International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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In 2006, the Chinese Government introduced a massive block grant program for rural compulsory education, similar to that of Title I grant in the United States. Central government provided block grants with add-on requirement to provincial governments based on total number of pupils, average per pupil spending in that province, and a cost-sharing plan that favors the economically backward provinces. Provincial governments then distributed the grants along with its own share to county government using a similar formula to cover school operating expenditures, free tuitions, and conditional cash transfers for boarding students.

 

While there have been plenty research on whether the program has buttressed the financing of rural education or crowded out local financing, little is known about its effects on the enrollment and education attainment of rural children after a decade  (Shi, 2012; Chyi & Zhou, 2014; Lü, 2014). This paper fills this glaring gap by using matched household survey data and county school expenditure data between 2000-2011 that were made available to researchers for the first time.

 

Our identification strategies are composed of three parts. First, we take advantage of the exogenous variation in the rates of cost-sharing in the two-step allocation process of the block grants to estimate “Intention to Treatment” effects of the whole program. Secondly, we compare counties receiving different proportion of subsidies from central government in a difference-in-difference framework. Thirdly, we use the IV-DID strategy that instruments the county-level education spending with the exogenous variation in the planned allocation of the grants.

 

Dr. Wei HA is currently Research Professor in Education Policy and Leadership at the Graduate School of Education and a faculty associate at the Institute of Education Economics at Peking University. Prior to joining the Peking University, he worked as policy specialists at UNICEF and UNDP for seven years in the United States and Africa. During his doctoral study at the Harvard University, he also served as a consultant at the World Bank. He has conducted research in a wide-range of fields including education economics, public health, migration, and development economics. His current research focuses on the impact evaluation of key national education policies in China such as the Rural Compulsory Education Finance Reform, and China’s efforts to build “World Class Universities” through the 211 and 985 Projects. He also examines the interaction between education and major social transformations in China such as the massive labor retrenchments at State-Owned Enterprises in the late 1990s and rising housing prices in urban China. Dr. Ha received a dual BA in Economics and Political Science and MA in Education Economics from Peking University and his PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University.

 

This event is cosponsored by the Rural Education Action Program (REAP).

Does Money Matter? The Effects of Block Grants on Education Enrollment and Attainment in Rural China
Wei HA Education Policy and Leadership at the Graduate School of Education and Institute of Education Economics at Peking University
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Less than four years after Mao Zedong’s death, Deng Xiaoping declared that China needed to move away from an “over-concentration of power” by an individual leader to establish a more institutionalized system of governance. Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2013 promised a new era of reform of the Communist Party of China (CCP), specifically intended to preserve the party’s power.  Rather than addressing governance issues, however, Xi’s actions, such as the anti-corruption campaign, have served to concentrate power in his hands, showing the weakness of political institutionalization in China after decades of collective leadership.  While decision-making processes continue to be a black box, by reclaiming the CCP’s authority over policy-making, and by chairing CCP small leading groups, Xi appears to have moved China back to Mao-style personalistic rule.   The puzzles that remain are how personalistic authoritarian rule has returned to a country characterized by a growing middle class and a modern open market economy; and what this reversion to personalistic leadership tells us about the ambiguities of institutions in communist ruling parties.  

 

Susan Shirk is the Chair of the 21st Century China Program and Research Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California - San Diego. She is also director emeritus of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). Susan Shirk first visited China in 1971 and has been teaching, researching and engaging China diplomatically ever since. 

From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia.

In 1993, she founded, and continues to lead, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a Track II forum for discussions of security issues among defense and foreign ministry officials and academics from the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and North Korea.

Shirk's publications include her books, China:  Fragile Superpower; How China Opened Its Door: The Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms; The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China; Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China; and her edited book, Changing Media, Changing China.

Shirk served as a member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board, the Board of Governors for the East-West Center (Hawaii), the Board of Trustees of the U.S.-Japan Foundation, and the Board of Directors of the National Committee on United States-China Relations. She is a member of the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and an emeritus member of the Aspen Strategy Group. Dr. Shirk received her BA in Political Science from Mount Holyoke College, her MA in Asian Studies from the University of California, Berkeley, and her PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

 

This event is off the record.

Feb 19, 2016 Event Flyer
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Susan Shirk, UC San Diego
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For scholars of corruption, the ferocious anti-corruption campaign launched by Xi Jinping since the end of 2012 has provided a wealth of fresh evidence of corruption in the Chinese body politic and economy.  The revelations from media accounts and court documents suggest that crony capitalism -- defined by the incestuous relationship between government officials and private businessmen -- has penetrated key Chinese political institutions and economic sectors.  Based on detailed examinations of 50 high-profile cases, many of them prosecuted in the last three years, this study investigates the institutional origins of crony capitalism, identifies principal modes of collusion between political and economic elites, and analyzes its behavioral patterns.  The insights from this study imply that Xi's anti-corruption drive will have only limited success if it does not treat the causes of corruption in contemporary China.

 

Minxin PEI is the Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow and Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies. Dr. Pei’s areas expertise includes China, Comparative Politics, Pacific Rim, U.S./Asia Relations, and U.S./China Relations. Dr. Pei’s published work includes China’s Transition: The limits of developmental autocracy (Harvard University Press, 2006), and From Reform to Revolution: The demise of communism in China and the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 1994).

 

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Minxin Pei Claremont McKenna College
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Please note this event has been moved to the Oksenberg Conference Room.

 

Thirty-five years after its nationwide implementation, China finally announced the end of the one-child policy in late 2015. How did this change come about? What are the demographic, economic, and social imperatives that have led to this much-delayed policy reversal? What are the historical legacies of this unprecedented birth control policy in human history, and what are the implications of this policy and China’s new demographics for China’s economy in the years to come? This presentation will address these questions and discuss in particular the roles of China’s changed demographics in its economic growth and political governance in the coming decades.

 

Feng WANG is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine and at Fudan University, China, and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. Wang Feng is the author of several books and many articles on contemporary social and demographic changes in China, on comparative historical demography and social organization in Eurasia, and on income and social inequalities in post-socialist China.

 

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Feb 8, 2016 Event Flyer
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Feng Wang UC Irvine
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China’s leaders now acknowledge the reality of much slower growth, and refer to it as the “new normal”.  But what does this mean, and what will be the consequences?  Exports have slowed, but can domestic consumption pick up the slack?  Will this slowdown lead to a rebalancing that will yield a more sustainable and robust growth?  How does the end of the “one child policy” fit into this equation, and will this be sufficient to address the demographic challenges that China faces?  What impact will Xi Jinping’s vigorous anti-corruption campaign have on this “new normal

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Two leading economists on China will launch this year’s China Program Winter Colloquia Series, China's New Normal, by examining the slower growth and its implications.  Barry Naughton proactively asks “why be normal”.  Is slower growth what the economy needs to be stabilized?.  Scott Rozelle asks whether there is a hidden demographic disaster that accentuate existing human capital inequality that derail a soft landing.

 

Barry Naughton is an economist and Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, at the University of California, San Diego.  Naughton has published extensively on the Chinese economy, with a focus on four interrelated areas: market transition; industry and technology; foreign trade; and Chinese political economy. His pioneering study of Chinese economic reform, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) won the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize. Dr. Naughton’s comprehensive survey, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, was published by MIT Press in 2007, and his most recent book (co-edited with Kellee Tsai), State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation and the Chinese Miracle, has just appeared from Cambridge University Press (2015). Naughton also publishes regular quarterly analyses of China’s economic policy-making online at China Leadership Monitor. Dr. Naughton received his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University in 1986, and is a non-resident fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

 

Scott Rozelle is the Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow and the co-director of the Rural Education Action Program in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He received his BS from the University of California, Berkeley, and his MS and PhD from Cornell University. His research focuses almost exclusively on China and is concerned with: agriculture; the emergence and evolution of markets and other economic institutions and their implications for equity and efficiency; and the economics of poverty and inequality, with an emphasis on rural education, health and nutrition. In recognition of his outstanding achievements, Rozelle has received numerous honors and awards, including the Friendship Award in 2008, the highest award given to a non-Chinese by the Premier; and the National Science and Technology Collaboration Award in 2009 for scientific achievement in collaborative research.

 

 

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Barry Naughton UC, San Diego
Scott Rozelle Stanford University
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In the wake of the recent historic meeting of the leaders of China and Taiwan, the Stanford News Service asked two of the university's Asia experts about the aftermath of that meeting and its possible effects on political relations between the two countries, the military situation and Taiwan's Jan. 16 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The first presidential meeting between the leaders of the communist mainland and the democratic island, split by civil war in 1949, was held in early November on neutral territory in Singapore.

Kharis Templeman is the Taiwan Democracy program manager at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He recently wrote about why Taiwan's defense spending has fallen as China's has risen. Thomas Fingar is a distinguished fellow at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He served as the chairman of the National Intelligence Council and in other key positions in Washington. 

Do you anticipate any lasting effects from the face-to-face meeting of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou?

Thomas Fingar: At a minimum, the meeting appears intended by both sides to validate and lock in the much-improved cross-Taiwan Strait relationship that has evolved over the past several years.

Kharis Templeman: I do think the Ma-Xi meeting itself will have one lasting legacy: it has created a precedent for treating the directly elected president of the Republic of China as an equal and as the rightful representative of Taiwanese interests in cross-strait relations. From now on, leaders in Beijing are going to have a hard time arguing that a non-KMT (the Kuomintang, Taiwan's governing party,) president is illegitimate, as they did during the [former Taiwanese president] Chen Shui-Bian era, or to continue to insist on referring to Taiwan’s leaders as provincial-level officials. So, the next president will come into office somewhat strengthened by that precedent.   

Will the meeting have any effect on the January elections in Taiwan?

Templeman: I don’t think it will make much, if any, difference. Taiwanese public opinion is deeply divided about Ma Ying-Jeou’s meeting with Xi. Ma himself remains quite unpopular, the economy is barely growing, and the KMT presidential candidate remains at least 20 points behind in the polls. There’s little indication that this meeting has shaken up what has been a large and steady lead for DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen, and I would be shocked if she didn’t win a comfortable victory in January.

Fingar: Probably not. Beijing seems to have learned that its past attempts to influence elections on Taiwan have been ineffectual or counterproductive, and the meeting is unlikely to change minds or votes on the island. 

How might the elections affect military spending on either sides, or China's aggressive island-building for military bases?

Fingar: The meeting will not have any effect on military spending or the building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, but Beijing may have hoped that agreeing to meet with Ma to demonstrate how "good" the relationship is might persuade Washington not to approve another round of arms sales to Taiwan.  Regardless of who wins the election on Taiwan, the next administration is likely to seek another round of U.S. arms sales in order to prove that it has the support of the United States.

Templeman: The meeting will have no impact on the security balance in the region. Ma reportedly raised the issue of PRC (People's Republic of China) missiles within easy range of Taiwan, but Xi claimed, implausibly, that they were not targeted at Taiwan, and that was the end of it. The broader trends are unchanged: the PRC’s military budget is growing annually by double-digit rates while Taiwan’s remains essentially flat. The consequence is that the PRC’s capacity to take coercive measures against Taiwan continues to expand, even as cross-strait cooperation has been improved and institutionalized.

Dan Stober is at the Stanford News Service.

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Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore on Nov. 7, 2015. | Flickr/Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan)
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The leader of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry B. Harris, Jr., addressed U.S. nautical movements in the South China Sea while also calling for sustained military cooperation between China and the United States in a speech at Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) on Tuesday.

Led by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, a group of Stanford faculty and scholars from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) listened to the speech from Stanford via an interactive, live videoconference at the Graduate School of Business. The speech was followed by a question and answer session, co-facilitated by Stanford professor Jean Oi in Beijing.

The admiral’s visit to SCPKU was part of a larger trip to China, which included discussions between senior Chinese and American military officials.

News media covered Admiral Harris’ remarks delivered at the SCPKU, which co-sponsored the event with Shorenstein APARC's U.S.-Asia Security Initiative. Articles appeared in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal (subscription may be required to view), among other publications.

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A group of faculty and scholars at Stanford participate in a videoconference with the leader of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry B. Harris, Jr., in Beijing on Nov. 3, 2015. | Ryan Blake
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Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States last week for his first state visit. Maintaining a busy schedule, Xi met with President Obama at the White House, technology leaders in Seattle and the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In Washington, Xi and Obama agreed to create a common vision toward a climate agreement at the Paris summit ‘COP21’ later this year and further establish shared norms in the area of cyberspace, according to a report from the White House.

Two Stanford scholars offer their analysis of Xi’s visit in a Q&A. Thomas Fingar discusses outcomes from the Chinese leader’s summit with Obama. Recently returning from Beijing, Karl Eikenberry offers his views on the media and reactions that occurred in China during the week preceding Xi’s visit.


Q&A: Thomas Fingar

Thomas Fingar is a China expert and a distinguished fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and previously served as the director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific in the U.S. Department of State.


Coming out of the meeting, where do China and the United States stand on climate change?

China and the United States have declared a willingness to work together on climate change, further than in the past. At their meeting, Xi and Obama agreed to build upon agreements announced last November that proclaim a common vision for the upcoming Paris meeting on climate change. Taken together, these statements mark a dramatic reversal of the antagonism between China and the United States at the 2009 talks in Copenhagen. It sends a strong signal that China and the United States are prepared to cooperate.

Moreover, other countries should no longer fear that their own efforts will be negated by disagreement between the two largest producers of greenhouse gases. They can no longer excuse their own inaction by claims that any potential international agreement on climate change would be vetoed by either China or the United States. The message is — it’s time to get serious.

Was there any progress on cybersecurity issues?

Obama and Xi committed to mitigate malicious cyber activity from their national territory and to refrain from targeting critical infrastructure in peacetime. The former is more significant than the latter. But of course the proof of significance will be how—and how quickly—it is implemented.

However, what is worth noting is the restraint on cyber targeting of infrastructure declared by the United States and China. The two leaders agreed to bring that arena within the purview of the United Nations. It’s a step toward the establishment of an international control regime for cyberspace. Such a regime is badly needed and would be a concrete example of how the two countries can work bilaterally, and multilaterally, to update the global order and address 21st century challenges.

Would you say Xi's trip was a success?

We won’t know how important any of the agreements from Xi’s visit are until we see how they are implemented. Rather than carp about the failure to adopt detailed and binding commitments, however, we should recognize and applaud the fact that the state of U.S.-China relations is less fraught and more future-focused than pessimists maintain.

This is an excerpt of a larger piece written by Thomas Fingar.


Q&A: Karl Eikenberry

Karl Eikenberry is the director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and a distinguished fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Eikenberry is a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and, among other positions, served as defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.


How do the Chinese view Xi’s visit?

Chinese state media coverage was intense – far greater than had appeared in the United States Every detail of Xi’s itinerary and exhaustive analyses of the issues likely to be discussed between the two presidents dominated the news. Interestingly, the state media reporting tended to emphasize the hosting arrangements, supportive of President Xi’s desire to place China within the Asia-Pacific Region and globally on an equal footing with the United States.

Whereas U.S. Government leaders hope for specific security and economic agreements – so-called “deliverables” – with China during this visit, Xi and his team place more of a premium on being accorded respect. The Chinese media is an arm of the communist party, and reinforces the party’s goals in its reporting of major issues.

How important do Chinese leaders and the people consider the visit?

I was asked during an interview with Chinese television if this visit was as significant as that of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States in 1979. That event had great historical meaning as it signaled Deng’s commitment to “open up” China after decades of relative isolation. President Xi’s visit can’t be compared with Deng’s in a historical sense. And yet, China has come along way since 1979.

When Deng visited the United States, China was a poor country. Now China is approaching middle-income country status and its GDP is the second largest in the world. President Xi was feted in Seattle this week by the captains of America’s IT industry and accompanied by China’s own IT captains. I expect Deng never could have imagined such a development even in his most optimistic moments.

China’s rapid growth over the past 35 years has been enabled by that country’s integration into the global economic and financial markets, and by an extended period of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, in turn, has played a decisive role in ensuring these favorable conditions have existed.

Almost everyone I met during my recent Beijing trip expressed concern that Sino-American relations are becoming more punctuated by disputes, such as over maritime and cyber issues. China’s leaders and its people recognize that their country faces a daunting array of political, economic, and security problems that will be difficult to solve if world trade and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are disrupted, likely developments if the United States and China should ever enter into a period of confrontation. So I think that most Chinese are hoping that President Xi’s visit can help put U.S.-China relations on a more positive trajectory.

How would you critique Chinese media coverage of Xi’s visit?

I would give it mixed reviews. In terms of thoroughness, I give it good marks. Frankly, the average Chinese citizen – at least in urban areas – knows far more about this event than the average American citizen. On the other hand, China state media has a strong tendency to downplay America’s concerns about China’s policies – this is worrisome.

For example, I watched China Central Television (CCTV)’s coverage of National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s Sept. 21 speech on U.S.-China relations. The report showed all of the positive parts of Rice’s speech, but very few of her criticisms. This leads the Chinese people to have unrealistic expectations about Sino-American relations, and worse, to entirely blame the United States when inevitable setbacks occur.

There is also a bit of irony worth mentioning. President Xi agreed to provide answers to questions submitted by The Wall Street Journal. The questions were published in that newspaper on the eve of Xi’s trip. The next morning, I was watching CCTV and listened as a presenter read Xi’s answers verbatim. But I was perplexed, because I thought The Wall Street Journal’s website, like several other western publications, was blocked due to its tendency to occasionally restrict print news that the communist party deems unfit to print. I tried to connect online to The Wall Street Journal and quickly discovered the site was indeed blocked. CCTV, apparently, had not gotten the word.  

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China's President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama arrive for a joint news conference at the White House on Sept. 25, 2015. | Reuters/Gary Cameron
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