In late 2006, the Chinese government appointed a high-level inter-ministerial commission—composed of fourteen government agencies, co-chaired by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Health—to develop a blueprint for China’s healthcare system. One party to that process, China’s Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), has developed a program of cooperation with its U.S. counterpart, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). To provide input to policymaking, representatives of CIRC, NAIC, private insurers in China and the United States, as well as Chinese and American scholars of health insurance gathered in Yichang, Hubei, PRC, on 18-19 June 2007, for a joint seminar on the role of commercial health insurance in the Chinese and U.S. healthcare systems.

The first section of this field report provides a brief description of China’s health care reforms in the past decades. The second section highlights the progress and challenges to date in developing commercial health insurance in China, and the final section summarizes the recommendations that the NAIC Commissioners provided to CIRC in 2007 at this critical juncture in China’s health policy reforms.

This systematic review examines what factors explain the diversity of findings regarding hospital ownership and quality. We identified 31 observational studies written in English since 1990 that used multivariate analysis to examine quality of care at nonfederal general acute, short-stay US hospitals. We find that pooled estimates of ownership effects are sensitive to the subset of studies included and the extent of overlap among hospitals analyzed in the underlying studies. Ownership does appear to be systematically related to differences in quality among hospitals in several contexts. Whether studies find for-profit and government-controlled hospitals to have higher mortality rates or rates of adverse events than their nonprofit counterparts depends on data sources, time period, and region covered. Policymakers should be aware of the underlying reasons for conflicting evidence in this literature, and the strengths and weaknesses of meta-analytic synthesis. The "true" effect of ownership appears to depend on institutional context, including differences across regions, markets, and over time.

This issue of Value in Health presents selected articles from the ISPOR Second Asia Pacific Conference held in Shanghai, March 2006. Under the leadership of ISPOR and the ISPOR Asian Consortium, the ISPOR AsiaPacific Conference is held every two years in Asia with a twofold mission: to help develop knowledge and capacity for health economics and outcomes research (HE/OR) in Asia; and to promote the use of HE/OR in policymaking processes in Asia, with the goal of improving efficiency in the allocation of resources. With "Improving Evidence and Outcomes in Health Care Decision-Making" as the theme, the Second ISPOR Asia-Pacific Conference was well received, achieving an unprecedented level of participation from the Asian communities. All articles included in this issue underwent the usual anonymous process of peer review.

Countries worldwide confront the challenge of defining and achieving appropriate roles for government and market forces in the health sector. China—as both a developing and a transitional economy—represents an important case. This paper uses an international comparative perspective to examine how the health of China’s population and other aspects of health system performance changed during the reform era. We draw on standard public finance and health economics theory, as well as the more recent incomplete-contracting theory of property rights, to summarize the comparative advantages of government and market for financing and delivery of health services, particularly in developing and transitional economies. We then describe and analyze against this theoretical background the transformation of China’s health sector and recent commitment of government funds to move toward universal coverage.

The economic approach of comparative and historical institutional analysis (Aoki 2001, Greif 2006) has virtually never been used in theoretical studies of healthcare incentives. This paper seeks to help fill this gap by exploring the explanatory power of such an approach for understanding incentives in China’s healthcare delivery system. It focuses on positive analysis of why China’s health system incentives evolved the way they did. The first section analyzes the institution of physician dispensing (MDD) and reforms toward separation of prescribing from dispensing (SPD), in historical and comparative perspective. It shows, for example, how MDD was a self-reinforcing institution; the longer a society remains under MDD, the higher the associated costs of supplier-induced demand can be before implementing SPD becomes the efficient self-enforcing social institution. Rapid technological change and adoption of universal coverage are likely to trigger SPD reforms. The second section seeks to explain the pattern and impact of price regulation and hospital payment reforms in contemporary China, which also reflect the legacy of MDD.