So much has been written and said about the Obama administration’s “pivot” toward Asia that one might think diplomacy has become ballet. More than three years have passed since February 2009 when Hillary Clinton broke a 48-year-old precedent at the State Department by choosing Asia as the destination for her first trip abroad as secretary of state. “As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan,” she wrote in November in Foreign Affairs, “the United States stands at a pivot point.” A skeptic might have stressed the negative: a pivot away from failure in the Middle East. She preferred the positive: a pivot towards greater “investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region,” itself the designated pivot of “America’s Pacific century.” 

How much of this pivot talk is hype, and how much is real? How have Asians responded to this apparent turn toward them? What global and regional scenarios and strategies could it imply? Will future historians remember the pivot as the start of a Sino-American cold war, or the requisite of a realistic entente? Does the pivot illustrate renewed American leadership in foreign affairs, or belated American acquiescence in a multi-polar world? Is Washington being implicated in conflict over the South China Sea? Even if Obama is re-elected this November, will Clinton’s replacement continue to pivot? Or is it time for the pivot’s critics to do some pivoting of their own—to stop worrying about the downside, start acknowledging the upside, and help make the ballet a constructive performance for all concerned?

Donald K. Emmerson has discussed the pivot recently with analysts in Asia, Canada, and the United States. “America Pivots toward ASEAN” and “US, China Role Play for ASEAN,” datelined November 2011 in Asia Times Online, reflect his impressions of the East Asia Summit that President Obama and Secretary Clinton attended that month in Bali. Forthcoming work includes an essay on Southeast Asia in the Journal of Democracy and a chapter in Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant.

Venue Changed to the Philippines Conference Room

In 1992, Cambodia became a United Nations (UN) protectorate—the first and only time the UN tried something so ambitious. What did the new, democratically-elected government do with this unprecedented gift? Cambodians today live in the grip of a venal government that refuses to provide even the most basic services without a bribe. Nearly half of the Cambodians who lived through the Khmer Rouge era suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. A malnourished populace still lives as Cambodians did 1,000 years ago, while government officials are the only overweight people in a nation where the hungry waste away. These conditions have not, however, dissuaded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from acceding the Cambodian regime's desire to chair ASEAN in 2012. Prof. Joel Brinkley will turn an unsparing analytical eye on these and related aspects of Cambodian history, political economy, and foreign policy.

Joel Brinkley joined Stanford in the fall of 2006 after a 23-year career with The New York Times. At the Times he served as a reporter, editor, and Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent. At Stanford, he writes a weekly column on foreign affairs that appears in some 50 newspapers and web sites in the United States and around the world. He also writes on foreign affairs for Politico, and maintains an active public-speaking career. His research interests include American foreign policy and foreign affairs in general. Over the last 30 years, he has reported from 46 American states and more than 50 foreign countries. The latest of his five books is Cambodia's Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land (2011), already lauded by a reviewer in The American Interest as a "compelling" and "revealing tale of delusion and corruption" told with "panache."  Copies of the book will be available for sale at the talk.