The 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met in San Francisco from November 11-17 at the APEC Leaders’ Week to discuss trade, sustainable development, technological innovation, and other pressing issues. The occasion also provided opportunities for APEC member leaders to hold bilateral meetings, of which perhaps the most highly anticipated was a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Shorenstein APARC experts explain the implications of the APEC convening, analyze the deliverables from the Biden-Xi meeting, and examine issues that cast a shadow on the U.S. relations with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous country. Continue reading below for a roundup of our experts’ analysis and commentary featured in U.S. and international media.

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Meeting face-to-face for the first time in a year on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Biden and Xi discussed issues spanning military and trade relations, signaling a willingness to bring a degree of stability to the rocky U.S.-China bilateral relations. Ties between the two countries have deteriorated amid tensions like those in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, disputes about technology competition, and the February 2023 Chinese spy balloon incident. APARC fellows consider the significance of the Biden-Xi meeting in numerous articles and interviews in the press.

The United States and China each have reasons to meet now and reduce hostilities. For President Biden, the upcoming 2024 presidential election is ample impetus to work for a better relationship with the Chinese. For Beijing, as Center Fellow Thomas Fingar tells the Japan Times, the country’s “economic difficulties and their implications for social stability and regime legitimacy have made Beijing more eager to improve relations with countries important to its economy than was the case six to 12 months ago.” And Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro notes in the Christian Science Monitor that “both sides are trying to present to the rest of the world that they have things under control,” something that requires “predictable, high-level engagement.”

Most analysts, however, held low expectations for substantive outcomes from the meeting between the two leaders. According to Mastro, there is no indication of improvement in the tension between the two sides because neither the United States nor China is ready to make “any significant concession,” she argues on NBC News.

One reason for that is an aversion to political risk. As Mastro tells KCRW’s Madeleine Brand on Press Play: “There’s no political appetite for [thinking outside the box]. Political leaders want to make sure any policy will 100% work before they're willing to embark on it. But in the world of geopolitics, it's really hard to know that before you try things and experiment and assess and reassess.”

That said, just the very fact of the meeting taking place could represent an essential signal to Chinese officials, as Fingar points out to NBC News: “For there really to be a movement for lower levels of the [Chinese] system to engage in specifics, it needs a refreshed endorsement from Xi.” 

One outcome many were looking for was a resumption of U.S.-China military communications, what defense analysts call “mil-to-mil exchanges.” The Chinese severed these in 2022 when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. With close encounters between American and Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea becoming almost commonplace, communications at the military senior level are critical to prevent escalation. But restoring these ties would have limited value because, as Mastro tells NPR, “You can expect that, the next time [the Chinese] get unhappy about something, maybe after the Taiwan election, they cut them off again. So, unless we have some sort of commitment to sustained engagement, the mil-to-mil exchanges are unlikely to be sufficient to stabilize the relationship.”
 

The Biden-Xi meeting took place on the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The United States is concerned that China — as a good friend of Iran and one of the largest importers of its gas and oil — could complicate diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and potentially exacerbate tensions. However, Mastro argues that bringing up the Middle East in the context of the U.S.-China bilateral meeting only serves to aid Beijing in its propaganda efforts. As she says on KTVU Fox 2 News, “China does not really care what happens [in the Middle East]. But they are leveraging the support, especially in the developing world, in the Global South, for Hamas to push back against the United States and basically use Israel as a proxy for discontent about what they call ‘American unilateralism,’ ‘American hegemony.’” 

The conflict in the Middle East came up in another high-level meeting when Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Biden in Washinton before heading to the APEC forum. Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, Jakarta is unhappy with the White House for several reasons. Among these, the war in Gaza was probably foremost in Widodo’s mind, writes Ambassador Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rholen Fellow at APARC, in an essay for The Diplomat magazine. “Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire.” Thus, Indonesian public opinion has put Jakarta and Washington at odds over the Israel-Hamas crisis, explains Marciel.

Indonesians also remain upset by the snub of Biden skipping the recent East Asia Summit and by “what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership, under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy,” Marciel writes, urging Washington to engage Jakarta seriously on these issues before Indonesia is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024.

More Media Coverage

For more coverage of the APEC forum and Biden-Xi meeting with analysis by APARC scholars, visit the links below:

Kishida and Xi Aim for Trade Progress Despite Lingering Tensions
The Japan Times, November 17, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 17, 2023

Oriana Skylar Mastro on the Xi-Biden Meeting on the Sidelines of APEC 
BBC Sounds, November 15, 2023

Biden, Xi Eye Economic, Military Thaw in High-Stakes Meeting
Bloomberg Technology, November 15, 2023

US Grants Chinese Journalists Hundreds of Visas to Cover APEC
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

Xi’s Arrival in US Brings Protesters and Fans Onto Streets
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

U.S.-China: One Summit, Two Different Goals for Biden and Xi
Nikkei Asia, November 14, 2023

Presidents Xi and Biden Seek to Turn Back the Clock in San Francisco
Time Magazine, November 14, 2023

China's Xi Jinping to meet with Biden in San Francisco
NPR, November 11, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 11, 2023

Biden and Xi to Seek to Stabilize Relations in California Meeting
New York Times, November 10, 2023

APEC Offers Important Chance to Stabilize Tense U.S.-China Relations
San Francisco Examiner, November 10, 2023

Joe Biden, Xi Jinping Set to Steal APEC Spotlight with Talks to Steady Ties
Reuters, November 8, 2023
 

Today’s geopolitical climate has created new and dangerous challenges for America’s defense and the support of democracy and freedom worldwide. These challenges demand a reexamination of the U.S. defense budget to ensure that America’s forces retain the capabilities to defend the nation and deter aggression abroad. The expert authors of the new volume Defense Budgeting for a Safer World (Hoover Institution Press) review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide recommendations for aligning it with new global realities. Chief among these new realities are China’s modernized military and the nation’s objectives in the South China Sea and for reunification with Taiwan, testing U.S. dominance in the world order and raising questions about allies’ security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army.

In her contribution to the new volume, in a chapter titled “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. Mastro explains that the original shape of that strategy, strengthening ties with Taiwan to persuade the population, “has failed” and now takes the form of belligerent air and sea incursions, increasingly sophisticated military exercises, and official Chinese rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the impossibility of Taiwan’s independence has intensified.

Mastro notes that “China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy." The United States, as a non-resident power in the Asia-Pacific, depends on its aircraft carriers to project power in the South China Sea, but these carriers are vulnerable to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain — that is, the “barrier” extending from Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, to maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia — the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are likewise vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack, as are U.S. forward bases in Asia, such as Okinawa.

Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include "more access, basing, and overflight," "more mass on targets," and "leveraging partners." While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States. On the other hand, she assesses that the needed deterrence is possible if the proper steps are taken now.

This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) invites applications for a postdoctoral fellowship and a visiting scholar position on contemporary Taiwan to begin in Autumn Quarter 2024. These new positions are part of APARC’s expansion of its work on Taiwan, focusing particularly on its economy, society, and culture in a new era of global relations and “postindustrial” development.

About the Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Taiwan

The postdoctoral fellow participates in APARC’s research and engagement activities while undertaking original research on contemporary Taiwan. We welcome fellowship applications from candidates studying issues related to how Taiwan can meet the challenges and opportunities of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades, using a variety of disciplines including the social sciences, public policy, and business.

The postdoctoral fellowship appointment begins in Autumn Quarter 2024 and is for one academic year, with a possibility of extension contingent on satisfactory performance and funding.

The fellowship is limited to recent PhDs: applicants cannot be more than three years past the awarding of their doctoral degree when the fellowship starts. They must have degree conferral and official approval/certification no later than June 30 prior to the fellowship start date (that is, no later than June 30, 2024, for 2024-25 fellowships starting in autumn 2024).

Postdoctoral fellows are required to be in residence for the duration of the appointment and to take part in APARC activities throughout the academic year. Fellows are also expected to support programmatic needs such as colloquiums and participate in research collaboration through the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL). The postdoctoral fellowship is a 10-month appointment with a salary of approximately $65,000 (annual rate of $78,000), or commensurate with Stanford policy and set minimums, plus up to $3,000 for research expenses.

The application deadline is January 1, 2024. Read on for the application guidelines.

Apply for the Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Taiwan

Interested candidates must follow these requirements:

I. Fill out the online application form;

II. Upload the following materials to the online form (in English, PDF format):

• Curriculum vitae;
• A short research statement (not to exceed five typed pages, double-spaced) that describes the research and writing to be undertaken during the fellowship period, as well as the proposed publishable product.

III. Submit the completed application form along with the required materials;

IV. Submit Letters of Recommendation: 
Email THREE (3) letters of recommendation (in PDF format) to taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. We will accept official letters of recommendation from the applicant, a dossier service, or directly from references.

All applications must be received by 11:59 p.m. Pacific Time on Monday, January 1, 2024.

Once we have received all components of your application, including three recommendations, we will send you an email confirming the completion of your application. If you have not received this email, you may send an email checking your application status. 

Note: Please be advised that Stanford University will close for winter break from December 21, 2023, through January 3, 2024, and response time to inquiries during this period may be delayed.

About the Visiting Scholarship on Contemporary Taiwan

The visiting scholar on contemporary Taiwan will work collaboratively with APARC faculty and researchers, Stanford faculty, and students to conduct research related to how Taiwan can meet the challenges and opportunities of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades, using a variety of disciplines including the social sciences, public policy, and business.

The visiting scholar position is available to researchers and professionals with PhD degrees or substantial records of professional achievement related to contemporary Taiwan. Applicants must be visiting from and affiliated with an outside institution or organization and must be proficient in the English language. There is a preference for mid-career professionals with a strong research and publication record. Visiting fellows are selected on the basis of prior professional achievements and the quality of research and publication proposals.

The appointment begins in Autumn Quarter 2024 and is for one academic year. The visiting scholar will be offered $30,000 as a supplementary stipend.

Visiting scholars are required to be in residence for the duration of the appointment, take part in APARC activities throughout the academic year, and meet with collaborators and stakeholders as needed. They are also expected to support programmatic needs such as colloquiums and participate in research collaboration through the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL). Additional privileges include access to Stanford research facilities, the opportunity to audit relevant University lecture courses without a fee (subject to permission of the instructor), and the opportunity to participate in events at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and elsewhere on campus.

The center is still accepting applications for the 2024-2025 visiting fellowship. Read on for the application guidelines.

Apply for the Visiting Scholar Position on Contemporary Taiwan

I. Fill out the online application form;

II. Upload the following materials to the online form (in English, PDF format):

• A formal letter of request containing a detailed proposal of the work to be carried out while in residency at APARC;
• A formal and complete academic curriculum vitae, including a list of publications.

III. Submit the completed application form along with the required materials;

IV. Submit two (2) letters of reference. The letters of reference should be emailed to taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. The candidate’s legal name and email address must be included on top of each required document.

Contact

For questions about the application process for the postdoctoral fellowship and visiting scholar position, please contact Kristen Lee at taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. 

About APARC

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) addresses critical issues affecting the countries of Asia, their regional and global affairs, and U.S.-Asia relations. As Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, we produce policy-relevant research, provide education and training to students, scholars, and practitioners, and strengthen dialogue and cooperation between counterparts in the Asia-Pacific and the United States. For more information, visit aparc.stanford.edu.

Stanford University is an equal opportunity employer, and we welcome applications from diverse backgrounds that would bring additional dimensions to the university's research and teaching missions. Diversity includes, but is not limited to, culture, socioeconomic background, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, physical capabilities, and life experience.

More Fellowship Opportunities at APARC

APARC offers additional Fall 2024 Asia Studies Fellowships that are now open for applications. We have opportunities for both emerging scholars and established professionals:

• Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship
• Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan
• Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia
• Stanford Next Asia Policy Postdoctoral and Visiting Fellowships
• Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellowship on Southeast Asia

This commentary first appeared as part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Interpret:China series. 

Tensions at the Taiwan Strait are at an all-time high. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit marked the highest level of exchange between U.S. and Taiwanese officials since 1997. China used the visit as a pretext to conduct large-scale military exercises encircling the island, coupled with rhetoric about how it could successfully use force to unify if it decided to do so.

The dynamics between China and the United States over Taiwan are eerily like those laid out in Zuo Xiying’s balanced, informative article. Zuo accurately captures the U.S. deterrence strategy toward Russia before its invasion of Ukraine—highlighting key components such as threatening economic sanctions and international isolation, as well as providing training and equipment to Ukraine to enhance its ability to defend itself. But deterrence failed, the reasons (according to Zuo) being that the United States did not do more to reassure Russia of its peaceful intentions and that ultimately costs are difficult to calculate ahead of time. Once war broke out, as Zuo also points out, the United States escalated its involvement by providing military aid to Ukraine, which increased the costs of the war to Russia.

What does all this mean for U.S. deterrence strategy with respect to Taiwan? Zuo recognizes that “for China, the Russia-Ukraine conflict acts as a mirror. . . . China needs to not only study in depth how the United States deters and how it punishes Russia, but also to carefully analyze how Russia perceives the United States’ threats and to derive experience and lessons from therein.” But he leaves the reader wondering what those lessons are. He hints in his discussion on Ukraine that a U.S. strategy to build up Taiwan’s defenses is unlikely to deter China; however, he also indirectly suggests that China may be underestimating the costs of war. Successful deterrence, Zuo notes, “requires not only that the United States itself has powerful forces and strong resolve but that it can make the other side accurately feel the threat and have an accurate calculation of the costs and benefits. But the real world is complicated, and it is difficult to have both conditions present at once.” In other words, he thinks there is an intermediate step needed in a deterrence strategy. The United States has to not only issue a credible threat, but also make the other side accurately assess the costs and benefits of certain actions.

Zuo does not seem optimistic. He implies the United States needs to increase efforts to paint a more specific picture of what it would do if war broke out—but that, even if it did, the message still might not get through. The reader is left with an acute understanding that if there is war over Taiwan, failures in both Beijing and Washington will be to blame.

This announcement was updated on October 6, 2023, to reflect the addition of two new fellowship offerings focused on contemporary Taiwan.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2024.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy; contemporary Japan; contemporary Asia broadly defined; postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the new Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab; and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded annually to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

Last January, Fumio Kishida made his first visit to Washington D.C. as Japan's Prime Minister, reaffirming the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the U.S.–China relationship continues to fracture, Japan has remained in close alignment with the United States, even signaling a paradigm shift in its recently revised National Security Strategy, naming China an “unprecedented strategic challenge,” and unveiling a record defense budget. “This is a revolutionary event in Japan's security policy," said Professor Ryosei Kokubun about Tokyo’s hike in military expenditure.

Kokubun, the Spring 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC, headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture. Held on May 3, 2023, and co-hosted by APARC and FSI, the event focused on the U.S.-China rivalry and Japan’s position.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

As the president of Japan's National Defense Academy from 2012 to 2021 and a longtime faculty member at Keio University, Professor Kokubun is uniquely qualified to share insights into Japan's perspectives on the rising security fears in the Asia-Pacific region. Following Kokubun's address was a panel discussion with Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, an expert on China and U.S. foreign policy, and FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia-Pacific security. Kiyoteru Tsutsui, director of the Japan Program at APARC and the Center’s deputy director, moderated the conversation.

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The Legacy of "Strategic Engagement

Although recent years have seen an escalation in the tense relationship between China and the United States, Professor Kokubun began his lecture by emphasizing the relatively recent nature of these tensions. He reminded the audience that the years following the formal re-establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China in 1979 saw a broad expansion of the U.S.–China relationship on nearly every front, from student exchange to diplomatic cooperation. During that time, Deng Xiaoping led China through the era of “reform and opening up,” integrating China into the global economy. Kokubun emphasized that U.S. leaders had hoped this policy of “strategic engagement” would push China towards democratization and the end of repressive domestic policies, and that, through reform and marketization, China would become more like the United States.

Kokubun depicted the era between 1979 and 2010 as a period of cautious optimism not only between the United States and China but also between China and Japan. Xi Jinping's presidency, however, has seen a complete reversal of this attitude. China's relationships with both Japan and the United States have become strained, and channels for communication and cooperation have steadily diminished. Kokubun pointed out that this has led to a substantial drop in U.S. public opinion of China, asking the audience, “Why is the U.S. so China-hating?” He sees this trend as a function of the failed “strategic engagement” policy. When the policy of engagement did not lead to democratization in China, U.S. officials and citizens felt a sense of betrayal and mistrust. The engagement policy and the hopes that came with it ended under the Trump administration, and Professor Kokubun predicts that the present U.S. hardline stance on China is here to stay.

How Would Japan Respond to a Taiwan Contingency?

In Kokubun’s view, Japan’s main concern is whether or not a Taiwan contingency is a real risk. He noted that the future depends on the decisions of the Taiwanese and Chinese leadership. “Whether Taiwan will move toward independence or move closer to the mainland lies at the crossroads,” he said. He pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s president, has not made any hardline statements supporting independence. 

However, even if Taiwan’s government were to shift closer to the mainland, a continuation of the status quo is not guaranteed. Kokubun emphasized the uncertainty of the situation and said that, regardless of how Taiwan’s government acts, China’s actions depend on how Xi sees his opponents’ actions. “The final decision will depend on how Xi Jinping views the future policies of Taiwan and the United States, and whether he sees them as having crossed a line,” said Kokubun. “However, the criteria for that line are also arbitrary and entirely up to Xi Jinping’s judgment.” Ultimately, Kokubun returned to the intractability of the mounting conflict. “The key to the Taiwan issue is one thing: Xi’s resolve. China will never abandon the possibility of an armed invasion of Taiwan.”

Concerns about rising threats from China and North Korea and the alarm raised by the war in Ukraine have put security at the forefront of national consciousness in Japan. In December 2022, Japan’s government announced an enormous increase in national defense spending to 2% of national GDP over a five-year period, which will give the country the third-largest defense budget in the world. “This is a revolutionary event in Japan's security policy," stated Kokubun." Japan has traditionally discussed the threat of North Korea and China, of course, but this has not led to a significant increase in real defense spending or a strengthening of defense capabilities. However, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine...serious discussions about the possibility of a Taiwan contingency began.”

Many experts have speculated as to Japan’s role in a potential Taiwan contingency. Despite Japan’s close ties with Taiwan and longstanding alliance with the United States, Japan’s ability to respond to a Taiwan contingency is severely restricted by the Peace Constitution, which forbids Japan from maintaining offensive capabilities and prohibits offensive actions by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Though some U.S. officials hope that Japan might defend Taiwan until U.S. forces arrive in the case of a Taiwan contingency, Kokubun noted that “this is completely impossible under the current Japanese legal system, and there is no way to move in that direction under the current circumstances.”

However, were an armed conflict to truly erupt in the Pacific, Japan might have no choice but to get involved. Kokubun said, “For Japan, the question is how to rescue the Japanese in Taiwan,” and if Taiwan were to attack the mainland in retaliation, “how to rescue the five times as many Japanese in China. They are hostages.” President Tsai’s position on retaliation against an invasion of Taiwan has complicated the situation for Japanese leadership. In addition, Chinese leadership has long contended that several Japanese possessions in the Pacific should be returned to Chinese sovereignty, including the Senkaku islands and Okinawa. To emphasize this point, Professor Kokubun cited a conversation he’d had with a high-level official in Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party: “If the U.S. and China really go to war, the battlefield would not be Taiwan, but Okinawa.”

East Asia’s Security Situation

Despite the complications of a Taiwan contingency, Kokubun noted that “if Okinawa or Senkaku islands were attacked, Japan would naturally fight back in close cooperation with the U.S. military. This makes a U.S.-China war very likely.” In Kokubun’s view, due to the absence of communication channels with North Korea and the continuing loss of communication channels with China, “the security environment in East Asia is approaching the worst situation since the end of World War II.” 

“What Japan should do is, on the one hand, strengthen its security deterrence while at the same time strengthening its alliance with the United States, of course, and on the other hand, strengthen its ties with Australia, India, and South Korea, which share the same values,” said Kokubun. “On the basis of this partnership, Japan has no choice but to continue dialogue with China at all levels, along with the rest of the world.”

Finally, Kokubun addressed the logistics of a Chinese occupation of Taiwan, emphasizing that there are already “dissatisfied elements” in mainland China, not only in Tibet but also in low- and middle-class communities, who no longer enjoy the benefits of economic growth. “How much power will it really take to govern a Taiwan filled with people who hate the mainland?” asked Kokubun. He suggested that the Chinese government benefits from maintaining the annexation of Taiwan as a political objective without acting on it. Once the island has been seized, China will no longer be able to rally its population around this national goal. “I think that once the ultimate goal is accomplished, the objective is lost,” said Kokubun. “Taiwan unification seems to me to be the most stable goal as it is.”