Colonel Patrick Winstead, the 2016-17 FSI senior military fellow at Shorenstein APARC, writes about the second annual orientation at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters

The mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region recently became a bit clearer for 22 faculty and military fellows from Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) organized a group of faculty and fellows for a two-day orientation of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its component military organizations in and around Honolulu, Hawaii, April 13-14, 2017. The purpose of the orientation was to provide researchers with a comprehensive understanding of how America’s armed forces both develop and implement U.S. national security strategy, doctrine and policy throughout Asia.

The trip began with a visit to the headquarters of USPACOM at Camp H.M. Smith. After receiving briefings about USPACOM's mission and operations, the group engaged in roundtable discussions with General Terrence O’Shaughnessy (Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces); Major General Kevin B. Schneider (Chief of Staff, USPACOM); Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (Director for Operations, USPACOM); Major General Steven Rudd (Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, USPACOM); as well as other key joint directors and members of the command staff. The faculty and fellows provided short presentations on the situation in the South China Sea, U.S.-Philippine relations and cyber warfare to an audience of mid-grade military officers and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM.

In addition to meeting with the leadership of USPACOM, the group was also afforded the opportunity to interact with personnel from the four separate component commands. Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, Major General Charlie Flynn, provided a command briefing at the U.S. Army Pacific headquarters at Fort Shafter. The briefing stimulated a wide-ranging discussion about Army initiatives and activities in support of USPACOM’s mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. At Marine Corps Base Hawaii at Kaneohe Bay, under the guidance of trainers, the visitors took part in a hands-on experience operating Humvee simulators in a virtual-reality convoy setting and firing simulated weapons that Marines typically employ in combat operations. The first day of the trip ended with a working dinner at the historic Nimitz House with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Scott Swift, where the conversation ranged from Chinese military modernization to evolving U.S. naval doctrine.

Those themes carried into the second day, when the group met for several hours with faculty at APCSS for plenary presentations and multiple breakout sessions to facilitate in-depth dialogue on select topics including the threats posed by nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia. The day continued with a tour of the U.S.S Hopper, an Arleigh-Burke class guided missile destroyer, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Once onboard, the ship’s captain, Lieutenant Commander J.D. Gainey, provided briefings on Hopper’s mission and operational capabilities. In addition, the group spoke with members of the ship’s crew. The experience allowed the faculty and fellows to interact informally with sailors who serve in the Asia-Pacific theatre and to candidly discuss issues of concern. The second day of the orientation ended with a visit to the headquarters of U.S. Pacific Air Forces and a dialogue with O’Shaughnessy and his staff about the unique security challenges of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, such as tyranny of distance, limited support bases and multiple emerging threats, and how those challenges impact the Air Force and the entire U.S. military’s preparations for contingencies in the region.

Overall, the orientation provided a unique opportunity to engage directly with high-level leaders of USPACOM and to learn first-hand about the challenges faced by those who serve in the armed forces. The orientation also provided a forum to discuss the United States’ national security interests in the region and its efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and to help maintain a rules-based, liberal democratic order.

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Researchers urge Moon Jae-in to form a close working relationship with Donald Trump and to establish a new special envoy role for North Korea policy emulating the “Perry Process”

Researchers from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) said they are optimistic about the election of South Korean president Moon Jae-in who assumed office last week following waves of protest across the country.

Now that the vacancy left in the wake of former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment has been filled, the South Korean government needs to work to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States amid escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, they said.

The Moon administration should immediately engage U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior staff at the White House and government agencies, said Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC.

“Moon would do well to establish a personal relationship with Trump,” said Stephens, who was U.S. ambassador to South Korea from 2008 to 2011. “The new administration must set up a meeting as early as possible and be ready to engage on a range of issues.”

“In a sense, Moon has to play catch-up,” said Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who noted that Trump already held in-person meetings with other Asian heads of state in the United States, including summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Shin added that a coherent U.S. strategy toward Asia and senior staff appointments in the State and Defense Departments would also aid in supporting the foundation upon which the South Korean and American governments work together on policy challenges, especially North Korea.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have become more and more advanced over the past few months, and provocations have continued to ratchet up, including its firing of a ballistic missile that landed in the sea near Russia on Sunday and repeat threats to conduct a sixth nuclear test.

The Moon administration must focus on establishing trust and cooperation with the Trump administration because it is the only pathway to finding a resolution to North Korea’s program, said Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, an additional center in the Freeman Spogli Institute.

“Any solution must be compatible with the interests of Seoul, but it has to be done in concert with Washington to get Pyongyang’s attention,” said Hecker, who served as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and has traveled to North Korea seven times since 2004 to survey its nuclear facilities.

During the campaign, Moon repeatedly spoke of his proposals to reengage the North Korean regime, such as holding talks with its leader Kim Jong-un and re-opening Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint economic zone on the North Korean side of the border.

Stephens and Shin said Moon’s proposals for North Korean engagement would be a step in the right direction if pursued in due time and led under the direction of a special envoy from South Korea emulating the American “Perry Process.”

The Perry Process, proposed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and implemented in the late 1990s under the Clinton administration, entails the appointment of a senior-level, bipartisan representative to pursue a two-track approach of engagement through joint projects and of continued dialogue on denuclearization with North Korea.

Appointing one person in South Korea to lead North Korea policy would help centralize and streamline its organization, which currently requires coordination of activities across dozens of government agencies, the two researchers noted.

“We recognize that establishing such a position and filling the position would be far from easy,” said Shin, co-author of the study Tailored Engagement. “But the magnitude of the nuclear crisis requires restructuring the way in which the South Korean government deals with North Korea, achieving domestic consensus, and shoring up international support for its efforts.”

The United States, China, Japan and Russia are the key international countries concerned with the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, yet South Korea has both an acute need and the potential to assume greater leadership of North Korea policy, said Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar.

China, as North Korea’s largest trade partner, exercises influence over North Korea by maintaining a commercial relationship in the hope of avoiding a collapse of the regime. Yet, its leverage only goes so far, he added.

The Moon administration should consider the limits of Chinese influence before making policy decisions regarding North Korea, Fingar said, for example, whether to freeze or remove the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system, Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), deployed last April in South Korea, which the Chinese government strongly opposed.

“There is little that Beijing can or will do that would persuade Pyongyang to be more receptive to initiatives from Seoul than it would otherwise be,” said Fingar, a China specialist who served as chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. “Seoul should not ‘pay’ much to obtain Chinese assistance because China already supports reengagement and would not do more no matter what Seoul offered as an inducement.”

It is of vital importance the Moon administration seeks to strengthen trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the United States, and to consider holding a summit to address areas of collaboration, all of which would function alongside the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral structure toward creating stability in the region, according to Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC.

“Such cooperation is essential to the security of the region – without it, the United States cannot fulfill its obligation to defend South Korea against the threat posed by North Korea,” said Sneider, who leads the Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project. “Moreover, it’s in the interest of all three countries to tighten such cooperation to balance the rise of China.”

The Moon administration should, above all else, take time to consider its first steps despite pressures to perform early, said Michael Armacost, a fellow at Shorenstein APARC who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government.

“Getting things right is more important than making a quick splash,” said Armacost, a former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs. “I would advise any new president to proceed at a deliberate pace, focusing particularly on the key personal issues first, and consulting widely before enunciating major policy departures.”

Related links:

South Korea's election: Shorenstein APARC scholars offer insight

Yonhap News: 미 한반도 전문가 그룹 "한국형 페리 프로세스 필요" (May 16, 2017)

VOA: 미 전문가들 "한국 정부, 미국과 북 핵 협력 중요...대북특사도 임명해야" (May 17, 2017)

Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, FSI Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker, and CISAC Senior Fellow Scott Sagan are part of a group of 80 national security experts included in a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) focused on the prospects for peace and security in South Asia.

The MOOC, titled Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, is an inaugural course in a series produced by the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. It is free to enroll and can be taken anytime and at any pace from a digital device.

Learn more about the MOOC.

President Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping last week at Mar-a-Lago for their first meeting which set out to address economic, trade and security challenges shared between the two countries. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) experts offered analysis of the summit to various media outlets.

In advance of the summit, Donald K. Emmerson, an FSI senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program, wrote a commentary piece urging the two leaders to prioritize the territorial disputes in the South China Sea in their discussions. He also suggested they consider the idea of additional “cooperative missions” among China, the United States and other countries in that maritime area.

“A consensus to discuss the idea at that summit may be unreachable,” Emmerson recognized in The Diplomat Magazine. “But merely proposing it should trigger some reactions, pro or con. The airing of the idea would at least incentivize attention to the need for joint activities based on international law and discourage complacency in the face of unilateral coercion in violation of international law.”

Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow in Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, spoke to the Boston Herald about U.S. policy toward North Korea and a potential role for China in pressuring North Korea to hold talks about denuclearization. She addressed the purported reports that the National Security Council is considering as options placing nuclear weapons in South Korea and forcibly removing North Korean leader Kim Jong-un from power.

“The two options have been on the long list of possible options for a long time and they have generally been found to have far too many downsides,” Stephens said in the interview.

Writing for Tokyo Business Today, Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, offered an assessment of the summit. He argued that two events - the U.S. airstrike on an airbase in Syria following the regime's chemical weapons attack and the leaked reports about tensions between White House staff - shifted the summit agenda and sidelined, at least for now, talk of a trade war between China and the United States.

“Instead of a bang, the Mar-a-Lago summit ended with a whimper,” Sneider wrote in the analysis piece (available in English and Japanese). “On the economy, the summit conversation was remarkably business-as-usual, with President Trump calling for China to ‘level the playing field’ and a vague commitment to speed up the pace of trade talks. When it came to North Korea…the two leaders reiterated long-standing goals of denuclearization but ‘there was no kind of a package arrangement discussed to resolve this.”

Stanford scholars are encouraging the new administration to consider steps to alleviate the uncertainty and anxiety felt by countries in East Asia about U.S. intentions toward the region.

President Donald Trump’s anti-China rhetoric during his campaign and his recent withdrawal of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership have contributed to the unease in the region, which is drifting in ways that are unfavorable for American interests, they said.

Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) recently published a 27-page report with recommendations on topics of trade and defense that would improve relations between the U.S. and Asian countries. The report, co-authored by eight Stanford scholars, is aimed to help shape U.S. policies in the region.

“The advent of any new administration provides an opportunity to reassess policy approaches,” wrote Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Shorenstein center. “A new mandate exists, and it is our hope that that mandate will be used wisely by the new administration.”

Trade and defense

The biggest trade concern for experts in the region is President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and his intention to focus on bilateral agreements instead of multinational pacts.

The agreement, which bound 12 countries in the region by a set of international trade and investment rules, had problems, Stanford scholars said. For example, some have criticized the treaty for not requiring full compliance with international labor standards for all the participating countries. Also, the rules of origin, which were supposed to give preferential treatment to countries in the TPP, were deemed to be weak by many, allowing goods produced outside the TPP to receive benefits.

But it would not be wise or efficient for the U.S. to start negotiations from scratch in the region because the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, which was touted as a model for the 21st century, already has hurt its credibility with other Asian countries, said Takeo Hoshi, director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Center. In addition, Asian countries view the idea of bilateral agreements as an attempt to force trade deals on them that disproportionately benefit the U.S., he said.

“The TPP was not perfect and many problems remain, but they are not removed by abandoning the TPP,” Hoshi wrote in the report. “Completely abandoning the TPP could hurt not only the U.S. economy but also erode U.S. leadership in Asia.”

Hoshi said the U.S. should rely on aspects of TPP that are consistent with the current U.S. trade policy when creating new bilateral agreements, while maintaining and improving existing free trade agreements with other Asian countries.

Another immediate concern for scholars is the maintenance of security and stability in the region.

“The region is unsettled because of uncertainty about us,” said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC fellow. “The U.S. has long served as the guarantor of prosperity and security in the region but Asians are no longer convinced that we have the will or ability to do so. This has real consequences … It’s not simply because they are already beginning to act as if we intend to play a less active or positive role.”

If China’s national power and economy continue to expand, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain stability in the region if the U.S. does not continue to play a constructive role. Possible dangers include escalation of tensions between China and the U.S. or its allies following accidents or tactical encounters near areas over which China claims sovereignty.

In the report, scholars recommend a comprehensive review of security in the region to make sure military plans are in place that prioritize management of a possible collapse of North Korea or a sudden military strike coming from the country. Other priorities should include peaceful resolution of China-Taiwan differences and ensuring military access in the South China Sea and East China Sea, wrote Karl Eikenberry, director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Shorenstein Center.

“The United States also should engage in a more long-range, exploratory strategic dialogue, first with allies and partners, and then with Beijing, to identify potential areas of mutual interest that can help prevent the unintended escalation of conflicts and reduce already dangerous levels of misperception and mistrust on both sides,” Eikenberry wrote.

China is key

Maintaining a peaceful, productive relationship with China should be of the utmost importance for the U.S., according to the Stanford scholars.

“Managing America’s multifaceted relationship with China is arguably the most consequential foreign policy challenge facing the new administration,” Fingar said.

Although President Trump’s anti-China rhetoric during his campaign made Asian countries anxious about the future, China has been criticized by many American leaders before. Ten previous U.S. presidents were critical of China during their campaigns, but once they assumed office, their tone changed and they adopted a more pragmatic view of U.S. interests in the area, Fingar wrote.

However, while in the past China’s political moves have been predictable for the most part, now that its economy is slowing, the country is increasingly relying on social control and nationalism to reinforce regime legitimacy. This makes China less predictable, according to Fingar.

But the scholars say that there are several opportunities to approach the relationship with China in a way that is beneficial for the U.S. and the rest of the region.

One such opportunity would be for the U.S. to declare its willingness to join China’s newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was formed in early 2016 to support construction projects in the Asia-Pacific region. This would be an “any outcome we win” opportunity that would showcase the U.S. desire to cooperate with China and help establish the region’s confidence in the U.S., Fingar said.

The new administration should also consider pushing for a quick completion of a Bilateral Investment Treaty with China – something that two previous U.S. administrations were not able to achieve. Creating this agreement would help protect things that are important to the U.S. businesses and reassure the willingness of the U.S. to deepen its relationship with China, according to Fingar.

“In my view, how we’re going to establish or reestablish relations with China is key,” Shin said. “Will there be more tension? That’s really important. This affects not only the U.S., but also our allies in the region.”

Alex Shashkevich is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Scholars at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies assess the strategic situation in East Asia to be unsettled, unstable, and drifting in ways unfavorable for American interests. These developments are worrisome to countries in the region, most of which want the United States to reduce uncertainty about American intentions by taking early and effective steps to clarify and solidify U.S. engagement. In the absence of such steps, they will seek to reduce uncertainty and protect their own interests in ways that reduce U.S. influence and ability to shape regional institutions. The recommendations summarized below, and elaborated in a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox,” suggest specific steps to achieve American economic and security interests.

» Key Recommendations

» Full Report with Preface from Director Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost

» About the Contributors

» Information for Press

» Press Coverage

Key Recommendations. 

Trade and Economic Relations

The dynamic economies of East Asian countries are increasingly integrated and interdependent. The United States is an important market and source of investment and technology, but this is no longer sufficient to ensure that future arrangements and rules will protect American interests. The region is moving toward more formal, rule-based arrangements and the United States must be an active shaper of those institutions.

Most in the region want the United States to play a leading role in the establishment and enforcement of free and fair international economic transactions, and want the rules and mechanisms governing trade to be multilateral ones. If we do not play such a role, China, and possibly others, will seek arrangements that disadvantage American firms.

• The replacement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should build on what was achieved in those negotiations, especially those that would assure market access for U.S. firms and protect intellectual property rights, enforce labor standards, and ensure environmental protection. A single multilateral agreement would be best, but much could be achieved through interlocking and consistent bilateral agreements.
• The administration should adopt policy measures to increase employability and create jobs for the Americans who have been disadvantaged by globalization.

Defense and Security

China’s military buildup and North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons have fueled concerns about U.S. will and ability to honor its security commitments in the region. No one wants a regional arms race or tit-for-tat moves that increase the danger of accidental conflict or escalation, but many believe concrete steps are needed to check perceptions that the United States is becoming less willing to maintain the peace and stability that undergirds regional prosperity.

• While reaffirming the need for a forward presence in the region, reconfigure it along the lines of an “active denial” strategy. “Active denial” means maintaining a forward presence in East Asia that is designed to deny an opponent the benefits of military aggression, especially the prospect of a quick victory. The first component of such a strategy is a resilient force posture, which can be achieved by exploiting the size and depth of the region to distribute units in more locations. The second component is an emphasis on planning to conduct military operations against an adversary’s offensive strike or maneuver forces, not targets deep inside an adversary’s homeland territory and not by carrying out preemptive strikes.
• Strengthen U.S. military capabilities by developing and fielding stealthier air and maritime platforms, increase submarine and anti-submarine assets, and provide forward deployed forces with better active defenses, such as rail guns and lasers. At the same time, the United States should assist those neighbors of the PRC who feel threatened by Chinese assertiveness to develop asymmetric coercive capabilities that can put at risk forward-deployed PLA forces. The United States can use elements of such assistance programs as points of negotiating leverage in our attempts to limit militarization on both sides.
• Continue to promote U.S.-China military relations, emphasizing accident avoidance and crisis management, sustained dialogues on national strategies and doctrines, and cooperative endeavors, such as training exercises and combined operations, where and when feasible and mutually beneficial.

China

People in the region worry about China’s actions and intentions but they worry more about the prospect of confrontation and conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic. They look to the United States as a counterbalance to China but fear that Washington will overreact or underreact to actions by Beijing, or take provocative actions that jeopardize their own interests. The U.S. should:

• Respond to Chinese actions inimical to American interests in ways that protect our interests, achieve U.S. goals shared by others in the region, and avoid both the reality and the appearance of being “anti-China.”
• Reaffirm American commitments to allies and partners including China and Taiwan.
• Tighten enforcement of import restrictions on products produced by firms that have stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea is threatening an ICBM test in 2017, possibly in the next few weeks or months. There is a political vacuum in South Korea, and Seoul is being pressured and punished by Beijing to reverse its decision to accept the deployment of a U.S. THAAD missile defense in South Korea. Under these circumstances, these are our priority recommendations for the administration

• It should work to dissuade North Korea from an ICBM test. Publicly, the new administration should reaffirm that the U.S. would use military means against an ICBM that appeared to threaten the U.S. or one of our allies. Regular spring ROK-U.S. joint military exercises should be held, but calibrated and conducted to avoid giving Pyongyang extra pretext for a test. The Trump administration should appoint a senior envoy empowered to go to Pyongyang to convey openness to renewed diplomacy, while at the same time being clear about the consequences of an ICBM test. China will share this goal, and the new Trump administration should establish a dialogue with China on North Korea based on this shared interest rather than linked to other issues in the U.S.-China relationship, such as bilateral trade. The Trump administration should not negotiate the THAAD issue with Beijing but rather stick to the principle that this is a Seoul-Washington issue.
• The U.S.-ROK relationship will need early and special attention in 2017. Secretary of Defense Mattis’ early visit to the ROK was a wise move. With names already announced for Beijing and Tokyo, a new American ambassador for Seoul should be nominated soon. Despite the political leadership vacuum in Seoul, the Trump administration should strive for the closest possible diplomatic, political, and military coordination on North Korea with our South Korean allies. Trade and burden-sharing issues should not be front-burner issues during South Korea’s political transition. U.S. neutrality in the South Korean election, along with demonstrated respect for South Korea’s democracy, will be carefully monitored, and is essential, as is strengthening U.S. contacts and outreach across the political spectrum in South Korea.

Japan

The Abe administration is the most stable government Japan has had for many years. The prime minister wants to work with Washington, is prepared to deepen defense cooperation with the United States and others in the region, and is eager to lock in the commitments and arrangements negotiated in the TPP. There is a real opportunity to secure access for U.S. firms greater than achieved by any previous administration.

• Build upon arrangements negotiated in TPP to secure a U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement (FTA) that increases access for U.S. firms and locks in economic reforms initiated by the Abe government.
• Propose annual head of state level trilateral cooperation summits with Japan and South Korea and seek greater trilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of security cooperation. Caution Tokyo against steps backward on historical reconciliation.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Southeast Asia is most vulnerable to and concerned about China’s actions and intentions. Countries in the region want the United States to counterbalance and constrain China but worry equally that the United States is unreliable and unequal to the challenge of protecting their interests while preserving American interests vis-à-vis China. Unless given a better option, they will lean toward China for economic and security reasons.

• The United States should anchor U.S. policy on the South China Sea (SCS) to an explicit commitment that no single country—not the US, not China, nor anyone else—should seek or enjoy a monopoly of ownership and control over that body of water. To underscore that commitment, the United States should execute freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in waters between and around the Spratly islands. These and other operations in the SCS should be conducted in conformity with the authoritative ruling on the status of its waters and land features issued in 2016 by the arbitral court convened for that purpose under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• The United States should also try, in concert with its allies and partners, to bring the SCS under international protection and management by a combination of claimant and user states, including the United States and China, based on international law. The Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative should be enlarged and upgraded to serve this purpose. If China declines to join, a chair at the table should remain empty should Beijing change its mind.

The U.S. should remain engaged with the process of regional and trans-Pacific institution building, including but not limited to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) annual meetings, the East Asian Summit, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will be hosted by Vietnam in 2017.

Full Report with Preface from Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost.

The policy recommendations published above are a summary included in the beginning of a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” You may view the full report here.

About the Contributors

Michael H. Armacost is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Karl Eikenberry is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Army.

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at FSI; director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC; and affiliated with FSI’s Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and has served as former first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council, among other positions.

Takeo Hoshi is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies and director of the Japan Program.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; director of the Korea Program; and the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, all at Stanford.

Daniel C. Sneider is the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, co-director of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project and a former foreign correspondent.

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Fellow in the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

Information for Press.

The contributors are open to comment, interview and provide background information on the contents of the report, “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” To inquire about availability, please contact Lisa Griswold, Shorenstein APARC Communications and Outreach Coordinator, at lisagris@stanford.edu or (650) 736-0656.

Related Press Coverage

Stanford report offers policy insights for the Trump administration, Caixin Media (in Chinese), Feb. 13, 2017

"Trump, do not bring up KORUS FTA and US forces cost-sharing until S. Korea's next presidential election," Yonhap News and various other outlets (in Korean), Feb. 13, 2017

China looks to US to resolve N. Korea nuclear issue, The Straits Times (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Stanford experts offer policy proposals, insights on US-Asia relations, Stanford News Service (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Unsettled, unstable and drifting: Today's US-East Asia relationship, Medium (in English), Feb. 16, 2017

Why Japan will also be "convenient" for the Trump administration, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 18, 2017

Study: Managing China relationship most consequential to US, China Daily USA (in English), Feb. 21, 2017

How the Trump administration should address China, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 23, 2017

Fears of Trump giving China free reign in Asia misplaced, Asia Times (in English), Feb. 24, 2017

Seventeen faculty members and researchers from Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies were hosted at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Headquarters in Hawaii for an intensive orientation on Feb. 4-5. The visit aimed to advance collaboration and to offer a deeper understanding of USPACOM’s operations to Stanford scholars who study international security and Asia.

Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander of USPACOM, together with his commanders and staff, welcomed the delegation. Harris’s meeting with Stanford faculty is the second in recent months. The USPACOM visit and earlier speech at Stanford Center at Peking University are part of a series of activities driven by the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative. Led by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, the Initiative seeks to provide constructive interaction between academic and governmental experts on the many and diverse security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region.

“Engaging deeply in conversations with those who are on the frontlines is incredibly valuable,” said trip participant Coit Blacker, FSI senior fellow and professor of international studies. “This is especially true for academics who focus much of their attention thinking about the prospects for international peace and security but not necessarily considering their direct application on a military-level.”

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Top: (Left) The Stanford delegation watches a demonstration of a 2-minute drill. / (Right) Karen Eggleston boards a UH-60 Blackhawk helpcopter enroute to the Lightning Academy with her colleagues. Bottom: The delegation takes a group photo on-site.

On the first day, FSI scholars spoke with military officers about the command’s strategies and challenges it faces, such as population aging and sovereignty disputes over the South China Sea. Discussions were followed with a tour of USS Michael Murphy, a guided missile destroyer which routinely conducts operations in the Western Pacific including the South China Sea.

Karen Eggleston, FSI senior fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program, was one of the discussants on the USPACOM trip. Her research focuses on health policy in Asia, specifically the effects of demographic change and urbanization.

“As a health economist, the visit yielded for me a behind-the-scenes sense of how members of the military respond to pandemics and humanitarian situations, and of the ongoing dialogue with their counterparts in Asian nations,” Eggleston said. “I think that kind of military-to-military engagement provides an area rich with questions and best practices that could in some ways be shared as a model among other nations.”

Other activities on the first day included a briefing by the U.S. Pacific Fleet command, informal presentations and dialogue between the Stanford participants and the USPACOM staff, and working with senior leaders of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces command.

On the second day, the group visited the U.S. Army’s installation at Schofield Barracks. There, they observed a command post simulation and field exercise including units of the 25^th Infantry Division. Graduates from the U.S. Army’s jungle survival training school also shared their impressions of applying lessons in the field. Researchers from the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS) joined the Stanford delegation later in the day. Both sides discussed research outcomes and avenues for future exchanges. The day concluded with an extensive tour of USS Mississippi, a Virginia-class attack submarine. FSI has long engaged military officers through a senior military fellows program. Started in 2009 by the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the program remains active today with five fellows conducting research at Stanford.

Lt. Col. Jose Sumangil, a 2015-16 U.S. Air Force Senior Military Fellow, participated in the Stanford delegation at USPACOM.

“The trip was an excellent opportunity to showcase how the U.S. ‘rebalance to Asia’ strategy is implemented on a day-to-day basis – for example, providing a look into the decision-making process that could occur should a situation arise in the South China Sea,” Sumangil said. “It’s incredibly important to build this kind of understanding among experts studying Asia, and I think we helped do that here.”

USPACOM is one of the largest U.S. military commands with four major service components (U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Marine Forces); it is tasked with protecting U.S. people and interests, and enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.