At a seminar hosted by APARC’s Taiwan Program, Wen-Chin Wu, Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and 2025–26 Lenore and Wallis Annenberg Fellow in Communication at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, presented findings from an original multi-wave survey program examining Taiwanese public opinion on national security. The talk focused on how Taiwanese citizens assess the credibility of the United States, interpret strategic ambiguity, and evaluate their own willingness to defend Taiwan amid intensifying U.S.-China geopolitical competition.

Drawing on repeated surveys conducted across different segments of the population, including military recruits, Wu argued that Taiwan’s security environment is shaped not only by external threats but also by domestic perceptions of alliance reliability, cost sharing, and political credibility.

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Why U.S. Credibility Matters

Wu began by noting that Taiwan is often discussed as an “invisible nation” whose security is framed through great power competition rather than through the perspectives of its own citizens. This disconnect matters when security risks become concrete and costly, as public perceptions of alliance credibility shape support for defense spending, military service, and deterrence strategies.

Recent developments have brought Taiwan into sharper focus in U.S. political discourse, including heightened attention to semiconductors, industrial policy, and supply chain security. Wu emphasized that these shifts raise an essential question for Taiwan itself: How do Taiwanese people interpret the U.S. role in their security, and how do those interpretations affect their willingness to defend the island?

Survey results reveal clear partisan differences in how Taiwanese citizens view the Taiwan-U.S. relationship. When asked to rate the relationship on a scale from hostile to friendly, supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party tend to offer more positive evaluations, while supporters of the Kuomintang express greater skepticism. These baseline attitudes shape responses to subsequent questions about U.S. defense commitments, arms sales, and cost sharing.

Wu emphasized that such partisan divides mean that debates over security policy are increasingly filtered through domestic political identity, rather than shared assessments of external threat alone.

Expectations of U.S. Defense and Strategic Ambiguity

When asked whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, more than half of the respondents expressed confidence that it would. Wu cautioned, however, that this optimism may overstate the stability of public expectations. Confidence in U.S. defense varies significantly across political groups and has declined in response to changes in U.S. leadership.

Survey data show a notable drop in confidence following the election of Donald Trump, with overall belief in U.S. defense falling by approximately ten percentage points. This finding underscores that Taiwanese public opinion is responsive to leadership signals and perceived shifts in U.S. policy.

Strategic ambiguity plays a central role in sustaining uncertainty. While ambiguity is intended to deter multiple scenarios, many respondents interpret it as a source of risk rather than reassurance. Unclear commitments can lead to the perception that Taiwan must limit its own actions to avoid escalation without guaranteed support, shaping how citizens understand Taiwan’s strategic options.

Credibility, Democracy, and Polarization

To separate Taiwan-specific judgments from broader country assessments, the survey asked respondents whether the United States and China are credible countries that keep their word. “Credibility is not only about power or military capability but also about regime type and institutional trust,” Wu argued.

Fewer than half of the respondents view the United States as credible, while only a small minority view China as credible. This produces a security dilemma characterized by dual uncertainty. Respondents see the adversary as threatening but untrustworthy, the key security partner as essential but not entirely reliable.

These credibility assessments are strongly polarized along partisan lines and closely linked to perceptions of democracy. Respondents who view a country as more democratic are more likely to see it as credible.

Defense Spending, Arms Sales, and the Silicon Shield

Wu then examined policy preferences related to defense spending and arms purchases. Support for increased defense spending declines sharply when framed as requiring higher taxes, particularly when associated with external pressure from the United States. Support for purchasing U.S. arms also varies by party affiliation, with strong support among DPP voters and more ambivalence among KMT voters.

The survey further compared arms sales with other forms of assurance, including high-level visits, explicit presidential commitments, and military patrols. This approach highlights differences in how Taiwanese citizens interpret these actions, distinguishing between gestures seen as symbolic and those viewed as credible security guarantees.

Questions surrounding TSMC investment in the United States illustrate how economic strategy and national security have become increasingly intertwined. Survey responses reveal sharp polarization over whether expanding semiconductor production abroad strengthens or weakens Taiwan’s security. For some respondents, overseas investment enhances deterrence and deepens bilateral ties. For others, it raises concerns about eroding Taiwan’s strategic leverage by weakening the silicon shield.

Willingness to Fight and Generational Divides

Finally, Wu addressed willingness to fight in a Taiwan contingency, identifying two consistent patterns. Younger respondents exhibit substantially lower willingness to fight than older cohorts, and willingness varies significantly depending on question wording. When respondents are asked whether they are willing to fight “at all costs,” reported willingness declines, particularly among younger participants.

These findings caution against treating any single measure of willingness to fight as definitive. Instead, they suggest that public resolve depends on perceived costs, perceived support, and perceived clarity, all of which are shaped by beliefs about U.S. credibility and strategic ambiguity.

Wu concluded that Taiwanese public opinion is shaped by a persistent tension between reliance on the United States and uncertainty about its credibility. These perceptions are increasingly polarized and responsive to political signals from abroad. As a result, shifts in rhetoric, leadership, or policy framing can have tangible effects on deterrence, domestic cohesion, and the sustainability of Taiwan’s defense policy.