Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance
Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance
Thursday, February 6, 202012:00 PM - 1:15 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
In 2015, Beijing issued a set of Guiding Opinions as part of a program to reform China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The new policy requires SOEs to amend their corporate charters to formalize and elevate the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party in their corporate governance. To better grasp the contours of political conformity in Chinese corporate governance, Curtis Milhaupt will empirically examine the patterns of “party-building” (dangjian) charter amendments adopted in response to this policy by all listed nonfinancial Chinese firms in the four-year period from 2015-2018. He will also analyze the wide, substantive variation in the adoption of this dangjian policy within and across firm types, including privately-owned enterprises.