Three foreign policy experts explored U.S.-China relations in a panel discussion at Stanford earlier this week. In a wide-ranging conversation, they described current relations as often complementary, sometimes conflicting, and above all, unavoidably crucial.

The panel titled “The United States, China and Global Security” included He Yafei, former Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, and Stanford’s Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador, and Karl Eikenberry, a distinguished fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

Jean Oi, a Stanford professor of political science, moderated the event, which was co-hosted by the China Program and the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, two entities in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

“The [U.S.-China] relationship is very complicated and full of complexity,” said He, a career diplomat who was recently appointed as a professor at Peking University.

Shifts in the international system that accompanied the end of the Cold War and China’s rapid growth have brought new demands and necessitated more engagement, He said, weighing the outcomes of “the great convergence,” or closing of the development gap between developed and developing countries, and its impact on the bilateral relationship.

“China has been a major beneficiary of the global system created by the United States,” He said, suggesting it would be unrealistic to assume China would have become the second largest economy without that context, moreover, that Beijing would seek its deterioration.

Uncertainty and the next U.S. administration

China and the United States, as two of the world’s most populous countries, face domestic politics and a range of challenges such as slowed economic growth, population aging and minority and ethnic issues.

“There’s a lot of uncertainty,” Oi said. “As you know, the U.S. presidential election will be taking place quite soon and China itself is going through a period of some uncertainty in its economic development.”

The panelists from the United States offered an optimistic view of the outcome of the presidential election. Armacost, who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government before coming to Stanford, said he foresees consistency in U.S. policy toward China, and more broadly, toward the region, during the next administration.

“Asia is destined to be a huge priority,” Armacost said. Two outstanding areas bound to be “sticking points” on the policy agenda are territorial issues in the South China Sea and international trade, he said. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement between 12 countries of which the United States is a party, has drawn tepid support in the U.S. Congress. And in July, China rejected a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on maritime rights in a case brought by the Philippines respective to the South China Sea.

Eikenberry shared a similar sentiment about the likelihood of policy continuity from the current U.S. administration to the next, and described the capacity for deepened cooperation between China and the United States as “profound.”

“And we’re already doing it,” he remarked. The Paris Agreement on climate change is one recent testament of the countries’ ability to successfully cooperate and galvanize support for solving global issues, he said.

The panelists agreed that the future of U.S.-China cooperation may well depend on youth, citing surveys of younger generations that show they are more amenable to engaging the other than older generations.

‘Global network of partnerships’

Asked to evaluate the China-Russia relationship, He said the countries have reached a “historic high” in their relationship, underscored by common interests, shared borders and a fraying U.S.-Russia relationship. Russia and China, however, have no intension of forming a formal strategic alliance, he added.

China’s approach to interaction with other countries is based on “a global network of partnerships” focused on trade, cultural exchange and relationships, He said.

The panelists highlighted the importance of striving for more dialogue and consultation between the United States and China on security, an area that is often superseded by economic aspects in bilateral talks.

Concluding the event, Oi emphasized the need for “frank discussions” about the challenges that affect the two countries. During the day, He held closed-door discussions with faculty members, senior research scholars and students focused on East Asia.

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Stanford professor Andrew Walder has been awarded the Founder’s Prize from the journal Social Science History for his paper, “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1971.” The journal’s editorial board selects one recipient annually for exemplary scholarly work.

Using data from 2,213 historical county and city annals, the paper charts the breadth of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, its evolution through time and the repression through which state structures were rebuilt in the post-Mao era.

Walder, who is a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director emeritus of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, has long studied the sources of conflict, stability and change in communist regimes. He recently published China under Mao, a book that explores the rise and fall of Mao Zedong’s radical socialism.

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford is now accepting applications for the Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship in Contemporary Asia, an opportunity made available to two junior scholars for research and writing on Asia.

Fellows conduct research on contemporary political, economic or social change in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to Shorenstein APARC’s publications, conferences and related activities. To read about this year’s fellows, please click here.

The fellowship is a 10-mo. appointment during the 2017-18 academic year, and carries a salary rate of $52,000 plus $2,000 for research expenses.

For further information and to apply, please click here. The application deadline is Dec. 16, 2016.

Last month, Admiral Scott H. Swift, the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, spoke to an audience at the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) and at Stanford via their linked Highly Immersive Classrooms (HIC). Against the backdrop of increasing tensions and hostility in the South China Sea, Swift stressed the importance of building a trust-based relationship between China and the United States. Stanford professor Jean Oi opened the roundtable by introducing Swift at SCPKU while Karl Eikenberry, director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, chaired the session at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business.

After his formal remarks, Swift engaged in a roundtable discussion with Chinese and American scholars on both sides of the Pacific. The participants at SCPKU included experts from Peking University and Chinese think tanks. Participants at Stanford included a diverse group of scholars from across campus with a number from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The HIC allowed a lively interactive session where Swift fielded questions from SCPKU and Stanford.

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As the inaugural meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sets to convene, Stanford researcher Thomas Fingar discusses findings from his new book that seeks to study China’s objectives and methods of engagement with other countries. Much of China’s behavior is determined by its own cost-benefit analysis of the perceived effect engagement would have on its security and development.

As China has pursued modernization over the past 35 years, patterns have emerged that shed light on the government’s foreign policy decision-making, according to new research by Thomas Fingar, a Stanford distinguished fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Since 1979, China’s foreign policy has been underscored by two priorities – security and development. Knowing those priorities, analysts can attempt to better study and anticipate China’s relations with other countries even in the wake of unforeseen events in the global system.

“China’s increased activity around the world has elicited both anxiety and admiration in neighboring countries eager to capitalize on opportunities but worried about Beijing’s growing capabilities. Yet as is the case with all countries, what China can do is shaped by global and regional developments beyond its control,” said Fingar, the editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

The book, which has a total of 13 authors, is the first in a series published by Stanford University Press that examines China’s changing relationships in Asia and with other portions of the world. It is also an outcome of the research project “China and the World.” Fingar, who heads the project, draws upon his experience from five decades working on Asia and more than 25 years in U.S. government, including as chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Framework to analyze China’s foreign policy

One dimension of the research project examines how China’s policies and priorities are shaped by China’s perceptions about how much a country threatens or addresses China’s security concerns; a second dimension examines China’s perceptions about how much a country can contribute to China’s pursuit of sustained economic growth and modernization.

To explore these relationships, Fingar developed a framework for analysis using a matrix that displays, on one axis, China’s perceptions about the threat to China’s security posed by a country or region, and on the other axis, China’s perceptions about a country or region’s capacity to contribute to China’s development.

By comparing the position of a given country or region from one period to another, the matrix both predicts the character of China’s policies and reveals a pattern over time. The figure below illustrates China’s views in 1979 and 2016.

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In 1979, India and countries in Central Asia figured high on the threat axis because of their relationship with the Soviet Union and low on capacity to provide the resources China needed to jumpstart its economy, Fingar said.

At that time, China sought to address both its priority security concerns and developmental goals by improving ties with Europe, Japan and the United States. South and Central Asia were afforded lower priority, he said.

In the 1990s, however, China’s perceptions shifted as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and a decade of economic success in China, Fingar explained. Shown in the matrix, China’s policies toward Central Asia changed as the region transitioned to a more favorable security position by 2000 and as China required additional resources (energy, technology, training, etc.) to fuel its growing economy.

Fingar said China’s increased engagement with South Asia was buttressed by a need for markets and investment opportunities, and furthered along by a reduction in the threat environment as India altered its relationship with Russia and Pakistan became a less valuable security partner.

Calculating who China will engage with and how has become much clearer, yet in some ways it has also become more complicated, according to Fingar.

“The countries that can do the most for China today often pose the greatest perceived long-term threat, namely the United States and its allies,” he said. “Conversely, China’s proclaimed closest friends—North Korea and Pakistan—can do little to assist China’s development and pose increasing danger to its security.”

Current policy applications

Over the past three years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on numerous projects with neighbors and other countries around the world, such as the “new Silk Road,” a trans-continental trade route that will link countries together, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that plans to lend money to poorer parts of Asia for building infrastructure.

The objectives of both initiatives are consistent with the China’s prioritization of security and development, Fingar said. The AIIB and Silk Road initiative indicate that China assumes there are gains from economic integration, and this is largely due to the fact that China has already benefited from past projects.

In 2001, the Chinese government launched concerted efforts to improve its relationships with Central Asian countries because of China’s concern that the United States was seeking to “contain” China, he said. Outcomes have included newfound markets for China’s manufactured goods and increased stability in separatist areas near or on its borders.

“By taking such a big stake in building infrastructure, China has changed the dynamic of the region,” he said. “Anybody can use a road, railroad or bridge. China has helped stitch together the economies of different countries in ways they have never been before.”

For China, the AIIB and the Silk Road initiative are also a form of “soft power,” said Fingar. The approach by the Chinese government evokes memories of U.S. “dollar diplomacy” early in the last century and Japanese “yen diplomacy” when financial assistance was extended to developing countries.

But Fingar doubts that “buying friends by building infrastructure” will be a major contributor to China’s quest for security and development. Going forward, the Chinese government must face the growing paradox between its foreign infrastructure projects and its principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, he said.

“When working in other countries, China cannot afford to dismiss internal stability, governance, rule of law,” he said. “Those facets are the baseline for building infrastructure.”

Related links:

The Diplomat - Q&A on Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century

Fifty years have passed since the beginning of China’s Cultural Revolution, a mass political movement led by Mao Zedong that lasted a decade and provoked widespread violence and social upheaval. Stanford sociologist Andrew Walder, a noted expert on contemporary Chinese society, offered his commentary and analysis to various media outlets, cited below.

In the years just following Mao’s death in 1976, the Communist Party showed an “incredible openness” toward addressing the horrors caused by the Cultural Revolution, he told The Guardian. The Communist Party denounced the Cultural Revolution and some within the Party led efforts to document the chaos and bloodshed under Mao’s tenure, Walder recounted on CNN International.

In the 1980s, however, young Chinese activists began to shift their attention from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution to the lack of government reform in China. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, despite being short-lived, disquieted the regime more than the Cultural Revolution did, he told The Guardian.

The Chinese government today, compared to the 1970s and early 80s, is much less inclined to discuss Mao’s historical record. Yet, when compared to other socialist regimes that experienced rebellion such as the Soviet Union, China has been much more open to confronting its dark historical past, Walder said in an interview with The Globe and Mail.

Walder is the author of China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed and Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (Harvard University Press, 2015 and 2009, respectively). He leads a research project focused on political movements in authoritarian regimes and recently published a journal article on transitions from state socialism and its economic impact.

A “radical uncertainty” now lies at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship, making it essential that the two countries find ways to rebuild the confidence they once shared or face a future with potentially catastrophic events, said Maxwell School Dean James Steinberg during a speech at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) on Wednesday.

“There is an urgent need for both sides to step back beyond the day to day back and forth to try to steer a different course,” he said. “We need to deal concretely – and in very pragmatic ways – with taking steps to give each other confidence that our paths are not necessarily in conflict.”

Steinberg’s call to action came as senior leaders of China and the United States set to meet for a dialogue on economics and strategy in Beijing. His speech was part of the Oksenberg Lecture series, an annual dialogue on U.S. policy toward China and Asia, named in honor of the late Stanford professor and Freeman Spogli Institute senior fellow Michel Oksenberg.

Oksenberg was a role model who “consistently urged the United States to engage with Asia in a more considerate manner,” China Program Director Jean Oi said in her welcome remarks. A reknowned China scholar, he served on the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter and was a driving force behind normalization of relations between China and the United States in the late 1970s.

A panel of experts from Shorenstein APARC including Michael Armacost, Thomas Fingar and Kathleen Stephens, all distinguished fellows at Shorenstein APARC, offered comments following the keynote speech. Steinberg worked with each of them in Washington at various points in his career that ranged from the State Department, where he served as deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, to the Brookings Institution, where he served as vice president.

Consensus approach to engagement

Oksenberg advocated a vision of engaging China based on pursing the goal of a creating a stable, secure and effectively governed China, Steinberg recounted. That vision became known as the consensus approach wherein the two countries agreed to work together by building trust and letting their priorities be known to each other.

That consensus held steady, weathering stressful events such as the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1996 and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Steinberg told the audience.

The mutual understanding that shaped the U.S.-China relationship remained relatively unscathed until the early twenty-first century. China pursued growth “without directly challenging the United States, our allies, or the post-World War II international order,” he said, but as 2010 came to a close, agreement began to wane as an “emerging security dilemma” took its place.

Part of the divergence in the U.S.-China relationship was caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, Steinberg argued. The crisis encouraged some in China to believe that the financial crisis foreshadowed an era of decline for the United States. Meanwhile, China began to increasingly assert sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas, despite objections from many of its neighbors and from the United States.

Toward strategic reassurance

While uncertainty is an inherent part of major power relations, China and the United States now each hold concerns about the other that are broader and more extreme compared to three decades ago, when the consensus approach was first shaped.

Armacost, a former U.S. ambassador to Japan, later noted that some ambiguity is to be expected. “In dealing with foreign policy issues of any consequence, there is an irreducible element of conjecture,” he said. “One doesn’t know the intensions of other countries – especially big complex societies like China.”

However, the level of uncertainty held by the United States and China is problematic because they are so deeply embedded in each other’s success, Steinberg said. The path to reducing uncertainty could be first addressed through “humble acknowledgement” of the unknown. Recognizing that neither side has an exact understanding of the other, he said, creates space for both sides to broach concerns and foster “strategic reassurance.”

But strategic reassurance by itself is not enough, the former senior State Department official said, and must be coupled with hedging. Steinberg described the United States’ pursuit of multiple strands of engagement with China as “hope for the best, prepare for the worst,” but also cautioned that too much emphasis on hedging could undermine progress.

Rebuilding confidence in the U.S.-China relationship will not be immediate or simple and requires sustained engagement and cooperation with other countries. Stephens, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, underscored the necessity of dialogue. She said the United States and its allies in the region must “talk more frankly and more often with each other, as well as managing that with China.”

The academy and policy community

Steinberg said an important role exists for academics and policy analysts in rebuilding lost confidence between the United States and China. Scholarship can give policymakers the tools to untangle some of the uncertainties and “help us not get the answers, but at least get the questions right,” he said.

Fingar, a former director of the National Intelligence Council, agreed with Steinberg and urged those communities to “do a better job of analyzing, explaining and perhaps buttressing confidence that the engagement with hedging strategy is actually still working.”

Steinberg lauded the example set by Oksenberg in his ability to bridge the academic and government sectors and of encouraging students to consider those career paths. “Our challenge…is to train the next generation of scholars – just as Michel Oksenberg trained his – to be able to talk and operate in both worlds,” he said.

Related links:

Video and transcript from the 2016 Oksenberg Lecture