International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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U.S. relations with China evolved into outright rivalry during the Trump administration. In this talk, Thomas Wright will look at whether this rivalry will continue and evolve during a Biden administration. To answer this question, he will look at the roots of strategic competition between the two countries and various strands of thinking within the Biden team. The most likely outcome is that the competition will evolve into a clash of governance systems and the emergence of two interdependent blocs where ideological differences become a significant driver of geopolitics. Cooperation is possible but it will be significantly shaped by conditions of rivalry.


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Thomas Wright is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is also a contributing writer for The Atlantic and a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. He is the author of “All Measures Short of War: The Contest For the 21st Century and the Future of American Power” which was published by Yale University Press in May 2017. His second book "Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order" will be published by St Martin's Press in 2021. Wright also works on U.S. foreign policy, great power competition, the European Union, Brexit, and economic interdependence.

Wright has a doctorate from Georgetown University, a Master of Philosophy from Cambridge University, and a bachelor's and master's from University College Dublin. He has also held a pre-doctoral fellowship at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a post-doctoral fellowship at Princeton University. He was previously executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy.

 


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This event is part of the 2021 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, Biden’s America, Xi’s China: What’s Now & What’s Next?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: https://bit.ly/3r1glp7

Thomas Wright Director, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy, Brookings Institution
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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) has broadened its fellowship and funding opportunities to support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia. The Center introduced these expanded offerings in response to the harsh impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on student’s academic careers and their access to future jobs and valuable work experience, and in recognition of the critical need to make the field of Asian Studies more diverse and inclusive.

APARC’s diversity grant aims to encourage Stanford students from underrepresented minorities (URM) to engage in the study and research of topics related to contemporary Asia and U.S.-Asia relations, including economic, health, foreign policy, social, political, and security issues. The grant, which was first announced in June 2020, is now an ongoing offering. APARC will award a maximum of $10,000 per grant. Current  Stanford undergraduate and graduate students in the URM category from any major or discipline are eligible and encourage to apply.

APARC also invites Stanford Ph.D. candidates specializing in topics related to contemporary Asia to apply for its 2021-22 predoctoral fellowship. Up to three fellowships are available and the application deadline is May 1, 2021.

In addition, APARC continues to offer an expanded array of research assistant internships. The Center is currently seeking highly motivated Stanford undergraduate- and graduate-level students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the spring and summer quarters of 2021. Applications for spring 2021 research assistant assignments are due on February 22, for summer 2021 assignments on March 8.

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APARC Experts on the Outlook for U.S.-Asia Policy Under the Biden Administration

Ahead of President-elect Biden’s inauguration and on the heels of the attack on the U.S. Capitol by a pro-Trump mob that has left America shaken, an APARC-wide expert panel provides a region-by-region analysis of what’s next for U.S. policy towards Asia and recommendations for the new administration.
APARC Experts on the Outlook for U.S.-Asia Policy Under the Biden Administration
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New Fellowship on China Policy Seeks to Strengthen U.S.-China Relations

Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center invites applications for the inaugural 2021-22 China Policy Fellowship from experts with research experience on issues vital to the U.S. China policy agenda and influence in the policymaking process.
New Fellowship on China Policy Seeks to Strengthen U.S.-China Relations
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The Center has launched a suite of offerings including a predoctoral fellowship, a diversity grant, and research assistant internships to support Stanford students interested in the area of contemporary Asia.

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Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has been vexed by a simple question: What is it fighting for? As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In this talk, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies Jude Blanchette will discuss the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism.
 

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Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  Previously, he was engagement director at The Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, where he researched China’s political environment with a focus on the workings of the Communist Party of China and its impact on foreign companies and investors.  Prior to working at The Conference Board, Blanchette was the assistant director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego.  Blanchette has written for a range of publications, including Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, and his Chinese translations have appeared in the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. His book, China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong, was published by Oxford University Press in 2019.

 


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This event is part of the 2021 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, Biden’s America, Xi’s China: What’s Now & What’s Next?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: https://bit.ly/35KfpgE

Jude Blanchette Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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As US-China competition intensifies, experts debate the degree to which the current strategic environment resembles that of the Cold War. Those that argue against the analogy often highlight how China is deeply integrated into the US-led world order. They also point out that, while tense, US-China relations have not turned overtly adversarial. But there is another, less optimistic reason the comparison is unhelpful: deterring and defeating Chinese aggression is harder now than it was against the Soviet Union. In this talk, Dr. Mastro analyzes how technology, geography, relative resources and the alliance system complicate U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility of its deterrence posture and, in a crisis, form any sort of coalition.


Photo of Oriana MastroOriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Within FSI, she works primarily in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) as well. She is also a fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and an inaugural Wilson Center China Fellow.

Mastro is an international security expert with a focus on Chinese military and security policy issues, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. Her research addresses critical questions at the intersection of interstate conflict, great power relations, and the challenge of rising powers. She has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security, and is the author of The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime (Cornell University Press, 2019).

She also continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a Strategic Planner at INDOPACOM. Prior to her appointment at Stanford in August 2020, Mastro was an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University.

 


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American and Chinese flags
This event is part of the 2021 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, Biden’s America, Xi’s China: What’s Now & What’s Next?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: bit.ly/2MYJAdw

Oriana Skylar Mastro Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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The United States just experienced a historic election, electing Joseph R. Biden as its 46th president. At the same time, Xi Jinping continues to solidify his control over the Communist Party of China. With escalating tensions between the two countries, many wonder: How will the US presidential election affect the relationship between these two major powers?

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The disruption of the 2020 pandemic, coupled with significant economic tensions between China and the US, have resulted in global companies rethinking their supply chains.  Many have called for drastic changes - reshoring, near-shoring, regionalization of vertical supply chains, increasing redundancies, or diversification of Chinese manufacturing to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa or Latin America, etc.  Empirical data, however, reveal that many are taking a more cautious approach.  Leading companies are continuing to develop innovative ways to redesign their supply chains that still preserve China as their key supply source.  This talk will share some of these innovative ways that, in the end, may provide better long term values.


Portrait of Hau L. LeeHau L. Lee is the Thoma Professor of Operations, Information and Technology at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University.  He was the founding faculty director of the Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies (SEED), and is the current Co-Director of the Stanford Value Chain Innovations Initiative.  Professor Lee’s expertise is on global supply chain management and value chain innovations.  He has published widely in top journals on supply chain management.  He was inducted to the US National Academy of Engineering, and elected a Fellow of MSOM, POMS; and INFORMS.   He was the previous Editor-in-Chief of Management Science.  In 2006-7, he was the President of the Production and Operations Management Society.  His article, “The Triple-A Supply Chain,” was the Second Place Winner of the McKinsey Award for the Best Paper in 2004 in the Harvard Business Review.  In 2004, his co-authored paper in 1997, “Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect,” was voted as one of the ten most influential papers in the history of Management Science.  His co-authored paper, “The Impact of Logistics Performance on Trade,” won the Wickham Skinner Best Paper Award by the Production and Operations Management Society in 2014. In 2003, he received the Harold Lardner Prize for International Distinction in Operations Research, Canadian Operations Research Society.  Professor Lee obtained his B.Soc.Sc. degree in Economics and Statistics from the University of Hong Kong, his M.Sc. degree in Operational Research from the London School of Economics, and his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Operations Research from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  He was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Engineering degree by the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and an Honorary Doctorate from the Erasmus University of Rotterdam.

 


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American and Chinese flags
This event is part of the 2021 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, Biden’s America, Xi’s China: What’s Now & What’s Next?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: https://bit.ly/35bMWQx

Hau L. Lee Thoma Professor of Operations, Information and Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business
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"America is back, ready to lead the world, not retreat from it,” declared President-elect Joe Biden as he unveiled his foreign policy team on November 24. Now, however, with the pillars of America’s international mission — multilateralism, alliances, and democracy – significantly frayed after four years of Trumpism, and amidst pressing global challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic to shifting geopolitics and climate change, the Biden administration faces numerous hard choices. The Asia-Pacific region in particular will remain a source of major challenges as the power competition with China looms large over the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In this online panel discussion, APARC experts will examine the challenges and opportunities for U.S. engagement and leadership in Asia, assess Asian nations’ expectations from the incoming administration, and provide recommendations to achieve American economic and security interests. APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin will moderate the conversation.

Panelists 

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Donald K. Emmerson, Director of APARC’s Southeast Asia Program 

At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

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Thomas Fingar, Center Fellow, APARC 

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI Center Fellow at APARC 

Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Within FSI, she works primarily in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) as well. She is also a fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and an inaugural Wilson Center China Fellow.

 

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Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Director of APARC’s Japan Program 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, the Director of the Japan Program at APARC, a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor of Sociology, all at Stanford University.

 

 

Moderator

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Gi-Wook Shin, Director of APARC and the Korea Program

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea; the founding director of the Korea Program; a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and a professor of sociology, all at Stanford University. As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, and international relations.

Via Zoom Webinar
Register:  https://bit.ly/39MlT1n

 

Donald K. Emmerson Director of APARC's Southeast Asia Program
Thomas Fingar Center Fellow, APARC
Oriana Skylar Mastro FSI Center Fellow at APARC
Gi-Wook Shin Director of APARC and the Korea Program
Kiyoteru Tsutsui Director of APARC's Japan Program
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While much of the world has been occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea. Is it justified to argue that China is taking advantage of the global pandemic to make military gains?

In a new essay published in the Winter 2020 issue of the China Leadership Monitor, FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro sheds light on this question. Leveraging Chinese-language sources in addition to her own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience, Mastro evaluates the PLA activities in the South China Sea over the eight-month period since March 2020. She includes in her analysis PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the region. Her conclusion is that the PLA has not significantly increased its operational role in the South China Sea but rather its signaling role. “Specifically, the Chinese military seems to be purposefully using, and perhaps even exaggerating, its capabilities and activities to enhance deterrence against the United States,” she argues.

Deployments of Weapons Systems and Military Exercises

After compiling a comprehensive picture of Chinese military activities in the South China Sea that includes both deployments of systems to the Paracels and Spratlys Islands and military exercises in the area, Mastro examines what these activities reveal about the PLA’s role in China’s South China Sea strategy.

PLA deployments in the area suggest it is trying to discourage the United States from countering its attempts to increase control over the South China Sea, she says. “China has been linking its deployments to U.S. activities for signaling purposes […] With new basing on the South China Sea islands and longer-range and more capable aircraft, China now has the option to move these platforms as a way to demonstrate to the United States its capability and resolve.” Over the past eight months, China has also conducted more robust military exercises to prepare for South China Sea contingencies. “But military readiness and preparedness are not the only reasons the PLA conducts exercises, notes Mastro. Instead, she argues that the PLA role has evolved beyond the operational to become a leader in a signaling strategy to bolster Chinese deterrence vis-à-vis the United States.

Chinese Discourse  

One of the strongest indicators that the Chinese military is attempting to leverage its role to signal capability to the United States is how the Chinese official media are capturing the ongoing competition. Having reviewed approximately 80 publications on the South China Sea, Mastro finds that the Chinese media are being used to amplify how capable the PLA has become in conducting complex operations in the South China Sea and to highlight that it is blameless for the current tensions in the region.

Mastro concludes that the PLA has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one. It is the need to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis the United States that has become a priority. “The PLA has become the main vehicle through which China is attempting to convince the United States to moderate its own South China Sea approach.” This sensitivity, and in some cases paranoia, about U.S. strategy, she claims, “suggests we are likely to hear tough talk and ostentatious military activity for some months to come.”

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Beijing’s Line on the South China Sea: “Nothing to See Here”

China’s official denials of growing military capability in the region look a lot like gaslighting.
Beijing’s Line on the South China Sea: “Nothing to See Here”
NPR's audio streaming logo next to a portrait of Oriana Skylar Mastro.
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Update on Taiwan and China's Troubled Relationship: Oriana Skylar Mastro on NPR

"The current threat is that the CCP is running out of patience, and their military is becoming more and more capable. So for the first time in its history, there's the option of taking Taiwan by force," Mastro tells NPR's Weekend Edition host Scott Simon.
Update on Taiwan and China's Troubled Relationship: Oriana Skylar Mastro on NPR
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Analysis by FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reveals that the Chinese military has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one.

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During the past eight months of the global COVID pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea.  This essay evaluates PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the South China Sea during this period. I leverage Chinese-language sources in addition to my own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience to provide greater context for these activities. I argue that the greatest change in the PLA’s role in the South China Sea has not been operational. Instead, the most interesting development has been the fact that the PLA has taken on a more significant signaling role. Specifically, the Chinese military seems to be purposefully using, and perhaps even exaggerating, its capabilities and activities to enhance deterrence against the United States. This may be seen as necessary as the US increases its own efforts to push back on China’s militarization of the South China Sea. In other words, the PLA has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one.

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This analysis by Oriana Skylar Mastro originally appeared in The Interpreter, by the Lowy Institute.


China’s strategy in responding to concerns about its intentions in the South China Sea is to claim that none of the activities, statements or behaviours that concern other countries are actually happening.

China claims it has not militarised the South China Sea, but that the United States “is the real pusher of militarisation” in these waters. Its leaders often argue that China is a peace-loving country only interested in defending itself. As the China’s General Wei Fenghe stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, “China has never provoked a war or conflict, nor has it ever invaded another country or taken an inch of land from others. In the future, no matter how strong it becomes, China shall never threaten anyone.”

China has similarly brushed off concerns of other claimants, such as Vietnam, about its intensifying military exercises in the South China Sea and largely ignored Australia’s assertion at the United Nations that China’s claims have no legal backing.

So apparently it is all one big misunderstanding.

On 24 November, former Chinese ambassador Fu Ying criticised the United States in a New York Times op-ed for raising multiple issues that in her mind do not exist. Thus, the way to resolve the growing bilateral tensions is for the two countries “to have candid talks to better understand each other’s intentions and cultivate trust”.

So, in the Chinese communist spirit of 实事求是, or “seeking truth from facts”, I have charted the military capabilities China has deployed to the South China Sea, which are displayed with references on the map below. The Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are under dispute; Hainan Island is a recognised part of China, but I include it because the military capabilities in situ have implications for Chinese military options in the South China Sea writ large.

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NPR's audio streaming logo next to a portrait of Oriana Skylar Mastro.
Commentary

Update on Taiwan and China's Troubled Relationship: Oriana Skylar Mastro on NPR

"The current threat is that the CCP is running out of patience, and their military is becoming more and more capable. So for the first time in its history, there's the option of taking Taiwan by force," Mastro tells NPR's Weekend Edition host Scott Simon.
Update on Taiwan and China's Troubled Relationship: Oriana Skylar Mastro on NPR
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Battleships patrol in the open ocean. | Getty Images
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China’s official denials of growing military capability in the region look a lot like gaslighting.

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