landed where they should have in recent days, and there were no accidents. But we don’t know how much and how well different groups are communicating with each other. To prepare for joint operations, air-force units need to operate in close proximity and coordinate with ground troops and amphibious elements. The PLA needs to practice providing supplies, such as prepositioned fuel stocks, and bringing munitions and medical supplies to forward locations such as Fujian, the province directly across the Taiwan Strait.

This is where the real trouble lies. If activities in the vicinity of Taiwan become more routine, not only does this heighten anxiety in Taipei (and probably other regional capitals as well) but it helps to disguise any preparations for a real military campaign. China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island. If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing. Ms Pelosi’s visit has allowed Beijing to move to a new level of military activity unchallenged, which will make it harder for America to defend Taiwan. No signal of America’s commitment to the island can fix that.

This story was last updated on August 10, 2022.

Amid warnings and condemnations from Chinese leadership, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on August 2, 2022, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the island since 1997. A day after Pelosi's visit, furious China began firing missiles near Taiwan in drills that appear to be a trial run for sealing off the island, and Japan said some missiles landed in its exclusive economic zone. In a series of articles and interviews, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the implications of Speaker Pelosi's visit, Beijing's response, and what the United States might do to prepare for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 

Mastro joined CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS to discuss what she calls the "unprecedented scale and complexity" of China's military drills near Taiwan. Over the past 20 years, China has invested in building up not only one of the most advanced and sophisticated militaries but also one that can attack and keep out the United States. So now, explains Mastro, beyond the live-fire and missile tests, the Chinese military exercises also included complex air and naval operations designed to demonstrate China's readiness to take Taiwan when it feels ready to do so. Watch:

According to Mastro, when China makes a move on Taiwan there has to be an element of surprise, so they don't want to do it right now when the United States has increased its focus and operations in the region. But we will probably see additional rounds of Chinese military exercises in the future, she predicts, "and the more they get to do it the more confident they become and the more likely we are to see Beijing initiate force against the island." 

A Question of Capability

China's round of military exercises in response to Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan visit was a bit of a “coming-out party” for Beijing, writes Mastro in an invited commentary for The Economist. After years of investments to build up and modernize the People's Liberation Army, China’s armed forces are now comparable to America’s in quality and quantity, Mastro says. But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities, and Pelosi's visit gave them the pretext to do exactly that. "China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island," Mastro notes. "If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing."

In an interview with BBC World News, Mastro argues that the political maneuvering intended to signal U.S. commitment to Taiwan — whether it comes in the form of Speaker Pelosi's visit or President Biden's statements that "the United States must protect Taiwan" — is ultimately unhelpful and does not address the more serious issue at hand, which is whether the United States has the military capabilities needed to defend Taiwan.

Mastro also suggested that Chinese leadership has benefited from Pelosi's visit, using the occasion for their own political purposes and to test some of their military capabilities to take Taiwan by force.

Watch the full discussion:

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According to Mastro, a noteworthy aspect of Pelosi's visit is that she chose to pursue it despite dissuasion from the Biden administration, signaling to Beijing that the U.S. model is grounded in the separation of powers and that Congress would act independently to pass legislation to supply arms or provide military funding to defend Taiwan.

Chinese Military Projection of Power

In response to Pelosi's visit, China announced military exercises in six regions around Taiwan, pressing its forces closer to the island than ever before. "They’re definitely going to use this as an excuse to do something that helps them prepare for a possible invasion,” Mastro says in a New York Times report. "Under the guise of signaling, they’re trying to basically test their ability to conduct complex maneuvers that are necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.”

Mastro recently outlined the array of weaponry China has amassed for a forceful "unification" with Taiwan, pointing out that China has now the world's largest navy and that its missile force is thought to be capable of targeting ships at sea to neutralize the main U.S. tool of power projection, namely, aircraft carriers, notes a New York Times explainer.

Mastro also joined WBUR's On Point Radio host Meghna Chakrabarti to examine the fallout from China's military exercises around Taiwan, current Chinese military capabilities, and what a modern war over Taiwan would look like. Listen to the full conversation:

Artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a major role in a Taiwan contingency, and these are significant because they change much of China's perceptions of its capabilities, Mastro explains. First, the Chinese are concerned about the capabilities of their personnel, but if they can use AI-enabled systems and take the person out of the loop, then that makes them more confident in their military capabilities. Moreover, the Chinese notion of "war control" is such in which thinking through enables planning and preparing for every possible outcome and contingency in a war. "Algorithmic warfare is exactly what they have in mind. They think, 'If we have the right systems, we can project and ensure victory ahead of time.' So, from my perspective, AI is really significant because of how much more confidence it would give China in its ability to win a war."

Under Xi Jinping, the People's Liberation Army has modernized to a point where "armed reunification" with Taiwan seems increasingly plausible. But experts differ in interpreting China's calculus on Taiwan. "When people talk about whether or not China can or cannot [invade Taiwan], they’re actually talking about something different, the level of operational cost — the loss of ships, casualties — that China would have to pay to do it," Mastro tells the New York Times. "They could do it," she added.

Paths to Deterrence

Mastro also appeared in an interview with NBC Bay Area, explaining the context for the flaring U.S.-China tensions as they pertain to Taiwan. "The issue is that the United States promised not to have official ties with the Taiwan government, and the visit by Speaker Pelosi is understood by the Chinese as an official delegation, meaning the United States is violating its promise."

Pelosi's visit is not the first time the United States has sent an official delegation to Taiwan, and the Chinese follow-up military exercises are not the first sign of Chinese retaliation. What has changed this time around, according to Mastro, is Chinese military capabilities. "China now has a formidable force that could take Taiwan, if it felt like it, and I think that is encouraging a much more aggressive posturing on the part of Beijing," she said.

Mastro emphasized that the U.S. strategy of making symbolic statements of commitment to Taiwan is misguided and does not deter Beijing from aggressive action. "China's uncertainty right now is not about U.S. commitment but is, instead, about U.S. capability [...] I'm sure the Chinese are watching [Pelosi's visit], but the lessons they're learning is not that they should back off Taiwan, but instead that they need to strengthen their position to convince the United States not to engage in these kinds of activities in the future."

For more of Mastro's analysis of the fallout from Pelosi's visit and cross-Strait tensions, visit the links below:

What Does China Want from Taiwan? 
Sky News, August 12, 2022

Will the US and China Go to War Over Taiwan 
BBC, August 11, 2022

What Are the Issues Between the U.S., China, and Taiwan? Stanford Scholar Explains 
Stanford News, August 10, 2022

China’s Military Operations Around Taiwan After Pelosi Visit Show Intent to Change Status Quo 
South China Morning Post, August 5, 2022

China ‘Convinced It Needs to Hit Us With Pearl Harbor-style Surprise Attack’ to Win War Over Taiwan, Expert Warns 
The U.S. Sun, August 5, 2022

Stanford Experts Cast Grim Predictions for U.S.-China Relations Following Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit 
The Stanford Daily, August 5, 2022

China’s War Games May Not Lead to All-out Conflict Against Taiwan... Yet 
The Telegraph, August 4, 2022

Chinese Missiles Strike Seas Off Taiwan, and Some Land Near Japan 
New York Times, August 3, 2022

Taiwan Lives Under the Threat of a Modernized and Reinforced Chinese Army 
Les Echos, August 3, 2022

China’s Military Drills Could Be a Prelude to Something Much Worse in Taiwan 
The Telegraph, August 3, 2022

Why Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit Is Raising U.S.-China Tensions 
New York Times, August 2, 2022

Pelosi's Taiwan Visit Triggering Potential Military Showdown 
VOA Chinese, August 2, 2022

China and US on a Collision Course: Tensions Over Taiwan Continue to Rise 
de volkskrant, July 29, 2022 (in Dutch)

For Taiwan, Pelosi Visit is About Us, China Controlling Risk 
CBS Bay Area, July 29, 2022

Xi Jinping's Phone Call with Biden 
BBC Chinese, July 28, 2022

Pelosi’s Rumored Taiwan Trip Sparks Uproar 
The Dispatch, July 27, 2022

Taiwan Holds Drills Amid Pelosi Visit Concern, China Tension 
AP, July 25, 2022

Guam: The Sharpening of the Spear’s Tip 
Foreign Policy Focus, July 20, 2022

Expert Voices: Interview with Oriana Skylar Mastro 
Center for Advanced China Research, July 18, 2022

Guam, the small island territory in the Pacific Ocean, plays a unique strategic role in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy. In a new article, part of a Hudson Institute collection of essays on the challenges and motivations of defending Guam, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro analyzes the island’s strategic importance to the United States, China’s threats to U.S. forces on the island, and the pathways to deterrence against Chinese encroachment in the region. 

Mastro enumerates a number of reasons behind Guam’s strategic importance. First, “the Chinese missile threat to U.S. regional bases, especially those located in the first island chain, enhances the operational role of those bases sufficiently distant from China to partially mitigate the threat it poses, yet also close enough to be operationally impactful.” Guam’s geostrategic potential is rooted in its proximity to China, and represents “the westernmost location from which the U.S. can project power, manage logistics, and establish command and control.” 

In a Taiwan contingency, Mastro argues that Guam would play an important role as a logistics hub and jumping-off point for combat forces headed toward the Taiwan Strait, with the caveat that U.S. forces could maintain roughly half the sortie rate from Guam as that from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan. Another reason behind Guam’s strategic utility comes from reliable base access, which is more reliable than in other Asian host countries.

Despite the U.S. force posture and the island’s protective distance from China, Guam remains vulnerable to Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile attack. According to Mastro, the U.S. has systems on the island to protect against missile threats, such as a THAAD battery, but “U.S. military commanders want much more of a guarantee that the U.S. would be able to continue operations out of Guam even under Chinese missile attack.”

Given China’s ability to threaten U.S. bases on the island, Mastro proposes an “unappreciated and underutilized” pathway to deterrence: deterrence by resiliency. Similar to deterrence by punishment, which seeks to prevent adversary attacks by employing the threat of severe penalties should the adversary do so, deterrence by resiliency is based primarily on shaping adversaries’ perceptions of one’s own capabilities. “However, unlike deterrence by punishment, the goal is not to create fear of retaliation but rather to encourage the perception that disruptive events would have little effect on an adversary.” Mastro uses the term resiliency to refer to a state’s ability to both absorb and deflect costs at a given level of violence.

Mastro argues that resilience is about signaling to China that “the benefits it would derive from a particular action would actually be less than it believes them to be. Improving defenses can enhance deterrence through this mechanism, but, given its limitations, other avenues—in particular, pursuing viable alternatives and creating redundancy—should also be pursued to ensure that an attack on Guam would not cripple a U.S. war effort.”

Guam, frequently cited as the U.S.’s viable alternative to bases within the first island chain, represents a critical strategic waypoint, but as long as the U.S. is reliant on the island to fight and win a war, “China will ensure that it can effectively target the island, thus making messaging associated with Guam’s defense key.” Mastro proposes that the language about defending Guam must expand to accomodate resilience contingencies for the island’s planned defenses, which, “once in place and even under attack […] would ensure that the US could continue operations there to the degree necessary to, for example, maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.” 

Whether China would accept deterrence by resilience remains to be seen, but policymakers must employ new thinking about Guam’s defense to meet the new security challenges posed by China.