"As much as China is front and center for the United States and Asia, the American pivot is not all about the dragon. It is also very much about the 10 member states of ASEAN," says Donald K. Emmerson in a recent opinion article.

Fresh off his re-election victory, Barack Obama—the “Pacific President”—became the first president to visit Myanmar and Cambodia when he traveled to the Southeast Asian countries in November.

The trip highlights the region’s importance to the United States and signals that Obama’s second term will significantly focus on Asian trade, security and governance issues.

Eight Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center scholars sat down to discuss reactions to the election in Asia, and possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations and foreign policy during the second Obama administration.

How do you think countries in Asia view the outcome of the U.S. presidential election?

Karl Eikenberry: Overall, I think the countries of Asia will view President Obama’s reelection as positive, including because of the likely continuity in American policy toward the region.

Thomas Fingar: Beijing is troubled by Obama’s policies toward Asia because it sees them as directed against China and detrimental to its interests. But it was more troubled by Romney’s rhetoric during the campaign and probably interprets the election outcome as portending more continuity than change in U.S. policy. On balance, Beijing would rather deal with a devil it knows than cope with the uncertainties of a new U.S. administration.

Gi-Wook Shin: There was some concern in South Korea that Mitt Romney would have reverted to the hardline North Korea policy of George W. Bush’s first term. It would have created a bit of tension between the United States and South Korea, so in that context many Koreans are relieved that Obama was re-elected.

David Straub: Interestingly, President Obama personally is overwhelmingly popular in South Korea, but opinion polls show that most South Koreans continue to have complex, even critical views of American foreign policy under him.

Is President Obama likely to make major changes to Asia policy in his second term?

Eikenberry: Some of the people in key positions in the second Obama administration will change, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but President Obama will of course be in office for four more years. He has been in Asia and knows the players. He has a clear strategy, so overall I expect continuity in his administration’s Asia policy. 

Michael H. Armacost: Events are really what shape foreign policy, and developments can occur that are hard to predict.

Henry S. Rowen: We tend to assume there is a continuity or gradual evolution to events, but there are also discontinuities. Something could happen in North Korea, for example. Unexpected events do happen from time to time, and the question is to try to figure out what they might be.

How could U.S. China policy develop?

Fingar: If President Obama has a clear plan for his second term, its goals and priorities are not yet clear to the Chinese. They worry that he may continue, or ratchet up, efforts they see as designed to constrain China’s rise. That said, they know that steady relations with the United States are essential for their own continued economic success and will respond positively to U.S. efforts to reduce distrust and enhance strategic stability. They will be troubled, however, by likely—and overdue—U.S. pressure to secure enforcement of China’s intellectual property and other trade-related commitments, and by likely U.S. efforts to deepen trade relations with other countries.

How could the possible election of a more conservative Japanese government during the second term of the Obama administration affect U.S.-Japan relations?

Armacost: The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an issue where we both have potential constraints on the extent to which Japan can be included, and it is not certain whether that will change very much under a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration. Secondly, there is the longstanding Okinawa base issue. The LDP did not do anything about the base from 1996 onward, and that will probably also be the case if the LDP comes into power again. Finally, the United States will probably push Japan to take more of a stand on the ongoing Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China.

After the failure of the United States’ Leap Day agreement with North Korea this year, and especially with the election of a new South Korean government next month, do you think that Obama’s second term could bring a renewed effort in diplomacy with North Korea?

Shin: It will be important to watch the outcome of the South Korean election. If the opposition party wins, they will move very quickly to engage with North Korea and the question then will be how the United States will respond.

Straub: In any event, the United States periodically reaches out to North Korea, to test it or just because time has passed. It may do so again after the election, particularly since there is a still fairly new leadership in North Korea, and also because there are elections or leadership changes in all the countries in the region. A number of the Six Party Talks member states, likely including South Korea, may also push harder for a resumption of those talks, which were never held during President Obama’s first term. But the Obama administration will be cautious because it was burned by North Korea’s breaking of their Leap Day agreement.

What direction might U.S. policy toward South Asia take?

Eikenberry: Our presence in Afghanistan is going to remain an important part of our overall military posture in Central, South, and East Asia. Managing properly the transition to full Afghan responsibility for their internal security will remain very high on President Obama’s agenda. At the same time, it will be important to keep some U.S. counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan, with the permission of the Afghan government.  

The nature of our security dialogue with Pakistan will change in emphasis from one that since 9/11 has mostly been informed by international terrorism. If we continue to make progress against Al Qaida, I expect our conversation with Pakistan will place more emphasis on its nuclear weapons programs and deployments. This is a potentially destabilizing issue and a concern not only to India, but also to China.

There has been a steady appreciation in the current and future importance of India. It will continue to be key in terms of the administration’s broader Asia-Pacific policy, but with a clear understanding of the limits of defense engagement with India.

Will the rebalancing, or “pivot,” toward Asia continue to be a central theme in U.S. foreign policy in Obama’s second term?

Eikenberry: Last year, when President Obama announced the rebalancing to Asia, I think this was done in part to signal to the world that we were putting the decade of costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan behind us and looking forward—that the U.S. “was back.” I do not believe we will see any short-term major change in the deployment of military capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region, but the rebalancing could have profound consequences in the longer term. It will likely inform the prioritization of our future defense modernization and the development of military doctrine, which in turn drives procurement.

Donald K. Emmerson: Asia will continue to loom large on Washington's policy horizon. Although the pivot was originally all about security, the rebalance has since been "rebalanced" to encompass economic concerns. In July 2012 when Secretary Clinton went to Phnom Penh to attend the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum, she brought along the largest delegation of American businesspeople ever to visit Southeast Asia. Their presence upgraded the profile of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum, which met the following day. The Obama administration has also taken the lead in promoting a Trans-Pacific Partnership to liberalize Asia-Pacific trade. 

President Obama's mid-November trip to Southeast Asia is further evidence of the pivot's continuation. In mid-November he will become the first U.S. president ever to have visited Myanmar and Cambodia. He will stop in Thailand as well. In Phnom Penh he will attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit. A key issue at these meetings will be the quarrels over sovereignty in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. To the extent that the United States appears to be intervening against Beijing in these disputes, the "pivot" will be interpreted as a move to check China.

Armacost: There is no doubt that the Asia rebalancing strategy will endure, but the components and the apportionment of resources may change. President Obama may have initially overplayed engagement with China, and now he is probably hedging too much. But it does not change the fact that there is a lot at stake in terms of our relationship with China and that we have to engage the government. So it is a question then of where to strike a balance between hedging and engagement. After the election, there is also the question now of what happens to U.S. trade policy, and whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will include India, China, and Japan.

Daniel C. Sneider: If you look at the president’s broader message and the one he carried in the campaign, he is very focused on restructuring and moving toward a more innovation-centered U.S. economy to develop new sources of employment. In addition to being concerned about climate change, he is also seriously looking at alternative energy resources as a source of real growth in the U.S. economy and as a way to move away from foreign fossil fuel dependency. Focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region is also quite consistent with these goals.

How will the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, China's leadership transition, and other upcoming power transfers in Asia impact U.S.-Asia relations and issues within the Asia-Pacific region? On November 15, Michael H. Armacost, Karl Eikenberry, and Thomas Fingar discussed this and related questions during a roundtable panel at the National University of Singapore.

Myanmar has made tremendous strides in its political and economic reform efforts since Thein Sein assumed the presidency in March 2011. But how stable is the country today, and how much has democracy taken root?

Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, recently discussed Myanmar’s path to democracy within the context of the country’s history, the current unrest in Rakhine State, and looking ahead to 2014 when Myanmar chairs the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and prepares for its next presidential election.

How committed is Myanmar’s current leadership to democratization?

We should understand that rather than a transformation to a true liberal democracy we are seeing political and economic reform, and also that there is a lot going on below the surface of the government that we cannot see.

President Thein Sein does appear genuinely committed to reform. During a meeting in August 2011, he and Aung San Suu Kyi worked out the plan in which she would run for election. That plan was critical for the reforms that have happened since, even if Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy have no real legislative power.

At the end of the day, Myanmar’s critical institution is still the Tatmadaw, the military. The constitution grants the military a quarter of the seats in parliament and the right to nominate the most important of the country’s two vice presidents. In July, when the first vice president, long known as a hard-liner, stepped down due to “health reasons,” the president replaced him with an ostensibly more moderate vice admiral. In making this transfer, Thein Sein may have wanted to ensure a smooth continuation of the reforms.

Although public figures in Myanmar are politically diverse, nearly everyone now claims to be a “reformer" (considered good) as opposed to a “spoiler." This even applies to individuals from more conservative military backgrounds who may have taken part in past repression. If the country’s stability comes under serious threat, such men could revert to harder-line views.

Ultimately, apart from the balance of forces between reformers and spoilers inside the military, national stability is and will remain a key requisite to further liberalization and the consolidation of democracy.

How stable is Myanmar at present?

It depends on where you are. If you are in Naypyidaw, the capital, or in Yangon, caught up in the influx of investors, fortune-seekers, and diplomats, things probably look pretty good—opportunistic and venal, but dynamic and potentially beneficial. However, if you are in the restive north or in clash-ridden Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh, then things probably look really bad.

Myanmar's many ethnic minorities tend to live on the periphery of the country. These border areas have been marked by endemic unrest and violence for a very long time. The latest flare-up in Rakhine is particularly unfortunate because it implicates a group that is identified both by ethnicity and by religion: the Rohingya. They are Muslims, and they have long been subject to discrimination at the hands of the Burman-Buddhist majority. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 Rohingya have fled across the border to escape the latest violence. The government in majority-Muslim Bangladesh, unwilling to alienate Nyapyidaw by appearing to harbor the refugees, has begun to push some of them back into Myanmar.

Assuming that Bangladesh does not champion the Rohingyas’ cause, the violence in Rakhine State is unlikely to disrupt Myanmar’s stability on a national scale. But it will reinforce the “need” of spoilers in the Tatmadaw to enlarge the military’s presence and its budget to prevent the clashes from getting further out of hand. And that could strengthen the nationalist legitimacy of the military and its rationale for retaining a political role.

How could reform change Myanmar, and what are some potential challenges to that process?

The urgent priority for Thein Sein is performance. It is vital that he be able to point to the positive results of reform. In aid, investment, and trade, Western countries, China, India, and other outside powers can facilitate meaningful economic growth, or be seen as abetting cronyism and corruption. If the reforms foster a high-performing economy in which incomes start to go up and a middle class begins to form, one can be more optimistic about the future. But if official repression of the Rohyingya intensifies, if other ethnic-minority grievances are reignited, if fighting spreads, and the Tatmadaw regains its former clout, disillusioned Westerners will be less willing to work with a regime they no longer trust.

As we move toward 2015, the stakes for reform are rising. Myanmar is scheduled to hold elections in that year. Thein Sein will be 75 years old, and so will Aung San Suu Kyi. He has said that he will not run, although he could change his mind. She is constitutionally barred from running, and her party is not currently strong enough to push through an amendment. What if neither one is available to run? Who will continue the process of reform, if it is still under way?

If 2015 bears watching, so does 2014. For the length the latter year, Myanmar will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The authorities in Naypyidaw will host all of ASEAN's major meetings in 2014. Some of these gatherings will involve the United States and other countries at ministerial and head-of-state levels. In 2015 ASEAN will inaugurate a first-ever, Southeast Asia-wide ASEAN Community encompassing economic, political-security, and socio-cultural cooperation. In 2014 Myanmar will oversee the Community’s final preparation. If in the meantime an intra-military coup occurs and the winner cracks down, the leaders of democratic countries will think twice before agreeing to lend legitimacy to such a regime by attending its events.

Despite these uncertainties, there is a real chance that reforms will take root. Myanmar is not likely to become a fully stable and liberal democracy, at least not soon, but it could, with skill, help, and luck, become a “good enough” democracy of sorts.

Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"